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SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

II

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

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IN THREE VOLUMES

II

AGAINST THE LOGICIAN



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PREFATORY NOTE

THE two books "Against the Logicians" contained in this volume form the first division of Sextus's treatise "Against the Dogmatists"; hence they are commonly cited as *Adversus Dogmaticos* i. ii.

For the constitution of the text we still have the manuscripts L and E (see Vol. I. Introd. p. xliii), but neither M nor the Latin Translation (T) is any longer available. Instead, we have a new and important manuscript, designated N by the Teubner editor (after A. Nebe, the scholar who first investigated it), of which the central part, which contains the books *Adv. Log.*, is attributed to the thirteenth century. Among the modern scholars and critics who have contributed corrections of the text, quoted by the Teubner editor, are L. Kayser, R. Hirzel, V. Heintz, A. Kochalsky, A. Rüstow.

Here, as in Vol. I., the text is based on that of Bekker; and here, again, the chapter-headings, omitted by Bekker, are restored.

ERRATUM IN VOLUME I

P. 395 l. 18 (= *Pyrrh. Hyp.* iii. 99 *ad fin.*)

for "opinion . . . opined" read "raftering . . . raftered"

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AGAINST THE LOGICIANS

ΠΡΟΣ ΛΟΓΙΚΟΥΣ

A

- 1 Ὁ μὲν καθόλου τῆς σκεπτικῆς δυνάμεως χαρακτηρ μετὰ τῆς προσηκούσης ἐξεργασίας ὑποδέδεικται, τὰ μὲν προηγουμένως τὰ δὲ καὶ κατὰ διορισμὸν τῶν παρακειμένων φιλοσοφιῶν ἐκτυπωθεῖς· ἀπολείπεται δὲ ἐξῆς καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ χρήσιν διδάσκειν εἰς τὸ μήτε ἰδίᾳ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων σκεπτομένους μήτε τοῖς δογματικοῖς
2 ἀνταίροντας ῥαδίως προπίπτειν. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ποικίλον τι χρήμα φιλοσοφία, δεήσει πρὸς τὸ κατὰ τάξιν καὶ ὁδῷ ζητεῖν ἕκαστον ὀλίγα περὶ τῶν ταύτης μερῶν διαλαβεῖν.

Αὐτίκα γὰρ οἱ μὲν μονομερῇ δοκοῦσιν αὐτὴν ὑποτεθεῖσθαι οἱ δὲ διμερῇ τινὲς δὲ τριμερῇ, καὶ τῶν ἐν μέρος ὑποσσησαμένων οἱ μὲν τὸ φυσικὸν οἱ δὲ τὸ ἠθικὸν ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ὑπεστήσαντο,
3 καὶ ὡσαύτως τῶν κατὰ δυνάδα διαιρούντων οἱ μὲν εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν διεῖλον, οἱ δὲ εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν, οἱ δὲ εἰς τὸ λογικὸν καὶ
4 ἠθικόν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰς τρία διαιροῦντες συμφώνως

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BOOK I

THE general character of Scepticism has now been¹ set forth by the appropriate method of description, as an Outline of it has been given partly by means of direct exposition and partly by distinguishing it from the philosophies which stand next to it.² It remains for us, in the next place, to explain how we apply it to the particular divisions of philosophy, so that we may be less prone to rashness either in our own sceptical investigations of things or in our contradictions of the Dogmatists. Since, however,² Philosophy is a complex affair, for the sake of an orderly and methodical inquiry into all its parts, we must first discuss briefly the question what its parts are.

Some, then, hold that it has but one part, others that it has two, and others that it has three parts; and of those who have supposed it to consist of one part, some have supposed this to be physics, others ethics, others logic; and so likewise of those who divide it³ into two, some have made the divisions physics and logic, others physics and ethics, others logic and ethics; while those who divide it into three parts are⁴

* The reference is to the "Outlines (*Hypotyposes*) of Pyrrhonism" contained in Vol. I. of this Translation.

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εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ λογικὸν καὶ ἠθικὸν διηγήκασιν.
 5 φυσικὸν μὲν οὖν μόνον ὑπεστήσαντο μέρος Θαλῆς
 τε καὶ Ἀναξίμενης καὶ Ἀναξίμανδρος Ἐμπεδοκλῆς
 τε καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Ἡράκλειτος, ὧν Θαλῆς
 μὲν καὶ Ἀναξίμενης καὶ Ἀναξίμανδρος κατὰ
 πάντας καὶ ἀναμφιλέκτως, ὁ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ
 Παρμενίδης ἔτι δὲ Ἡράκλειτος οὐ κατὰ πάντας.
 6 Ἐμπεδοκλέα μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ πρῶτον
 ῥητορικὴν κεκνηκέναι, ἧς ἀντίστροφον εἶναι τὴν
 διαλεκτικὴν, τουτέστιν ἰσόστροφον, διὰ τὸ περὶ
 τὴν αὐτὴν ὕλην στρέφεσθαι, ὡς καὶ ἀντίθεον ὁ
 7 ποιητὴς ἔφη τὸν Ὀδυσσεά, ὅπερ ἦν ἰσόθεον. Παρ-
 μενίδης δὲ οὐκ ἂν δόξαι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἀπείρων
 ἔχειν, ἐπεὶ περ πάλιν Ἀριστοτέλης τὸν γνῶριμον
 αὐτοῦ Ζήνωνα διαλεκτικῆς ἀρχηγὸν ὑπέληφεν.
 ἐζητεῖτο δὲ καὶ περὶ Ἡρακλείτου, εἰ μὴ μόνον
 8 φυσικός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἠθικός φιλόσοφος. πλὴν
 οἱ μὲν τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέρους προστάντες εἰσὶν οἷδε,
 τοῦ δὲ ἠθικοῦ μόνου ἐπεμελεῖτο Σωκράτης κατὰ
 γε τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτοῦ γνωρίμους, εἶγε καὶ ὁ
 Ξενοφῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀπομνημονεύμασι ῥητῶς φησὶν
 ἀπαρνείσθαι αὐτὸν τὸ φυσικὸν ὡς ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς καθ-
 εστηκός καὶ μόνον σχολάζειν τῷ ἠθικῷ ὡς πρὸς
 ἡμᾶς ὄντι. τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν οἶδε καὶ ὁ Τίμων, ἐν
 οἷς φησὶν

ἐκ δ' ἄρα τῶν ἀπέκλινε λαοξόος ἐννομολῆσχος,
 τουτέστιν ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν

* For this classification cf. *P. II.* ii. 12 ff.

^b For these names see Vol. I. *Introd.*

^c Cf. *Diog. Laert.* viii. 57.

^d i.e. all except Plato (cf. § 9).

all agreed on the division into physics, logic, and ethics.^a It has been supposed to consist of physics, 5 as its sole part, by Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander, Empedocles, Parmenides, Heracleitus^b: and of these, as regards Thales, Anaximenes, and Anaximander, all agree and there is no dispute, but all do not agree about Empedocles and Parmenides, nor yet Heracleitus. Thus Aristotle says^c that "Em- 6 pedocles first cultivated the art of rhetoric, to which dialectic is *antistrophic* (or corresponding)," that is to say is *isostrophic* (or equivalent), inasmuch as it is *strophic* of (concerned with) the same subject matter—just as the Poet called Odysseus *antitheos* (god-like), which means *isotheos* (god-equal). And it would seem 7 that Parmenides was not unversed in dialectic since Aristotle, again, regarded his friend Zeno as "the pioneer of dialectic." About Heracleitus, too, it was a question whether he was not merely a physicist but an ethical philosopher as well. But in any case 8 these are the leading exponents of the Physical division. The Ethical division alone was that which engaged Socrates, at least according to the rest of his friends^d; for Xenophon in his *Memorabilia*^e says expressly that "he rejected physics as a subject above our human powers and devoted himself solely to Ethics as the subject which concerns us men." Timon also knows that this was his practice, for in one place he says—

But by the Stone-cutter,^f prater of laws, such things were abjured.

That is to say, Socrates turned aside from physics to

^a Xen. *Mem.* i. 1, 11 ff.

^f Socrates is said to have been, in his youth, a stone-cutter or quarry-man, like his father.

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- θεωρίαν· διὸ καὶ ἐννομολέσχης προσέθηκεν, ἅτε τοῦ ἠθικοῦ μέρους ὄντος τοῦ περὶ νόμων διαλέγε-
 9 σθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων παντὸς μέρους φιλοσοφίας αὐτῷ μεταδίδωσιν, τοῦ μὲν λογικοῦ παρόσον περὶ ὄρων καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ ἐτυμολογίας παρεισῆγκται ζητῶν, ἅπερ ἐστὶ λογικά, τοῦ δὲ ἠθικοῦ ὅτι περὶ
 10 ἀρετῆς καὶ πολιτείας καὶ νόμων διασκέπτεται, τοῦ δὲ φυσικοῦ ὅτι καὶ περὶ κόσμου τι καὶ περὶ ζωογονίας καὶ ψυχῆς πεφιλοσόφηκεν. ἔνθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων αἰτιάται τὸν Πλάτωνα ἐπὶ τῷ οὕτω καλλωπίζειν τὸν Σωκράτην πολλοῖς μαθήμασιν· ἥ γὰρ φησι τὸν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα μεῖναι ἡθολόγον.
- 11 Δοκοῦσι δὲ κατὰ τινας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης μόνον ἀσπάζεσθαι τὸ ἠθικὸν μέρος, παραπέμπειν δὲ τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ὥς μηδέν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν συνεργοῦντα. καίτοι περιτρέπεισθαι τούτους ἐνιοὶ νενομίκασιν ἐξ ὧν τὸ ἠθικὸν διαιροῦσιν εἰς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν αἰρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν τόπον καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν παθῶν καὶ ἔτι εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ ἤδη τὸν περὶ τῶν αἰτίων καὶ τελευταῖον εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν πίστεων· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὁ περὶ αἰτίων τόπος, φασίν, ἐκ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέρους ἐτύγχανεν, ὁ δὲ περὶ πίστεων ἐκ
 12 τοῦ λογικοῦ. καὶ Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χίος οὐ μόνον, ὥς φασί, παρητεῖτο τὴν τε φυσικὴν καὶ λογικὴν θεωρίαν, διὰ τὸ ἀνωφελές καὶ πρὸς κακοῦ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπους τινὰς συμπεριέγραφεν, καθάπερ τὸν τε παραινε-
 τικὸν καὶ τὸν ὑποθετικὸν τόπον· τούτους γὰρ εἰς τίτθας καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς πίπτειν, ἀρκεῖν δὲ πρὸς

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the study of Ethics; and on this account Timon gave him the name of "prater of laws," as the discussion of laws is a branch of Ethics. Plato, however, ascribes to him every division of philosophy,—Logic, in so far as he is introduced as an investigator of definitions and divisions and etymology, which are logical themes,—Ethics, because he discusses virtue and government and laws,—Physics, since he is made to philosophize about the Universe and animal creation and the Soul. Hence, too, Timon censures Plato for thus decking out Socrates with a host of sciences: for Plato, he says, "suffered him not to remain a simple teacher of Ethics."

The Cyrenaics,^a too, are thought by some to embrace the Ethical division only, and to dismiss Physics and Logic as contributing nothing to the happiness of life. Some, however, have supposed that this view is refuted by the fact that they divide Ethics into sections—one dealing with objects of choice and aversion, another treating of the affections, yet another treating of actions, then a further section concerned with causes, and finally one dealing with arguments; for of these, the section treating of causes, they say, belongs to the Physical division of Philosophy, and that treating of arguments to the Logical. Ariston of Chios,^b also, not only, they say, rejected the study of Physics and Logic on the ground that they are unprofitable and injurious to the philosophers who study them, but also proscribed some branches of Ethics, such as the hortatory and admonitory; for these, he held, are the business of nurses and pedagogues, whereas for securing happi-

^a Cf. § 191 *infra*; Vol. I. Introd. p. xvii.

^b A disciple of Zeno, the Stoic.

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- τὸ μακαρίως βιώναι τὸν οἰκειοῦντα μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν λόγον, ἀπαλλοτριοῦντα δὲ κακίας, κατατρέχοντα δὲ τῶν μεταξὺ τούτων, περὶ ᾧ οἱ πολλοὶ
- 13 πτοηθέντες κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. περὶ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν κατηνέχθησαν μέρος οἱ περὶ Πανθοίδην καὶ Ἀλεξίνον καὶ Εὐβουλίδην καὶ Βρύσωνα Διονυσόδωρόν τε καὶ Εὐθύδημον [Θούριοι, ὧν μέμνηται καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ].
- 14 Τῶν δὲ διμερῇ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὑποστησαμένων Ξενοφάνης μὲν ὁ Κολοφώνιος τὸ φυσικὸν ἅμα καὶ λογικόν, ὥς φασί τινες, μετήρχετο, Ἀρχέλαος δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν· μεθ' οὗ τινες καὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον τάττουσιν ὥς καὶ τὴν λογικὴν
- 15 θεωρίαν ἐκβάλλοντα. ἄλλοι δὲ ᾔσαν οἱ φασὶ μὴ κοινῶς αὐτὸν τὴν λογικὴν παρητήσθαι, μόνην δὲ τὴν τῶν στωικῶν, ὥστε δυνάμει τριμερῇ πάλιν ἀπολείπειν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. ἀναφέρεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινων δόξα, καθὼ καὶ ὁ Σωτίων μεμαρτύρηκεν, εἰς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης ὥς λέγοντας ἠθικόν τι καὶ λογικὸν φιλοσοφίας εἶναι μέρος.
- 16 Πλὴν οὗτοι μὲν ἐλλιπῶς ἀνεστράφθαι δοκοῦσιν, ἐντελέστερον δὲ παρὰ τούτους οἱ εἰπόντες τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι φυσικόν τὸ δὲ ἠθικόν τὸ δὲ λογικόν· ὧν δυνάμει μὲν Πλάτων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός, περὶ πολλῶν μὲν φυσικῶν [περὶ] πολλῶν δὲ ἠθικῶν οὐκ ὀλίγων δὲ λογικῶν διαλεχθεῖς· ῥητότατα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενοκράτην καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔχονται
- 17 τῆσδε τῆς διαιρέσεως. ἐνθένδε πιθανῶς¹ ὁμοιοῦσι

¹ πιθανῶς c¹. Bekk.: ἀπιθάνως MSS.

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ness in life that doctrine is sufficient which attracts men to virtue and alienates them from vice and runs down those intermediate things which excite the admiration of most men and ruin their lives. Logic, on the other hand, was the sole division which ¹³ was cultivated by Panthoides and Alexinus, and Eubuldes and Bryson, and Dionysodorus and Euthydemus.^a

Of those who supposed Philosophy to consist of ¹⁴ two parts, Xenophanes of Colophon, as some say, pursued both Physics and Logic, but Archelaos of Athens Physics and Ethics; and some set Epicurus beside Archelaos as equally rejecting the study of Logic. But there have been others who say that ¹⁵ he did not set aside logic as a whole but merely that of the Stoics, so that he virtually allowed after all the three divisions of Philosophy. Some too—as Sotion ^b has testified—ascribe to the Cyrenaics the expression of the opinion that both Ethics and Logic are parts of Philosophy.

These thinkers, however, seem to have handled ¹⁶ the question incompletely, and, in comparison with them, the view of those who divide Philosophy into Physics, Ethics, and Logic is more satisfactory. Of these Plato is, virtually, the pioneer, as he discussed many problems of physics and of ethics, and not a few of logic; but those who most expressly adopt this division are Xenocrates ^c and the Peripatetics, and also the Stoics. Hence they plausibly liken philo- ¹⁷

^a Dionysodorus and his brother Euthydemus were fifth-century Sophists; Bryson and Eubulides, Logicians of the fourth century; Alexinus and Panthoides, Logicians or Eristics of the third century.

^b Sotion of Alexandria, a historian of philosophy (*circa* 220 B.C.). ^c A disciple of Plato, see Vol. I. Introd. p. xix.

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- τὴν φιλοσοφίαν παγκάρπῳ ἀλωῇ, ἵνα τῇ μὲν
 ὑψηλότητι τῶν φυτῶν εἰκάζεται τὸ φυσικόν, τῷ
 δὲ νοστήμῳ τῶν καρπῶν τὸ ἠθικόν, τῇ δὲ ὀχυρό-
 18 τητι τῶν τειχῶν τὸ λογικόν. οἱ δὲ ὥῳ φασὶν
 αὐτὴν εἶναι παραπλήσιον· ἐώκει γὰρ τῇ μὲν λεκίθῳ,
 ἣν τινες νεοττὸν ὑπάρχειν λέγουσι, τὰ ἠθικά, τῷ
 δὲ λευκῷ, ὃ δὴ τροφή ἐστὶ τῆς λεκίθου, τὰ φυσικά,
 19 τῷ δὲ ἔξωθεν ὀστρακῶδει τὰ λογικά. ὁ δὲ Ποσει-
 δώνιος, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν μέρη τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀχώριστά
 ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ φυτὰ τῶν καρπῶν ἕτερα
 θεωρεῖται καὶ τὰ τεῖχη τῶν φυτῶν κεχώρισται,
 ζῶν μᾶλλον εἰκάζειν ἡξίου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, αἵματι
 μὲν καὶ σαρκὶ τὸ φυσικόν, ὀστέοις δὲ καὶ νεύροις
 τὸ λογικόν, ψυχῇ δὲ τὸ ἠθικόν.
 20 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ τριμεροῦς οὕσης τῆς φιλοσοφίας οἱ
 μὲν πρῶτον μέρος τάττουσι τὸ φυσικόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
 χρόνῳ μὲν πρεσβυτάτη ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τὴν φυσικὴν
 πραγματεία ὥς καὶ μέχρι νῦν τοὺς πρῶτους
 φιλοσοφῆσαντας φυσικοὺς καλεῖσθαι, τάξει δέ, ὅτι
 πρῶτον ἀρμόττει περὶ τῶν ὄλων διαλαβεῖν καὶ
 τότε περὶ τῶν ἐπ' εἶδους καὶ τάνθρώπου σκέ-
 21 πτεσθαι. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἠθικῶν κατήρξαντο ὥς
 ἀναγκαιοτέρων καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπισπώντων,¹
 καθὼ καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παρήγγελλε μηδὲν ἄλλο
 ζητεῖν εἰ μὴ

ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ' ἀγαθόν τε
 τέτυκται.

- 22 οἱ δὲ Ἐπικούρειοι ἀπὸ τῶν λογικῶν εἰσβάλλουσιν·
 τὰ γὰρ κανονικὰ πρῶτον ἐπιθεωροῦσιν, περὶ τε

¹ ἐπισπώντων Kayser: ἐπειγόντων Bekk.: ἐπιστώντων E:
 ἐπιστόνων L.

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sophy to a garden rich in fruits, comparing Physics to the height of the plants, Ethics to the richness of the fruits, Logic to the strength of the walls. And 18 others say that Philosophy resembles an egg, Ethics being like the yolk, which some identify with the chick, Physics like the white, which is nutriment for the yolk, and Logic like the outside shell. But 19 on the ground that the parts of Philosophy are inseparable one from another, whereas plants appear different from fruits and walls separated from plants, Poseidonius ^a preferred the comparison of Philosophy with an animal—Physics with the blood and flesh, Logic with the bones and sinews, Ethics with the soul.

Regarding Philosophy, then, as tripartite, some 20 put Physics as its first division since it holds first place both in point of time—seeing that even up till now the earliest philosophers have been called “physicists”—and also in natural order, as it is fitting to begin by discussing the Whole before we go on to investigate the particulars and Man himself. Others have begun with Ethics, as a more necessary 21 subject and one which invites to happiness; just as Socrates gave out that his only subject of inquiry was

Whatso of evil and good within these homes is enacted.^b

The Epicureans start off with Logic, for they expound 22 “Canonic” first, treating of things evident and

^a An Eclectic of the first century B.C.

^b Homer, *Od.* iv. 392.

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- ἐναργῶν καὶ ἀδήλων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἀκολουθῶν
 ποιοῦνται τὴν ὑφήγησιν. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς
 καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄρχειν μὲν φασὶ τὰ λογικά, δευτερεύειν
 δὲ τὰ ἠθικά, τελευταῖα δὲ τετάχθαι τὰ φυσικά.
- 23 πρῶτον γὰρ δεῖν κατησφαλίσθαι τὸν νοῦν εἰς δυσ-
 ἐκκρουστον τῶν παραδιδομένων φυλακὴν, ὀχυρω-
 τικὸν δὲ εἶναι τῆς διανοίας τὸν διαλεκτικὸν τόπον·
 δεύτερον δὲ ὑπογράφειν τὴν ἠθικὴν θεωρίαν πρὸς
 βελτίωσιν τῶν ἡθῶν· ἀκίνδυνος γὰρ ἡ παραδοχὴ
 ταύτης ἐπὶ προϋποκειμένη τῇ λογικῇ δυνάμει·
 τελευταίαν δὲ ἐπάγειν τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρίαν·
 θειοτέρα γάρ ἐστι καὶ βαθυτέρας δέεται τῆς ἐπι-
 στάσεως.
- 24 Ταῦτα μὲν καὶ οὗτοι· ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀκριβὲς
 ἐν τῷ πράγματι τὰ νῦν οὐ σκεπτόμεθα, ἐκεῖνο δὲ
 φάμεν ὡς εἶπερ ἐν παντὶ μέρει φιλοσοφίας ζητητέον
 ἐστὶ τάληθές, πρὸ παντός δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τοὺς
 τρόπους τῆς τούτου διαγνώσεως ἔχειν πιστούς.
 ὁ δὲ γε λογικὸς τόπος τὴν περὶ τῶν κριτηρίων
 καὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων θεωρίαν περιεῖχεν· ἀπὸ τούτου
- 25 ἄρα ποιητέον ἐστὶν ἡμῖν τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ ἵνα
 εὐέφοδος γένηται πρὸς τοὺς δογματικούς ἢ ζήτησις,
 ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ἐναργῇ διὰ κριτηρίου τινὸς αὐτόθεν
 γνωρίζεσθαι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἀδήλα διὰ σημείων καὶ
 ἀποδείξεων κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν
 ἐξιχνεύεσθαι, τάξει σκεπτόμεθα πρῶτον μὲν περὶ
 τοῦ εἰ ἔστι τι κριτήριον τῶν αὐτόθεν κατ' αἴσθησιν
 ἢ διάνοιαν προσπιπτόντων, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο περὶ
 τοῦ εἰ ἔστι σημειωτικὸς ἢ ἀποδεικτικὸς τῶν
- 26 ἀδήλων τρόπος. οἶμαι γὰρ ὡς τούτων ἀναιρεθέν-
 των οὐδεμία ἔτι καταλειφθήσεται ζήτησις περὶ τοῦ
 δεῖν ἐπέχειν ἅτε μήτε ἐν τοῖς προφανέσι μήτε ἐν

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS, I. 22-26

non-evident and allied matters. The Stoics themselves, too, say that Logic comes first, and Ethics second, while Physics occupies the last place. For ²³ the mind must first be fortified for the task of guarding its heritage impregvably, and what thus makes the intellect secure is the Dialectical section; secondly we must subjoin Ethical doctrine for the bettering of morals; for when this is laid upon an existing basis of logic, its reception is without danger; and finally we must add Physical doctrine, it being a more divine subject and one which requires more profound attention.

Such, then, are the views of these thinkers. We, ²⁴ however, are not at present investigating this matter with exactness; but this we do affirm—that if truth is to be sought in every division of Philosophy, we must, before all else, possess trustworthy principles and methods for the discernment of truth. Now the Logical branch is that which includes the theory of criteria and of proofs; so it is with this that we ought to make our beginning. And in order to facilitate ²⁵ our inquiry, in its criticism of the Dogmatists, seeing that things evident are held to be directly cognized by means of a criterion, whereas the non-evident things are discovered by means of signs and proofs through inference from the evident, we shall take them in this order, inquiring first whether there exists a criterion of things directly perceived either by sense or by reason, and, in the next place, whether there exists a method capable of either signifying or proving things non-evident. For I suppose that ²⁶ if these shall be abolished there will no longer be any question as to the duty of suspending judgement, seeing that no truth is discovered either in things

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τοῖς συνεσκιασμένοις εὕρισκομένου τινὸς ἀληθοῦς. ἀρχέτω οὖν ὁ περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου λόγος, ἐπεὶ καὶ πάντων τῶν τῆς καταλήψεως τρόπων περιεκτικὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ.

ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΣ

- 27 Ἡ περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου ζήτησις οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ φύσει φιλάληθες ζῶον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ τὰς γενικωτάτας τῆς φιλοσοφίας αἰρέσεις περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων βραβεύειν, πᾶσιν ἐστὶ περιμάχητος. ἥ γὰρ τὸ μέγα καὶ σεμνὸν τῶν δογματικῶν αὔχημα ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἄρδην δεήσει, μηδεὶνὸς εὕρισκομένου κανόνος τῆς κατ' ἀλήθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπάρξεως, ἥ ἀνάπαλιν ὥς προπετεῖς ἐλέγχεσθαι τοὺς σκεπτικούς καὶ τῆς κοινῆς πίστεως κατατολμήσαντας, εἴαν φαίνηται τι τὸ δυνάμενον ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας κατάληψιν ὀδηγεῖν. καὶ γὰρ σχέτλιον εἰ τὰ μὲν ἐκτὸς κριτήρια μετὰ πάσης σπουδῆς ἀναζητήσομεν, οἷον κανόνας καὶ διαβήτας σταθμῖα τε καὶ τρυτάνας, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν δοκιμαστικὸν
- 28 εἶναι δοκοῦν παρήσομεν. τάξει τοίνυν ὥς ἂν περὶ τῶν ὅλων οὔσης τῆς σκέψεως ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπεὶ δύο μέρη ἐμφέρεται τῇ προτάσει, τό τε κριτήριον καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἐν μέρει τὸν περὶ ἑκατέρου τούτων λόγον ποιησόμεθα, καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἐξηγητικῶς ὑποδεικνύντες ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ κριτήριον καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια, καὶ τίνα ποτὲ κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς εἶχε φύσιν, ὅτε δὲ καὶ ἀπορητικώτερον σκεπτόμενοι εἰ δύνатаί τι τούτων ὑπάρχειν.

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS, I. 26-28

plainly obvious or in things obscure. Let us begin, then, with the discussion of the criterion, since it is held to embrace all the modes of apprehension.

DOES A CRITERION OF TRUTH EXIST ?

The problem of this Criterion is everywhere a 27 subject of controversy, not only because Man is by nature a truth-loving animal, but also because the most extensive systems of Philosophy pronounce judgement on the weightiest matters. For either the great and sublime theme of the Dogmatists' boasts will necessarily be utterly abolished if no Canon of the veritable existence of things is discovered, or conversely, if something appears which is able to point us to the apprehension of the truth, the Sceptics will be convicted of rashness and of defiant disregard for the general belief. It would indeed be monstrous if, while spending the utmost pains in investigating the external criteria—such as rules and compasses, weights and scales—we should neglect the Criterion within us—itsself the 28 accepted test of those very externals. As our inquiry, then, has to do with the whole subject, we shall proceed in an orderly way, and since two terms are involved in the proposition^a—namely, "the Criterion" and "Truth"—we shall discuss each of these separately, our treatment consisting partly of an exposition of the various senses of the terms "Criterion" and "Truth" and of the kind of reality ascribed to them by the Dogmatists, and partly of a more critical inquiry as to the possibility of the real existence of any such things.

^a *i.e.* the question "Does a Criterion of Truth exist?"

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29 Αὐτίκα τοῖνυν τὸ κριτήριον (ἀρκτέον γὰρ ἀπὸ
 τούτου) λέγεται πρῶτον μὲν διχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν
 τρόπον ᾧ προσέχοντες τὰ μὲν ποιοῦμεν τὰ δὲ
 οὐδαμῶς, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ ᾧ προσέχοντες τὰ μὲν
 ὑπάρχειν φαμέν τὰ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν καὶ ταυτὶ μὲν
 ἀληθῆ καθεστάναι ταυτὶ δὲ ψευδῇ. ὣν τὸ μὲν
 30 πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς ἐξεθέ-
 μεθα· κατ' ἀνάγκην γὰρ ἔδει τὸν ἀπορητικῶς φιλο-
 σοφούντα, μὴ εἰς τὸ παντελὲς ἀνενέργητον ὄντα
 καὶ ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεσιν ἄπρακτον,
 ἔχειν τι κριτήριον αἰρέσεως ἅμα καὶ φυγῆς, τουτ-
 ἔστι τὸ φαινόμενον, καθὼς καὶ ὁ Τίμων μεμαρ-
 τύρηκεν εἰπὼν

ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον πάντῃ¹ σθένει, οὐπερ ἂν
 ἔλθῃ.

31 τὸ δ' ἕτερον, λέγω δὲ τὸ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως καὶ
 περὶ οὗ τὰ νῦν σκεπτόμεθα, λέγεσθαι δοκεῖ τριχῶς,
 κοινῶς τε καὶ ιδίως καὶ ἰδιαίτατα. κοινῶς μὲν
 γὰρ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως, καθ' ὃ σημαίνόμενον
 καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ κριτήρια ταύτης ἡξίωται τῆς προσ-
 32 ηγορίας, οἷον ὄρασις ἀκοή γεῦσις· ιδίως δὲ πᾶν
 μέτρον καταλήψεως τεχνικόν, καθ' ὃ πῆχυν μὲν
 καὶ ζυγόν καὶ κανόνα καὶ διαβήτην εἵποι τις ἂν
 κριτήρια, παρόσον ἐστὶ τεχνικά, τὴν δὲ ὄρασιν
 καὶ τὴν ἀκοήν καὶ καθόλου τὰ λοιπὰ κοινὰ τῶν
 αἰσθητηρίων, φυσικὴν ἔχοντα τὴν κατασκευήν,
 33 οὐδαμῶς· ἰδιαίτερον δὲ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως

¹ πάντῃ cj. Bekk.; παντὶ mss.

* See P. II. i. 21 ff. Cf. P. H. ii. 14.

^b For Timon, the Sceptic, see Vol. I. Introd. pp. xxx ff.

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS, I. 29-33

CONCERNING THE CRITERION

Well, then, the Criterion (for with it we must begin) 29 has, in the first place, two senses : in the one sense it is used of that in view of which we do these things and not those ; in the other, it means the thing in view of which we assert that these things exist and those do not exist, and that these are true, those false. The former of these we have dealt with in our section "Concerning the Sceptic Way." ^a For the 30 sceptical philosopher, if he is not to be entirely inert and without a share in the activities of daily life, was necessarily obliged to possess some Criterion both of choice and of aversion—that is to say, the Appearance ; even as Timon ^b also testified in his saying—

Yea, the Appearance is ev'rywhere strong, where'er it approacheth.

"Criterion," in the second of the two senses—that 31 of existence, I mean, which is the theme of our present inquiry—seems to be used with three meanings : the general, the special, and the most special. ^c As general it is used of every measure or standard of apprehension, and in this sense the physical criteria also—such as sight, hearing, taste—are thought worthy of the title ; as special it includes 32 every technical measure of apprehension, so that in this sense one would call the cubit, the balance, the rule and the compass "criteria" inasmuch as they are technical, but not sight nor hearing nor in general the rest of the common sense-organs, the construction of which is natural ; in the more special sense the 33 Criterion is every measure of apprehension of a non-

^c With this passage cf. *P.H.* ii. 15, 16.

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ἀδήλου πράγματος, καθ' ὃ τὰ μὲν βιωτικὰ οὐκέτι λέγεται κριτήρια, μόνα δὲ τὰ λογικὰ καὶ ἅπερ οἱ δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων παρεισάγουσι πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας εὕρεσιν.

- 34 Πολλαχῶς δὴ λεγομένου τοῦ κριτηρίου, πρόκειται πάλιν τὸ σκέπτεσθαι προηγουμένως μὲν περὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις θρυλουμένου, κατ' ἐπακολούθημα δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου
- 35 τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον. πάρεστι μέντοι καὶ τὸ λογικὸν τοῦτο ὑποδιαιρεῖσθαι, λέγοντας τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι κριτήριον ὡς ὑφ' οὗ, τὸ δὲ ὡς δι' οὗ, τὸ δὲ ὡς προσβολῇ καὶ σχέσις. ὑφ' οὗ μὲν ὡς ἄνθρωπος, δι' οὗ δὲ ὡς αἰσθησις, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὡς ἡ προσβολῇ
- 36 τῆς φαντασίας. ὃν γὰρ τρόπον ἐν τῇ τῶν βαρέων καὶ κούφων ἐξετάσει τρία ἐστὶ κριτήρια, ὃ τε ζυγοστάτης καὶ ὁ ζυγὸς καὶ ἡ τοῦ ζυγοῦ θέσις, τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν ζυγοστάτης κριτήριον ἦν τὸ ὑφ' οὗ, ὁ δὲ ζυγὸς τὸ δι' οὗ, ἡ δὲ θέσις τοῦ ζυγοῦ ὡς σχέσις, καὶ πάλιν ὃν τρόπον πρὸς τὴν τῶν εὐθειῶν καὶ στρεβλῶν διάκρισιν τεχνίτου τε καὶ κανόνος καὶ τῆς τούτου προσβολῆς ἐστὶ χρεία, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶν τε καὶ ψευδῶν διάγνωσιν δεόμεθα τῶν προειρημένων
- 37 ἡμῖν τριῶν κριτηρίων, καὶ ἔοικε τῷ μὲν ζυγοστάτῃ ἡ τέκτονι ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὑφ' οὗ γίνεται ἡ κρίσις, τῷ δὲ ζυγῷ καὶ κανόνι ἡ αἰσθησις καὶ ἡ διάνοια, δι' ἧς γίνεται τὰ τῆς κρίσεως, τῇ δὲ σχέσει τῶν προειρημένων ὀργάνων ἡ προσβολῇ τῆς φαντασίας, καθ' ἣν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐπιβάλλεται κρίνειν.

Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν κριτηρίου ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος προλαβεῖν.

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS, I. 33-37

evident object, and in this sense the ordinary standards are no longer called criteria but only logical standards and those which the dogmatic philosophers introduce as means for the discovery of truth.

The term "Criterion," then, being used in many 34 senses, we again propose to examine in the first place the logical criterion, which the philosophers harp on, and subsequently each of the criteria of ordinary life. One may, however, subdivide this logical criterion 35 as well, by calling one form of it that of the agent, another the instrument, and a third the application and use. The agent, for instance, may be a man, the instrument sense-perception, and the third form of criterion the application of the sense-impression. For just as in the process of examining heavy and 36 light objects there are three criteria, the man who weighs, the scales, and the act of weighing, and of these the weigher is the criterion of the agent, the scales that of the instrument, and the act of weighing that of the use ; and again, just as for the determination of things straight and crooked there is need of a craftsman and a rule and the application of the rule ; so, in the same way, in philosophy also, for the determination of things true and false, we require the three criteria we have mentioned above ; and here 37 the man, who is the agent in the judgement, corresponds to the weigher or carpenter ; sense-perception or intelligence, as the instrument by which the judgement is effected, corresponds to the scales and the rule ; and the application of the sense-impression, according to which the man proceeds to judge, corresponds to the use of the aforesaid instruments.

It was, in fact, necessary for our present purpose to begin with this explanation of the criterion

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ΠΕΡΙ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΣ

- 38 Τὴν δὲ ἀλήθειαν οἶονταί τινες, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διαφέρειν τᾶληθοῦς κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους, οὐσία τε καὶ συστάσει καὶ δυνάμει, οὐσία μὲν παρόσον ἢ μὲν ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἀσώματον ὑπῆρχεν. καὶ εἰκότως, φασίν· τουτὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀξίωμα ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀξίωμα λεκτόν, τὸ δὲ λεκτόν ἀσώματον. ἀνάπαλιν δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστι παρόσον ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν
- 39 ἀποφαντικῇ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν, πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιστήμη πῶς ἔχον ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πῶς ἔχουσα χεὶρ πυγμῇ νοεῖται· τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικόν σῶμα κατὰ τούτους ὑπῆρχεν· τοίνυν καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια
- 40 κατὰ γένος ἔσται σωματικῇ. συστάσει δὲ καθόσον τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ὡς μονοειδὲς τι καὶ ἀπλοῦν τὴν φύσιν νενόηται, ὅλον ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ “ἡμέρα ἔστιν” καὶ τὸ “ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι,” ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ὡς ἂν ἐπιστήμη καθεστηκυῖα τοῦναντίον συστηματικῇ τε καὶ πλειόνων ἄθροισμα τυγχάνειν ὑπ-
- 41 εἰληπται. ὥ οὖν λόγῳ ἕτερόν τί ἐστὶν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἕτερον ὁ πολίτης, καὶ δῆμος μὲν τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν πολιτῶν ἄθροισμα πολίτης δὲ ὁ εἷς, τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ διενήνοχεν ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, καὶ ὁμοίωται ἢ μὲν ἀλήθεια τῷ δήμῳ τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς τῷ πολίτῃ, διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν εἶναι συστηματικὴν τὸ
- 42 δὲ ἀπλοῦν. δυνάμει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων κεχώρισται, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς οὐ πάντως ἐπιστήμης εἶχετο (καὶ γὰρ ὁ φαῦλος καὶ ὁ νῆπιος καὶ ὁ μεμηνὼς λέγει μὲν ποτέ τι ἀληθὲς, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀληθοῦς), ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια κατ’ ἐπιστήμην θεωρεῖται.

° With §§ 38-42 cf. P.H. ii. 80-83.

CONCERNING TRUTH

It is supposed by some, and especially by the 38
 Stoics, that "truth" differs from "the true" in
 three ways, in essence and composition and potency,
 —in essence in so far as truth is a body whereas the
 true is incorporeal.^a And naturally so, they say ;
 for the latter is "judgement," and the judgement is
 "expression," and the expression is incorporeal. On
 the other hand, truth is a body in so far as it is held
 to be "knowledge declaratory of all true things,"
 and all knowledge is "a particular state of the regent 39
 part," just as the fist is conceived as a particular
 state of the hand, and, according to these thinkers,
 the regent part is a body, so that truth also will
 belong to the genus body. They differ in composition, 40
 inasmuch as the true is conceived as uniform and
 simple in its nature,—as for instance, at the present
 moment, the propositions "It is day" and "I am
 conversing,"—whereas truth, as consisting in know-
 ledge, is on the contrary conceived to be of composite
 nature and a collection of several elements. Thus, 41
 just as "the people," is one thing and "the citizen"
 another,—the collection composed of many citizens
 being "the people," the one individual "the citizen,"
 —so, by the same reasoning, truth is distinguished
 from the true, and whereas truth corresponds to
 "the people," the true corresponds to "the citizen,"
 because the former is composite but the latter simple.
 And they are distinct from one another in potency, 42
 since the true is not altogether dependent on know-
 ledge (for in fact the fool and the infant and the
 madman at times say something true, but they do
 not possess knowledge of the true), whereas truth is
 considered to involve knowledge. Hence, too, its

ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἔχων ταύτην σοφός ἐστιν (ἐπιστήμην
 γὰρ εἶχεν ἀληθῶν) καὶ οὐποτε ψεύδεται, καὶ
 ψεύδος λέγει, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ κακῆς ἀλλ' ἀπὸ
 43 ἀστείας αὐτὸ διαθέσεως προφέρεσθαι. καθὰ γὰρ
 ὁ περὶ τῆς τοῦ κάμνοντος σωτηρίας ψεύδος τι
 λέγων ἰατρός, καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενός τι δώσειν μὴ
 διδούς δέ, ψεύδος μὲν τι λέγει, οὐ ψεύδεται δέ
 (πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ἐπιστατουμένου σωτηρίαν αὐτῷ
 τὸ τοιοῦτο λαμβάνει τὴν ἀναφοράν), καὶ ὡς οἱ
 ἄριστοι τῶν στρατηγῶν πρὸς εὐθυμίαν τῶν ὑπο-
 ταττομένων αὐτοῖς στρατιωτῶν πολλάκις ἐπιστολὰς
 ἀπὸ συμμαχίδων πόλεων πλασάμενοι¹ ψεύδος μὲν
 τι λέγουσιν, οὐ ψεύδονται δέ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ
 44 ποιηρᾶς γνώμης τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ ὃν τρόπον γραμ-
 ματικὸς σολοικισμοῦ τιθεῖς ὑπόδειγμα σολοικισμὸν
 μὲν προφέρεται, οὐ σολοικίζει δέ (οὐ γὰρ παρὰ
 ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου τοῦτο πάσχει), ὥδε καὶ
 ὁ σοφός, τουτέστιν ὁ τὴν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμην
 ἔχων, ἐρεῖ μὲν ποτε ψεύδος, ψεύσεται δέ οὐδέποτε
 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην ψεύδει συγκατατιθε-
 45 μένην. ὅτι γάρ, φασίν, ἀπὸ τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ
 οὐκ ἀπὸ ψιλῆς τῆς προφορᾶς κριτέον ἐστὶ τὸν
 ψευδόμενον, πάρεστι μαθεῖν ἐκ τῶν τεθησομένων
 ὑποδειγμάτων. τυμβωρύχος γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ὁ
 ἐπὶ τῷ σκυλεύειν τοὺς νεκροὺς τοῦτο πράττων
 καὶ ὁ τύμβους τοῖς νεκροῖς ὀρύττων· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν
 πρῶτος κολάζεται ὡς ἀπὸ κακῆς διαθέσεως τοῦτο
 πράσσειν, ὁ δὲ δεῦτερος καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνει τῆς
 ὑπηρεσίας διὰ τὴν ἀντικειμένην αἰτίαν. προφανές
 τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὅτι καὶ τὸ ψεύδος λέγειν τοῦ ψεύ-

¹ πλασάμενοι LE: πλασάμενος N: παρασκευασάμενοι Bekk.

possessor is a Sage (for he possesses knowledge of things true), and he never speaks falsely, even if he says what is false, because he does not utter it from an evil but from a kindly disposition. For just as the 43 doctor who says something false respecting the cure of his patient, and promises to give him something but does not give it, is not lying though he says something false (for in saying it he has regard to the cure of the person in his charge),—and just as the best commanders, when, as often, they concoct messages from allied States for the encouragement of the soldiers under their command, say what is false yet are not liars because they do not do this with a bad intention,—and just as the grammarian, although 44 when giving an example of a solecism he utters a solecism, is not guilty of bad grammar (for it is not through ignorance of correct speech that he makes the mistake),—so also the Sage (I mean the man who possesses the knowledge of the true) will at times say something false but will never lie because his mental disposition is not assenting to what is false. For, as 45 they assert, the fact that the liar must be judged by his disposition and not by his mere utterance may be learnt from the examples now to be adduced. Thus the name “grave-digger” is applied both to the man who so acts in order to plunder the dead and to the man who digs graves for the dead; but whereas the first is punished as doing this from an evil disposition, the second receives pay for his service for the opposite cause. So then it is quite plain that uttering a falsehood is vastly different from lying, in

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δεσθαι κατὰ πολὺ διενήνοχεν, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ ἀστείας γίνεται γνώμης, τὸ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι ἀπὸ πονηρᾶς.

- 46 Ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας κατὰ τινας προαποδόντες, ἀκολουθῶς καὶ τὴν γενομένην τοῖς δογματικοῖς φιλοσόφοις διάστασιν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου σκοπῶμεν· ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστι ζητοῦντας περὶ τῆς τούτου ὑπάρξεως συνεπιθεωρεῖν καὶ ὃ τι ἔστιν.
- 47 πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ποικίλαι διαιρέσεις φέρονται κατὰ τὸν τόπον¹. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀπόχρη πρὸς τὸ παρὸν λέγειν ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἀνείλον τὸ κριτήριον οἱ δὲ ἀπέλιπον. καὶ τῶν ἀπολιπόντων τρεῖς αἱ ἀνωτάτω γεγόνاسι στάσεις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν λόγῳ τοῦτο ἀπέλιπον, οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἀλόγοις ἐναργείαις,² οἱ δὲ
- 48 ἐν ἀμφοτέροις. καὶ δὴ ἀνείλον μὲν αὐτὸ Ξενοφάνης τε ὁ Κολοφώνιος καὶ Ξενοφάνης ὁ Κορίνθιος καὶ Ἀνάχαρσις ὁ Σκύθης καὶ Πρωταγόρας καὶ Διονυσόδωρος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ Μητρόδωρος ὁ Χῖος καὶ Ἀνάξαρχος ὁ εὐδαιμονικὸς καὶ Μόνιμος ὁ κύων. [ἐν τούτοις δὲ
- 49 εἰσι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως.]³ ὧν Ξενοφάνης μὲν κατὰ τινας εἰπὼν πάντα ἀκατάληπτα ἐπὶ ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς φορᾶς, ἐν οἷς γράφει

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὐ τις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις ἔσται

εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπὼν, αὐτὸς ὁμῶς οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

¹ τόπον N, cj. Bekk. : τρόπον L.E.

² ἐναργείαις Helntz : ἐνεργείαις mss., Bekk.

³ ἐν . . . σκέψεως] secl. Mutsch.

that the former proceeds from a kindly intention but lying from an evil intention.

Having thus stated the views held by some concerning truth, let us next consider the divergent opinions which have arisen among the dogmatic philosophers concerning the criterion; for while we are investigating its existence we must also consider at the same time what, in its essence, it is. Now many divergent opinions of all sorts are propounded regarding this subject, but for the present it is sufficient for us to say that some have rejected, others retained the criterion. Of those who have retained it the main views are three: some have retained it in rational discourse, some in non-rational self-evident facts, some in both. Moreover, it has been rejected by Xenophanes of Colophon and Xenias of Corinth and Anacharsis the Scythian and Protagoras and Dionysodorus^a; and besides these, by Gorgias of Leontini and Metrodorus of Chios and Anaxarchus "the Eudaemonist" and Monimus the Cynic. [And amongst these are also the Sceptics.] And of these Xenophanes, according to some, took up this position by declaring all things to be non-apprehensible, as in this passage^b:

Yet, with respect to the gods and what I declare about
all things,
No man has seen what is clear nor ever will any man
know it.
Nay, for e'en should he chance to affirm what is really
existent,
He himself knoweth it not; for all is swayed by opining.

^a For the views of those here named see §§ 53 ff. *infra*, § 13 *supra*; *P.H.* ii. 18.

^b Repeated in § 110 *infra*, and *Adv. Log.* ii. 326.

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50 διὰ τούτων γὰρ σαφὲς μὲν ἔοικε λέγειν τάληθές
καὶ τὸ γνῶριμον, καθὼ καὶ λέγεται

ἀπλοῦς ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφν,

ἄνδρα δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῷ εἰδικῶ καταχρώμενος
ἀντὶ τοῦ γένους· εἶδος γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καθέστηκεν
ὁ ἀνὴρ. σύνηθες δ' ἔστι τούτῳ χρῆσθαι τῷ τρόπῳ
τῆς φράσεως καὶ Ἰπποκράτει, ὅταν λέγῃ " γυνὴ
ἀμφιδέξιος οὐ γίνεται," τουτέστι θήλεια ἐν τοῖς
δεξιοῖς μέρεσι τῆς μήτρας οὐ συνίσταται. ἀμφὶ
θεῶν δὲ ὑποδειγματικῶς περὶ τινος τῶν ἀδῆλων,
51 δόκον δὲ τὴν δόκησιν καὶ τὴν δόξαν. ὥστε τοιοῦ-
τον εἶναι κατὰ ἐξάπλωσιν τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον
" τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς καὶ γνῶριμον οὐθεὶς ἄνθρωπος
οἶδε, τό γε ἐν τοῖς ἀδῆλοις πράγμασιν· κἂν γὰρ
ἐκ τύχης ἐπιβάλλῃ τούτῳ, ὅμως οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι
52 ἐπιβέβληκεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' οἶεται καὶ δοκεῖ." ὥσπερ
γὰρ εἰ ἐν ζοφερῷ οἰκῆματι καὶ πολλὰ ἔχοντι
κειμήλια ὑποθοίμεθ' αἰνας χρυσὸν ζητοῦντας, ὑπο-
πесεῖται διότι ἕκαστος μὲν τούτων λαβόμενός τις
τῶν ἐν τῷ οἰκῆματι κειμένων οἰήσεται τοῦ χρυσοῦ
δεδράχθαι, οὐδεὶς δὲ αὐτῶν ἔσται πεπεισμένος ὅτι
τῷ χρυσῷ περιέπεσε, κἂν μάλιστα τύχῃ τούτῳ
περιπεπτωκῶς, ὥδε καὶ εἰς τουτονὶ τὸν κόσμον
ὥσπερ τινὰ μέγαν οἶκον παρῆλθε πλήθος φιλοσόφων
ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ζήτησιν, ἥς τὸν λαβόμενον
εἰκὸς ἐστὶν ἀπιστεῖν ὅτι εὐστόχησεν.

Οὗτος μὲν δὴ οὐ φησιν εἶναι κριτήριον ἀληθείας

^a Eurip. *Phoen.* 469.

^b A curious use of ἀμφιδέξιος (usually "ambidextrous"). That the "left" is the "female" side was an old Pythagorean idea. But the main point of the sentence is that

For here he seems to mean by "clear" what is true 50
and known, just as in the saying

By nature simple is the word of truth.²

And by "man" he seems to mean "human being,"
using the special term instead of the general; for
man is a species of human being. The use of this
mode of speech is customary also in Hippocrates,
as when he says "A woman is not produced right-
handed,"—that is to say, "a female is not com-
pounded in the right-hand parts of the womb."³
The words "with respect to the gods" are used, by
way of example, for "concerning any non-evident
object"; and "opining" stands for surmise and
opinion. Consequently his statement, when sim- 51
plified, amounts to this—"Yet the true and known—
at least in respect of non-evident things—no human
being knows; for even if by chance he should hit
upon it, still he knows not that he has hit upon it but
imagines and opines." For just as, if we were to 52
suppose that certain people are searching for gold in
a dark room containing many treasures, what happens
will be that each of them whenever he lays hold of
some one of the treasures in the room will imagine
that he has grasped the gold, though none of them
will be convinced that he has lighted on the gold,
even though, in fact, he has lighted upon it; so
also into this Universe, as into a great house, there
has entered a host of philosophers bent on the search
for truth, and it is quite likely that the one who has
laid hold of it disbelieves that he has achieved his
aim.

Thus Xenophanes denies that a criterion of truth

H. is here using the specific term *γυνή* ("woman") in place
of the generic *θῆλυα* ("female").

- διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν
 53 ζητουμένων· Ξενιάδης δὲ ὁ Κορίνθιος, οὗ καὶ
 Δημόκριτος μέμνηται, πάντ' εἰπὼν ψευδῇ, καὶ
 πᾶσαν φαντασίαν καὶ δόξαν ψεύδεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ
 μὴ ὄντος πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον γίνεσθαι, καὶ εἰς τὸ
 μὴ ὄν πᾶν τὸ φθειρόμενον φθείρεσθαι, δυνάμει
 54 τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχεται τῷ Ξενοφάνει στάσεως. μὴ
 ὄντος γάρ τινος ἀληθοῦς κατὰ διαφορὰν τοῦ ψεύ-
 δους, ἀλλὰ πάντων ψευδῶν ὄντων καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 ἀκαταλήπτων, οὐδὲ διακριτικὸν τι τούτων ἔσται
 κριτήριον. τὸ δ' ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῇ καὶ διὰ
 τοῦτο ἀκατάληπτα[, οὐδὲ διακριτικὸν τούτων ἔσται
 κριτήριον,]¹ δείκνυται ἐκ τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων δια-
 βολῆς· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐπαναβεβηκὸς κριτήριον πάντων
 τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ ψευδές, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ
 πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῇ. τὸ δέ γε ἐπαναβεβηκὸς κριτή-
 ριον πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις,
 καὶ δείκνυνται ψευδεῖς· πάντα ἄρα τὰ πράγματά
 ἐστὶ ψευδῇ.
- 55 Καὶ Ἀνάχαρσις, ὡς φασίν, ὁ Σκύθης πάσης
 τέχνης τὴν κριτικὴν κατάληψιν ἀναιρεῖ, σφόδρα τε
 ἐπιτιμᾷ τοῖς Ἑλλήσι ταύτην ἀπολείπουσιν· τίς
 γάρ ἐστι, φησίν, ὁ κρίνων τι τεχνικῶς; ἄρα γε
 ὁ ἰδιώτης ἢ ὁ τεχνίτης; ἀλλ' ἰδιώτην μὲν οὐκ
 ἂν εἴποιμεν· πεπήρωται γὰρ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν τῶν
 τεχνικῶν ἰδιωμάτων, καὶ ὡς οὔτε τυφλὸς λαμ-
 βάνει τὰ τῆς ὁράσεως ἔργα οὔτε κωφὸς τὰ τῆς
 ἀκοῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος ὀξυωπεῖ πρὸς τὴν
 κατάληψιν τοῦ τεχνικῶς ἀποτελεσθέντος, ἐπεὶ τοι
 εἰάν καὶ τούτῳ μαρτυρῶμεν τὴν τινος πράγματος
 τεχνικοῦ κρίσιν, οὐ διοίσει τῆς τέχνης ἢ ἀτεχνία,

¹ [οὐδὲ . . . κριτήριον] om. NLE.

exists because there is nothing apprehensible existing in the nature of the objects of inquiry. And Xenocrates 53 the Corinthian ^a—who is mentioned by Democritus—inasmuch as he asserts that all things are false, and that every impression and opinion is false, and that all that becomes becomes out of the non-existent, and all that perishes perishes into the non-existent, virtually adopts the same position as Xenophanes. For if 54 nothing true, as opposed to false, exists, but all things are false and therefore inapprehensible, neither will there exist any criterion capable of judging between things. And the fact that all things are false and therefore inapprehensible is proved by disparagement of the senses ; ^b for if the supreme criterion of all things is false, all things also are of necessity false. But the senses are the supreme criterion of all things, and they are proved to be false ; therefore all things are false.

Anacharsis the Scythian also, as they say, destroys 55 the apprehension which judges concerning every art, and strongly censures the Greeks for accepting it. "For who," says he, "is the man who judges a thing by rules of art? Is he the non-expert or the expert artist? ^c But surely we could not say that he is the non-expert ; for he is lacking in knowledge of the special features of the art, and just as the blind man does not perceive the effects of vision, nor the deaf those of hearing, so neither is the non-expert keen of sight to apprehend the result produced by artistic methods ; since in fact, were we to entrust to him the judgement of any product of art, there will be no difference between lack

^a See *P.H.* ii. 18 ; § 388 *infra*.

^b See *P.H.* i. 44 ff., ii. 49 ff.

^c Cf. *P.H.* iii. 259.

- ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον· ὥστε οὐχ ὁ ἰδιώτης ἐστὶ
 56 κριτῆς τῶν τεχνικῶν ἰδιωμάτων. λείπεται ἄρα
 λέγειν τὸν τεχνίτην· ὃ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀπίθανον. ἦτοι
 γὰρ ὁ ὁμόζηλος τὸν ὁμόζηλον ἢ ὁ ἀνομόζηλος τὸν
 ἑτερόζηλον κρίνει. ἀλλ' ὁ ἑτερόζηλος οὐχ οἷός τέ
 ἐστὶ κρίνειν τὸν ἑτερόζηλον· τῆς γὰρ ἰδίας τέχνης
 57 ἐστὶν ἐπιγνώμων, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν ἰδιώτης
 καθέστηκεν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ὁ ὁμόζηλος τὸν ὁμό-
 ζηλον δύναται δοκιμάζειν· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐξη-
 τοῦμεν, τίς ἐστὶν ὁ τούτους κρίνων ἐν μιᾷ δυνάμει
 τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῇ τέχνῃ καθεστῶτας. ἄλλως
 τε, εἴπερ οὗτος ἐκείνον κρίνει, γενήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ
 κρίνον τε καὶ κρινόμενον πιστόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον·
 58 ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὁμόζηλός ἐστιν ὁ ἕτερος τῷ κρινομένῳ,
 κρινόμενος καὶ αὐτὸς ἄπιστος ἔσται, ἢ δὲ κρίνει,
 πιστὸς γενήσεται. οὐ δυνατόν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ
 κρίνον καὶ κρινόμενον καὶ πιστόν καὶ ἄπιστον
 ὑπάρχειν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις ὁ κρίνων τεχνικῶς.
 59 διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ κριτήριον· τῶν γὰρ κριτηρίων
 τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ τεχνικά, τὰ δὲ ἰδιωτικά, οὔτε δὲ τὰ
 ἰδιωτικά κρίνει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὁ ἰδιώτης, οὔτε τὰ
 τεχνικά, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὁ τεχνίτης, διὰ τὰς ἔμ-
 προσθεν εἰρημένας αἰτίας. τοίνυν οὐδέν ἐστι
 κριτήριον.
- 60 Καὶ Πρωταγόραν δὲ τὸν Ἀβδηρίτην ἐγκατέλεξάν
 τινες τῷ χορῷ τῶν ἀναιρούντων τὸ κριτήριον
 φιλοσόφων, ἐπεὶ φησι πάσας τὰς φαντασίας καὶ
 τὰς δόξας ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι
 τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ πᾶν τὸ φανέν ἢ δόξαν τινὲ

* Cf. P.II. i. 216; Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xiv.

of art and art, which is absurd. So that the non-expert is not the judge of the special features of art. It 56 remains, then, to say that the expert artist is the judge; and this again is improbable. For either the fellow-craftsman judges the fellow-craftsman, or the man of one craft the man of another craft. But the man of one craft is incapable of judging the man of another craft; for he is learned in his own art, but 57 in regard to another man's he is in the position of a non-expert. Nor in fact can the fellow-craftsman pass judgement on his fellow-craftsman; for precisely this was our question—Who is he that judges those who stand on the same level inasmuch as they are engaged in the same art? And besides, if this fellow-craftsman judges that one, the same thing will be both judging and judged, both trusted and distrusted; for in so 58 far as the other man is a fellow-craftsman of the man who is being judged, he himself also will be subject to judgement and distrusted, whereas, in so far as he is giving judgement, he will be trusted. But it is not possible for the same thing to be both judging and judged, trusted and distrusted. Therefore there is none who judges by rules of art. And because of this 59 there is no criterion either; for of criteria some are technical, others non-technical, but, for the reasons already stated, neither the non-technical criteria judge any more than the non-expert, nor the technical any more than the expert artist. So then no criterion exists."

Some, too, have counted Protagoras of Abdera^a 60 among the company of those philosophers who abolish the criterion, since he asserts that all sense-impressions and opinions are true and that truth is a relative thing inasmuch as everything that has

εὐθέως πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὑπάρχειν. ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν τῶν καταβαλλόντων ἀνεφώνησε " πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς 61 ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν." καὶ μαρτυρεῖν φαίνεται τούτῳ ὁ ἀντικείμενος λόγος. εἰ γὰρ φήσῃ τις μὴ πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων κριτήριον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, βεβαιώσει τὸ πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων κριτήριον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον· αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ τοῦτο λέγων ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸν τιθεὶς φαινόμενον ὁμολογεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῶν ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸν φαινομένων ὑπάρχειν. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ μεμνηνὼς τῶν ἐν μανίᾳ φαινομένων πιστόν ἐστι κριτήριον, καὶ ὁ κοιμώμενος τῶν ἐν ὕπνοις καὶ ὁ νήπιος τῶν ἐν νηπιότητι καὶ 62 ὁ γεγηρακὼς τῶν ἐν γήρᾳ προσπιπτόντων. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οἰκείον ἀπὸ τῶν διαφερουσῶν περιστάσεων τὰς διαφόρους περιστάσεις ἀθετεῖν, τουτέστιν ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ σωφρονεῖν ὑποπιπτόντων τὰ ἐν τῷ μεμνηνέσθαι φαινόμενα, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ὕπαρ τὰ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐν γήρᾳ τὰ ἐν νηπιότητι. ὡς γὰρ αὐτὰ ἐκείνοις οὐ φαίνεται, οὕτω καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ τούτοις φαινόμενα ἐκείνοις οὐ προσ- 63 πίπτει. διόπερ εἰ ὅτι ὁ μεμνηνὼς ἢ ὁ κοιμώμενος ἐν ποιᾷ διαθέσει θεωρεῖται, οὐκ ἔστι βέβαιος τῶν φαινομένων αὐτῷ κριτής, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ σωφρονῶν καὶ ὁ ἐγρηγορῶν ἐν ποιᾷ κατέστηκεν διαθέσει, πάλιν οὐκ ἔσται πιστὸς πρὸς τὴν διάγνωσιν τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων αὐτῷ. μηδενὸς οὖν χωρὶς περιστάσεως λαμβανομένου, ἐκάστῳ πιστευτέον (περὶ)¹

¹ <περὶ> addidi: <ἀποφαινομένων περὶ> cj. Mutsch.

appeared to someone or been opined by someone is at once real in relation to him. Certainly, at the opening of his book *The Down-Throwers* he has proclaimed that "Of all things the measure is man, of existing things that they exist and of non-existing things that they exist not." And to this statement 61 even the opposite statement appears to bear witness. For if anyone shall assert that man is not the criterion of all things he will be confirming the statement that man is the criterion of all things; since the very person who makes the assertion is himself a man, and in affirming what appears relatively to himself he confesses that this very assertion of his is one of the appearances relative to himself. Hence also the madman is a trustworthy criterion of the appearances which occur in madness, and the sleeper of those in sleep, and the infant of those in infancy, and the ancient of those in old age. Nor is it appropriate to 62 disallow one set of circumstances because of a different set of circumstances—that is to say, the appearances which occur in the state of madness because of the impressions received in the sane state of mind, and those of sleep because of those of the waking state, and those of infancy because of those of old age. For as the latter percepts do not appear to the former percipients, so also conversely the appearances perceived by these do not affect those. Consequently, 63 if the madman or the sleeper is not a reliable judge of the appearances he perceives because he is found to be in a certain state of mind, then since both the sane and the waking man are also in a certain state, they again will not be trustworthy for the determining of their percepts. Seeing, then, that no impression is received apart from circumstances, each man must

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τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν περίστασιν λαμβανομένων.
 64 καὶ τοῦτον¹ δὴ κινεῖν τινὲς ὑπενόησαν τὸ κριτήριον,
 ἐπεὶπερ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ μὲν τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ὑποκειμένων
 δοκιμαστικὸν εἶναι βούλεται, τοῦ τε ἀληθοῦς καὶ
 τοῦ ψεύδους διοριστικὸν ὑπάρχειν, ὃ δὲ προειρη-
 μένος ἀνὴρ οὔτε καθ' αὐτό τι ὑπάρχον οὔτε ψεῦδος
 ἀπολέλοιπεν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γεγονέναι λέγονται καὶ
 οἱ περὶ τὸν Εὐθύδημον καὶ Διονυσόδωρον· τῶν γὰρ
 πρὸς τι καὶ οὗτοι τό τε ὄν καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀπο-
 λελοίπασιν.

65 Γοργίας δὲ ὁ Λεοντῖνος ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν τάγ-
 ματος ὑπῆρχε τοῖς ἀνηρηκόσι τὸ κριτήριον, οὐ
 κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν δὲ ἐπιβολὴν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πρωτ-
 αγόραν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ περὶ τοῦ μὴ
 ὄντος ἢ περὶ φύσεως τρία κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς κεφάλαια
 κατασκευάζει, ἐν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν,
 δεύτερον ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπῳ,
 τρίτον ὅτι εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, ἀλλά τοι γε ἀνέξ-
 66 οιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῷ πέλας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν
 οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐπιλογίζεται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. εἰ
 γὰρ ἔστι τι, ἤτοι τὸ ὄν ἔστιν ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ καὶ
 τὸ ὄν ἔστι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ ὄν ἔστιν, ὥς
 παραστήσει, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὥς παραμυθήσεται,
 οὔτε τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὥς καὶ τοῦτο διδάξει.
 67 οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι. καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν.
 εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστιν, ἔσται τι ἅμα καὶ οὐκ
 ἔσται· ἢ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὄν νοεῖται, οὐκ ἔσται, ἢ δὲ
 ἔστι μὴ ὄν, πάλιν ἔσται. παντελῶς δὲ ἄτοπον τὸ
 εἶναι τι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ μὴ

¹ τοῦτον Heintz: τοῦτ' mss., Bekk.

* Viz. Protagoras.

be trusted regarding those received in his own
 circumstances. And this man,^a as some have sup- 64
 posed, rejects the criterion, seeing that it purports
 to be a test of absolute realities and to discriminate
 between the true and the false, whereas the man just
 mentioned does not admit the existence either of
 anything absolutely real or of falsehood. Euthy-
 demus and Dionysodorus also are said to have shared
 these views ; for they too regarded both the existent
 and the true as relative things.

Gorgias of Leontini belonged to the same party as 65
 those who abolish the criterion, although he did not
 adopt the same line of attack as Protagoras. For
 in his book entitled *Concerning the Non-existent* or
Concerning Nature he tries to establish successively
 three main points—firstly, that nothing exists ;
 secondly, that even if anything exists it is inappre-
 hensible by man ; thirdly, that even if anything is
 apprehensible, yet of a surety it is inexpressible
 and incommunicable to one's neighbour. Now that 66
 nothing exists, he argues in the following fashion :
 If anything exists, either it is the existent that exists
 or the non-existent, or both the existent and the
 non-existent exist. But neither does the existent
 exist, as he will establish, nor the non-existent, as
 he will demonstrate, nor both the existent and the
 non-existent, as he will also make plain. Nothing,
 therefore, exists. Now the non-existent does not 67
 exist. For if the non-existent exists, it will at one
 and the same time exist and not exist ; for in so far
 as it is conceived as non-existent it will not exist, but
 in so far as it is non-existent it will again exist. But
 it is wholly absurd that a thing should both exist
 and exist not at one and the same time. Therefore

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ὄν. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι, τὸ ὄν οὐκ ἔσται· ἐναντία γὰρ ἔστι ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ εἰ τῷ μὴ ὄντι συμβέβηκε τὸ εἶναι, τῷ ὄντι συμβήσεται τὸ μὴ εἶναι. οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ <τοίνυν>¹ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔσται.

- 68 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὄν ἔστιν, ἦτοι αἰδιόν ἐστιν ἢ γενητόν ἢ αἰδιον ἅμα καὶ γενητόν· οὔτε δὲ αἰδιόν ἐστιν οὔτε γενητόν οὔτε ἀμφοτέρω, ὥς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν (ἀρκτέον γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν), οὐκ
69 ἔχει τινὰ ἀρχήν· τὸ γὰρ γινόμενον πᾶν ἔχει τιν' ἀρχήν, τὸ δὲ αἰδιον ἀγένητον καθεστῶς οὐκ εἶχεν ἀρχήν. μὴ ἔχον δὲ ἀρχήν ἀπειρόν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ ἀπειρόν ἐστιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ πού ἐστιν, ἕτερον αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἐκείνο τὸ [ὄν] ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκέτ' ἀπειρον ἔσται τὸ ὄν ἐμπεριεχόμενον τινι· μείζον γὰρ ἐστι τοῦ ἐμπεριεχομένου τὸ ἐμπεριέχον, τοῦ δὲ ἀπείρου οὐδέν ἐστι μείζον,
70 ὥστε οὐκ ἔστι που τὸ ἀπειρον. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν αὐτῷ περιέχεται. ταῦτόν γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ δύο γενήσεται τὸ ὄν, τόπος τε καὶ σῶμα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ᾧ τόπος ἐστίν, τὸ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ σῶμα. τοῦτο δέ γε ἄτοπον· τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν. ὥστ' εἰ αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἀπειρόν ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀπειρόν ἐστιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ μηδαμοῦ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστιν. τοίνυν εἰ αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχήν ὄν ἐστιν.
- 71 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ γενητόν εἶναι δύναται τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ γέγονεν, ἦτοι ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γέγονεν.

¹ οὐδὲ <τοίνυν>: <τοίνυν> οὐδὲ cj. Bekk., Mutsch.

the non-existent does not exist. Moreover, if the non-existent exists, the existent will not exist ; for these are contrary the one to the other, and if existence is a property of the non-existent, non-existence will be a property of the existent. But it is not the fact that the existent does not exist ; neither, then, will the non-existent exist.

Furthermore, the existent does not exist either. 68 For if the existent exists, it is either eternal or created or at once both eternal and created ; but, as we shall prove, it is neither eternal nor created nor both ; therefore the existent does not exist. For if the existent is eternal (the hypothesis we must take first), it has no beginning ; for everything created 69 has some beginning, but the eternal being uncreated had no beginning. And having no beginning it is infinite. And if it is infinite, it is nowhere. For if it is anywhere, that wherein it is is different from it, and thus the existent, being encompassed by something, will no longer be infinite ; for that which encompasses is larger than that which is encompassed, whereas nothing is larger than the infinite ; so that the infinite is not anywhere. Nor, again, is it 70 encompassed by itself. For, if so, that wherein it is will be identical with that which is therein, and the existent will become two things, place and body (for that wherein it is is place, and that which is therein is body). But this is absurd ; so that the existent is not in itself either. Consequently, if the existent is eternal it is infinite, and if it is infinite it is nowhere, and if it is nowhere it does not exist. So then, if the existent is eternal, it is not even existent at all.

Nor, again, can the existent be created. For if 71 it has been created, it has been created either out of

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ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος γέγονεν· εἰ γὰρ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ γέγονεν ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἤδη· οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄν οὐδὲ γεννησαί τι δύναται διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀφείλειν ὑπάρξεως μετέχειν τὸ γεννητικόν τινος. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ γεννητόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν.

72 Κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ συναμφότερον, αἰδίων ἅμα καὶ γεννητόν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀναιρετικά ἐστιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἰ αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, οὐ γέγονεν, καὶ εἰ γέγονεν, οὐκ ἔστιν αἰδίων. τοίνυν εἰ μήτε αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν μήτε γεννητόν μήτε τὸ συναμφότερον, οὐκ ἂν εἶη τὸ ὄν.

73 Καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ἔστιν, ἥτοι ἓν ἐστιν ἢ πολλά· οὔτε δὲ ἓν ἐστιν οὔτε πολλά, ὥς παρασταθήσεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ ἓν ἐστιν, ἥτοι ποσόν ἐστιν ἢ συνεχές ἐστιν ἢ μέγεθος ἐστιν ἢ σῶμά ἐστιν. ὃ τι δὲ ἂν ᾗ τούτων, οὐχ ἓν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ποσὸν μὲν καθεστῶς διαιρεθήσεται, συνεχές δὲ ὄν τμηθήσεται. ὁμοίως δὲ μέγεθος νοούμενον οὐκ ἔσται ἀδιαίρετον. σῶμα δὲ τυγχάνον τριπλοῦν ἔσται· καὶ γὰρ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος ἔξει. ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ μηδὲν τούτων εἶναι λέγειν τὸ ὄν·

74 οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἓν τὸ ὄν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πολλά ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐστιν ἓν, οὐδὲ πολλά ἐστιν· σύνθεσις γὰρ τῶν καθ' ἓν ἐστι τὰ πολλά, διόπερ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀναιρουμένου συναναιρεῖται καὶ τὰ πολλά.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅτι μὲν οὔτε τὸ ὄν ἔστιν οὔτε τὸ μὴ
75 ὄν ἔστιν, ἐκ τούτων συμφανές· ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀμφοτέρω ἔστιν, τό τε ὄν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, εὐεπιλόγιστον.

^a i.e. a quantity, or number, which is divisible.

the existent or out of the non-existent. But it has not been created out of the existent; for if it is existent it has not been created but exists already; nor out of the non-existent; for the non-existent cannot create anything because what is creative of anything must of necessity partake of real existence. Neither, then, is the existent created.

In the same way, it is not both together—at once 72 eternal and created; for these are destructive the one of the other, and if the existent is eternal it has not been created, while if it has been created it is not eternal. So then, if the existent is neither eternal nor created nor both at once, the existent will not exist.

Moreover, if it exists, it is either one or many; but, 73 as we shall show, it is neither one nor many; therefore the existent does not exist. For if it is one, it is either a discrete quantity^a or a continuum or a magnitude or a body. But whichever of these it be, it is not one; but if it be a discrete quantity it will be divided, and if it be a continuum it will be cut in sections; and similarly, if it be conceived as a magnitude it will not be indivisible, while if it is a body it will be threefold, for it will possess length and breadth and depth. But it is absurd to say that the existent is none of these; therefore the existent is not one. Yet neither is it many. For if it is not 74 one, neither is it many; for the many is a sum of the ones, and hence if the one is destroyed the many also are destroyed with it.

Well, then, it is plain from this that neither does the existent exist nor the non-existent exist; and that 75 they do not both exist—both the existent and the non-existent—is easy to prove. For if the non-

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εἴπερ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὄν ἔστι, ταὐτὸν ἔσται τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὄν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ εἶναι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν ἔστιν. ὅτι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁμολογον· δέδεικται δὲ ταὐτὸ τούτῳ

76 καθεστῶς τὸ ὄν· καὶ αὐτὸ τοίνυν οὐκ ἔσται. οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' εἴπερ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὄν, οὐ δύναται ἀμφοτέρα εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα, οὐ ταὐτόν, καὶ εἰ ταὐτόν, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρα. οἷς ἔπεται τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μήτε τὸ ὄν ἔστι μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν μήτε ἀμφοτέρα, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν νοεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔστιν.

77 "Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἢ τι, τοῦτο ἄγνωστόν τε καὶ ἀνεπι- νόητόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ, παρακειμένως ὑποδεικτέον. εἰ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενα, φησὶν ὁ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, τὸ ὄν οὐ φρονεῖται. καὶ κατὰ λόγον· ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς φρονουμένοις συμβεβήκεν εἶναι λευκοῖς, καὶ συμβεβήκει τοῖς λευκοῖς φρονεῖσθαι, οὕτως εἰ τοῖς φρονουμένοις συμβεβήκει μὴ εἶναι οὖσι, κατ' ἀνάγκην συμβήσεται τοῖς οὖσι μὴ φρονεῖσθαι.

78 διόπερ ὑγιὲς καὶ σῶζον τὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἐστὶ τὸ "εἰ τὰ φρονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, τὸ ὄν οὐ φρονεῖται." τὰ δὲ γε φρονούμενα (προληπτέον γάρ) οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, ὥς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὄν φρονεῖται. καὶ ὅτι τὰ φρονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, συμφανές· εἰ γὰρ τὰ φρονουμένά ἐστιν ὄντα, πάντα τὰ φρονούμενα ἔστιν, καὶ ὅπῃ ἂν τις αὐτὰ φρονήσῃ. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπεμφαῖνον· [εἰ δὲ ἐστι, φαῦλον.] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν φρονῇ τις ἄνθρωπον ἱπτάμενον ἢ ἄρματα ἐν πελάγει τρέχοντα, εὐθέως

* Cf. P.H. ii. 64.

existent exists and the existent exists, the non-existent will be identical with the existent so far as regards existing ; and for this reason neither of them exists. For it is admitted that the non-existent does not exist : and it has been proved that the existent is identical therewith ; therefore it too will not exist. And what is more, if the existent is identical with the non-existent, both of them cannot exist ; for if the pair of them both exist, there is no identity, and if there is identity, there is no longer a pair. From which it follows that nothing exists : for if neither the existent exists nor the non-existent nor both, and besides these no other alternative is conceived, nothing exists.

In the next place it must be shown that even if anything exists it is unknowable and inconceivable by man. If, says Gorgias, the things thought are not existent, the existent is not thought.^a And this is logical ; for just as, if it is a property of the things thought to be white it would be a property of white things to be thought—so, if it is a property of things thought not to be existent, it will necessarily be a property of things existent not to be thought. Consequently, this is a sound and consistent syllogism—"If the things thought are not existent, the existent is not thought." But the things thought (for we must take them first) are not existent, as we shall establish ; therefore the existent is not thought. And, in fact, that the things thought are not existent is plain ; for if the things thought are existent, all the things thought exist, and in the way, too, in which one has thought them. But this is contrary to sense. For if someone thinks of a man flying or of a chariot running over the sea, it does not follow at once that a

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- ἄνθρωπος ἵπταται ἢ ἄρματα ἐν πελάγει τρέχει.
80 ὥστε οὐ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα. πρὸς τούτοις
εἰ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα, τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὐ
φρονηθήσεται. τοῖς γὰρ ἐναντίοις τὰ ἐναντία συμ-
βέβηκεν, ἐναντίον δέ ἐστι τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὄν· καὶ
διὰ τοῦτο πάντως εἰ τῷ ὄντι συμβέβηκε τὸ
φρονεῖσθαι, τῷ μὴ ὄντι συμβήσεται τὸ μὴ φρονεῖ-
σθαι. ἄτοπον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο· καὶ γὰρ Σκύλλα καὶ
Χίμαιρα καὶ πολλὰ τῶν μὴ ὄντων φρονεῖται. οὐκ
81 ἄρα τὸ ὄν φρονεῖται. ὥσπερ τε τὰ ὁρώμενα διὰ
τοῦτο ὁρατὰ λέγεται ὅτι ὁράται, καὶ τὰ ἀκουστὰ
διὰ τοῦτο ἀκουστὰ ὅτι ἀκούεται, καὶ οὐ τὰ μὲν
ὁρατὰ ἐκβάλλομεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀκούεται, τὰ δὲ ἀκουστὰ
παραπέμπομεν ὅτι οὐχ ὁράται (ἕκαστον γὰρ ὑπὸ
τῆς ἰδίας αἰσθήσεως ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλλης ὀφείλει
κρίνεσθαι), οὕτω καὶ τὰ φρονούμενα καὶ εἰ μὴ
βλέποιτο τῇ ὄψει μηδὲ ἀκούοιτο τῇ ἀκοῇ ἔσται,
82 ὅτι πρὸς τοῦ οἰκείου λαμβάνεται κριτηρίου. εἰ
οὖν φρονεῖ τις ἐν πελάγει ἄρματα τρέχειν, καὶ εἰ
μὴ βλέπει ταῦτα, ὀφείλει πιστεῦειν ὅτι ἄρματα
ἔστιν ἐν πελάγει τρέχοντα. ἄτοπον δὲ τοῦτο· οὐκ
ἄρα τὸ ὄν φρονεῖται καὶ καταλαμβάνεται.
83 Καὶ εἰ καταλαμβάνοιτο δέ, ἀνέξοιστον ἐτέρῳ.
εἰ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ὁρατὰ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκουστὰ καὶ
κοινῶς αἰσθητά, ἅπερ ἐκτὸς ὑπόκειται, τούτων τε
τὰ μὲν ὁρατὰ ὁράσει καταληπτὰ ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ
ἀκουστὰ ἀκοῇ καὶ οὐκ ἐναλλάξ, πῶς οὖν δύναται
84 ταῦτα ἐτέρῳ μηνύεσθαι; ᾧ γὰρ μηνύομεν ἔστι

man is flying or a chariot running over the sea. So that the things thought are not existent. Further- 80
 more, if the things thought are existent, the non-existent things will not be thought. For opposites are properties of opposites, and the non-existent is the opposite of the existent; and because of this, if "to be thought" is a property of the existent, "not to be thought" will most certainly be a property of the non-existent. But this is absurd; for Scylla and Chimaera and many non-existent things are thought. Therefore the existent is not thought. And just 81
 as the things seen are called visible because of the fact that they are seen, and the audible termed audible because of the fact that they are heard, and we do not reject the visible things because they are not heard, nor dismiss the audible things because they are not seen (for each object ought to be judged by its own special sense and not by another),—so also the things thought will exist, even if they should not be viewed by the sight nor heard by the hearing, because they are perceived by their own proper criterion. If, 82
 then, a man thinks that a chariot is running over the sea, even if he does not behold it he ought to believe that there exists a chariot running over the sea. But this is absurd; therefore the existent is not thought and apprehended.

And even if it should be apprehended, it is incom- 83
 municable to another person. For if the existent things are objects, externally existing, of vision and of hearing and of the senses in general, and of these the visible things are apprehensible by sight and the audible by hearing, and not conversely,—how, in this case, can these things be indicated to another person? For the means by which we indicate is 84

λόγος, λόγος δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ὑποκείμενα καὶ ὄντα· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ὄντα μηνύομεν τοῖς πέλας ἀλλὰ λόγον, ὃς ἑτερός ἐστι τῶν ὑποκειμένων. καθάπερ οὖν τὸ ὁρατὸν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀκουστὸν καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ ὑπόκειται τὸ ὄν ἐκτός, οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο
 85 λόγος ὁ ἡμέτερος· μὴ ὦν δὲ λόγος οὐκ ἂν δηλωθείη ἐτέρῳ.

Ὁ γε μὴν λόγος, φησὶν, ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν προσπιπτόντων ἡμῖν πραγμάτων συνίσταται, τουτέστι τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ χυλοῦ ἐγκυρήσεως ἐγγίνεται ἡμῖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτης τῆς ποιότητος ἐκφερόμενος λόγος, καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ χρώματος ὑποπτώσεως ὁ κατὰ τοῦ χρώματος. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐχ ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἐκτός παραστατικός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ
 86 τὸ ἐκτός τοῦ λόγου μηνυτικὸν γίνεται. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνεστι λέγειν ὅτι ὄν τρόπον τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ ἀκουστὰ ὑπόκειται, οὕτως καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὥστε δύνασθαι ἐξ ὑποκειμένου αὐτοῦ καὶ ὄντος τὰ ὑποκείμενα καὶ ὄντα μηνύεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὑπόκειται, φησὶν, ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῶν λοιπῶν ὑποκειμένων, καὶ πλείστῳ διενήνοχε τὰ ὁρατὰ σώματα τῶν λόγων· δι' ἐτέρου γὰρ ὀργάνου ληπτὸν ἐστι τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ δι' ἄλλου ὁ λόγος. οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδείκνυται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα τὴν ἀλλήλων διαδηλοῖ φύσιν.
 87 Τοιούτων οὖν παρὰ τῷ Γοργίᾳ ἠπορημένων οἴχεται ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον· τοῦ γὰρ μήτε ὄντος μήτε γνωρίζεσθαι δυναμένου μήτε ἄλλῳ παρασταθῆναι πεφυκότος οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη κριτήριον.

Οὐκ ὁλόγοι δὲ ἦσαν, ὥς προείπον, οἱ καὶ τοὺς

^a See § 46.

speech, and speech is not the real and existent things; therefore we do not indicate to our neighbours the existent things but speech, which is other than the existing realities. Thus, just as the visible thing will not become audible, and *vice versa*, so too, since the existent subsists externally, it will not become our speech; and not being speech it will not 85 be made clear to another person.

Speech moreover, as he asserts, is formed from the impressions caused by external objects, that is to say the sensibles; for from the occurrence of flavour there is produced in us the speech uttered respecting this quality, and by the incidence of colour speech respecting colour. And if this be so, it is not speech that serves to reveal the external object, but the external object that proves to be explanatory of speech. Moreover, it is not possible to assert that 86 speech subsists in the same fashion as the visible and audible things, so that the subsisting and existent things can be indicated by it as by a thing subsisting and existent. For, says he, even if speech subsists, yet it differs from the rest of subsisting things, and the visible bodies differ very greatly from spoken words; for the visible object is perceptible by one sense-organ and speech by another. Therefore speech does not manifest most of the subsisting things, just as they themselves do not make plain one another's nature.

Such, then, being the difficulties raised by Gorgias, 87 if we go by them the criterion of truth is swept away; for there can be no criterion of that which neither exists nor can be known nor is naturally capable of being explained to another person.

As I said above,^a there have been not a few who

περὶ Μητρόδωρον καὶ Ἀνάξαρχον ἔτι δὲ Μόνιμον
 88 φήσαντες ἀνηρηκέναι τὸ κριτήριον, ἀλλὰ Μητρό-
 δωρον μὲν ὅτι εἶπεν "οὐδὲν ἴσμεν, οὐδ' αὐτὸ
 τοῦτο ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἴσμεν," Ἀνάξαρχον δὲ καὶ
 Μόνιμον ὅτι σκηνογραφία ἀπέεικασαν τὰ ὄντα,
 τοῖς τε κατὰ ὕπνου ἢ μανίαν προσπίπτουσι ταῦτα
 ὁμοιωσθαι ὑπέλαβον.

89 Ἄλλ' οὗτοι μὲν τοιαύτης μετεσχῆκασι στάσεως,
 πρῶτοι δ' ἔδοξαν οἱ ἀπὸ Θάλεω φυσικοὶ τὴν περὶ
 κριτηρίου σκέψιν εἰσηγήσασθαι. καταγνόντες γὰρ
 τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν πολλοῖς ὡς ἀπίστου, τὸν λόγον
 κριτὴν τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀληθείας ἐπέστησαν· ἀφ'
 οὗ ὁρμώμενοι περὶ τε ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων διετάσσοντο, ὧν ἡ κατάληψις διὰ τῆς
 90 τούτου δυνάμεως περιγίνεται. ἔνθεν ὁ μὲν φυσι-
 κώτατος Ἀναξαγόρας ὡς ἀσθενεῖς διαβάλλων τὰς
 αἰσθήσεις "ὑπὸ ἀφαιρότητος αὐτῶν" φησὶν "οὐ
 δυνατοὶ ἴσμεν κρίνειν τὰληθές." τίθησιν τε πίστιν
 αὐτῶν τῆς ἀπιστίας τὴν παρὰ μικρὸν τῶν χρωμάτων
 ἐξαλλαγὴν· εἰ γὰρ δύο λάβοιμεν χρώματα, μέλαν
 καὶ λευκόν, εἴτα ἐκ θατέρου εἰς θάτερον κατὰ
 σταγόνα παρεκχέοιμεν, οὐ δυνήσεται ἡ ὄψις δια-
 κρίνειν τὰς παρὰ μικρὸν μεταβολάς, καίπερ πρὸς
 91 τὴν φύσιν ὑποκειμένης. τούτῳ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ δυνάμει
 καὶ ὁ Ἀσκληπιάδης εὐρίσκεται κατακεχρημένος ἐν
 τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν περὶ οἶνον δόσεως, ἐνθα¹ ἐπὶ
 ὥχρας καὶ μέλανος ἴσταται· "μιγέντων γὰρ τού-
 των" φησὶν "ἀδυνατεῖ διαγινώσκειν ἡ αἰσθησις
 εἴτε ἐν ἑστί καὶ ἀπλοῦν χρῶμα τὸ ὑποκείμενον
 εἴτε καὶ μή."

"Ὡστε ὁ μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας κοινῶς τὸν λόγον ἔφη

¹ ἐνθα cj. Bekk.: ἐνθεν mss.

have asserted that Metrodorus and Anaxarchus, and also Monimus, abolished the criterion—Metrodorus 88 because he said " We know nothing, nor do we even know the very fact that we know nothing "; and Anaxarchus and Monimus because they likened existing things to a scene-painting and supposed them to resemble the impressions experienced in sleep or madness.

Such, then, was the view in which all these men 89 shared ; but it is held that the Physicists, from Thales down, were the first to introduce the inquiry regarding the criterion. For when they had condemned sensation as being in many cases untrustworthy, they set up reason as the judge of the truth in existing things, and starting out from this they arranged their doctrines of principles and elements and the rest, the apprehension of which is gained by means of the faculty of reason. Hence the greatest of the Physi- 90 cists, Anaxagoras, in disparaging the senses on the ground of their weakness, says, "Owing to their infirmity we are unable to judge what is true." And as an assurance of their lack of sureness he alleges the gradual change in colours : for if we were to take two colours, black and white, and pour some of the one into the other drop by drop, our sense of sight will be unable to distinguish the gradual alterations although they subsist as actual facts. Asclepiades, 91 too, is found using virtually the same argument in the First Book of his *Concerning Wine-giving*, where he is dealing with the pale and the dark—" For when these," he says, " are mixed, the sense is unable to discern whether what subsists is a single and simple colour or not."

Anaxagoras, accordingly, declared that reason in

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92 κριτήριον εἶναι· οἱ δὲ Πυθαγορικοὶ τὸν λόγον μὲν φασιν, οὐ κοινῶς δέ, τὸν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων περιγινόμενον, καθάπερ ἔλεγε καὶ ὁ Φιλόλαος, θεωρητικόν τε ὄντα τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως ἔχειν τινὰ συγγένειαν πρὸς ταύτην, ἐπεὶ περ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου τὸ ὁμοιον καταλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν·

γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπάπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα διόν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἰδηλον, στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νείκος δέ γε νείκει λυγρῷ.

93 καὶ ὥς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος, ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὀψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου. ἦν δὲ ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ὑποστάσεως ἀριθμός· διὸ καὶ ὁ κριτὴς τῶν πάντων λόγος οὐκ ἀμέτοχος ὢν τῆς τούτου δυνάμεως καλοῖτο ἂν ἀριθμός.

94 καὶ τοῦτο ἐμφαίνοντες οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ ποτὲ μὲν εἰώθασι λέγειν τὸ

ἀριθμῷ δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέοικεν,

ὅτε δὲ τὸν φυσικώτατον ὀμνύναι ὄρκον οὕτωςί,

οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρα κεφαλᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν,
πηγὴν ἀενάου φύσεως ῥιζώματ' ἔχουσαν,

τὸν μὲν παραδόντα λέγοντες Πυθαγόραν (τοῦτον γὰρ ἐθεοποιοῦν), τετρακτύν δὲ ἀριθμόν τινα, ὃς ἐκ τεσσάρων τῶν πρώτων ἀριθμῶν συγκείμενος τὸν τελειότατον ἀπῆρτιζεν, ὥσπερ τὸν δέκα· ἐν γὰρ

95 καὶ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα δέκα γίνεται. ἔστι τε οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμὸς πρώτη τετρακτὺς, πηγὴ δὲ ἀενάου φύσεως λέλεκται παρόσον κατ' αὐτοὺς ὁ

general is the criterion. But the Pythagoreans declare that it is not reason in general but the reason which is attained from the sciences; even as Philolaus said that "It, being conversant with the nature of all things, possesses a certain kinship thereto, since it is the nature of like to be apprehended by like":

Verily earth by earth we behold, and water by water,
Aether divine by aether, and fire the destructive by fire,
Love, moreover, by love, and hate by dolorous hatred.

And as Posidonius says in his exposition of Plato's *Timaeus*, "Just as light is apprehended by the luciform sense of sight, and sound by the acriform sense of hearing, so also the nature of all things ought to be apprehended by its kindred reason." But the principle of the structure of all things is number; wherefore also the reason that is judge of all things may be called "number," seeing that it is not devoid of the potency thereof. And by way of indicating this the Pythagoreans are wont at one time to declare that "All things are like unto number," and at another time to swear the most natural of oaths in this form:

Nay, by the man I swear who bequeathed to our head the
Tetraktys,
Fount containing the roots of Nature ever-enduring.

By "the man who bequeathed" they mean Pythagoras (for him they deified); and by "the Tetraktys" a certain number which, being composed of the four primary numbers, makes up the most perfect number, namely the Ten; for one plus two plus three plus four amount to ten. And this number is the first Tetraktys, and it is termed the "fount of Nature ever-enduring" in

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- σύμπας κόσμος κατὰ ἀρμονίαν διοικεῖται, ἡ δὲ ἀρμονία σύστημά ἐστι τριῶν συμφωνιῶν, τῆς τε διὰ τεσσάρων καὶ τῆς διὰ πέντε καὶ τῆς διὰ πασῶν, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν συμφωνιῶν αἱ ἀναλογίαι ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις τέτταρσιν ἀριθμοῖς εὐρίσκονται, ἔν τε τῷ ἐνὶ κᾶν τῷ δύο κᾶν τῷ τρία κᾶν τῷ
- 96 τέσσαρα. ἦν γὰρ ἡ μὲν διὰ τεσσάρων συμφωνία ἐν ἐπιτρίτῳ λόγῳ κειμένη, ἡ δὲ διὰ πέντε ἐν ἡμιολίῳ, ἡ δὲ διὰ πασῶν ἐν διπλασίονι. ὅθεν ὁ μὲν τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸς τοῦ τρία ἐπίτритος ὢν, ἐπεὶ περ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ τρίτου μέρους αὐτοῦ συνίσταται, περιέσχηκε τὴν διὰ τεσσάρων συμ-
- 97 φωνίαν· ὁ δὲ τρία τοῦ δύο ἡμιόλιος ὢν, ἥ ἐκείνόν τε περιέσχηκε καὶ τὸ ἡμισυ αὐτοῦ, ἐμφαίνει τὴν διὰ πέντε συμφωνίαν· ὁ δὲ τέσσαρα τοῦ δύο καὶ ὁ δύο τῆς μονάδος διπλασίῳν καθεστὼς περιληπτί-
- 98 κός ἐστι τῆς διὰ πασῶν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ τετρακτὺς ἀναλογίαν τῶν λεχθειῶν συμφωνιῶν ὑποβάλλει, αἱ δὲ συμφωνίαι τῆς τελείου ἀρμονίας εἰσὶ συμπληρωτικαί, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τέλειον ἀρμονίαν πάντα διοικεῖται, τοῦδε χάριν πηγὴν ἀενάου φύσεως ριζώματ' ἔχουσιν εἰρήκασιν αὐτήν.
- 99 Καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῶν τεσσάρων τούτων ἀριθμῶν τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον νοεῖται, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πάντα. στιγμῆς γὰρ ρύεῖσης γραμμὴν φαντασιούμεθα, ἣτις ἐστὶ μῆκος ἀπλατές, γραμμῆς δὲ ρύεῖσης πλάτος ἐποιήσαμεν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐπιφάνειά τις ἀβαθής, ἐπιφανείας δὲ ρύεῖσης
- 100 στερεὸν ἐγένετο σῶμα. ἀλλ' ἦν γε ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς στιγμῆς ἡ μονὰς ἀδιαίρετος οὐσα, καθὼς καὶ ἡ

so far as the whole Universe, according to them, is arranged according to harmony, and harmony is a system composed of three symphonies—that of the “By-Fours,” and that of the “By-Fives,” and that of the “By-Alls”^a; and the proportions of these three symphonies are found in the four numbers just mentioned—in the one and in the two and in the three and in the four. For the “By-Fours” symphony consists 96 in the “epitrite” (4 : 3) ratio, the “By-Fives” in the ratio 3 : 2, and the “By-Alls” in the ratio 2 : 1. Hence the number four being “epitrite” in relation to three (since it is composed of three plus a third part of three) comprises the symphony “By-Fours”; and 97 the number three, being one and a half times two (in that it comprises both the two and the half of the two), discloses the “By-Fives” symphony; and the four which is double of two, and the two double of one, are fitted to comprise the “By-Alls.” Seeing, 98 then, that the Tetraktys supplies the proportion of the symphonies mentioned, and the symphonies serve to make up the perfect harmony, and according to the perfect harmony all things are arranged, on this account they have described it as “the fount containing the roots of Nature ever-enduring.”

Again, they argue that it is according to the ratios of 99 these four numbers that both body and the incorporeal are conceived—for it is by the flow of a point that we form a notion of a line, which is length without breadth, and by the flow of a line we conceive breadth, which is surface without depth, and by the flow of surface solid body is produced. But over the point stands the monad which is indivisible, 100

^a Cf. *P.H.* iii. 155, where a similar account is given of the “harmonic ratios” of the Pythagorean musical system.

στιγμή, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς γραμμῆς ὁ δύο ἀριθμός (, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ὁ τρία)¹. ποθὲν γάρ (που)² πάρεστιν ἡ γραμμή, τουτέστιν ἀπὸ σημείου ἐπὶ σημείον καὶ πάλιν ἀπὸ τούτου ἐπὶ ἄλλο σημείον. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος ὁ τέσσαρα· ἐὰν γὰρ τρισὶ σημείοις τέταρτον ἐπαιωρήσωμεν σημείον, πυραμὶς γίνεται, ὅπερ δὴ πρῶτόν ἐστι στερεοῦ σώματος σχῆμα. κατὰ λόγον οὖν ἡ τετρακτὺς πηγὴ τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως ἐστίν.

- 101 Καὶ ἄλλως, πᾶν τὸ καταλαμβανόμενον ἀνθρώπῳ, φασίν, ἥτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον· εἴαν τε δὲ σῶμα ἢ εἴαν τε καὶ ἀσώματον, οὐ χωρὶς τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐννοίας καταλαμβάνεται, τὸ μὲν σῶμα, ἐπεὶ τριχῇ διαστατὸν καθεστὼς τὸν τρία ἀριθμὸν
 102 ὑπαγορεύει. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐκ συναπτομένων ὡς πλοῖα καὶ ἀλύσεις καὶ πυργίσκοι, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἡνωμένων, ὅπερ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως συνέχεται, ὡς φυτὰ καὶ ζῶα, τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων ὡς χοροὶ καὶ στρατιαὶ καὶ ποιῖμαι. ἀλλ' εἴαν τε ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ εἴαν τε ἐξ ἡνωμένων εἴαν τε ἐκ διεστώτων, ἀριθμοὺς ἔχει παρόσον ἐκ πλειόνων
 103 συνέστηκεν. ἔτι τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν ἀπλαῖς κεῖται ποιότησι τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀθρόαις, καθάπερ τὸ μῆλον· καὶ γὰρ ποιόν³ ἔχει χρῶμα πρὸς ὄρασιν καὶ χυλὸν πρὸς γεῦσιν καὶ ὁσμὴν πρὸς ὁσφρησιν καὶ λειότητα πρὸς ἀφήν· ἃ δὴ τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐστὶ φύσεως.
 104 Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἐστὶ λόγος,

¹ <ἐπὶ . . . τρία> cf. Bekk.

² <που> cf. Bekk.

³ ποιόν NE: ποικίλον Bekk.

as is also the point, and over the line the number two; <and over the surface stands the number three> (for the line is somehow in existence), that is to say <the movement> from one point to another, and from this again to a third; and over the solid body stands the number four; for if upon the top of three points we place a fourth, there is formed a pyramid, which is in fact the first form of a solid body. Thus it is reasonable to hold that the Tetraktys is the fount of universal Nature.

Again, everything apprehended by man is, they 101 say, either body or incorporeal; but whether it be body or whether it be incorporeal, it is not apprehended apart from the conception of numbers, since, in the case of body, as it has three dimensions it involves the number three. Moreover, of bodies some are 102 composed of things joined together, like ships and cables and turrets, others of things unified, which are held together by a single mode of connexion, like plants and animals, others of separate units, like choruses and armies and herds.^a But whether they consist of things joined or of things unified or of things separate, they contain numbers in so far as they are composed of a plurality of things. And further, some bodies are substances with single 103 qualities, others with numerous qualities, as is the apple; for it possesses a certain quality of colour to the sight and of flavour to the taste and of odour to the smell and of smoothness to the touch; and these belong to the nature of numbers.

The same argument applies to the case of incor- 104

^a Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 78 ff.

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εἶγε καὶ χρόνος ἀσώματος τῷ ἀριθμῷ λαμβάνεται, ὡς ἔστι συμφανὲς ἀπὸ ἐνιαυτῶν τε καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἡμερῶν καὶ ὥρῶν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ στιγμή καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπιφάνεια, καὶ τὰλλα περὶ ὧν καὶ μικρῷ πρόσθεν διελέχθημεν, συνάγοντες καὶ τὰς τούτων νοήσεις εἰς ἀριθμούς.

- 105 Συνάδειν δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις φασὶ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν βίον, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας πράγματα. ὁ τε γὰρ βίος ἕκαστον κρίνει κριτηρίοις ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ μέτρα. ἐὰν γοῦν ἀνέλωμεν τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἀναιρεθήσεται μὲν πῆχυς ἐκ δυοῖν ἡμιπηχείων καὶ παλαιστῶν ἕξ καὶ δακτύλων εἰκο-
106 σιτεσσάρων συγκείμενος, ἀναιρεθήσεται δὲ μέδιμνος καὶ τάλαντον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν κριτηρίων· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα ἐκ πλειόνων συνεστῶτα εὐθὺς ἀριθμοῦ ἐστὶν εἶδη. ὅθεν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τούτῳ συνέχεται, δάνεια μαρτυρίαι ψῆφοι συγγραφαὶ χρόνοι περίοδοι. καὶ καθόλου τῶν ἀμηχάνων ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν τι κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀμοιροῦν τούτου.

- Πᾶσά γε μὴν τέχνη οὐ χωρὶς ἀναλογίας συνέστη, ἀναλογία δ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ κείται· πᾶσα ἄρα τέχνη δι'
107 ἀριθμοῦ συνέστη. Ῥόδιοι γοῦν, ὡς φασίν, ἐπύθοντο Χάρητος τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος πόσον δαπανηθήσεται χρῆμα πρὸς κατασκευὴν τοῦ κολοσσοῦ. ὀρίσαντος δὲ αὐτοῦ τι, πάλιν ἐπηρώτων πόσον δέ, εἰ θέλοιεν διπλασίονα κατὰ μέγεθος αὐτὸν κατασκευάσαι. τοῦ δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον αἰτήσαντος οἱ μὲν ἔδοσαν, ὁ δ' εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ προκεντήματα
108 δαπανήσας τὸ δοθὲν ἑαυτὸν ἀνείλεν. θανόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ συνείδον οἱ τεχνῖται ὡς οὐ διπλάσιον ἐχρῆν ἀλλ' ὀκταπλάσιον αἰτῆσαι· οὐ γὰρ μῆκος μόνον

^a For this use of βίος cf. *P.H.* li. 15.

poreals also, seeing that time, which is incorporeal, is perceived by number, as is plain from the years and months and days and hours. So likewise are the point and line and surface and the rest of the things we were discussing a moment ago, when we traced back the notions of them to numbers.

The practice of ordinary life^a too, they assert, is 105 in unison with the views thus stated, as is also the practice of the arts. For ordinary life judges each thing by criteria, and these are numerical standards. And certainly, if we abolish number, the cubit will be abolished, which consists of two half-cubits and six palms and twenty-four fingers, and the bushel will be abolished and the talent and the rest of the criteria ; for all these, as composed of a plurality of elements, are at once species of number. Hence all the other 106 things, too, are bound up with number—loans, evidences, votes, contracts, times, periods. And in general, it is impossible to find anything in ordinary experience that does not participate in number.

And assuredly there is no art or craft that has been built up without proportion, and proportion is based on number ; so that every art is built up by means of number. Thus the Rhodians, it is said, asked Chares 107 the architect how much money it would cost to construct the Colossus. And when he had named a figure, they asked again how much it would be if they wished to construct it twice that size. And when he asked double the sum, they gave it to him ; but he, when he had spent the sum given on the first stages of the work and the preliminary expenses, slew himself. And when he was dead the craftsmen 108 became aware that he ought to have asked not double but eight times the sum, for he was bound to enlarge

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ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσαν διάστασιν ὥφειλε μεγεθοποιεῖν
 τοῦ δημιουργήματος. ὥστε ἀναλογία τις ἔστιν ἐν
 πλαστικῇ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν ζωγραφίᾳ, δι' ἣν
 109 ὁμοιότης¹ κατ' ἀπαραλλαξίαν κατορθοῦται. κοινῶ
 τε λόγῳ πᾶσα τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων,
 τὸ δὲ σύστημα ἀριθμός. τοίνυν ὑγιὲς τὸ

ἀριθμῶ δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέοικεν,

τουτέστι τῷ κρίνουντι λόγῳ καὶ ὁμοιογενεῖ τοῖς τὰ
 πάντα συνεστακόσιν ἀριθμοῖς.
 110 Ταῦτα μὲν οἱ Πυθαγορικοί· Ξενοφάνης δὲ κατὰ
 τοὺς ὡς ἐτέρως αὐτὸν ἐξηγουμένους, ὅταν λέγῃ

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὐ τις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις
 ἔσται

εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
 εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,
 αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται,

φαίνεται μὴ πᾶσαν κατάληψιν ἀναιρεῖν ἀλλὰ τὴν
 ἐπιστημονικὴν τε καὶ ἀδιάπτωτον, ἀπολείπειν δὲ
 τὴν δοξαστήν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμφαίνει τὸ “δόκος δ'
 ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.” ὥστε κριτήριον γίνεσθαι
 κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν δοξαστὸν λόγον, τουτέστι τὸν
 τοῦ εἰκότος ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν τοῦ παγίου ἐχόμενον.

111 Ὁ δὲ γνώριμος αὐτοῦ Παρμενίδης τοῦ μὲν
 δοξαστοῦ λόγον κατέγνω, φημὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀσθενεῖς
 ἔχοντος ὑπολήψεις, τὸν δ' ἐπιστημονικόν, τουτέστι
 τὸν ἀδιάπτωτον, ὑπέθετο κριτήριον, ἀποστὰς καὶ
 τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων πίστεως. ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν
 τοῦ περὶ φύσεως γράφει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

¹ ὁμοιότης L.E (-τητος N): ὁμοιότητα Bekk.

not only the length but also every other dimension of the structure. So that there exists in the plastic art, and likewise in painting, a certain proportion whereby unvarying resemblance is preserved. And, 109 to speak generally, every art is a system composed of apprehensions, and system is number. Hence it is a sound saying that "all things are like unto number,"—that is, like unto the reason that judges and is akin to the numbers which compose all things.

Such is the doctrine of the Pythagoreans. But 110 Xenophanes, according to those who interpret him differently,^a when he says—

Yet, with respect to the gods and what I declare about all things,

No man has seen what is clear nor ever will any man know it.

Nay, for e'en should he chance to affirm what is really existent,

He himself knoweth it not; for all is swayed by opining,—

does not appear to be abolishing every apprehension, but only that which is cognitive^b and inerrant, while admitting that which is opinionative; for this is what the sentence "all is swayed by opining" indicates. So that according to him the opinionative reason—that is to say, the reason which holds to the probable but not to the certain—is the criterion.

But his friend Parmenides rejected the opinionative 111 reason—I mean that which has weak conceptions,—and assumed as criterion the cognitive—that is, the inerrant—reason, as he also gave up belief in the senses. Thus in the opening of his work *On Nature* he writes in this fashion:

^a *i.e.* who interpret X. otherwise than Sotion, as quoted in § 49 *supra*.

^b *i.e.* affording absolute knowledge of the truth.

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ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἰκάνοι,
πέμπον, ἐπεὶ μ' ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον
ἄγουσαι

δαίμονος, ἥ κατὰ πάντα σαφῆ¹ φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα.
τῇ φερόμην· τῇ γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι
ἄρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ' ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον.
ἄξων δ' ἐν χνοιῇσιν ἴει σύριγγος αὐτὴν
αἰθόμενος· δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπείγετο δινωτοῖσιν
κύκλοις ἀμφοτέρωθεν, ὅτε σπερχοίατο πέμπειν
Ἑλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα νυκτός,
εἰς φάος, ὡσάμεναι κρατῶν ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας,
ἔνθα πύλαι νυκτός τε καὶ ἡματός εἰσι κελεύθων,
καὶ σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός·
αὐταὶ δ' αἰθέραι πληνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτροις.
τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληίδας ἀμοιβούς.
τὴν δὴ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν
πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως ὥς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὀχῆα
ἀπτερέως ὥσειε πυλέων ἄπο. ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων
χάσμ' ἀχανὲς ποίησαν ἀναπτάμεναι, πολυχάλ-
κους

ἄξοντας ἐν σύριγγιν ἀμοιβαδὸν εἰλίξασαι,
γόμφοις καὶ περόνησιν ἀρηρότε· τῇ² ῥά δι' αὐτῶν
ἰθὺς ἔχον κοῦραι κατ' ἀμαξιτὸν ἄρμα καὶ ἵππους.
καὶ με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρὶ
δεξιτερὴν ἔλεν, ὦδε δ' ἔπος φάτο καὶ με
προσηύδα.

ὦ κοῦρ' ἀθανάτησι συνήγορος ἡνιόχοισιν
ἵπποις θ' αἶ σε φέρουσιν, ἰκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ

¹ πάντα σαφῆ Brandia: πάντα τῇ EL, Bekk.: πάντ' ἄσση N.

² ἀρηρότε· τῇ Bergk: ἀρηρότα· τῇ MSS.: ἀρηρότας. ἢ Bekk.

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS, I. 111

Far as the soul can aspire have the steeds that hurry me
 forward
 Brought me, seeing that now on the far-famed road they
 have set me,
 Road of the *Daemon* which all-whither leadeth the truth-
 witting mortal.
 By that road was I drawn ; for the fam'd steeds drew me
 by that road
 Pulling the chariot amain ; and damsels guided my going,
 Glowing within its nave the axle sang like a reed-pipe—
 Furnish'd on either side with a pair of wheels well-rounded—
 Whenas the Sun-born damsels in haste proceeded to bring
 me
 Into the sun-light, leaving behind them the chambers of
 Darkness,
 When with their hands they had stript from their heads
 the mantles that veiled them.
 There are the gates dividing the ways of Day-time and
 Night-time,
 Gates which are holden around by a lintel and threshold
 of marble ;
 High in the air they stand and with doors immense are
 they furnish'd ;
 Justice, dealer of dooms, doth keep the keys which unlock
 them.
 Her the damsels addressing with soft and flattering speeches
 Artfully won her consent to push the bolted cross-bar
 Back from the gates ; and whenas the gates swung wide
 in the door-way,
 Vast was the chasm they caused as they set the hinges
 revolving,
 Each in its socket on either side,—of bronze were the hinges,
 Fitted with bolts and with nails of bronze. So then through
 the gate-way
 Straight did the damsels drive their horses and car on the
 high-road,
 Graciously then did the goddess receive me, taking my right
 hand
 Clasp'd in her own, and this was the speech wherewith she
 address'd me :
 " Youth, who hast for thy fellows immortal chariot-drivers,
 Now thou hast come to our halls, both thou and the horses
 that speed thee,

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χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προύπεμπε
 νέεσθαι
 τήνδ' ὁδὸν (ἥ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου
 ἐστίν)
 ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα
 πυθέσθαι,
 ἡμὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμές ἥτορ
 ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνί πίστις ἀληθής.
 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἰργε νόημα,
 μηδέ σ' ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατά τήνδε
 βιάσθω
 νωμῶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἡχέεσαν ἀκουήν
 καὶ γλώσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύπειρον¹ ἔλεγχον
 ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα. μόνος δ' ἔτι θυμὸς ὁδοῖο
 λείπεται.

- 112 Ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὁ Παρμενίδης ἵππους μὲν φησιν
 αὐτὸν φέρειν τὰς ἀλόγους τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρμάς τε καὶ
 ὀρέξεις, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολύφημον ὁδὸν τοῦ δαίμονος
 πορεύεσθαι τὴν κατὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον λόγον θεωρίαν,
 ὃς λόγος προπόμπου δαίμονος τρόπον ἐπὶ τὴν
 ἀπάντων ὁδηγεῖ γνῶσιν. κούρας δ' αὐτοῦ προάγειν
 τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ὧν τὰς μὲν ἀκοὰς αἰνίττεται ἐν τῷ
 λέγειν "δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπείγετο δινωτοῖσι κύκλοις,"
 τουτέστι τοῖς τῶν ὠτων, τὴν φωνὴν δι' ὧν κατα-
 113 δέχονται, τὰς δὲ ὁράσεις Ἡλιάδας κούρας κέκληκε,
 δώματα μὲν νυκτὸς ἀπολιπούσας, ἐς φάος δὲ ὥσα-
 μένας διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρὶς φωτὸς γίνεσθαι τὴν χρῆσιν
 αὐτῶν. ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν πολύποιον ἐλθεῖν δίκην καὶ
 ἔχουσαν κληίδας ἀμοιβούς, τὴν διάνοιαν ἀσφαλεῖς
 114 ἔχουσαν τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων καταλήψεις. ἥτις

¹ πολύπειρον MSS. : πολύδηριν Bekk.

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS, I. 111-114

Hail! since the doom was no evil doom that prompted thy
journey

Hither (for far does it lie from the ways that are trodden
of mortals),

Nay, but justice and right. Thy task is now to discover
Truth's unshakable heart, which fitly induces persuasion,
Mortals' opinions, to boot, which are empty of true con-
viction.

Nay, but I bid thee restrain thy mind from this path of
inquiry,

Nor let habit oft-tried along this pathway impel thee,
Eye unobservant to ply and tongue and echoing ear-drum,
But use reason to judge the oft-tried proof which refutes
them

Utter'd by me. For the heart when alone still misseth the
pathway."

In these verses Parmenides means that the steeds 112
which take him along are the irrational impulses and
appetites of the soul, and that "the far-famed road
of the Daemon" they travel is that of investigation
according to philosophical reason, which reason, like
a Divine conductor, points the way to the knowledge
of all things. And the damsels that lead him on are
the senses, the reports of which he indicates in
riddling wise by saying "It was furnish'd with a pair
of well-rounded wheels," that is with those of the
ears, by means of which they receive sound; and the 113
acts of vision he calls "Sun-born damsels," which
"leave the chambers of Darkness" and "thrust into
the light" because it is impossible to make use of
them without light. And the approach to "Justice,
dealer of dooms," which holds "the keys which unlock
them," is that to intelligence which holds safe the
apprehensions of things. And she, after welcoming 114

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αὐτὸν ὑποδεξαμένη ἐπαγγέλλεται δύο ταῦτα διδά-
 ξειν, ἡμὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμές ἡτορ, ὅπερ
 ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀμετακίνητον βῆμα, ἕτερον
 δὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐν πίστις ἀληθῆς,
 τουτέστι τὸ ἐν δόξῃ κείμενον πᾶν, ὅτι τὴν ἀβέβαιον.
 καὶ ἐπὶ τέλει προσδιασαφεῖ τὸ μὴ δεῖν ταῖς
 αἰσθήσεσι προσέχειν ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ· μὴ γάρ σε,
 φησὶν, ἔθος πολὺπειρον ὁδὸν κάτα τήνδε βιάσθω
 νωμῶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἡχῆεσαν ἀκουὴν καὶ
 γλῶσσαν, κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ πολὺπειρον ἔλεγχον ἐξ
 ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.

- Ἄλλ' οὗτος μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὥς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
 συμφανές, τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον κανόνα τῆς ἐν
 τοῖς οὖσιν ἀληθείας ἀναγορεύσας ἀπέστη τῆς τῶν
 115 αἰσθήσεων ἐπιστάσεως· Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ ὁ Ἄκρα-
 γαντῖνος κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἀπλούστερον δοκοῦντας
 αὐτὸν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἐξ κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας παρα-
 δίδωσιν. δύο γὰρ δραστηρίους τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὰς
 ὑποθέμενος, φιλίαν καὶ νεῖκος, ἅμα τε τῶν τεσσά-
 ρων μνησθεὶς ὡς ὑλικῶν, γῆς τε καὶ ὕδατος καὶ
 αἰέρος καὶ πυρός, πάσας ταύτας ἔφη κριτήρια
 116 τυγχάνειν. παλαιὰ γάρ τις, ὡς προείπον, ἄνωθεν
 παρὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς κυλίστα δόξα περὶ τοῦ τὰ
 ὅμοια τῶν ὁμοίων εἶναι γνωριστικά· καὶ ταύτης
 ἔδοξε μὲν καὶ Δημόκριτος κεκομικέναι τὰς παρα-
 μυθίας, ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ Πλάτων αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ
 117 παρεψαυκέναι. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος ἐπὶ τε τῶν
 ἐμφύχων καὶ ἀψύχων ἴσθησι τὸν λόγον. καὶ γὰρ
 ζῶα, φησὶν, ὁμογενέσι ζώοις συναγελάζεται, ὡς
 περιστεραὶ περιστεραῖς καὶ γέρανοι γέρανοις, καὶ
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλόγων· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν

him, promises to teach him two things—"Truth's unshakable heart which fitly induces persuasion," which is the immovable seat of knowledge, and secondly "mortal men's opinions which are empty of true conviction," that is to say everything which consists in opinion because all such things are unsure. And at the end he again makes it clear that one must not pay attention to the senses but to the reason; for he says "Let not habit oft-tried along this pathway impel thee, Eye unobservant to ply and tongue and echoing ear-drum, But use reason to judge the oft-tried proof which refutes them Utter'd by me."

This man himself, then, as is plain from his statements, proclaimed the cognitive reason to be the standard of truth in things existing and gave up paying attention to the senses. But Empedocles of 115 Acragas, according to those who seem to interpret him most simply, offers us six criteria of truth. For having laid down two efficient principles of all things, Love and Strife, and having at the same time designated as material principles the four—earth and water and air and fire,—he declared that all these are criteria. For, as I said before,^a there is an old 116 opinion, dating from far back, which is prevalent among the Physicists to the effect that like things are cognitive of like; Democritus too seems to have brought a confirmation of this opinion, and Plato also seems to have introduced it in his *Timæus*. But, on 117 the one hand, Democritus bases his argument on both animate and inanimate things. "For animals," he says, "flock together with animals of a like species, as doves with doves and cranes with cranes, and so too all other irrational animals." And it is the same with

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- ἀψύχων, καθάπερ ὁρᾶν πάρεστιν ἐπὶ τε τῶν
κοσκινευομένων σπερμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ ταῖς
κυματωγαῖς ψηφίδων· ὅπου μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ
κοσκίνου δῖνον διακριτικῶς φακοὶ μετὰ φακῶν
τάσσονται καὶ κριθαὶ μετὰ κριθῶν καὶ πυροὶ μετὰ
118 πυρῶν, ὅπου δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ κύματος κίνησιν αἱ
μὲν ἐπιμήκεις ψηφίδες εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον ταῖς
ἐπιμήκεσιν ὠθοῦνται, αἱ δὲ περιφερεῖς ταῖς περι-
φερέσιν, ὥς ἂν συναγωγόν τι ἐχούσης τῶν πραγ-
μάτων τῆς ἐν τούτοις ὁμοιότητος.
- 119 Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος οὕτως, Πλάτων δὲ ἐν
τῷ Τιμαίῳ πρὸς παράστασιν τοῦ ἀσώματος εἶναι
τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει τῆς ἀποδείξεως κέχρηται.
εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὄρασις, φησί, φωτὸς ἀντιλαμβανομένη
εὐθύς ἐστι φωτοειδής, ἡ δὲ ἀκοή ἀέρα πεπληγμένον
κρίνουσα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὴν φωνήν, εὐθύς ἀεροειδής
θεωρεῖται, ἡ δὲ ὀσφρησις ἀτμοὺς γνωρίζουσα πάν-
τως ἐστὶν ἀτμοειδής καὶ ἡ γεῦσις χυλοὺς χυλοειδής,
κατ' ἀνάγκην καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰς ἀσωμάτους ἰδέας
λαμβάνουσα, καθάπερ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ
τὰς ἐν τοῖς πέρασι τῶν σωμάτων, γίνεται τις ἀ-
σώματος.
- 120 Τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης παρὰ τοῖς προγενεστέροις
δόξης, ἔοικε καὶ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ταύτῃ συμπερι-
φέρεσθαι, ἔξ τε οὐσῶν τῶν τὰ πάντα συνεστακυῶν
ἀρχῶν λέγειν ἰσάριθμα ταύταις ὑπάρχειν τὰ
κριτήρια, δι' ὧν γέγραφε
- 121 γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὁπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,
αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα διόν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἰδηλον,
στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νεῖκος δέ τε νεῖκει λυγρῷ,
ἐμφαίνων ὥς γῆν μὲν καταλαμβανόμεθα μετουσίᾳ

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- γῆς, ὕδωρ δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν ὕδατος, ἀέρα δὲ μετουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀέρος, καὶ ἐπὶ πυρὸς τὸ ἀνάλογον.
 122 ἄλλοι δὲ ἦσαν οἱ λέγοντες κατὰ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα κριτήριον εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀλλὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, τοῦ δὲ ὀρθοῦ λόγου τὸν μὲν τινα θεῖον ὑπάρχειν τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπινον, ὦν τὸν μὲν θεῖον ἀνέξοιστον εἶναι τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπινον
 123 ἐξοιστόν. λέγει δὲ περὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὴν κρίσιν τάληθοῦς ὑπάρχειν οὕτως·

στενωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται, πολλὰ δὲ δεῖλ' ἔμπαια, τά τ' ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας.

παῦρον δὲ ζωῆς ἀβίου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες, ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν, αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος, πάντοσ' ἐλαυνόμενοι. τὸ δ' ὅλον (μάψ)' εὐχεται εὐρεῖν.

οὕτως οὐτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τὰδ' ἀνδράσιν οὐτ' ἐπακουστά

οὔτε νόψ περιληπτὰ.

- 124 περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ παντελὲς ἄληπτον τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἰκνεῖται ὁ ἀνθρώπινος λόγος ληπτὴν ὑπάρχειν, διασαφεῖ τοῖς προκειμένοις ἐπιφέρων

σὺ δ' οὖν ἐπεὶ ᾧδ' ἐλιάσθης,

πεύσεαι, οὐ πλείον γε βροτεῖη μῆτις ὅπωπεν.¹

καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐξῆς ἐπιπλήξας τοῖς πλέον ἐπαγγελλομένοις γινώσκειν, παρίστησιν ὅτι τὸ δι' ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως λαμβανόμενον πιστόν ἐστι, τοῦ λόγου τούτων ἐπιστατοῦντος, καίπερ πρό-

¹ <μάψ> Stein.

² ὅπωπεν Panzerbieter: ὄρωρεν MSS., Bekk.

by participation in earth and water by partaking in water, and air by participation in air, and similarly in the case of fire. But there have been others who 122 have asserted that according to Empedocles the criterion of truth is not the senses but right reason, and of right reason one sort is divine, the other human. And of these the divine sort is inexpressible, but the human sort expressible. As regards the fact 123 that the judgement of truth does not reside in the senses he speaks thus :

Strutten'd in sooth are the powers which lie dispersed in
our members,
 Many the plagues which thwart them, and blunt the edge
 of our thinking.
 Short is the span of unlivable life beholden by mortals,
 Swift is their doom, as, whirl'd like smoke, they are lifted
 and vanish,
 Each persuaded only of what himself has encounter'd,
 Carried about all ways ; yet each keeps foolishly boasting
 How he has found the Whole. So far from human percep-
 tion
 Lie these things, out of reach of the sense of vision or
 hearing,
 And of the grasp of the mind.

And as regards the fact that truth is not altogether 124 unattainable, but is really attainable so far as the reason of man can reach, he makes this clear when to the foregoing verses he adds this :

But since thou hast hither retreated,
 Thou shalt be told not more than mortal wit has discovered.

And in what follows, after rebuking those who profess they know more, he tries to establish that the thing perceived by each sense is trustworthy, as the reason is in control of them, although he had previ-

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τερον καταδραμὼν τῆς ἀπ' αὐτῶν πίστεως.
125 φησὶ γὰρ

ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης,
ἐκ δ' ὁσίων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε
πηγὴν.

καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκῶλενε παρθένε μοῦσα,
ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,
πέμπε παρ' εὐσεβείης ἐλάουσ' εὐήνιον ἄρμα·
μηδὲ σέ γ' εὐδόξοιο βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς
πρὸς θνατῶν ἀνελέσθαι ἐφ' ᾧ θ' ὁσίης πλέον
εἰπεῖν

θάρσει καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίης ἐπ' ἄκροισι θαάζειν.
ἀλλ' ἄγ' ἄθρει πάσῃ παλάμῃ πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον,
μήτε τιν' ὄψιν ἔχων πιστὴν πλέον ἢ κατ' ἀκουήν
ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης,
μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὅποσῃ πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι,
γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ' ἡ δῆλον ἕκαστον.

126 Τοιαῦτα μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἑμπεδοκλῆς· ὁ δὲ Ἡρά-
κλειτος, ἐπεὶ πάλιν ἐδόκει δυσὶν ὤργανῶσθαι ὁ
ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας γνῶσιν, αἰσθήσει
τε καὶ λόγῳ, τούτων τὴν μὲν αἰσθησιν παρα-
πλησίως τοῖς προειρημένοις φυσικοῖς ἄπιστον εἶναι
νενόμικεν, τὸν δὲ λόγον ὑποτίθεται κριτήριον.
ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν αἰσθησιν ἐλέγχει λέγων κατὰ λέξιν
“κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα
βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων,” ὅπερ ἴσον ἦν τῷ βαρ-
βάρων ἐστὶ ψυχῶν ταῖς ἀλόγοις αἰσθήσεσι πισ-
127 τεύειν. τὸν δὲ λόγον κριτὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπο-
φαίνεται οὐ τὸν ὁποιονδήποτε ἀλλὰ τὸν κοινὸν καὶ

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS, I. 124-127

ously run down the evidence supplied by them. For 125
he says :

Nay, ye gods, avert from my tongue the madness of those
men,
And nuke flow pure rivers of speech from lips that are
holy.

Thee, too, now I beseech, O Muse white-armed and virgin,
Courtèd by many : thy car well-reined from Piety's dwell-
ing

Drive, and bring to me all that is meet to be told unto
mortals ;

Nor shalt thou ever be forced to receive from hands that
are mortal

Flowers of glorious honour for uttering more than is holy
Over-bold, and to gain thus a seat on the summits of
wisdom.

Come, then, with each of thy powers discern each manifest
object,

Putting no greater trust in the sight of the eye than in
hearing,

Nor in the echoing car above the clear witness of tongue's
taste ;

Nor from the rest of the parts wherein are the channels
of knowledge

Hold thou back thy trust, but mark each manifestation.

Such, then, are the views of Empedocles. And 126
Heracleitus—since he again supposed that man is
furnished with two organs for gaining knowledge of
truth, namely sensation and reason—held, like the
Physicists mentioned above, that of these organs
sensation is untrustworthy, and assumes reason as
the criterion. Sensation he convicts by saying ex-
pressly, " Ill witnesses for men are eyes and ears
when they have barbarous souls," which is equivalent
to saying " To trust in the irrational senses is the part
of barbarous souls." And he declares reason to be 127
the judge of truth—not, however, any and every
kind of reason, but that which is " common " and

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θεῖον. τίς δ' ἐστὶν οὗτος, συντόμως ὑποδεικτέον.
ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ φυσικῷ τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς λογικόν
128 τε ὄν καὶ φρενήρες. ἐμφαίνει δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο πολὺ
πρόσθεν Ὁμηρος εἰπὼν

τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
οἷον ἐπ' ἡμᾶρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος δέ φησι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοιαῦτα
φρονεῖν

ὁποίῃν Ζεὺς ἐφ' ἡμέρην ἄγει.

εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ τὸ αὐτό·

ὅστις ποτ' εἴ σὺ δυστόπαστος εἰσιδεῖν
Ζεὺς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν,
ἐπευξάμην σε.

129 τοῦτον δὴ τὸν θεῖον λόγον καθ' Ἡράκλειτον δι'
ἀναπνοῆς σπᾶσαντες νοεροὶ γινόμεθα, καὶ ἐν μὲν
ὑπνοῖς ληθαῖοι, κατὰ δὲ ἔγερσιν πάλιν ἔμφρονες.
ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὑπνοῖς μυσάντων τῶν αἰσθητικῶν
πόρων χωρίζεται τῆς πρὸς τὸ περιέχον συμφυῆς
ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς, μόνης τῆς κατὰ ἀναπνοὴν προσ-
φύσεως σωζομένης οἷονεῖ τινος ῥίζης, χωρισθεὶς
τε ἀποβάλλει τὴν πρότερον εἶχε μνημονικὴν δύνα-
130 μιν· ἐν δὲ ἐγρηγορόσι πάλιν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν
πόρων ὥσπερ διὰ τινων θυρίδων προκύψας καὶ τῷ
περιέχοντι συμβαλὼν λογικὴν ἐνδύεται δύναμιν.
ὥνπερ οὖν τρόπον οἱ ἄνθρακες πλησιάσαντες τῷ
πυρὶ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν διάπυροι γίνονται, χωρισ-
θέντες δὲ σβέννυνται, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐπιξενωθεῖσα
τοῖς ἡμετέροις σώμασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος μοῖρα

divine. But what this is must be explained concisely. It is a favourite tenet of the Physicist that "What encompasses us is rational and intelligent." And, 128 long before, Homer had expressed this when he says^a:

As is the day which upon them is brought by the sire
immortal,
So are the minds of mortal men.

Archilochus, too, says that the thoughts men think are "Such as the day which Zeus doth bring about." And the same thing has also been said by Euripides^b:

To see and know thee, who thou art, O Zeus,
Doth baffle wit! Art thou Necessity
Of Nature? Or mankind's Intelligence?
Howbeit, I invoke thee.

It is then by drawing in by inspiration this divine 129 reason that, according to Heraclitus, we become intelligent, and while forgetful during sleep become sensible again on waking. For during sleep, as the passages of the senses are closed, the mind within us is cut off from its natural union with the enveloping substance—only the connexion by way of respiration, like that of a root, being preserved—and being thus parted it loses the power of memory which it previously possessed; but on waking it stretches out 130 again through the passages of sense, as it were through windows, and by junction with the enveloping substance is invested with the power of reason. Thus, just as cinders when put close to the fire are altered and become ignited, but are extinguished when put at a distance, in like manner the fraction of the enveloping substance that stays as a stranger in our bodies becomes well-nigh irrational owing to

^a Hom. *Odys.* xviii. 136-137; cf. *P.H.* iii. 244.

^b Eur. *Troad.* 885.

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- κατὰ μὲν τὸν χωρισμὸν σχεδὸν ἄλογος γίνεται,
κατὰ δὲ τὴν διὰ τῶν πλείστων πόρων σύμφυσιν
131 ὁμοιοειδῆς τῷ ὄλῳ καθίσταται. τοῦτον δὴ τὸν
κοινὸν λόγον καὶ θεῖον, καὶ οὐ κατὰ μετοχὴν γινώ-
μεθα λογικοί, κριτήριον ἀληθείας φησὶν ὁ Ἡρά-
κλειτος. ὅθεν τὸ μὲν κοινῇ πᾶσι φαινόμενον, τοῦτ'
εἶναι πιστόν (τῷ κοινῷ γὰρ καὶ θείῳ λόγῳ λαμ-
βάνεται), τὸ δὲ τινι μόνῳ προσπίπτον ἀπιστον
132 ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὴν ἐναντίαν αἰτίαν. ἐναρχόμενος
οὖν τῶν περὶ φύσεως ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ, καὶ
τρόπον τινὰ δεικνὺς τὸ περιέχον, φησὶ "λόγου
τοῦδε ἔοντος ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι, καὶ
πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι, καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον.
γινομένων γὰρ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἄπειροι
εἰκόασι πειρώμενοι ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων
ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγέσθαι, κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκα-
στον καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους
ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν,
133 ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὖδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται." διὰ
τούτων γὰρ ῥητῶς παραστήσας ὅτι κατὰ μετοχὴν
τοῦ θείου λόγου πάντα πράττομέν τε καὶ νοοῦμεν,
ὀλίγα προσδιελθὼν ἐπιφέρει "διὸ δεῖ ἔπесθαι τῷ
ἔξινῳ", τουτέστι τῷ) κοινῷ. ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός.
"τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἔοντος ξυνοῦ, ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς
ιδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν." ἡ δ' ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι
ἀλλ' ἐξήγησις τοῦ τρόπου τῆς τοῦ παντός διοική-
σεως. διὸ καθ' ὃ τι ἂν αὐτοῦ τῆς μνήμης κοινωνή-

¹ ἔξινῳ . . . τῷ) ej. Bekk.

the separation, but through its union by means of its numerous passages it is made like in kind to the Whole. Heracleitus, then, asserts that this common 131 and divine reason, by participation in which we become rational, is the criterion of truth. Hence, that which appears to all in common is trustworthy (for it is perceived by the common and divine reason), but that which affects one person alone is, for the opposite cause, untrustworthy. Thus the man above-men- 132 tioned declares at the beginning of his work *On Nature*, pointing in a fashion to the enveloping substance—"Of this existent Reason men are without comprehension, both before they have heard of it and when they have heard of it for the first time; for they are like unto men without experience of the things which happen according to this reason when they experience such words and deeds as I relate, when I define each thing according to its nature and declare what its condition is. But as to the rest of mankind, all the things which they do when awake escape their notice, even as they forget all when asleep." For having in these words expressly argued 133 that we do and think everything through participation in the divine reason, after proceeding a little further, he adds, "Wherefore one must follow the comprehensive," that is the "common" (for "comprehensive" means "common")^a; "and though reason is comprehensive most people live as though they possessed a private intelligence of their own." And this is nothing else than an explanation of the mode of arrangement of the Whole. Therefore in so far as we share in the memory of that reason we say

II. evidently intends a play on the words ἀξίοντοι (in § 132) and ἐνός, I render the latter "comprehensive."

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- σωμεν, ἀληθεύομεν, ἃ δὲ ἂν ἰδιάσωμεν, ψευδόμεθα.
- 134 νῦν γὰρ ῥητότατα καὶ ἐν τούτοις τὸν κοινὸν λόγον
κριτήριον ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ τὰ μὲν κοινῇ φησὶ
φαινόμενα πιστὰ ὥς ἂν τῷ κοινῷ κρινόμενα λόγῳ,
τὰ δὲ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐκάστῳ ψευδῇ.
- 135 Τοιόσδε μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος· Δημόκριτος δὲ
ὅτε¹ μὲν ἀναιρεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, καὶ
τούτων λέγει μηδὲν φαίνεσθαι κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀλλὰ
μόνον κατὰ δόξαν, ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσις ὑπ-
άρχειν τὸ ἀτόμους εἶναι καὶ κενόν. “νόμῳ” γάρ
φησι “γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ πικρόν, νόμῳ θερμόν, νόμῳ
ψυχρόν, νόμῳ χροιή· ἑτεῇ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν.”
ὅπερ ἔστι, νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ
αἰσθητά, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ
- 136 τὰ ἄτομα μόνον καὶ τὸ κενόν. ἐν δὲ τοῖς Κρατυν-
τηρίοις, καίπερ ὑπεσχημένος ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὸ
κράτος τῆς πίστεως ἀναβεῖναι, οὐδὲν ἡττον εὐρίσ-
κεται τούτων καταδικάζων. φησὶ γὰρ “ἡμεῖς δὲ
τῷ μὲν εἰσὶν οὐδὲν ἀτρεκέες συνίμεν, μεταπίπτον
δὲ κατὰ τε σώματος διαθήκην καὶ τῶν ἐπ-
εισιόντων καὶ τῶν ἀντιστηριζόντων.” καὶ πάλιν
φησὶν “ἑτεῇ μὲν νυν ὅτι οἶον ἕκαστον ἔστιν ἢ
- 137 οὐκ ἔστιν οὐ συνίμεν, πολλαχῇ δεδῆλωται.” ἐν
δὲ τῷ περὶ ἰδεῶν “γιγνώσκειν τε χρή” φησὶν
“ἄνθρωπον τῷδε τῷ κανόνι ὅτι ἑτεῆς ἀπ-
ήλλακται,” καὶ πάλιν “δηλοῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ οὗτος
ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἑτεῇ οὐδὲν ἴσμεν περὶ οὐδενός, ἀλλ'
ἐπιρυσμὶν ἐκάστοισιν ἢ δόξιν,” καὶ ἔτι “καίτοι

¹ ὅτε Usener: ὅτι mss., Bekk.

what is true, but whenever we utter our own private thoughts, we lie. So here and in these words he 134 most expressly declares that the common reason is the criterion, and that the things which appear in common are trustworthy as being judged by the common reason, whereas those which appear privately to each man are false.

Such, then, is the attitude of Heraclitus. And 135 Democritus in some places abolishes the things that appear to the senses and asserts that none of them appears in truth but only in opinion, the true fact in things existent being the existence of atoms and void; for "By convention," he says, "is sweet, by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour; but by verity atoms and void." (This means: Sensible objects are conventionally assumed and opined to exist, but they do not truly exist, but only the atoms and the void.) And in his *Confirmations*, although he had pro- 136 mised to ascribe the confirmatory evidence to the senses, yet none the less he is found condemning them. For he says: "But we in reality comprehend nothing invariable, but what shifts about according to the disposition of the body and of the things which enter into it and the things which oppose it." And again he says: "Now verily that we do not comprehend what the nature of each thing is or is not, has been oft-times made plain." And in his book *Con- 137 cerning Forms* he says, "Man must learn by this rule that he is divorced from verity"; and again, "This argument also makes plain that we know nothing verily about anything, but each man's opinion is due to influx"; and yet again, "It will, however,

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δηλον ἔσται ὅτι ἐτεῇ οἶον ἕκαστον γινώσκειν ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἐστί.”

Καὶ δὴ ἐν μὲν τούτοις πᾶσαν σχεδὸν κινεῖ κατά-
ληψιν, εἰ καὶ μόνων ἐξαιρέτως καθάπτεται τῶν
138 αἰσθήσεων· ἐν δὲ τοῖς κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι
γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὴν δὲ διὰ
τῆς διανοίας, ὣν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνησίην
καλεῖ, προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας
κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτήν ὀνομάζει,
ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
139 ἀπλανές. λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν “ γνῶμης δὲ δύο
εἰσὶν ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη ἡ δὲ σκοτή· καὶ σκοτὴς
μὲν τὰδε σύμπαντα, ὅψις ἀκοή ὁδμὴ γεῦσις ψαύσις,
ἡ δὲ γνησίη, ἀποκεκριμένη δὲ ταύτης.” εἰτα
προκρίνων τῆς σκοτὴς τὴν γνησίην ἐπιφέρει λέγων
“ ὅταν ἡ σκοτή μηκέτι δύναται μήτε ὀρῆν ἐπ’
ἔλαττον μήτε ἀκούειν μήτε ὁδμᾶσθαι μήτε γεύεσθαι
μήτε ἐν τῇ ψαύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ λεπτό-
τερον.”¹ οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ
140 κριτήριον, ὃν γνησίην γνῶμην καλεῖ. Διότιμος δὲ
τρία κατ’ αὐτὸν ἔλεγεν εἶναι κριτήρια, τῆς μὲν
τῶν ἀδήλων καταλήψεως τὰ φαινόμενα, (ὅψις γὰρ
τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα,) ὡς φησὶν Ἀναξ-
αγόρας, ὃν ἐπὶ τούτῳ Δημόκριτος ἐπαινεῖ, ζητήσεως
δὲ τὴν ἔννοιαν (περὶ παντὸς γάρ, ὦ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ
τὸ εἰδέναι περὶ οὗτου ἔστιν ἡ ζήτησις), αἰρέσεως δὲ
καὶ φυγῆς τὰ πάθη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ᾧ προσοικεῖού-

¹ Mutsch. (after Dieks) marks a lacuna after λεπτότερον. Otherwise we might read ἄλλο τι <λεπτότερον> λεπτ., “some other finer (more delicate) <instrument> must be adopted.”

² ὅψις . . . φαινόμενα add. N: om. cet., Bekk.

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS, I. 137-140

be plain that it is impracticable to learn the veritable nature of each thing."

Now in these passages he almost rejects apprehension altogether, although it is the senses only that he specially attacks. But in his "Canons" he says 138 that there are two kinds of knowledge, one by means of the senses, the other by means of the intelligence; and of these he calls that by means of the intelligence "genuine," ascribing to it trustworthiness in the judgement of truth, but that by means of the senses he terms "bastard," denying it inerrancy in the distinguishing of what is true. He expressly declares— 139 "Of knowledge there are two forms, the genuine and the bastard: and to the bastard belong all these—sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch; but the other form is distinct from this and genuine." Then, while thus preferring the genuine to the bastard, he proceeds: "Whenever the bastard kind is unable any longer to see what has become too small, or to hear or smell or taste or perceive it by touch, (one must have recourse to) another and finer (instrument)." Thus, according to this man also, reason is the criterion, and he calls it "genuine knowledge." But Diotimus used 140 to say that according to Democritus there are three criteria—namely, the criterion of the apprehension of things non-evident, which is the things apparent; for, as Anaxagoras says (and Democritus commends him for it), the things apparent are the vision of the things non-evident; and the criterion of investigation, which is the conception—"for in every case, my child, the one starting-point is to know what the subject of investigation is"^a; and the criterion of choice and aversion, which is the affections—for that

^a Quoted loosely from Plato, *Phædr.* 237 B.

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μεθα, τοῦτο αἰρετόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ᾧ προσαλλοτριούμεθα, τοῦτο φευκτόν ἐστιν.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν παλαιῶν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου
141 τῆς ἀληθείας ἱστορία τοιαύτη τις ἦν· ἀπτώμεθα
δὲ ἐξῆς καὶ τῶν μετὰ τοὺς φυσικοὺς αἰρέσεων.

Πλάτων τοίνυν ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ διελόμενος τὰ
πράγματα εἰς τε τὰ νοητὰ καὶ αἰσθητά, καὶ εἰπὼν
περιληπτὰ μὲν λόγῳ εἶναι τὰ νοητὰ δοξαστὰ δὲ
τυγχάνειν τὰ αἰσθητά, προδήλως κριτήριον ὤρισε
τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων γνώσεως τὸν λόγον, συμ-
περιλαβὼν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν-
142 ἀργειαν. λέγει δὲ οὕτως· “ τί τὸ ὄν αἰεί, γένεσιν
δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γινόμενον μὲν, ὄν δὲ οὐδέ-
ποτε; τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν,
143 τὸ δὲ δόξῃ μετὰ αἰσθήσεως.” περιληπτικὸν δὲ
καλεῖσθαι φασὶ λόγον παρ’ αὐτῷ οἱ Πλατωνικοὶ
τὸν κοινὸν τῆς ἐναργείας καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. δεῖ
γάρ τὸν λόγον ἐν τῷ κρίνειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀπὸ
τῆς ἐναργείας ὀρμᾶσθαι, εἶπερ δι’ ἐναργῶν ἡ
κρίσις γίνεται τῶν ἀληθῶν. ἀλλ’ ἢ τε ἐνάργεια
οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτάρκης πρὸς γνῶσιν ἀληθοῦς· οὐ γὰρ
εἴ τι κατ’ ἐνάργειαν φαίνεται, τοῦτο καὶ κατ’
ἀλήθειαν ὑπάρχει· ἀλλὰ δεῖ παρῆναι τὸ κρίνον τί
τε φαίνεται μόνον καὶ τί σὺν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ἔτι
καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ὑπόκειται, τουτέστι τὸν λόγον.
144 ἀμφοτέρω τοίνυν συνελθεῖν δεήσει, τὴν τε ἐν-
ἀργειαν ὥς ἂν ἀφετήριον οὔσαν τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τὴν
κρίσιν τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον πρὸς

* See Tim. 27 n.

which we feel is congenial to us is choiceworthy, but that which we feel is alien is to be regarded with aversion.

Such, then, was the account given by the old philosophers concerning the criterion of truth. Next let us treat of those who came after the 141 Physicists.

Plato, then, in his *Timaeus*, after dividing things into intelligibles and sensibles and stating that the intelligibles are apprehensible by reason whereas the sensibles are objects of opinion, plainly specified reason as the criterion of the knowledge of things, though he included along with it the clear evidence of sense. These are his words^a: "What is that 142 which is Existent always and has no Becoming? And what is that which is Becoming always and never is Existent? Now the one of these is apprehensible by thought with the aid of reasoning, but the other by opinion with the aid of sensation." And the Platonists say that the reason which em- 143 braces both sensible evidence and truth is termed by him "comprehensive reason." For in the act of judging truth the reason must set out from the sensible evidence, if it be so that the judgement of things true is effected by means of things evident. But this evidence is not self-sufficient for knowledge of the true; for if a thing appears evidently, it does not therefore exist truly; but there must also be present an instrument which judges what thing merely appears and what, in addition to appearing, also subsists in truth—that is to say, reason. Thus it 144 will be necessary for both to come together—both the sensible evidence as forming the starting-point for the reason in its judging of the truth, and the

διάκρισιν τῆς ἐναργείας. εἰς μέντοι τὸ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ ἐναργείᾳ καὶ τὸ ἐν ταύτῃ ἀληθὲς διακρίνειν πάλιν συνεργοῦ δεῖται ὁ λόγος τῆς αἰσθήσεως· διὰ ταύτης γὰρ τὴν φαντασίαν παραδεχόμενος ποιεῖται τὴν νόησιν καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τᾶληθοῦς, ὥστε περιληπτικὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν τῆς τε ἐναργείας καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὅπερ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ καταληπτικόν.

- 145 Ὡς δὲ καὶ Πλάτων· Σπεύσιππος δέ, ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ τὰ δὲ νοητά, τῶν μὲν νοητῶν κριτήριον ἔλεξεν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν αἴσθησιν. ἐπιστημονικὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν ὑπείληφε καθεστάναι τὴν μεταλαμβάνουσαν τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον
146 ἀληθείας. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τοῦ αὐλητοῦ ἢ ψάλτου δάκτυλοι τεχνικὴν μὲν εἶχον ἐνέργειαν, οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς δὲ προηγουμένως τελειουμένην ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν συνασκήσεως ἀπαρτιζομένην, καὶ ὡς ἡ τοῦ μουσικοῦ αἴσθησις ἐνέργειαν μὲν εἶχεν ἀντιληπτικὴν τοῦ τε ἡρμοσμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀναρμόστου, ταύτην δὲ οὐκ αὐτοφύῃ ἀλλ' ἐκ λογισμοῦ περιγεγονυῖαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις φυσικῶς παρὰ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ἐπιστημονικῆς μεταλαμβάνει τριβῆς πρὸς ἀπλανῇ τῶν ὑποκειμένων διάγνωσιν.

- 147 Ξενοκράτης δὲ τρεῖς φησὶν οὐσίας εἶναι, τὴν μὲν αἰσθητὴν τὴν δὲ νοητὴν τὴν δὲ σύνθετον καὶ δοξαστήν, ὧν αἰσθητὴν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, νοητὴν δὲ (τὴν)¹ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ, δοξαστήν δὲ καὶ σύνθετον τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ· ὁρατὴ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει, νοητὴ δὲ δι'

¹ <τὴν> c.j. Bekk.

reason itself for estimating the evidence. Yet for getting in touch with the evidence and estimating the truth it contains, the reason in turn needs sensation as a colleague ; for it is through it that the reason receives the presentation and produces the thought and the knowledge of what is true, so that it really is "comprehensive" both of evidence and of truth, which is equivalent to being "apprehensive."

Such, then, was the view of Plato. But Spensippus 145 declared that, since some things are sensible, others intelligible, the cognitive reason is the criterion of things intelligible and the cognitive sense of things sensible. And cognitive sense he conceived as being that which shares in rational truth. For just as the 146 fingers of the flute-player or harper possess an artistic activity, which, however, is not primarily brought to perfection by the fingers themselves but is fully developed as a result of joint practice under the guidance of reasoning,—and just as the sense of the musician possesses an activity capable of grasping the harmonious and the non-harmonious, this activity, however, not being self-produced but an acquisition due to reasoning,—so also the cognitive sense naturally derives from the reason the cognitive experience in which it shares, and which leads to unerring discrimination of subsisting objects.

But Xenocrates says that there are three forms of 147 existence, the sensible, the intelligible, and the composite and opinable ; and of these the sensible is that which exists within the Heaven, and the intelligible that which belongs to all things outside the Heaven, and the opinable and composite that of the Heaven itself ; for it is visible by sense but intelligible by

- 148 ἀστρολογίας. τούτων μέντοι τοῦτον ἔχόντων τὸν
τρόπον, τῆς μὲν ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ νοητῆς οὐσίας
κριτήριον ἀπεφαίνετο τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τῆς δὲ ἐντὸς
οὐρανοῦ καὶ αἰσθητῆς τὴν αἴσθησιν, τῆς δὲ μικτῆς
τὴν δόξαν· καὶ τούτων κοινῶς τὸ μὲν διὰ τοῦ
ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου κριτήριον βέβαιόν τε ὑπ-
άρχειν καὶ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀληθές
μὲν, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ
λόγου, τὸ δὲ σύνθετον κοινὸν ἀληθοῦς τε καὶ
ψευδοῦς ὑπάρχειν· τῆς γὰρ δόξης τὴν μὲν τινα
149 ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ. ὅθεν καὶ τρεῖς μοίρας
παραδεδόσθαι, Ἄτροπον μὲν τὴν τῶν νοητῶν,
ἀμετάθετον οὖσαν, Κλωθὴν δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν,
Λάχεσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν δοξαστῶν.
- 150 Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀρκεσίλαον προηγουμένως μὲν
οὐδὲν ὥρισαν κριτήριον, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὠρικένας δοκοῦν-
τες τοῦτο κατὰ ἀντιπαρεξαγωγὴν τὴν ὡς πρὸς
- 151 τοὺς στωικοὺς ἀπέδωσαν. τρία γὰρ εἶναί φασιν
ἐκεῖνοι τὰ συζυγοῦντα ἀλλήλοις, ἐπιστήμην καὶ
δόξαν καὶ τὴν ἐν μεθορίᾳ τούτων τεταγμένην
κατάληψιν, ὣν ἐπιστήμην μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀσφαλῆ
καὶ βεβαίαν καὶ ἀμετάθετον ὑπὸ λόγου κατά-
ληψιν, δόξαν δὲ τὴν ἀσθενῆ καὶ ψευδῆ συγ-
κατά θεσιν, κατάληψιν δὲ τὴν μεταξὺ τούτων, ἥτις
- 152 ἐστὶ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις· κατα-
ληπτικὴ δὲ φαντασία κατὰ τούτους ἐτύγχανεν ἢ
ἀληθὴς καὶ τοιαύτη οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδῆς. ὣν
τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην ἐν μόνοις ὑφίστασθαι λέγουσι
τοῖς σοφοῖς, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς φαύλοις,
τὴν δὲ κατάληψιν κοινὴν ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι, καὶ
- 153 ταύτην κριτήριον ἀληθείας καθεστάναι. ταῦτα δὲ
λεγόντων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος ἀντι-

means of astronomy. This, then, being the condition 148
of things, he declared that the criterion of the existence which is outside the Heaven and intelligible is knowledge ; and the criterion of that which is within the Heaven and sensible is sense ; and the criterion of the mixed kind is opinion. And of these generally the criterion afforded by the cognitive reason is both firm and true, and that by sense is true indeed but not so true as that by the cognitive reason, while the composite kind shares in both truth and falsehood ; for opinion is partly true and partly false. Hence, 149
too, we have by tradition three Fates—Atropos, the Fate of things intelligible, she being unchangeable, and Clotho of things sensible, and Lachesis of things opinable.

Arcesilaus ^a did not, to begin with, lay down any 150
definite criterion, and those who are thought to have laid one down produced it by way of counter-blast to that of the Stoics. For the latter assert that there 151
are three criteria—knowledge and opinion and, set midway between these two, apprehension ; and of these knowledge is the unerring and firm apprehension which is unalterable by reason, and opinion is weak and false assent, and apprehension is intermediate between these, being assent to an apprehensive presentation ; and an apprehensive presenta- 152
tion, according to them, is one which is true and of such a kind as to be incapable of becoming false. And they say that, of these, knowledge subsists only in the wise, and opinion only in the fools, but apprehension is shared alike by both, and it is the criterion of truth. It was these statements of the Stoics that 153

^a Cf. *P.H.* i. 232 ; Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxxii.

- καθίστατο, δεικνὺς ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι μεταξύ ἐπιστήμης καὶ δόξης κριτήριον ἢ κατάληψις. αὕτη γὰρ ἦν φασὶ κατάληψιν καὶ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσιν, ἥτοι ἐν σοφῷ ἢ ἐν φαύλῳ γίνεται. ἀλλ' ἐάν τε ἐν σοφῷ γένηται, ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, ἐάν τε ἐν φαύλῳ, δόξα, καὶ οὐδέν ἄλλο παρὰ
- 154 ταῦτα ἢ μόνον ὄνομα μετέληπται. εἴπερ τε ἡ κατάληψις καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις ἐστίν, ἀνυπαρκτός ἐστι, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἡ συγκατάθεσις οὐ πρὸς φαντασίαν γίνεται ἀλλὰ πρὸς λόγον (τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωμαμάτων εἰσὶν αἱ συγκαταθέσεις), δεύτερον ὅτι οὐδεμία τοιαύτη ἀληθῆς φαντασία εὐρίσκεται οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδῆς, ὥς
- 155 διὰ πολλῶν καὶ ποικίλων παρίσταται. μὴ οὔσης δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ κατάληψις γενήσεται. ἦν γὰρ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσις. μὴ οὔσης δὲ καταλήψεως πάντ' ἔσται ἀκατάληπτα. πάντων δὲ ὄντων ἀκαταλήπτων ἀκολουθήσει καὶ κατὰ τοὺς στωικοὺς ἐπέχειν τὸν σοφόν.
- 156 σκοπῶμεν δὲ οὕτωςί. πάντων ὄντων ἀκαταλήπτων διὰ τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν τοῦ στωικοῦ κριτηρίου, εἰ συγκαταθήσεται ὁ σοφός, δοξάσει ὁ σοφός· μηδενὸς γὰρ ὄντος καταληπτοῦ εἰ συγκατατίθεται τινι, τῷ ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκαταθήσεται, ἢ δὲ τῷ ἀκατα-
- 157 λήπτῳ συγκατάθεσις δόξα ἐστίν. ὥστε εἰ τῶν συγκατατιθεμένων ἐστίν ὁ σοφός, τῶν δοξαστῶν ἔσται ὁ σοφός. οὐχὶ δέ γε τῶν δοξαστῶν ἐστίν ὁ σοφός (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀφροσύνης ἦν κατ' αὐτοὺς, καὶ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων αἰτίον). οὐκ ἄρα τῶν συγκατατιθεμένων ἐστίν ὁ σοφός. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, περὶ πάν-

Arcesilaus controverted by proving that apprehension is not a criterion intermediate between knowledge and opinion. For that which they call "apprehension" and "assent to an apprehensive presentation" occurs either in a wise man or in a fool. But if it occurs in a wise man, it is knowledge, and if in a fool, opinion, and nothing else is acquired besides these two save a mere name. And if apprehension 154 is in fact assent to an apprehensive presentation, it is non-existent—firstly, because assent is not relative to presentation but to reason (for assents are given to judgements), and secondly, because no true presentation is found to be of such a kind as to be incapable of proving false, as is shown by many and various instances. But if the apprehensive presentation does 155 not exist, neither will apprehension come into existence, for it was assent to an apprehensive presentation. And if apprehension does not exist, all things will be non-apprehensible. And if all things are non-apprehensible, it will follow, even according to the Stoics, that the wise man suspends judgement. Let us consider the matter thus :—Since 156 all things are non-apprehensible owing to the non-existence of the Stoic criterion, if the wise man shall assent the wise man will opine ; for when nothing is apprehensible, if he assents to anything he will be assenting to what is non-apprehensible, and assent to the non-apprehensible is opinion. So that if the 157 wise man is in the class of assenters, the wise man will be in the class of those who opine. But the wise man, to be sure, is not in the class of those who opine (for, according to them, opinion is a mark of folly and a cause of sins) ; therefore the wise man is not in the class of assenters. And if this be so, he will neces-

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- των αὐτὸν δεῖσει ἀσυγκαταθετεῖν. τὸ δὲ ἀσυγ-
καταθετεῖν οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἐπέχειν· ἐφέξει
158 ἄρα περὶ πάντων ὁ σοφός. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ μετὰ τοῦτο
ἔδει καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγῆς ζητεῖν,
ἥτις οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν ἀποδίδοσθαι, ἀφ'
οὗ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τουτέστι τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος,
ἡρτημένην ἔχει τὴν πίστιν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος
ὅτι ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων κανονεῖ τὰς αἰρέσεις
καὶ φυγὰς καὶ κοινῶς τὰς πράξεις τῷ εὐλόγῳ,
κατὰ τοῦτό τε προερχόμενος τὸ κριτήριον κατ-
ορθώσει· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν περιγίνεσθαι διὰ
τῆς φρονήσεως, τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν κείσθαι¹ ἐν τοῖς
κατορθώμασιν, τὸ δὲ κατόρθωμα εἶναι ὅπερ πραχ-
θὲν εὐλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν. ὁ προσέχων οὖν
τῷ εὐλόγῳ κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει.
- 159 Ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος· ὁ δὲ Καρνεάδης οὐ
μόνον τοῖς στωικοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ
ἀντιδιετάρσσετο περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου. καὶ δὴ πρῶτος
μὲν αὐτῷ καὶ κοινὸς πρὸς πάντας ἐστὶ λόγος καθ'
ὃν παρίσταται ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς ἀληθείας
κριτήριον, οὐ λόγος, οὐκ αἴσθησις, οὐ φαντασία,
οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συλ-
160 λήβδην διαψεύδεται ἡμᾶς. δεύτερον δὲ καθ' ὃ
δείκνυσιν ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἐστὶ τὸ κριτήριον τοῦτο, οὐ
χωρὶς τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας πάθους ὑφίσταται.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ αἰσθητικὴ δυνάμει διαφέρει τὸ ζῶον τῶν
ἀψύχων, πάντως διὰ ταύτης ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν
ἐκτὸς ἀντιληπτικὸν γενήσεται. ἡ δέ γε αἴσθησις
ἀκίνητος μὲν οὔσα καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἄτρεπτος οὔτε
161 αἰσθησίς ἐστιν οὔτε ἀντιληπτικὴ τινος, τραπέισα

¹ ὁ Hervetus: οὐ 3188., Bekk.

² κείσθαι N: κινεῖσθαι cet., Bekk.

sarily refuse assent in all cases. But to refuse assent is nothing else than to suspend judgement; therefore the wise man will in all cases suspend judgement. But inasmuch as it was necessary, in the next place, 158 to investigate also the conduct of life, which cannot, naturally, be directed without a criterion, upon which happiness—that is, the end of life—depends for its assurance, Arcesilaus asserts that he who suspends judgement about everything will regulate his inclinations and aversions and his actions in general by the rule of “the reasonable,” and by proceeding in accordance with this criterion he will act rightly; for happiness is attained by means of wisdom, and wisdom consists in right actions, and the right action is that which, when performed, possesses a reasonable justification. He, therefore, who attends to “the reasonable” will act rightly and be happy.

Such was the doctrine of Arcesilaus. Carneades 159 arrayed his arguments concerning the criterion not only against the Stoics but against all his predecessors. In fact his first argument, aimed at all alike, is that by which he establishes that there is absolutely no criterion of truth—neither reason, nor sense, nor presentation, nor anything else that exists; for these things, one and all, play us false. Second comes the 160 argument by which he shows that even if a criterion exists, it does not subsist apart from the affection produced by the evidence of sense. For since the living creature differs from lifeless things by its faculty of sense, it will certainly become perceptive both of itself and of external things by means of this faculty. But when the sense is unmoved and unaffected and undisturbed, neither is it sense nor perceptive of anything; but when it is disturbed and 161

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δὲ καὶ πως παθοῦσα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐναργῶν ὑπό-
 πτωσιν, τότε ἐνδείκνυται τὰ πράγματα. ἐν ἄρα τῷ
 ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας πάθει τῆς ψυχῆς ζητητέον ἐστὶ
 τὸ κριτήριον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικτικὸν
 ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν καὶ τοῦ ἐμποιήσαντος αὐτὸ
 162 φαινομένου, ὅπερ πάθος ἐστὶν οὐχ ἕτερον τῆς
 φαντασίας. ὅθεν καὶ φαντασίαν ῥητέον εἶναι πάθος
 τι περὶ τὸ ζῶον ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου παρα-
 στατικόν. ὅλον προσβλέψαντές τινι, φησὶν ὁ Ἀν-
 τίοχος, διατιθέμεθά πως τὴν ὄψιν, καὶ οὐχ οὕτως
 αὐτὴν διακειμένην ἴσχομεν ὥς πρὶν τοῦ βλέψαι
 διακειμένην εἶχομεν· κατὰ μέντοι τὴν τοιαύτην
 ἀλλοίωσιν δυοῖν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἐνὸς μὲν αὐτῆς
 τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως, τουτέστι τῆς φαντασίας, δευτέρου
 δὲ τοῦ τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν ἐμποιήσαντος, τουτέστι τοῦ
 ὁρατοῦ. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τὸ παρα-
 163 πλῆσιον. ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ φῶς ἑαυτὸ τε δείκνυσι καὶ
 πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φαντασία, ἀρχηγὸς
 οὖσα τῆς περὶ τὸ ζῶον εἰδήσεως, φωτὸς δίκην
 ἑαυτὴν τε ἐμφανίζειν ὀφείλει καὶ τοῦ ποιήσαντος
 αὐτὴν ἐναργοῦς ἐνδεικτικὴ καθεστάναι. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ
 οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰεὶ ποτε ἐνδείκνυται, πολλάκις
 δὲ διαψεύδεται καὶ διαφωνεῖ τοῖς ἀναπέμψασιν
 αὐτὴν πράγμασιν ὥς οἱ μοχθηροὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων,
 κατ' ἀνάγκην ἠκολούθησε τὸ μὴ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν
 δύνασθαι κριτήριον ἀπολείπειν ἀληθείας, ἀλλὰ
 164 μόνην, εἰ καὶ ἄρα, τὴν ἀληθῆ. πάλιν οὖν ἐπεὶ
 οὐδεμία ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς τοιαύτη οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο
 ψευδῆς, ἀλλὰ πάσῃ τῇ δοκούσῃ ἀληθεῖ καθεστάναι
 εὐρίσκεται τις ἀπαράλλακτος ψευδῆς, γενήσεται τὸ
 κριτήριον ἐν κοινῇ φαντασίᾳ τοῦ τε ἀληθοῦς καὶ
 ψεύδους. ἡ δὲ κοινὴ τούτων φαντασία οὐκ ἔστι

somehow affected owing to the impact of things evident, then it indicates the objects. Therefore the criterion must be sought in the affection of the soul caused by the sensible evidence. And this affection must be indicative both of itself and of the appearance which caused it, which affection is nothing else than the presentation. Hence we must say that the presentation is an affection of the living creature capable of presenting both itself and the other object. Thus for example, says Antiochus,^a when we have looked at an object we have our sense of sight in a certain condition, and not in the same condition as that in which we had it before we looked ; and owing to such an alteration we perceive, in fact, two things, one the alteration itself, which is the presentation, and, secondly, that which produced the alteration, which is the visible object. And similarly in the case of the other senses. So then, just as light shows both itself and all things within it, so also presentation, which is the primary factor in the cognition of the living creature, must, like light, both reveal itself and be indicative of the evident object which produced it. But since it does not always indicate the true object, but often deceives and, like bad messengers, misreports those who dispatched it, it has necessarily resulted that we cannot admit every presentation as a criterion of truth, but—if any—only that which is true. So then, once more, since there is no true presentation of such a kind that it cannot be false, but a false presentation is found to exist exactly resembling every apparently true presentation, the criterion will consist of a presentation which contains the true and the false alike. But the presentation

^a Cf. *P.H.* I. 295.

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- καταληπτική, μὴ οὖσα δὲ καταληπτική οὐδὲ κριτή-
 165 ριον ἔσται. μηδεμιᾶς δὲ οὔσης φαντασίας κριτικῆς
 οὐδὲ λόγος ἂν εἴη κριτήριον· ἀπὸ φαντασίας γὰρ
 οὗτος ἀνάγεται. καὶ εἰκότως· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δεῖ
 φανῆναι αὐτῷ τὸ κρινόμενον, φανῆναι δὲ οὐδὲν
 δύναται χωρὶς τῆς ἀλόγου αἰσθήσεως. οὔτε οὖν ἡ
 ἀλογος αἰσθησις οὔτε ὁ λόγος ἦν κριτήριον.
- 166 Ταῦτα μὲν [γὰρ] ἀντιπαρεξάγων τοῖς ἄλλοις
 φιλοσόφοις ὁ Καρνεάδης εἰς τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν τοῦ
 κριτηρίου διεξήρχετο· ἀπαιτούμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτός
 τι κριτήριον πρὸς τε τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὴν καὶ
 πρὸς τὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας περίκτησιν, δυνάμει
 ἐπαναγκάζεται καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν περὶ τούτου δια-
 τάττεσθαι, προσλαμβάνων τὴν τε πιθανὴν φαν-
 τασίαν καὶ τὴν πιθανὴν ἅμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον καὶ
 167 διεξωδευμένην. τίς δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τούτων διαφορά,
 συντόμως ὑποδεικτέον. ἡ τοίνυν φαντασία τινὸς
 φαντασία ἐστίν, ὅλον τοῦ τε ἀφ' οὗ γίνεται καὶ τοῦ
 ἐν ᾧ γίνεται, καὶ ἀφ' οὗ μὲν γίνεται ὡς τοῦ ἐκτὸς
 ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ, τοῦ ἐν ᾧ δὲ γίνεται καθάπερ
 168 ἀνθρώπου. τοιαύτη δὲ οὖσα δύο ἂν ἔχοι σχέσεις,
 μίαν μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ φανταστόν, δευτέραν δὲ ὡς
 πρὸς τὸν φαντασιούμενον. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρὸς
 τὸ φανταστόν σχέσιν ἡ ἀληθὴς γίνεται ἡ ψευδής,
 καὶ ἀληθὴς μὲν ὅταν σύμφωνος ᾖ τῷ φανταστῷ,
 169 ψευδὴς δὲ ὅταν διάφωνος. κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς τὸν
 φαντασιούμενον σχέσιν ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ φαινομένη
 ἀληθὴς ἡ δὲ οὐ φαινομένη ἀληθὴς, ὣν ἡ μὲν φαινο-

^a With §§ 166-169 cf. P.H. i. 226-231.

which contains them both is not apprehensive, and not being apprehensive, it will not be a criterion. And if no presentation capable of judging exists, 165 neither will reason be a criterion; for it is derived from presentation. And naturally so; for that which is judged must first be presented, and nothing can be presented without sense which is irrational. Therefore neither irrational sense nor reason is the criterion.

These were the arguments which Carneades set 166 forth in detail, in his controversy with the other philosophers, to prove the non-existence of the criterion; yet as he, too, himself requires a criterion for the conduct of life and for the attainment of happiness, he is practically compelled on his own account to frame a theory about it, and to adopt both the probable presentation and that which is at once probable and irreversible and tested.^a What the dis- 167 tinction is between these must be briefly indicated. The presentation, then, is a presentation of something—of that, for instance, from which it comes and of that in which it occurs; that from which it comes being, say, the externally existent sensible object, and that in which it occurs, say, a man. And, such 168 being its nature, it will have two aspects, one in its relation to the object presented, the second in its relation to the subject experiencing the presentation. Now in regard to its aspect in relation to the object presented it is either true or false—true when it is in accord with the object presented, but false when it is not in accord. But in regard to its aspect in relation 169 to the subject experiencing the presentation, the one kind of presentation is apparently true, the other apparently false; and of these the apparently true

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μένη ἀληθῆς ἔμφασις καλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς Ἀκαδη-
μαϊκοῖς καὶ πιθανότης καὶ πιθανὴ φαντασία. ἡ δ'
οὐ φαινόμενη ἀληθῆς ἀπέμφασις τε προσαγορεύε-
ται καὶ ἀπειθής καὶ ἀπίθανος φαντασία· οὔτε γὰρ
τὸ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενον ψευδές οὔτε τὸ ἀληθές μὲν,
μὴ φαινόμενον δὲ ἡμῖν πείθειν ἡμᾶς πέφυκεν.
70 τούτων δὲ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ μὲν φανερώς ψευδῆς
καὶ μὴ φαινόμενη ἀληθῆς παραγράφιμός ἐστι καὶ
οὐ κριτήριον, εἴαν τε (ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος γίνηται
εἴαν τε)¹ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν, διαφώνως δὲ τῷ
ὑπάρχοντι καὶ μὴ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον, ὅποια ἦν
ἡ ἀπὸ Ἡλέκτρας προσπεσοῦσα τῷ Ὀρέστη, μίαν
τῶν Ἐρινύων αὐτὴν δοξάζοντι καὶ κεκραγότι

μέθες μί' οὔσα τῶν ἐμῶν Ἐρινύων.

- 171 τῆς δὲ φαινομένης ἀληθοῦς ἡ μὲν τίς ἐστὶν ἀμυδρά,
ὥς ἡ ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ μικρότητα τοῦ θεωρουμένου ἡ
παρὰ ἱκανὸν διάστημα ἡ καὶ παρὰ ἀσθένειαν τῆς
ὄψεως συγκεχυμένως καὶ οὐκ ἐκτύπως τι λαμ-
βανόντων, ἡ δὲ τις ἦν σὺν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ἀληθῆς ἔτι
καὶ σφοδρὸν ἔχουσα τὸ φαίνεσθαι αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ.
172 ὧν πάλιν ἡ μὲν ἀμυδρά καὶ ἔκλυτος φαντασία οὐκ
ἂν εἴη κριτήριον· τῷ γὰρ μήτε αὐτὴν μήτε τὸ
ποιῆσαν αὐτὴν τρανῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαι οὐ πέφυκεν
ἡμᾶς πείθειν οὐδ' εἰς συγκατάθεσιν ἐπισπᾶσθαι.
173 ἡ δὲ φαινόμενη ἀληθῆς καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐμφαινόμενη
κριτήριόν ἐστι τῆς ἀληθείας κατὰ τοὺς περὶ τὸν

¹ <ἀπὸ . . . τε> cf. Bekk.

* I retain, perforce, the Greek terms in the absence of any good English equivalents. "Emphasis" means, roughly, the "appearance" or "reflection" in the mind caused by an external object which seems to correspond to that object

is termed by the Academics "emphasis" and probability and probable presentation, while the not apparently true is denominated "ap-emphasis"^a and unconvincing and improbable presentation; for neither that which itself appears false, nor that which though true does not appear so to us, is naturally convincing to us. And of these presentations that which is 170 evidently false, or not apparently true, is to be ruled out and is not a criterion whether (it be derived from a non-existent object or) from an object which exists, but not in accord with that object and not representing the actual object—such as was the presentation derived from Electra which Orestes experienced, when he supposed her to be one of the Furies and cried out—

Avaunt! For of my Furies thou art one.^b

And of the apparently true kind of presentation, 171 one sort is obscure—the sort, for instance, that is found in the case of those who have a perception that is confused and not distinct owing to the smallness of the object viewed or owing to the extent of the interval or even owing to the weakness of the sense of sight,—while the other sort, in addition to being apparently true, possesses this appearance of truth to an intense degree. And of these, again, the pre- 172 sentation which is obscure and vague will not be a criterion; for because of its not indicating clearly either itself or that which caused it, it is not of such a nature as to persuade us or to induce us to assent. But that which appears true, and appears so vividly, 173 is the criterion of truth according to the School of and thus is "apparently true"; but an "ap-emphasis" is apparently false.

^a Eurip. *Orest.* 264; cf. § 249 *infra*.

Καρνεάδην. κριτήριον δὲ οὐσα πλάτος εἶχεν ἱκανόν, καὶ ἐπιτεινομένης αὐτῆς ἄλλη ἄλλης ἐν εἵδει πιθανωτέραν τε καὶ πληκτικωτέραν ἴσχει φαν-
 174 τασίαν. τὸ δὲ πιθανὸν ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν λέγεται τριχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ ἀληθές τε ὃν καὶ φαινόμενον ἀληθές, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ψευδές μὲν καθεστὼς φαινόμενον δὲ ἀληθές, κατὰ δὲ τρίτον τὸ [ἀληθές] κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων. ὅθεν τὸ κριτήριον ἔσται μὲν ἡ φαινομένη ἀληθῆς φαντασία, ἣν καὶ πιθανὴν προσηγόρευον οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας,
 175 ἐμπίπτει δὲ ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ ψευδῆς, ὥστε ἀνάγκην ἔχειν καὶ τῇ κοινῇ ποτὲ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ ψευδοῦς φαντασία χρῆσθαι. οὐ μέντοι διὰ τὴν σπάνιον ταύτης παρέμπτωσιν, λέγω δὲ τῆς μιμουμένης τὰληθές, ἀπιστητέον ἔστι τῇ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἀληθεύουσι· τῷ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὰς τε κρίσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις κανονίζεσθαι συμβέβηκεν.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον καὶ κοινὸν κριτήριον κατὰ
 176 τοὺς περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδέποτε φαντασία μονοειδῆς ὑφίσταται· ἀλλ' ἀλύσεως τρόπον ἄλλη ἐξ ἄλλης ἡρτῆται, δεύτερον προσγενήσεται κριτήριον ἡ πιθανὴ ἅμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία. οἷον ὁ ἀνθρώπου σπῶν φαντασίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν λαμβάνει
 177 φαντασίαν καὶ τῶν ἐκτός, τῶν μὲν περὶ αὐτὸν ὡς χρόας μεγέθους σχήματος κινήσεως λαλιᾶς ἐσθῆτος ὑποδέσεως, τῶν δὲ ἐκτός ὡς αἴρος φωτὸς ἡμέρας οὐρανοῦ γῆς φίλων, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. ὅταν οὖν μηδεμίᾳ τούτων τῶν φαντασιῶν περιέλκῃ ἡμᾶς τῷ φαίνεσθαι ψευδῆς, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι συμφώνως φαίνων-

Carneades. And, being the criterion, it has a large extension,* and when extended one presentation reveals itself as more probable and more vivid than another. Probability, in the present instance, is used 174 in three senses—in the first, of that which both is and appears true ; in the second, of that which is really false but appears true ; in the third, of that which is at once both true and false. Hence the criterion will be the apparently true presentation, which the Academics called "probable" ; but sometimes the 175 impression it makes is actually false, so that we are compelled at times to make use of the presentation which is at once both true and false. But the rare occurrence of this kind—the kind I mean which imitates the truth—should not make us distrust the kind which "as a general rule" reports truly ; for the fact is that both our judgements and our actions are regulated by the standard of "the general rule."

Such then is the first and general criterion according to Carneades. But since no presentation is ever 176 simple in form but, like links in a chain, one hangs from another, we have to add, as a second criterion, the presentation which is at once both probable and "irreversible." For example, he who receives the presentation of a man necessarily receives the presentation both of his personal qualities and of the external conditions—of his personal qualities, such as 177 colour, size, shape, motion, speech, dress, foot-gear ; and of the external conditions, such as air, light, day, heaven, earth, friends, and all the rest. So whenever none of these presentations disturbs our faith by appearing false, but all with one accord appear

* *i.e.* it is very comprehensive and includes many sub-species, or varieties, of presentations.

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- 178 ται ἀληθεῖς, μᾶλλον πιστεύομεν. ὅτι γὰρ οὗτός
 ἐστὶ Σωκράτης, πιστεύομεν ἐκ τοῦ πάντα αὐτῷ
 προσεῖναι τὰ εἰωθότα, χρῶμα μέγεθος σχῆμα
 διάληψιν τρίβωνα, τὸ ἐνθάδε εἶναι ὅπου οὐθεὶς ἐστὶν
 179 αὐτῷ ἀπαράλλακτος. καὶ ὃν τρόπον τινὲς τῶν
 ἱατρῶν τὸν κατ' ἀλήθειαν πυρέσσοντα οὐκ ἐξ ἐνὸς
 λαμβάνουσι συμπτώματος, καθάπερ σφυγμοῦ σφο-
 δρότητος ἢ δαψιλοῦς θερμασίας, ἀλλ' ἐκ συνδρομῆς,
 ὅλον θερμασίας ἅμα καὶ σφυγμοῦ καὶ ἐλκώδους
 ἀφῆς καὶ ἐρυθήματος καὶ δίψους καὶ τῶν ἀνάλογον,
 οὕτω καὶ ὁ Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς τῇ συνδρομῇ τῶν φαν-
 τασιῶν ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν τῆς ἀληθείας, μηδεμιᾶς
 τε τῶν ἐν τῇ συνδρομῇ φαντασιῶν περισπώσης
 αὐτὸν ὡς ψευδοῦς λέγει ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ προσ-
 180 πῖπτον. καὶ ὅτι ἡ ἀπερίσπαστός ἐστι συνδρομὴ τοῦ
 πίστιν ἐμποιεῖν, φανερόν ἀπὸ Μενελάου· καταλιπὼν
 γὰρ ἐν τῇ νηὶ τὸ εἶδωλον τῆς Ἑλένης, ὅπερ ἀπὸ
 Τροίας ἐπήγετο ὡς Ἑλένην, καὶ ἐπιβὰς τῆς Φάρου
 νήσου ὀρᾷ τὴν ἀληθῆ Ἑλένην, σπῶν τε ἀπ' αὐτῆς
 ἀληθῆ φαντασίαν ὅμως οὐ πιστεύει τῇ τοιαύτῃ
 φαντασίᾳ διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἄλλης περισπᾶσθαι, καθ' ἣν
 181 ᾗδει ἀπολελοιπῶς ἐν τῇ νηὶ τὴν Ἑλένην. τοιαύτη
 γοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία· ἥτις καὶ
 αὐτὴ πλάτος ἔχειν ἔοικε διὰ τὸ ἄλλην ἄλλης μᾶλλον
 ἀπερίσπαστον εὐρίσκεσθαι.

Τῆς δὲ ἀπερισπάστου φαντασίας πιστοτέρα
 μᾶλλον ἐστὶ καὶ τελειοτάτην ποιοῦσα τὴν κρίσιν, ἢ
 σὺν τῷ ἀπερίσπαστος εἶναι ἔτι καὶ διεξωδευμένη
 182 καθέστηκεν. τίς δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ταύτης χαρακτήρ,
 παρακειμένως ὑποδεικτέον. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἀ-

true, our belief is the greater. For we believe that 178
 this man is Socrates from the fact that he possesses
 all his customary qualities—colour, size, shape, con-
 verse, coat, and his position in a place where there is
 no one exactly like him. And just as some doctors 179
 do not deduce that it is a true case of fever from one
 symptom only—such as too quick a pulse or a very high
 temperature—but from a concurrence, such as that
 of a high temperature with a rapid pulse and ulcerous
 joints and flushing and thirst and analogous symptoms;
 so also the Academic forms his judgement of truth
 by the concurrence of presentations, and when none
 of the presentations in the concurrence provokes in
 him a suspicion of its falsity he asserts that the im-
 pression is true. And that the “irreversible” pre- 180
 sentation is a concurrence capable of implanting belief
 is plain from the case of Menelaus ; for when he had
 left behind him on the ship the wraith of Helen—which
 he had brought with him from Troy, thinking it to
 be the true Helen—and had landed on the island of
 Pharos, he beheld the true Helen, but though he
 received from her a true presentation, yet he did not
 believe that presentation owing to his mind being
 warped by that other impression from which he
 derived the knowledge that he had left Helen behind
 in the ship. Such then is the “irreversible” presenta- 181
 tion ; and it too seems to possess extension inas-
 much as one is found to be more irreversible than
 another.

Still more trustworthy than the irreversible pre-
 sentation and supremely perfect is that which creates
 judgement ; for it, in addition to being irreversible, is
 also “tested.” What the distinctive feature of this 182
 presentation is we must next explain. Now in the

περισπάστου ψιλὸν ζητεῖται τὸ μηδεμίαν τῶν ἐν τῇ συνδρομῇ φαντασιῶν ὡς ψευδῇ ἡμᾶς περισπᾶν, πάσας δὲ εἶναι ἀληθεῖς τε [καί]¹ φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ ἀπιθάνους· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν περιωδευμένην συνδρομῆς² ἐκάστην τῶν ἐν τῇ συνδρομῇ ἐπιστατικῶς δοκιμάζομεν, ὁποῖόν τι γίνεται καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ὅταν ὁ δῆμος ἕκαστον τῶν μελλόντων ἄρχειν ἢ δικάζειν ἐξετάζῃ εἰ ἀξίός ἐστι τοῦ πιστευ-
 183 θῆναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ τὴν κρίσιν. οἷον ὄντων κατὰ τὸν τῆς κρίσεως τόπον τοῦ τε κρίνοντος καὶ τοῦ κρινομένου καὶ τοῦ δι' οὗ ἡ κρίσις, ἀποστήματός τε καὶ διαστήματος, τόπου χρόνου τρόπου διαθέσεως ἐνεργείας, ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ὁποῖόν ἐστι φυλοκρινουῦμεν, τὸ μὲν κρῖνον, μὴ ἡ ὄψις ἡμβλῦται (τοιαύτη γὰρ οὕσα ἀθετός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν), τὸ δὲ κρινόμενον, μὴ μικρὸν ἄγαν καθέστηκε, τὸ δὲ δι' οὗ ἡ κρίσις, μὴ ὁ ἀὴρ ζοφερός ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ ἀπόστημα, μὴ μέγα λίαν ὑπόκειται, τὸ δὲ διάστημα, μὴ συγκέχυται, τὸν δὲ τόπον, μὴ ἀχανής ἐστι, τὸν δὲ χρόνον, μὴ ταχύς ἐστι, τὴν δὲ διάθεσιν, μὴ μανιώδης θεωρεῖται, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν, μὴ ἀπρόσδεκτός ἐστιν.

184 Ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα καθ' ἐν γίνεται κριτήριον, ἥ τε πιθανὴ φαντασία καὶ ἡ πιθανὴ ἄμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ πιθανὴ ἄμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος καὶ διεξωδευμένη. παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν ὄν

¹ [καί] secl. Heintz.

² συνδρομῆς Heintz: συνδρομῇ mss., Bekk.

^a Literally, "poured together," "confused"; hence "shortened" or "telescoped."

case of the irreversible presentation it is merely required that none of the presentations in the concurrence should disturb us by a suspicion of its falsity ; but all should be apparently true and not improbable ; but in the case of the concurrence which involves the " tested " presentation, we scrutinize attentively each of the presentations in the concurrence,—just as the practice is at assembly-meetings, when the People makes inquiry about each of those who desire to be magistrates or judges, to see whether he is worthy to be entrusted with the magistracy or the judgeship. Thus, for example, as there are present 183 at the seat of judgement both the subject that judges and the object that is being judged and the medium through which judgement is effected, and distance and interval, place, time, mood, disposition, activity, we judge the distinctive character of each of these factors—as regards the subject *judging*, whether its vision be not dimmed (for vision of that kind is unfitted for judging) ; and as regards the object judged, whether it be not excessively small ; and as regards the medium through which the judgement is effected, whether the atmosphere be not dark ; and as to distance, whether it be not excessively great ; and as to interval, whether it be not too short ^a ; and as to place, whether it be not immense ; and as to time, whether it be not brief ; and as to disposition, whether it is not found to be insane ; and as to activity, whether it be not unacceptable.

For all these factors together form the criterion— 184 namely, the probable presentation, and that which is at once both probable and irreversible, and besides these that which is at once probable and irreversible and tested. And it is because of this that, just as

- τρόπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ὅταν μὲν περὶ μικροῦ πράγματος
ζητῶμεν, ἓνα μάρτυρα ἀνακρίνομεν, ὅταν δὲ περὶ
μείζονος, πλείονας, ὅταν δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον περὶ ἀναγ-
καιοτέρου, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μαρτυρούντων ἐξετά-
ζομεν ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθομολογήσεως, οὕτω,
φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην, ἐν μὲν τοῖς τυχοῦσι
πράγμασι τῇ πιθανῇ μόνον φαντασίᾳ κριτηρίῳ
χρῶμεθα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διαφέρουσι τῇ ἀπερισπάστῳ,
ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντείνουσι τῇ περι-
185 ωδευμένῃ. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν διαφερόντων
πραγμάτων τὴν διάφορόν φασι παραλαμβάνειν
φαντασίαν, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφόρους περι-
στάσεις μὴ τῇ αὐτῇ κατακολουθεῖν. τῇ μὲν γὰρ
αὐτὸ μόνον πιθανῇ προσέχειν λέγουσιν ἐφ' ὧν οὐ
δίδωσιν ἡμῖν καιρὸν ἢ περίστασις πρὸς ἀκριβῆ τοῦ
186 πράγματος ἀναθεώρησιν. οἷον διώκεται τις ὑπὸ
πολεμίων, καὶ ἔλθων εἰς τάφρον τινὰ φαντασίαν
σπᾶ ὥς κἀνταῦθα πολεμίων αὐτὸν λοχόντων· εἴθ'
ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς φαντασίας ὥς πιθανῆς συναρ-
πασθεὶς ἐκκλίνεται καὶ φεύγει τὴν τάφρον, ἐπόμενος
τῇ περὶ τὴν φαντασίαν πιθανότητι, πρὶν ἀκριβῶς
ἐπιστῆσαι πρότερον εἰ τῷ ὄντι λόχος ἔστι πολεμίων
187 κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἢ οὐδαμῶς. τῇ δὲ πιθανῇ καὶ
περιωδευμένῃ ἔπονται ἐφ' ὧν χρόνος δίδεται εἰς τὸ
μετὰ ἐπιστάσεως καὶ διεξόδου χρῆσθαι τῇ κρίσει
τοῦ προσπίπτοντος πράγματος. οἷον ἐν ἀλαμπεί
οἰκῇματι εἴλημα σχοινίου θεασάμενός τις παρὰ
τίκα μὲν ὄφιν ὑπολαβὼν τυγχάνειν ὑπερήλατο, τὸ
δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ὑποστρέψας ἐξετάζει τάληθές, καὶ
εὐρὼν ἀκίνητον ἤδη μὲν εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὄφιν ῥοπήν
188 ἴσχει κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅμως δὲ λογιζόμενος ὅτι
καὶ ὄφεις ποτὲ ἀκίνητοῦσι χειμερινῶ κρύει παγέν-
100

in ordinary life when we are investigating a small matter we question a single witness, but in a greater matter several, and when the matter investigated is still more important we cross-question each of the witnesses on the testimony of the others,—so likewise, says Carneades, in trivial matters we employ as criterion only the probable presentation, but in greater matters the irreversible, and in matters which contribute to happiness the tested presentation. Moreover, just as they adopt, they say, a different 185 presentation to suit different cases, so also in different circumstances they do not cling to the same presentation. For they declare that they attend to the immediately probable in cases where the circumstances do not afford time for an accurate consideration of the matter. A man, for example, is being 186 pursued by enemies, and coming to a ditch he receives a presentation which suggests that there, too, enemies are lying in wait for him ; then being carried away by this presentation, as a probability, he turns aside and avoids the ditch, being led by the probability of the presentation, before he has exactly ascertained whether or not there really is an ambush of the enemy at the spot. But they follow the probable and tested 187 presentation in cases where time is afforded for using their judgement on the object presented with deliberation and thorough examination. For example,^a on seeing a coil of rope in an unlighted room a man jumps over it, conceiving it for the moment to be a snake, but turning back afterwards he inquires into the truth, and on finding it motionless he is already inclined to think that it is not a snake, but as he 188 reckons, all the same, that snakes too are motionless

^a Cf. *P. II.* i. 227.

- τες, βακτηρία καθικνεῖται τοῦ σπειράματος, καὶ τότε οὕτως ἐκπεριοδεύσας τὴν προσπίπτουσαν φαντασίαν συγκατατίθεται τῷ ψεύδος εἶναι τὸ ὄφιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ φαντασθὲν αὐτῷ σῶμα. καὶ πάλιν, ὡς προεῖπον, ὁρῶντές τι περιφανῶς συγκατα-
 τιθέμεθα ὅτι τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστι, προδιεξοδεύσαντες ὅτι ἀρτίους μὲν ἔχομεν τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ὕπαρ δὲ καὶ οὐ καθ' ὕπνους βλέπομεν, συμπάρεστι δὲ καὶ διαυγῆς ἀῆρ καὶ ἀπόστημα σύμμετρον καὶ ἀκινήσια
 189 τοῦ προσπίπτοντος, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα πιστὴν εἶναι τὴν φαντασίαν, χρόνον ἡμῶν ἐσχηκότων αὐτάρκη πρὸς διέξοδον τῶν κατὰ τὸν τόπον αὐτῆς θεωρουμένων. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀ-
 περισπάστου· προσίενται γὰρ αὐτὴν ὅταν μηδὲν ᾗ τὸ ἀντιπεριέλκειν δυνάμενον, ὡς ἐπὶ Μενελάου προεῖρηται.
- 190 Ἄλλὰ καὶ τῆς Ἀκαδημαϊκῆς ἱστορίας ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ἀποδοθείσης, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλότριόν που καὶ τὴν τῶν Κυρηναϊκῶν στάσιν ἐπελθεῖν·
 δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων ἡ αἵρεσις ἀπὸ τῆς Σωκράτους ἀνεσχηκέναι διατριβῆς, ἀφ' ἧς περ
 191 ἀνέσχε καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα διαδοχὴ. φασὶν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναῖκοι κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάψευστα τυγχάνειν, τῶν δὲ πεποιηκότων τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν
 μηδὲ ἀδιάψευστον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκαινόμεθα, φασί, καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατόν λέγειν ἀδιαψεύ-
 στως καὶ [βεβαίως] ἀνεξελέγκτως· ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμποιη-
 τικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκόν ἐστίν ἢ γλυκύ ἐστιν, οὐχ
 192 οἶόν τ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι. εἰκὸς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ λευκοῦ τινὰ λευκαντικῶς διατεθῆναι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ

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- γλυκέος γλυκανθῆναι. καθὰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοτωθεὶς καὶ ἱκτεριῶν ὠχραντικῶς ὑπὸ πάντων κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρυθαίνεται, ὁ δὲ παραπιέσας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ὡς ὑπὸ δυοῖν κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ μεμηνῶς δισσὰς ὁρᾷ τὰς Θήβας καὶ δισσὸν φαντάζεται τὸν
- 193 ἥλιον, ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ὅτι τότε τι πάσχουσιν, ὅλον ὠχραίνονται ἢ ἐρυθαίνονται ἢ δυάζονται, ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὠχρόν ἐστὶ τὸ κινεῖν αὐτοὺς ἢ ἐνερευθές ἢ διπλοῦν ψεῦδος εἶναι νενόμισται, οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς εὐλογώτατόν ἐστι πλέον τῶν οἰκείων παθῶν μηδὲν λαμβάνειν δύνασθαι. ὅθεν ἤτοι τὰ πάθη φαινόμενα θετέον ἢ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν
- 194 παθῶν. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὰ πάθη φάμεν εἶναι φαινόμενα, πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα λεκτέον ἀληθῆ καὶ καταληπτὰ· εἰ δὲ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν παθῶν προσαγορεύομεν φαινόμενα, πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ψευδῆ καὶ πάντα ἀκατάληπτα. τὸ γὰρ περὶ ἡμᾶς συμβαῖνον πάθος ἑαυτοῦ πλέον οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ἐνδείκνυται. ἔνθεν καὶ, εἰ χρή τάληθές λέγειν, μόνον τὸ πάθος ἡμῖν ἐστὶ φαινόμενον· τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς καὶ τοῦ πάθους ποιητικὸν τάχα μὲν ἐστὶν ὄν, οὐ φαινόμενον δὲ ἡμῖν.
- 195 καὶ ταύτῃ περὶ μὲν τὰ πάθη τά γε οἰκεῖα πάντες ἐσμέν ἀπλανεῖς, περὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον πάντες πλανώμεθα· κακεῖνα μὲν ἐστὶ καταληπτὰ, τοῦτο δὲ ἀκατάληπτον, τῆς ψυχῆς πάνυ ἀσθενοῦς καθεστῶσης πρὸς διάγνωσιν αὐτοῦ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους, παρὰ τὰ διαστήματα, παρὰ τὰς κινήσεις,

^a Cf. P.H. I. 101, 126.

^b Eurip. *Bacch.* 918:

καὶ μὲν ὁρᾷν μοι δύο μὲν ἡλίους δοκῶ
δισσὰς δὲ Θήβας.

"The madman" is Pentheus.

is not white and sweetness by what is not sweet. For just as the sufferer from vertigo or jaundice "receives a yellowish impression from everything, and the sufferer from ophthalmia sees things red, and he who pushes his eye sideways gets as it were a double impression, and the madman beholds a "doubled Thebes," and sees the image of a doubled sun,^b and in 193 all these cases, while it is true that they have this particular affection (have, for instance, a feeling of yellowness or of flushing or of doubleness), yet it is supposed to be false to say that the object which impresses them is yellow or reddish or double,—so also it is most reasonable to hold that we are not able to perceive anything more than our own immediate affections. Hence we must posit as apparent either the affections or the things productive of the affections. And if we assert that the affections are apparent, we 194 must declare that all apparent things are true and apprehensible; but if we term the things productive of the affections apparent, all the apparent things are false and all non-apprehensible.^c For the affection which takes place in us reveals to us nothing more than itself. Hence too (if one must speak the truth) our affection alone is apparent to us, and the external object which is productive of the affection, though it is perhaps existent, is not apparent to us. And in 195 this way, whereas we are all unerring about our own affections, as regards the external real object we all err; and whereas the former are apprehensible, the latter is non-apprehensible, the soul being far too weak to discern it, owing to the positions, the

^c *i.e.* on the Cyrenaic assumption (§ 191) that affections are apprehensible and true, their causes not so.

- παρὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, παρὰ ἄλλας παμπληθεῖς αἰτίας. ἔνθεν οὐδὲ κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων, ὀνόματα δὲ κοινὰ τίθεσθαι τοῖς χρή-
 190 μασιν.¹ λευκὸν μὲν γάρ τι καὶ γλυκὺ καλοῦσι κοινῶς πάντες, κοινὸν δέ τι λευκὸν ἢ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἰδίου πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται, τὸ δὲ εἰ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἀπὸ λευκοῦ ἐγ-
 γίνεται αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ πέλας, οὐτ' αὐτὸς δύναται λέγειν μὴ ἀναδεχόμενος τὸ τοῦ πέλας πάθος, οὔτε
 197 ὁ πέλας μὴ ἀναδεχόμενος τὸ ἐκείνου. μηδενὸς δὲ κοινοῦ πάθους περὶ ἡμᾶς γινομένου προπετές ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν ὅτι τὸ ἐμοὶ τοῖον φαίνόμενον τοῖον καὶ τῷ παρεστῶτι φαίνεται. τάχα γὰρ ἐγὼ μὲν οὕτω συγκέκριμαι ὥς λευκαίνεισθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔξωθεν προσπίπτοντος, ἕτερος δὲ οὕτω κατεσκευασμένην ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν ὥστε ἐτέρως διατεθῆναι. οὐ
 198 πάντως οὖν κοινόν ἐστὶ τὸ φαίνόμενον ἡμῖν. καὶ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους τῆς αἰσθήσεως κατασκευὰς οὐχ ὡσαύτως κινούμεθα, πρόδηλον ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἰκτεριῶντων καὶ ὀφθαλμιῶντων καὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν διακειμένων· ὥς γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ οἱ μὲν ὠχραντικῶς οἱ δὲ φοινικτικῶς οἱ δὲ λευκαν-
 τικῶς πάσχουσιν, οὕτως εἰκὸς ἐστὶ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν διακειμένους παρὰ τὴν διάφορον τῶν αἰσθήσεων κατασκευὴν μὴ ὡσαύτως ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐτέρως μὲν τὸν λευκόν, ἐτέρως δὲ τὸν χαροπόν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δὲ τὸν μελανόφθαλμον. ὥστε κοινὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς ὀνόματα τιθέναι τοῖς πράγμασιν, πάθη δὲ γε ἔχειν ἴδια.
 199 Ἀνάλογα δὲ εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς περὶ κριτηρίων

¹ χρήμασιν Natorp: ἀρίμασιν mss., Bekk.

intervals, the motions, the changes, and a host of other causes. Hence they assert that there exists no criterion common to mankind, but common names are given to the objects. For all in common use the terms "white" or "sweet," but they do not possess in common anything white or sweet. For each man perceives his own particular affection, but as to whether this affection is produced by a white object both in himself and in his neighbour, neither the man himself can affirm without experiencing his neighbour's affection, nor can the neighbour without experiencing that of the man. But since there is no affection which is common to us all, it is rash to assert that the thing which appears of this kind to me appears to be of this kind to the man next me as well. For possibly while I am so constituted as to get a feeling of whiteness from that which impresses me from without, the other man has his sense so constructed as to be otherwise affected. So what appears to us is not always common to all. And that we do not, in fact, receive identical impressions, owing to the different constructions of our senses, is obvious in the case of sufferers from jaundice and ophthalmia and of those who are in a normal condition. For just as some have an affection of yellow, others of crimson, others of white, caused by the same object, so also it is likely that those who are in a normal condition will not receive identical impressions from the same objects owing to the differing construction of their senses, but the grey-eyed one kind, the blue-eyed another, and the black-eyed a different kind. So that we give to things names that are common, but the affections we have are peculiar to each of us.

Corresponding to the statements made by these

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λεγομένοις κατὰ τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ τὰ περὶ
τελῶν λεγόμενα. διήκει γὰρ τὰ πάθη καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ
τέλη. τῶν γὰρ παθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ δὲ
ἀλγεινὰ τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀλγεινὰ κακά
φασιν εἶναι, ὧν τέλος ἀλγηδὼν, τὰ δὲ ἡδέα ἀγαθὰ,
ὧν τέλος ἐστὶν ἀδιάψευστον ἡδονή, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ
οὔτε ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακά, ὧν τέλος τὸ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν
οὔτε κακόν, ὅπερ πάθος ἐστὶ μεταξύ ἡδονῆς καὶ
200 ἀλγηδόνος. πάντων οὖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ πάθη
κριτήριά ἐστι καὶ τέλη, ζῶμέν τε, φασίν, ἐπόμενοι
τούτοις, ἐναργεῖα τε καὶ εὐδοκῆσει προσέχοντες,
ἐναργεῖα μὲν κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα πάθη, εὐδοκῆσει δὲ
κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν.

Τοιαῦτα μὲν καὶ οἱ Κυρηναῖκοί, συστέλλοντες
μᾶλλον τὸ κριτήριον παρὰ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα
ἐκείνοι μὲν γὰρ σύνθετον αὐτὸ ἐποιοῦν ἐκ τε ἐναρ-
γείας καὶ τοῦ λόγου, οὗτοι δὲ ἐν μόναις αὐτὸ ταῖς
ἐναργείαις καὶ τοῖς πάθεσιν ὀρίζουσιν.

201 Οὐκ ἄποθεν δὲ τῆς τούτων δόξης εἰκόασιν εἶναι
καὶ οἱ ἀποφαινόμενοι κριτήριον ὑπάρχειν τῆς ἀλη-
θείας τὰς αἰσθήσεις. ὅτι γὰρ ἐγένοντό τινες τὸ
τοιούτο ἀξιοῦντες, προϋπτον πεποίηκεν Ἀντίοχος
ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἐν δευτέρῳ τῶν Κανονικῶν
ρήτῳ γράψας ταῦτα " ἄλλος δέ τις, ἐν ἱατρικῇ μὲν
οὐδενὸς δεύτερος, ἀπτόμενος δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας,
ἐπείθετο τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς
ἀντιλήψεις εἶναι, λόγῳ δὲ μηδὲν ὅλως ἡμᾶς κατα-
202 λαμβάνειν." εἶκε γὰρ διὰ τούτων ὁ Ἀντίοχος τὴν
προειρημένην τιθέναι στάσιν καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην τὸν

^a i.e. the ethical "ends" (good and evil); cf. P.H. 1. 25.

^b See §§ 141 ff.

men regarding criteria are, as it seems, their statements regarding Ends. For the affections reach even as far as the Ends.^a For of the affections some are pleasant, some painful, some intermediate; and the painful, they say, are evils, whereof the End is pain, and the pleasant are goods, whereof the infallible End is pleasure, and the intermediate are neither goods nor evils, whereof the End is neither good nor evil, this being an affection intermediate between pleasure and pain. Of all things, therefore, that exist 200 the affections are the criteria and Ends, and we live, they say, by following these, paying attention to evidence and to approval—to evidence in respect of the other affections, but to approval in respect of pleasure.

Such are the views of the Cyrenaics, who thus, as compared with the Platonists, restricted the nature of the criterion more closely; for whereas the latter made it to be a compound of both evidence and reason,^b the former confine it to evidences and affections.

Not far removed, it would seem, from the opinion 201 of the Cyrenaics are those who declare the senses to be the criterion of truth. For that there have been some who have maintained this view has been made clear by Antiochus^c the Academic, when in the Second Book of his *Canonicæ* he writes thus: "But a certain other man, second to none in the art of medicine and a student also of philosophy, believed that the sensations are really and truly perceptions, and that we apprehend nothing at all by the reason." For in 202 these words Antiochus seems to be stating the view mentioned above and to be hinting at Asclepiades the

^a Cf. § 162 *supra*; P.H. 1. 235.

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ιατρὸν αἰνίττεσθαι, ἀναιροῦντα μὲν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον αὐτῷ γενόμενον. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τούτου φορᾶς ποικιλώτερον καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐν τοῖς ἱατρικοῖς ὑπομνήμασι διεξήλθομεν, ὥστε μὴ ἔχειν ἀνάγκην παλινωδεῖν.

103 Ἐπίκουρος δὲ δυοῖν ὄντων τῶν συζυγούντων ἀλλήλοις πραγμάτων, φαντασίας καὶ τῆς δόξης, τούτων τὴν φαντασίαν, ἣν καὶ ἐνάργειαν καλεῖ, διὰ παντὸς ἀληθῆ φησὶν ὑπάρχειν. ὥς γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα πάθη, τουτέστιν ἡδονὴ καὶ πόνος, ἀπὸ ποιητικῶν τινῶν καὶ κατ' αὐτὰ τὰ ποιητικὰ συνίσταται, οἷον ἢ μὲν ἡδονὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἢ δὲ ἀλγηδῶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλγεινῶν, καὶ οὔτε τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ποιητικὸν ἐνδέχεται ποτε μὴ εἶναι ἡδὺ οὔτε τὸ τῆς ἀλγηδόνης παρεκτικὸν μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀλγεινόν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἡδον ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀλγῦνον ἀλγεινόν τὴν φύσιν ὑποκεῖσθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν, παθῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς οὐσῶν, τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐκάστου αὐτῶν πάντῃ τε καὶ πάντως φανταστὸν ἐστίν, ὃ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὄν φανταστὸν, μὴ ὑπάρχον κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιοῦτον οἷον φαίνεται, ποιητικὸν φαντασίας καθεστάναι.

104 Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος τὸ παραπλήσιον χρῆ λογίζεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ ὁρατὸν οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ὁρατόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον ὅποιον φαίνεται καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ἀκουστόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις τοιοῦτον ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. γίνονται οὖν πᾶσαι
205 αἱ φαντασίαι ἀληθεῖς. καὶ κατὰ λόγον· εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὴς λέγεται φαντασία, φασὶν οἱ Ἐπικουρείοι,

¹ λέγεται N : φαίνεται cet., Bekk.

physician, who abolished the "ruling principle,"^a and who lived at the same time as himself. But of this man's attitude we have given a more circumstantial and particular account in our *Medical Memoirs*,^b so that there is no need to repeat the story

Epicurus^c asserts that there are two things 203 which are correlative—namely, presentation and opinion,—of which the presentation, which he also terms "evidence," is constantly true. For just as the primary affections—that is to say pleasure and pain—come about owing to certain agents and in accord with those agents (pleasure, for instance, from things pleasant and pain from things painful), and it is impossible for the agent productive of pleasure ever to be not pleasant, or that which is creative of pain to be not painful, but of necessity that which gives pleasure must in its real nature be pleasant and that which gives pain painful,—so also in the case of the presentations, which are affections of ours, the agent which is productive of each of them is always entirely presented, and, as being presented, it is incapable of being productive of the presentation without being in very truth such as it appears.

In the case, also, of the particular sensations one 204 must argue in like manner. Thus the visible object not only appears visible but actually is such as it appears; and the audible object not only appears audible but also really is so in truth; and so on with the rest. The presentations, then, which occur are all true. And reasonably so; for, say the Epicureans, 205

^a i.e. denied the existence of that part of the soul which the Stoics termed the "ruling principle" or "regent part"; cf. Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxv.

^b This work of Sextus is no longer extant.

^c Cf. § 368.

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ὅταν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντός τε καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον γίνηται, πᾶσα δὲ φαντασία ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ φανταστοῦ καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ φανταστὸν συνίσταται, πᾶσα κατ' ἀνάγκην φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής.

206 ἐξαπατᾷ δὲ ἐνίους ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, ὅλον ὁρατοῦ, δοκουσῶν προσπίπτειν φαντασιῶν, καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀλλοιόχρουν ἡ ἀλλοιόσχημον ἡ ἄλλως πως ἐξηλλαγμένον φαίνεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ὑπενόησαν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν οὕτω διαφερουσῶν καὶ μαχομένων φαντασιῶν δεῖ τὴν μὲν τινα ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὴν δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ψευδῆ τυγχάνειν. ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὐθές, καὶ ἀνδρῶν μὴ συνορώντων τὴν

207 ἐν τοῖς οὖσι φύσιν. οὐ γὰρ ὅλον ὁράται τὸ στερεμνιον, ἵνα ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν ποιῶμεθα τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ στερεμνίου. τοῦ δὲ χρώματος τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ στερεμνίου, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σύνεγγυς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μετρίου διαστήματος βλεπομένων, τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς τοῦ στερεμνίου καὶ τοῖς ἐφεξῆς τόποις ὑποκείμενον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ μακροῦ διαστήματος θεωρουμένων. τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ ἐξαλλαττόμενον, καὶ ἴδιον ἀναδεχόμενον σχῆμα, τοιαύτην ἀναδίδωσι φαντασίαν ὅποιον καὶ

208 αὐτὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑπόκειται. ὅπερ οὖν τρόπον οὔτε ἡ ἐν τῷ κρουμένῳ χαλκῷματι φωνὴ ἐξακούεται οὔτε ἡ ἐν τῷ στόματι τοῦ κεκραγοτος, ἀλλ' ἡ προσπίπτουσα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ αἰσθήσει, καὶ ὥς οὐθείς φησι τὸν ἐξ ἀποστήματος μικρᾶς ἀκούοντα φωνῆς ψευδῶς ἀκούειν, ἐπεὶπερ σύνεγγυς ἐλθὼν ὥς μείζονος ταύτης ἀντιλαμβάνεται, οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμι ψεῦδεσθαι τὴν ὄψιν, ὅτι ἐκ μακροῦ μὲν διαστήματος

* The Epicureans explained the fact that our impressions of a coloured object vary with its distance from us by assum-

if a presentation is termed "true" whenever it arises from a real object and in accord with that real object, and every presentation arises from a real presented object and in accord with that object, then every presentation is necessarily true. But some are de- 206
ceived by the difference in the presentations which seem to be derived from the same object of sense—for instance a visible object—because of which the object appears of another colour or of another shape, or altered in some other way. For they have supposed that, of the presentations thus differing and conflicting, one kind must be true and the kind derived from an opposite source false. But this is silly, and the notion of men who do not fully con- 207
sider the real nature of things. Thus—to base our argument on objects of sight—it is not the whole of the solid body that is seen, but the colour of the solid body. And of the colour, one part is on the solid (as in the case of objects seen close at hand or at a moderate distance), and another part outside the solid and existent in the spaces adjacent (as in the case of things viewed at a great distance).^a And this being altered in the intervening space and receiving a special shape of its own gives rise to a presentation which is similar to its own real nature. For just as 208
neither the sound in the brass instrument that is struck, nor the sound in the mouth of the man who shouts, is heard but the sound which strikes on our own sense; and just as no one says that he who hears a faint sound from a distance hears falsely because the same man, on coming close, perceives it as loud;—just so I should decline to say that the eyesight is
ing that its colour is partly absorbed by the intervening space, and thus is "outside the solid" (body).

- μικρὸν ὀρᾷ τὸν πύργον καὶ στρογγύλον ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
 209 σύνεγγυς μείζονα καὶ τετράγωνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
 ἀληθεύειν, ὅτι καὶ ὅτε φαίνεται μικρὸν αὐτῇ τὸ
 αἰσθητὸν καὶ τοιουτόσχημον, ὄντως ἐστὶ μικρὸν
 καὶ τοιουτόσχημον, τῇ διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος φορᾷ ἀπο-
 θραυομένων τῶν κατὰ τὰ εἶδωλα περάτων, καὶ ὅτε
 μέγα πάλιν καὶ ἀλλοιόσχημον, πάλιν ὁμοίως μέγα
 καὶ ἀλλοιόσχημον, ἥδη μέντοι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀμφοτέρω
 καθεστώς. τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς διαστροφῆς λοιπὸν ἐστὶ
 210 δόξης οἶεσθαι, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἦν τό τε ἐκ τοῦ σύνεγγυς
 καὶ τὸ πόρρωθεν θεωρούμενον φανταστόν. αἰ-
 σθήσεως δὲ ἴδιον ὑπῆρχε τοῦ παρόντος μόνον καὶ
 κινουontos αὐτὴν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, οἷον χρώματος,
 οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ διακρίνειν ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνθάδε
 ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐνθάδε ὑποκείμενον. διόπερ αἱ μὲν
 φαντασίαι διὰ ταῦτα πᾶσαι εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς, (αἱ δὲ
 δόξαι οὐ πᾶσαι ἦσαν ἀληθεῖς,)¹ ἀλλ' εἶχόν τινα
 διαφοράν. τούτων γὰρ αἱ μὲν ἦσαν ἀληθεῖς αἱ
 δὲ ψευδεῖς, ἐπεὶ περ κρίσεις καθεστᾶσιν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ
 ταῖς φαντασίαις, κρίνομεν δὲ τὰ μὲν ὀρθῶς τὰ
 δὲ μοχθηρῶς ἥτοι παρὰ τὸ προστιθέναι τι καὶ
 προσνέμειν ταῖς φαντασίαις ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἀφαιρεῖν
 τι τούτων καὶ κοινῶς καταψεύδεσθαι τῆς ἀλόγου
 211 αἰσθήσεως. οὐκοῦν τῶν δοξῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἐπί-
 κουρον αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἰσὶν αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς, ἀληθεῖς
 μὲν αἱ τε ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιμαρ-
 τυρούμεναι πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας, ψευδεῖς δὲ αἱ τε
 ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι πρὸς
 212 τῆς ἐναργείας. ἐστὶ δὲ ἐπιμαρτύρησις μὲν κατὰ-
 ληψις δι' ἐναργείας τοῦ τὸ δοξαζόμενον τοιοῦτον

¹ <αἱ δὲ . . . ἀληθεῖς> add. Usener, Mutsch.: αἱ δὲ δόξαι εἶχον (om. ἀλλ') Bekk.

false because at a long distance it sees the tower as small and round but from close at hand as large and square, but I should say rather that it reports truly 209 because, when the object of sense appears to it small and of a certain shape, it really is small and of a certain shape, as the limits belonging to the images* are rubbed away by their passage through the air; and again when it appears large and of a different shape it is correspondingly large and of a different shape, since it is no longer the same object that is both at once. For it is left to the distorted opinion to imagine that the presented object seen from close at hand is the same as that seen from a distance. But it is the 210 special function of sense to perceive only that which is present and affects it—colour, for instance—but not to discern that the object here is one thing and the object there another. Hence, for these reasons, presentations are all true, (but opinions are not all true) but possess certain distinctions. For some of them are true, others false, since they are judgments of ours concerning the presentations, and we judge sometimes rightly and sometimes wrongly either because of adding and attaching something to the presentations or because of subtracting something from them and, in either case, falsifying the irrational sensation. Of opinions, then, according to Epicurus, 211 some are true, others false; the true being those which testify for, and not against, the evidence of sense, and the false those which testify against, and not for, that evidence. And confirmatory testimony 212 is apprehension by means of evidence that the thing

* Sensation, according to Epicurus, is caused by "images" or "effluences," which issue forth from the external objects and strike upon the organs of sense; cf. Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xliii.

- εἶναι ὁποῖόν ποτε ἐδοξάζετο, οἷον Πλάτωνος μακρόθεν προσιόντος εἰκάζω μὲν καὶ δοξάζω παρὰ τὸ διάστημα ὅτι Πλάτων ἐστί, προσπελάσαντος δὲ αὐτοῦ προσεμαρτυρήθη ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ἐστί, συναιρεθέντος τοῦ διαστήματος, καὶ ἐπεμαρτυρήθη δι'
- 213 αὐτῆς τῆς ἐναργείας. οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις δὲ ἔστιν ἀκολουθία τοῦ ὑποσταθέντος καὶ δοξασθέντος ἀδήλου τῷ φαινομένῳ, οἷον ὁ Ἐπίκουρος λέγων εἶναι κενόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄδηλον, πιστοῦται δι' ἐναργοῦς πράγματος τοῦτο, τῆς κινήσεως· μὴ ὄντος γὰρ κενοῦ οὐδὲ κίνησις ὤφειλεν εἶναι, τόπον μὴ ἔχοντος τοῦ κινουμένου σώματος εἰς ὃν περιστή-
- 214 σεται διὰ τὸ πάντα πλήρη εἶναι καὶ ναστά, ὥστε τῷ δοξασθέντι ἀδήλῳ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν τὸ φαινόμενον κινήσεως οὔσης. ἡ μέντοι ἀντιμαρτύρησις μαχόμενόν τί ἐστι τῇ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρήσει· ἦν γὰρ συνασκευὴ τοῦ φαινομένου τῷ ὑποσταθέντι ἀδήλῳ, οἷον ὁ στωικὸς λέγει μὴ εἶναι κενόν, ἄδηλόν τι ἀξιῶν, τούτῳ δὲ οὕτως ὑποσταθέντι ὀφείλει τὸ φαινόμενον συνασκευάζεσθαι, φημί δ' ἡ κίνησις· μὴ ὄντος γὰρ κενοῦ κατ' ἀνάγκην οὐδὲ κίνησις γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν ἤδη προδεδηλωμένον ἡμῖν
- 215 τρόπον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις ἀντίξους ἐστὶ τῇ ἐπιμαρτυρήσει· ἦν γὰρ ὑπόπτωσις δι' ἐναργείας τοῦ τὸ δοξαζόμενον μὴ εἶναι τοιοῦτον ὁποῖόν περ ἐδοξάζετο, οἷον πόρρωθέν τινος προσιόντος εἰκάζομεν παρὰ τὸ διάστημα Πλάτωνα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ συναιρεθέντος τοῦ διαστήματος ἔγνωμεν δι' ἐναργείας ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι Πλάτων. καὶ γέγονε τὸ

opined is of such a sort as it was opined to be—as when, for example, on the approach of Plato from afar I guess and opine, because of the distance, that it is Plato, and when he has drawn near the fact that he is Plato is further testified—the distance being reduced—and is confirmed by actual evidence of sense. And lack of contrary testimony is the con- 213
gruity of the supposed and opined non-evident object with the apparent—as when Epicurus says that void exists, which is a thing non-evident, and this is supported by an obvious fact, namely motion ; for if void does not exist, neither ought motion to exist, the moving body having no place into which to pass over, owing to the fact that all things are full and close-
packed ; so that, since motion exists, the apparent 214
does not give testimony that contradicts the opined non-evident fact. But contrary testimony is something which conflicts with lack of contrary testimony ; for it is the joint-refutation of the apparent fact and the supposed non-evident fact,—as when, for instance, the Stoic says that void does not exist, asserting something non-evident, and jointly with this supposed fact the apparent fact, by which I mean motion, is necessarily refuted ; for if void does not exist, of necessity motion does not exist either, according to the argument we have already set out. So likewise lack of confirmatory testimony is opposed 215
to confirmatory testimony ; for it is the impression due to sense-evidence that the thing opined is not such as it was opined to be ; as, for instance, when someone is approaching from afar and we guess, because of the distance, that it is Plato, but when the distance is reduced we learn by evidence that it is not Plato. Such an occurrence is lack of con-

- τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις· οὐ γὰρ ἐπεμαρτυρήθη
 216 τῷ φαινομένῳ τὸ δοξαζόμενον. ὅθεν ἡ μὲν ἐπι-
 μαρτύρησις καὶ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις τοῦ ἀληθὲς
 εἶναι τι ἔστι κριτήριον, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις
 καὶ ἀντιμαρτύρησις τοῦ ψευδὸς εἶναι. πάντων δὲ
 κρηπὶς καὶ θεμέλιος ἡ ἐνάργεια.
 217 Τοιοῦτο μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρόν ἐστι κριτή-
 ριον· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ Θεόφραστον
 καὶ κοινῶς οἱ περιπατητικοί, διττῆς οὔσης κατὰ τὸ
 ἀνωτάτω τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων φύσεως, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν,
 καθὼς προείπον, αἰσθητά ἐστι τὰ δὲ νοητά, διττὸν
 καὶ αὐτοὶ τὸ κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, αἰσθῆσιν μὲν
 218 τῶν αἰσθητῶν νόησιν δὲ τῶν νοητῶν, κοινὸν δὲ
 ἀμφοτέρων, ὥς ἔλεγεν ὁ Θεόφραστος, τὸ ἐναργές.
 τάξει μὲν οὖν πρῶτόν ἐστι τὸ ἄλογον καὶ ἀναπόδει-
 κτον κριτήριον, ἡ αἰσθῆσις, δυνάμει δὲ ὁ νοῦς, εἰ καὶ
 τῇ τάξει δευτερεύειν δοκεῖ παρὰ τὴν αἰσθῆσιν.
 219 ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κινεῖται ἡ αἰσθῆσις,
 ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς κατὰ ἐνάργειαν περὶ τὴν αἰσθῆσιν
 κινήσεως ἐπιγίνεται τι κατὰ ψυχὴν κίνημα τοῖς
 κρείττοσι καὶ βελτίοσι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν δυναμένοις
 κινεῖσθαι ζώοις. ὅπερ μνήμη τε καὶ φαντασία
 καλεῖται παρ' αὐτοῖς, μνήμη μὲν τοῦ περὶ τὴν
 αἰσθῆσιν πάθους, φαντασία δὲ τοῦ ἐμποιήσαντος
 220 τῇ αἰσθήσει τὸ πάθος αἰσθητοῦ. διόπερ ἔχκει τὸ
 τοιοῦτον ἀναλογεῖν κίνημα φασίν· καὶ ὃν τρόπον
 ἐκεῖνο, φημί δὲ τὸ ἔχκος, ὑπὸ τινός τε γίνεται καὶ
 ἀπὸ τινος, ὑπὸ τινος μὲν οἶον τῆς τοῦ ποδὸς ἐπ-
 ερέσεως, ἀπὸ τινος δὲ ὥσπερ τοῦ Δίωνος, οὕτω καὶ
 τὸ προειρημένον τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα ὑφ' οὗ μὲν
 γίνεται ὥσπερ τοῦ περὶ τὴν αἰσθῆσιν πάθους, ἀφ'

firmatory testimony ; for the thing opined was not confirmed by the apparent fact Hence confirmatory 216 testimony and lack of contrary testimony form a criterion of the truth of a thing, but lack of confirmatory testimony and contradictory testimony of its falsehood. And the base and foundation of all is the evidence of sense.

Such, then, is the criterion according to Epicurus. 217 But Aristotle and Theophrastus and the Peripatetics in general, seeing that the nature of things falls into two main classes,—since, as I said before, some things are sensible, others intelligible,—themselves also admit a twofold criterion, sense of things sensible and intellect of things intelligible, while common to 218 both, as Theophrastus said, is the plainly evident. First, then, in order comes the irrational and non-demonstrable criterion, sense, but first in potency intellect, although it appears to come second in order as compared with sense. For the sense is affected by 219 things sensible, and as a result of the affection of the sense in an evident way there supervenes an affection of the soul in such creatures as are superior and better and able to move of themselves ; and this is termed by them memory and presentation—memory of the affection felt by the sense, and presentation of the sensible object which has produced the affection in the sense. Hence they say that an affection of this kind is com- 220 parable to a foot-mark^a ; and just as that (I mean the foot-mark) is made both by something and from something—by something as, for example, by the pressure of the foot, and from something, as, say, from Dion,—so also the affection of the soul mentioned above is generated by something, as, say, the affection of the sense, and from something, such as the sensible

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οὐδὲ καθάπερ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, πρὸς ὃ καὶ ὁμοιότητά
 221 τινὰ σώζει. τοῦτο δὲ πάλιν τὸ κίνημα, ὅπερ
 μνήμη τε καὶ φαντασία καλεῖται, εἶχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ
 τρίτον ἐπιγινόμενον ἄλλο κίνημα τὸ τῆς λογικῆς
 φαντασίας, κατὰ κρίσιν λοιπὸν καὶ προαίρεσιν τὴν
 ἡμετέραν συμβαῖνον, ὅπερ κίνημα διάνοιά τε καὶ
 νοῦς προσαγορεύεται, ὅλον ὅταν τις προσπεσόντος
 κατ' ἐνάργειαν Δίωνος πάθῃ πως τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ
 τραπῇ, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν πάθους ἐγ-
 γείνηται τις αὐτοῦ τῇ ψυχῇ φαντασία, ἣν καὶ μνήμην
 πρότερον ἐλέγομεν καὶ ἔχει παραπλήσιον ὑπάρχειν,
 222 ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης τῆς φαντασίας ἐκουσίως ἀναζω-
 γραφῇ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀνυπλάσσει φάντασμα, καθάπερ τὸν
 γενικὸν ἄνθρωπον. τὸ γὰρ δὴ τοιοῦτο κίνημα τῆς
 ψυχῆς κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς οἱ περιπατητικοὶ
 τῶν φιλοσόφων διάνοιάν τε καὶ νοῦν ὀνομάζουσι,
 κατὰ μὲν τὸ δύνασθαι διάνοιαν, κατὰ δὲ ἐνέργειαν
 223 νοῦν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ δύνηται τοῦτον ποιεῖσθαι τὸν
 ἀναπλασμὸν ψυχῇ, τουτέστιν ὅταν πεφύκῃ, διάνοια
 καλεῖται, ὅταν δὲ ἐνεργητικῶς ἤδη ποιῇ, νοῦς ὀνο-
 μάζεται. ἀπὸ μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς διανοήσεως
 συνίσταται ἡ τε ἔννοια καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη.
 διανοήσεις μὲν γὰρ γίνεται ὅτε μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος
 224 εἰδῶν ὅτε δὲ τῶν τε εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γενῶν· ἀλλ' ὃ
 μὲν ἀθροισμὸς τῶν τοιούτων τοῦ νοῦ φαντασμάτων
 καὶ ἡ συγκεφαλαίωσις τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους εἰς τὸ
 καθόλου ἔννοια καλεῖται, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀθροισμῷ τούτῳ
 καὶ τῇ συγκεφαλαίώσει τελευταῖον ὑφίσταται ἡ τε
 ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὸ ἀκριβὲς καὶ
 ἀδιάπτωτον ἔχουσα, τέχνη δὲ ἡ μὴ πάντως τοιαύτη.
 225 ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τεχνῶν φύσις ἐστὶν
 ὑστερογενής, οὕτω καὶ ἡ καλουμένη δόξα· ὅταν γὰρ

object, to which also it preserves a certain similarity. And this affection, again, which is termed both 221 memory and presentation, possesses within itself a third and separate supervenient affection—that of rational presentation, which is an after-result consequent on our judgement and preference; and this affection is called mind and thought; as, for example, when someone, on receiving an evident impression of Dion, suffers a certain affection of sense and a certain disturbance, and by the affection of his sense there is produced in his soul a presentation (which is also, as we said above, memory and similar to a foot-mark), and from this presentation there is voluntarily limned 222 and represented by him an imagined object, such as generic Man. Now this kind of affection of the soul the Peripatetic philosophers call either mind or thought according to the different ways in which it occurs—mind in so far as it is a potency, thought in so far as it is an actuality; for whenever the soul is 223 potentially able to form this representation—that is to say, whenever it is of a nature to do so—it is called mind, but whenever it is already actually doing so, it is termed thought. Moreover, from thought and the action of mind arise comprehension and science and art. For mental action deals at one time with particulars, at another with both particulars and genera; but the aggregation of such images of the 224 thought and the summing-up of the particulars in the universal is termed comprehension, and in this process of aggregation and summing-up the last stage constitutes science and art—science being that which possesses accuracy and inerrancy, art that which does not always possess them. And as the sciences 225 and arts are of later origin, so also is what is termed

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εἶξη ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐγγενομένη
 φαντασίᾳ καὶ τῷ φανέντι πρόσθῃται καὶ συγκατά-
 226 θηται, λέγεται δόξα. φαίνεται οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρη-
 μένων πρῶτα κριτήρια τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων γνώ-
 σεως ἢ τε αἰσθησις καὶ ὁ νοῦς, ἡ μὲν ὀργάνου
 τρόπον ἔχουσα ὁ δὲ τεχνίτου. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡμεῖς
 οὐ δυνάμεθα χωρὶς ζυγοῦ τὴν τῶν βαρέων καὶ
 κούφων ἐξέτασιν ποιεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ ἄτερ κανόνος τὴν
 τῶν εὐθέων καὶ στρεβλῶν διαφορὰν λαβεῖν, οὕτως
 οὐδὲ ὁ νοῦς χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως δοκιμάσαι πέφυκε τὰ
 πράγματα.

Τοιοῦτοι μὲν ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίοις εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ
 227 τοῦ περιπάτου· ἀπολειπομένης δ' ἔτι τῆς στωικῆς
 δόξης παρακειμένως καὶ περὶ ταύτης λέγωμεν.
 κριτήριον τοίνυν φασὶν ἀληθείας εἶναι οἱ ἄνδρες
 οὗτοι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. ταύτην δ'
 εἰσόμεθα, πρότερον γνόντες τί ποτέ ἐστι κατ' αὐτοὺς
 ἡ φαντασία καὶ τίνες ἐπ' εἰδους ταύτης διαφοραί.
 228 φαντασία οὖν ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ.
 περὶ τῆς εὐθὺς καὶ διέστησαν· Κλεάνθης μὲν γὰρ
 ἤκουσε τὴν τύπωσιν κατὰ εἰσοχὴν τε καὶ ἐξοχὴν,
 ὥσπερ καὶ <τὴν>¹ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων γινομένην
 229 τοῦ κηροῦ τύπωσιν, Χρύσιππος δὲ ἄτοπον ἡγείτο
 τὸ τοιοῦτο. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ φησι, τῆς διανοίας
 δεήσει ὑφ' ἧν ποτε τρίγωνόν τι καὶ τετράγωνον
 φαντασιουμένης τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
 χρόνον διαφέροντα ἔχειν περὶ αὐτῷ σχήματα ἅμα
 τε τρίγωνον καὶ τετράγωνον γίνεσθαι ἢ καὶ περι-
 φερές, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον· εἴτα πολλῶν ἅμα φαν-

¹ <τὴν> add. Zeller.

² Cf. P.H. ii. 70.

³ i.e. the mind, or part of the soul which receives the
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"opinion"; for whenever the soul yields to the presentation produced in it by sense and inclines and assents to the object which has appeared, this is called "opinion." It appears, then, from what has 226 been said that the primary criteria of the knowledge of things are sensation and thought, the former playing the part of the instrument, the latter that of the craftsman. For just as we are unable to carry out a test of things heavy and light without a balance, or to grasp the difference between things straight and crooked without a rule, so likewise thought is naturally incapable of estimating objects when divorced from sense.

Such, then, summarily stated, are the views of the Peripatetics; and as there still remains the Stoic 227 doctrine, let us deal with it also in the next place. These men, then, assert that the criterion of truth is the apprehensive presentation. What this is we shall understand when we have first learnt what, in their view, presentation is and what are its specific differences. Presentation then, according to them, 228 is an impression on the soul. But about this they at once began to quarrel; for whereas Cleanthes understood "impression" as involving eminence and depression,^a just as does the impression made in wax by signet-rings, Chrysippus regarded such a thing as 229 absurd. For in the first place, he says, when the mind imagines at one and the same moment a triangular object and a quadrangular, the same body^b must needs be circumscribed by different forms at the same time and become simultaneously both triangular and quadrangular, or even circular, which is absurd;

^a "impression,"—the Stoics regarding the soul as just as truly "corporeal" as the body; cf. Vol. I. *Introductio*. pp. xxiv f.

- τασιῶν ὑφισταμένων ἐν ἡμῖν παμπληθεῖς καὶ τοὺς
 σχηματισμοὺς ἔξειν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὃ τοῦ προτέρου
 230 χεῖρόν ἐστιν. αὐτὸς οὖν τὴν τύπωσιν εἰρησθαι ὑπὸ
 τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὑπενόει ἀντὶ τῆς ἑτεροιώσεως, ὥστ'
 εἶναι τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον "φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτε-
 ροιώσις ψυχῆς," μηκέτι ἀτόπου ὄντος τοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ
 σῶμα ὑφ' ἑνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πολλῶν περὶ
 ἡμᾶς συνισταμένων φαντασιῶν παμπληθεῖς ἀνα-
 231 δέχεσθαι ἑτεροιώσεις· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ, ὅταν ἅμα
 πολλοὶ φωνῶσιν, ἀμυθήτους ὑπὸ ἓν καὶ διαφερούσας
 ἀναδεχόμενος πληγὰς εὐθὺς πολλὰς ἴσχει καὶ τὰς
 ἑτεροιώσεις, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ποικίλως
 φαντασιούμενον ἀνάλογόν τι τούτῳ πείσεται.
 232 "Ἄλλοι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸν κατὰ διόρθωσιν ἐκείνου ἐξ-
 ενεχθέντα ὅρον ὀρθῶς ἔχειν φασίν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι
 τις φαντασία, αὕτη τύπωσις καὶ ἑτεροιώσις τῆς
 ψυχῆς καθέστηκεν· εἰ δέ τις ἐστὶ τύπωσις τῆς
 ψυχῆς, ἐκείνη οὐ πάντως ἐστὶ φαντασία. καὶ γὰρ
 προσπταίσματος γενομένου περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον ἢ
 κνησμοῦ περὶ τὴν χεῖρα συμβάντος τύπωσις μὲν
 καὶ ἑτεροιώσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποτελεῖται, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ
 φαντασία, ἐπεὶ περ οὐδὲ περὶ τῷ τυχόντι μέρει τῆς
 ψυχῆς γίνεσθαι ταύτην συμβέβηκεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῇ
 233 διανοίᾳ μόνον καὶ τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ. πρὸς οὓς
 ἀπαντῶντες οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς συνεμφαίνεσθαι φασὶ
 τῇ τυπώσει τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ὡς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ, ὥστε εἶναι
 τὸ πλήρες τοιοῦτον "φαντασία ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν
 ψυχῇ ὡς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ." καθὰ γὰρ ἡ ἐφηλότης
 λέγεται λευκότης ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ συνεμφαινόντων
 ἡμῶν τὸ ὡς ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ, τοιούτου τὸ κατὰ ποιόν

* A disease of the eye, supposed to be derived from rays of the sun ("Helios").

and further, when many presentations occur in us simultaneously, the soul will also receive innumerable formations, which result is worse than the former. He himself, therefore, suspected that the term 230 "impression" was used by Zeno in the sense of "alteration," so that the definition runs like this—"presentation is an alteration of the soul"; for it is no longer absurd that, when many presentations co-exist in us at the same moment, the same body should admit of innumerable alterations; for just 231 as the air, when many people are speaking simultaneously, receives in a single moment numberless and different impacts and at once undergoes many alterations also, so too when the regent part is the subject of a variety of images it will experience something analogous to this

But others assert that not even the definition 232 thus put forth in accordance with the amendment of Chrysippus is correct. For if a presentation exists, it is an impression and alteration of the soul; but if an impression of the soul exists, it is not in all cases a presentation. For in fact when a knock happens to the finger, or a scratch occurs in the hand, there is produced indeed an impression and alteration of the soul, but not a presentation as well; seeing that this is a result which occurs not in any chance part of the soul but only in the mind and the regent part.—By 233 way of meeting their objection the Stoics declare that in the phrase "impression of the soul" there is implied also the words "in so far as it is soul," so that the full statement is this—"presentation is an impression in the soul in so far as it is soul." For just as "epheletes"^a is defined as "whiteness in the eye," wherewith we also imply that "in so far as it is eye"

- μέρος τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ, τὴν λευκότητα εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐφηλότητα ἔχωμεν ὥς ἂν πάντες ἐκ φύσεως ἔχοντες λευκότητα ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ, οὕτως ὅταν λέγωμεν τὴν φαντασίαν τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, συνεμφαίνομεν καὶ τὸ περὶ ποιὸν μέρος γίνεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν τύπωσιν, τουτέστι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ὥστε ἐξαπλούμενον γίνεσθαι τὸν ὅρον τοιοῦτον "φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ."
- 234 ἄλλοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ὁρμώμενοι δυνάμεως γλαφυρώτερον ἀπελογήσαντο. φασὶ γὰρ ψυχὴν λέγεσθαι διχῶς, τό τε συνέχον τὴν ὅλην σύγκρισιν καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. ὅταν γὰρ εἴπωμεν συνεστάναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ἢ τὸν θάνατον εἶναι χωρισμὸν ψυχῆς ἀπὸ
- 235 σώματος, ἰδίως καλοῦμεν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅταν διαιρούμενοι φάσκωμεν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχὴν τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα τὰ δ' ἐκτός, οὐ τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν ἐμφαίνομεν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ταύτης μόριον· περὶ τοῦτω γὰρ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ
- 236 ἀγαθὰ συνίσταται. διόπερ καὶ ὅταν λέγῃ ὁ Ζήνων φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἀκουστέον ψυχὴν οὐ τὴν ὅλην ἀλλὰ τὸ μόριον αὐτῆς, ἵνα ᾖ τὸ λεγόμενον οὕτως ἔχον "φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις περὶ
- 237 τὸ ἡγεμονικόν." ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ, φασὶ τινες, πάλιν ἡμάρτηται. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὁρμὴ καὶ ἡ συγκατάθεσις καὶ ἡ κατάληψις ἑτεροιώσεις μὲν εἰσι τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, διαφέρουσι δὲ τῆς φαντασίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ πείσῃς τις ἦν ἡμετέρα καὶ διάθεσις, αὐταὶ δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον [ἢ ὁρμαὶ] ἐνέργειαι τινες ἡμῶν ὑπῆρχον. μοχθηρὸς ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ ὅρος πολλοῖς καὶ
- 238 διαφόροις πράγμασιν ἐφαρμοζόμενος· καὶ ὃν τρόπον ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὀρισάμενος, καὶ εἰπὼν ὅτι ἄνθρωπός

(that is to say, "in a certain portion of the eye")
 there exists whiteness, in order that all of us men
 may not have "ephelotes," seeing that we all natur-
 ally have whiteness in the eye,—so when we define
 presentation as "impression in the soul," we also
 imply therewith that it occurs in a certain part of the
 soul, to wit, the regent part, so that, stated explicitly,
 the definition is this—"presentation is alteration in
 the regent part."—Others, starting with the same 234
 line of argument, have made a more subtle defence.
 For they say that soul is used in two senses, as
 denoting both that which holds together the whole
 framework and, in especial, the regent part. For
 when we say that man is composed of soul and body,
 or that death is a separation of soul from body, we
 are speaking specially of the regent part. So like- 235
 wise, when we are classifying goods and say that some
 are goods of the soul, some of the body, and some
 external, we do not mean the whole soul but the
 regent part of it, for it is to this that the affections and
 the goods belong. Hence, when Zeno says that "pre- 236
 sentation is an impression on the soul," we must
 understand by "soul" not the whole but that part of
 it, so that the statement may be in this form, "pre-
 sentation is alteration of the regent part."—But even 237
 when put in this form some say that it is wrong again.
 For, in fact, impulse and assent and apprehension are
 alterations of the regent part, but are different from
 presentation. For whereas this is a passivity of ours
 and a condition, the former are much rather activities.
 The definition, therefore, is a bad one, as it suits many
 different things; and just as he who defines "man" 238
 and says that "man is a rational animal" ^a does not

^a Cf. *P.H.* ii. 26 ff.

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- ἐστι ζῶον λογικόν, οὐχ ὑγιῶς τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑπέγραψε διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸν θεὸν ζῶον εἶναι λογικόν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ τὴν φαντασίαν ἀποφηνάμενος ἑτεροίωσιν ἡγεμονικοῦ διέπτεσεν· οὐ μᾶλλον γὰρ ταύτης ἢ ἐκάστης τῶν κατηγορημένων κινήσεων
 239 ἐστὶν ἀπόδοσις. τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης καὶ τῆσδε τῆς ἐνστάσεως πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰς συνεμφάσεις οἱ στωικοὶ ἀνατρέχουσι, λέγοντες τῷ ὄρω δεῖν τῆς φαντασίας συνακούειν τὸ κατὰ πείσιν· ὥς γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὸν ἔρωτα ἐπιβολὴν εἶναι φιλοποίας συνεμφαίνει τὸ νέων ὠραίων, καὶ εἰ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ῥήτὸν τοῦτο ἐκφέρῃ (οὐθεὶς γὰρ γερόντων καὶ ἀκμῆς ὥραν μὴ ἔχόντων ἐρᾷ), οὕτως ὅταν λέγωμεν, φασί, τὴν φαντασίαν ἑτεροίωσιν ἡγεμονικοῦ, συνεμφαίνομεν τὸ κατὰ πείσιν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ κατὰ ἐνέργειαν γίνεσθαι τὴν
 240 ἑτεροίωσιν. δοκοῦσι δὲ μὴδ' οὕτως ἐκπεφευγέναι τὸ ἔγκλημα· ὅτε γὰρ τρέφεται τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ νῆ Δία γε αὖξεται, ἑτεροιοῦται μὲν κατὰ πείσιν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη ἑτεροίωσις αὐτοῦ, καίπερ κατὰ πείσιν οὔσα καὶ διάθεσις, φαντασία, ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ τι πάλιν λέγοιεν ἰδίωμα πείσεως εἶναι τὴν φαντασίαν,
 241 ὅπερ διενήνοχε τῶν τοιούτων διαθέσεων, ἢ ἐκεῖνό γε, ἐπεὶ ἡ φαντασία γίνεται ἥτοι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἢ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν, ὃ δὴ κυριώτερον διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς παρ' αὐτοῖς καλεῖται, πάντως ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φαντασίας συνεμφαίνεσθαι τὸ τὴν πείσιν γίνεσθαι ἥτοι κατὰ τὴν ἐκτὸς προσβολὴν ἢ κατὰ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πάθη· ὅπερ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰς αὐξήσεις ἢ θρέψεις ἑτεροιώσεως συνεξακούειν.

* i.e. a "presentation" without any real "presented" object (and so purely subjective and illusory) which "attracts" the mind to a "phantasma," or imaginary object.

give a sound description of the notion of "man" because "god" also is a rational animal, so also he who declares presentation to be "an alteration of the regent part" is at fault, since this is no more an account of presentation than of any one of the motions enumerated.—Such being this further objection, the Stoics resort once again to their "implications," saying that we must understand, as implied in the definition, the words "by way of passivity." For just as he who says that love is "an impulse to win affection" implies therewith "of youths in their bloom," even though he does not state this expressly (for no one loves old men and those who are not in their first bloom), so when we describe presentation as "alteration of the regent part," we imply therewith, they say, that the alteration occurs "by way of passivity" and not by way of activity.—But not even so do they seem to have escaped the charge; for when the regent part is being nourished and, in sooth, increased, it is altered by way of passivity, but this kind of alteration, although it is by way of passivity and condition, is not presentation—unless they should say once again that presentation is a special form of passivity which is distinct from the passive conditions, or else say this—that, since presentation is either of things external or of our own internal affections (this being more precisely termed by them "vacuous attraction"), there is always implied in the definition of presentation that the "passivity" is either in respect of external impact or in respect of our internal affections; but this additional implication is no longer possible in the case of alteration due to processes of increase or nutrition.

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Ἄλλ' ἡ μὲν φαντασία κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς
οὕτω δυσαπόδοτός ἐστι· τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν πολλαὶ
μὲν καὶ ἄλλαι εἰσὶ διαφοραί, ἀπαρκέσουσι δὲ αἱ
242 λεχθησόμεναι. τούτων γὰρ αἱ μὲν εἰσι πιθαναί, αἱ
δὲ ἀπίθανοι, αἱ δὲ πιθαναὶ ἅμα καὶ ἀπίθανοι, αἱ δὲ
οὔτε πιθαναὶ οὔτε ἀπίθανοι. πιθαναὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν
αἱ λεῖον κίνημα περὶ ψυχὴν ἐργαζόμεναι, ὥσπερ νῦν
τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐμὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ πᾶν ὃ
τῆς ὁμοίας ἔχεται περιφανείας, ἀπίθανοι δὲ αἱ μὴ
τοιαῦται ἀλλ' ἀποστρέφουσαι ἡμᾶς τῆς συγκατα-
243 θέσεως, οἷον " εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ὑπὲρ
γῆς· εἰ σκότος ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν." πιθαναὶ δὲ
καὶ ἀπίθανοι καθεστᾶσιν αἱ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τι
σχέσιν ὅτε μὲν τοιαῖαι γινόμεναι ὅτε δὲ τοιαῖαι [γινό-
μεναι], οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀπόρων λόγων, οὔτε δὲ πιθαναὶ
οὔτε ἀπίθανοι καθάπερ αἱ τῶν τοιούτων πραγμάτων
" ἄρτιοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀστέρες, περισσοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀστέρες."
τῶν δὲ πιθανῶν [ἢ ἀπιθάνων]¹ φαντασιῶν αἱ μὲν
244 εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ ἀληθεῖς καὶ
ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ οὔτε ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς. ἀληθεῖς
μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ὧν ἔστιν ἀληθῆ κατηγορίαν ποιήσα-
σθαι, ὡς τοῦ " ἡμέρα ἔστιν " ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἢ
τοῦ " φῶς ἔστι, " ψευδεῖς δὲ ὧν ἔστι ψευδῆ κατ-
ηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι, ὡς τοῦ κεκλάσθαι τὴν κατὰ
βυθοῦ κώπην ἢ μύουρον εἶναι τὴν στοάν, ἀληθεῖς
δὲ καὶ ψευδεῖς, ὅποια προσέπιπτεν Ὀρέστη κατὰ
245 μανίαν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἡλέκτρας (καθὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀπὸ
ὑπάρχοντός τινος προσέπιπτεν, ἦν ἀληθής, ὑπῆρχε
γὰρ Ἡλέκτρα, καθὸ δ' ὡς ἀπὸ Ἐρινύος, ψευδής,

¹ [ἢ ἀπιθάνων] secl. Argum.

Thus presentation, in the doctrine of the Stoics, is hard to define. In presentations, also, there are many and various distinctions, of which it will be enough to record the following. Some of them are 242 probable, some improbable, some at once both probable and improbable, some neither probable nor improbable. "Probable," then, are those which produce a smooth motion in the soul—as, at the present moment, the impression that "it is day" and that "I am discoursing," and everyone which attains a similar degree of obviousness; "improbable" are those which do not do so but make us decline to assent, such as the judgement "if it is day, 243 the sun is not above the earth," "if it is dark, it is day." "Both probable and improbable" are those which, according to the relation in which they stand, are at one time of this kind and at another time of that kind, as for instance presentations of problematic statements. "Neither probable nor improbable" are such as are concerned with judgements of this sort—"the stars are even in number," "the stars are odd." 244 And of the probable presentations some are true, some false, some both true and false, some neither 245 true nor false. True, then, are those about which it is possible to make a true affirmation, as, at the present moment, "it is day" or "it is light"; false are those about which it is possible to make a false affirmation, as that the oar under the water is bent or that the porch is dilapidated; an example of both true and false is the impression of Electra experienced by Orestes in his madness (for in so far as his impres- 245 sion was of an existing object it was true, for Electra existed, but in so far as it was that of a Fury it was

* Cf. *P.H.* i. 97, ii. 90.

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οὐκ ἦν γὰρ Ἑρινύς), καὶ πάλιν εἴ τις ἀπὸ Δίωνος
ζῶντος κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους ὡς ἀπὸ παρεστῶτος
246 ὄνειροπολεῖται ψευδῇ καὶ διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν. οὔτε
δὲ ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς εἰσὶν αἱ γενικαί· ὦν γὰρ τὰ
εἶδη τοῖα ἢ τοῖα, τούτων τὰ γένη οὔτε τοῖα οὔτε
τοῖα, οἷον τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν Ἕλληνες οἱ
δὲ βάρβαροι, ἀλλ' ὁ γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος οὔτε Ἕλλην
ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ πάντες ἂν οἱ ἐπ' εἶδους ἦσαν Ἕλληνες,
247 οὔτε βάρβαρος διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. τῶν δὲ
ἀληθῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι καταληπτικαὶ αἱ δὲ οὐ, οὐ
καταληπτικαὶ μὲν αἱ προσπίπτουσαί τισι κατὰ
πάθος· μυρίοι γὰρ φρενιτίζοντες καὶ μελαγχολῶντες
ἀληθῇ μὲν ἔλκουσι φαντασίαν, οὐ καταληπτικὴν δὲ
ἀλλ' ἐξωθεν καὶ ἐκ τύχης οὕτω συμπεσοῦσαν, ὅθεν
οὐδὲ διαβεβαιοῦνται περὶ αὐτῆς πολλάκις, οὐδὲ
248 συγκατατίθενται αὐτῇ. καταληπτικὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ
ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπο-
μεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὅποια οὐκ ἂν
γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος· ἄκρως γὰρ ποιοῦμενοι
ἀντιληπτικὴν εἶναι τῶν ὑποκειμένων τήνδε τὴν
φαντασίαν, καὶ πάντα τεχνικῶς τὰ περὶ αὐτοῖς
ιδιώματα ἀναμεμαγμένην, ἕκαστον τούτων φασὶν
249 ἔχειν συμβεβηκός. ὦν πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ ὑπ-
άρχοντος γίνεσθαι· πολλαὶ γὰρ τῶν φαντασιῶν
προσπίπτουσιν ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος ὥσπερ ἐπὶ
τῶν μεμνηνόντων, αἵτινες οὐκ ἂν εἴεν καταληπτικαί.
δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος εἶναι καὶ κατ'
αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πάλιν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος
μὲν εἰσιν, οὐκ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἰνδάλλονται,
ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ μεμνηνότος Ὁρέστου μικρῷ πρότερον

false, for there was no Fury); and again when a man experiences a false and "vacuous attraction" in his dreams, imagining that Dion is standing beside him when Dion is alive. Neither true nor false 246 are the generic presentations: for the genera of things of which the particulars are of this kind or of that are neither of this kind nor of that kind; as, for instance, whereas some men are Greeks, others barbarians, the generic Man is neither a Greek (for then all particular men would have been Greeks), nor yet a barbarian (for the same reason) —And of 247 true presentations some are apprehensive, others not, —not apprehensive being those which are experienced by persons in a morbid condition; for countless sufferers from frenzy and melancholia receive a presentation which though true is not apprehensive but occurs externally and fortuitously, so that often they make no positive affirmation about it and do not assent to it. An apprehensive presentation is one 248 caused by an existing object and imaged and stamped in the subject in accordance with that existing object, of such a kind as could not be derived from a non-existent object. For as they deem that this presentation is eminently perceptive of real objects and reproduces with artistic precision all their characteristics, they declare that it possesses each one of these as an attribute. Of these the first is derivation from an 249 existing object; for many presentations occur from what is non-existent, as in the case of madmen, and these will not be apprehensive. Second is derivation both from an existing object and according to that existing object; for some again, though they are derived from an existing object, do not resemble that object, as we showed a little while ago in the case of

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ἐδείκνυμεν. εἴλκε μὲν γὰρ φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος τῆς Ἡλέκτρας, οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· μίαν γὰρ τῶν Ἑρινύων ὑπελάμβανεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, καθὼ καὶ προσιοῦσαν καὶ τημελεῖν αὐτὸν σπουδάζουσιν ἀπωθεῖται λέγων

μέθες μί' οὔσα τῶν ἐμῶν Ἑρινύων.

καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν ἐκινεῖτο τῶν Θηβῶν, οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· καὶ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὴν καταληπτικὴν
 250 φαντασίαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένην τυγχάνειν, ἵνα πάντα τεχνικῶς
 251 τὰ ιδιώματα τῶν φανταστῶν¹ ἀναμάττηται. ὥς γὰρ οἱ γλυφεῖς πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσι συμβάλλουσι τῶν τελουμένων, καὶ ὃν τρόπον αἱ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων σφραγίδες αἰεὶ πάντας ἐπ' ἀκριβὲς τοὺς χαρακτῆρας ἐναπομάττονται τῷ κηρῷ, οὕτω καὶ οἱ κατάληψιν ποιούμενοι τῶν ὑποκειμένων πᾶσιν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς
 252 ιδιώμασιν αὐτῶν ἐπιβάλλειν. τὸ δὲ "οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος" προσέθεσαν, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδύνατον ὑπειλήφασιν κατὰ πάντα ἀπαράλλακτόν τινα εὐρεθήσεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ φασιν ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν τεχνικῶς προσβάλλει τῇ ὑπόψει τῶν πραγμάτων διαφορὰ, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ εἶχε τι τοιοῦτον ἰδίωμα ἢ τοιαύτη φαντασία παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας φαντασίας καθάπερ οἱ κερᾶσται παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὄφεις· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας τοῦναντίον φασὶ δύνασθαι τῇ κατα-

¹ φανταστῶν Apelt: φαντασιῶν mss., Bekk.

* Eurip. *Orest.* 264; cf. §§ 170, 245.

the mad Orestes. For though he derived a presentation from an existing object, Electra, it was not in conformity with that object; for he supposed that she was one of the Furies, and accordingly repulses her, as she approaches and eagerly seeks to tend him, with the words ^a—

Avaunt! For of my Furies thou art one.

Heracles, too, derived an impression of Thebes^b from an existing object, but not according to that object; for the apprehensive presentation must also be in accord with the object itself. Moreover, it must also ²⁵⁰ be imaged and stamped in the subject, in order that all the characteristics of the presented objects may be reproduced with artistic exactitude. For just as ²⁵¹ carvers set their hands to all the parts of the works they are completing, and as the seals on rings always imprint all their markings exactly on the wax, so likewise those who experience apprehension of real objects ought to perceive all their characteristics. And they added the clause "of such a kind as could ²⁵² not be derived from a non-existent object" because the Academics did not, like the Stoics, suppose it to be impossible that a presentation exactly similar in all respects should be found. For the Stoics assert that he who has the apprehensive presentation discerns with artistic exactitude the difference subsisting in the objects, since a presentation of that kind as compared with all other presentations has a special characteristic of its own, like the horned serpents as compared with all other serpents; but the Academics assert on the contrary that a false

^b Cf. § 192 (Heracles seems to be put for Pentheus, by oversight).

ληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ ἀπαράλλακτον εὐρεθήσεσθαι
 ψεῦδος.

- 253 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν στωικῶν
 κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν κατα-
 ληπτικὴν ταύτην φαντασίαν, οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προσ-
 254 ετίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνσθημα. ἔσθ' ὅτε
 γὰρ καταληπτικὴ μὲν προσπίπτει φαντασία, ἄ-
 πιστος δὲ διὰ τὴν ἔξωθεν περίστασιν. οἶον ὅτε
 Ἀδμήτῳ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς τὴν Ἀλκηστιν γῆθεν ἀν-
 αγαγὼν παρέστησε, τότε ὁ Ἀδμητος ἔσπασε μὲν
 καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλκήστιδος,
 255 ἠπίσται δ' αὐτῇ· καὶ ὅτε ἀπὸ Τροίας ὁ Μενέλαος
 ἀνακομισθεὶς εὔρα τὴν ἀληθῆ Ἑλένην παρὰ τῷ
 Πρωτεῖ, [καὶ] καταλιπὼν ἐπὶ τῆς νεῶς τὸ ἐκείνης
 εἶδωλον, περὶ οὗ δεκαετὴς συνέστη πόλεμος, ἀπὸ
 ὑπάρχοντος μὲν καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον καὶ
 ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπесφραγισμένην ἐλάβανε
 256 φαντασίαν, οὐκ εἶκε δὲ αὐτῇ.¹ ὥσθ' ἡ μὲν κατα-
 ληπτικὴ φαντασία κριτήριόν ἐστι μηδὲν ἔχουσα
 ἔνσθημα, αὗται δὲ καταληπτικαὶ μὲν ἦσαν, εἶχον
 δὲ ἐνστάσεις· ὃ τε γὰρ Ἀδμητος ἐλογίζετο ὅτι
 τέθνηκεν ἡ Ἀλκηστις καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἀποθανὼν οὐκέτι
 ἀνίσταται, ἀλλὰ δαιμόνιά τινά ποτε ἐπιφοιτᾷ· ὃ τε
 Μενέλαος συνέωρα ὅτι ἀπολέλοιπεν ἐν τῇ νηὶ
 φυλαττομένην τὴν Ἑλένην, καὶ οὐκ ἀπίθανον μὲν
 ἐστὶν Ἑλένην μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς Φάρου εὐρε-
 257 θείσαν, φάντασμα δέ τι καὶ δαιμόνιον. ἐνθένδε οὐχ
 ἀπλῶς κριτήριον γίνεται τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ κατα-
 ληπτικὴ φαντασία, ἀλλ' ὅταν μηδὲν ἔνσθημα ἔχῃ.
 αὕτη γὰρ ἐναργὴς οὔσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μόνον οὐχὶ
 τῶν τριχῶν, φασί, λαμβάνεται, κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς

¹ εἶκε δὲ αὐτῇ Lachelier: εἶχε δὲ αὐτῇ mss., Bekk.

one exactly similar to the apprehensive presentation can be found.

But whereas the older Stoics declare that this apprehensive presentation is the criterion of truth, the later Stoics added the clause "provided that it has no obstacle." For there are times when an apprehensive presentation occurs, yet is improbable because of the external circumstances. When, for instance, Heracles presented himself to Admetus bringing back Alcestis from the grave,^a Admetus then received from Alcestis an apprehensive presentation, but disbelieved it; and when Menelaus on his return from Troy^b beheld the true Helen at the house of Proteus, after leaving on his ship that image of her for which the ten years' war was waged, though he received a presentation which was imaged and imprinted from an existing object and in accordance with that object, he did not accept it as valid. So that, whereas the apprehensive presentation is the criterion when it has no obstacle, these presentations, although they were apprehensive, yet had obstacles. For Admetus argued that Alcestis was dead and that he who is dead does not rise again, but certain daemons do rove about at times; and Menelaus also reflected that he had left Helen under guard in his ship and that it was not improbable that she who was discovered in Pharos might not be Helen but a phantom and supernatural. Hence the apprehensive presentation is not the criterion of truth unconditionally, but only when it has no obstacle. For in this latter case it, being plainly evident and striking, lays hold of us, almost by the very hair, as they say, and drags us

^a Cf. *P.H.* i. 228.

^b Cf. § 180.

εἰς συγκατάθεσιν, καὶ ἄλλου μηδενὸς δεομένη εἰς
 τὸ τοιαύτη προσπίπτειν ἢ εἰς τὸ τὴν πρὸς τὰς
 258 ἄλλας διανοήσας ὑποβάλλειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ πᾶς ἄν-
 θρωπος, ὅταν τι σπουδάζῃ μετὰ ἀκριβείας καταλαμ-
 βάνεσθαι, τὴν τοιαύτην φαντασίαν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ μετα-
 διώκειν φαίνεται, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν, ὅταν
 ἄμυδρὰν λαμβάνῃ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φαντασίαν.
 ἐντείνει γὰρ τὴν ὄψιν καὶ σύνεγγυς ἔρχεται τοῦ
 ὀρωμένου ὡς τέλος μὴ πλανᾶσθαι, παρατρίβει γὰρ
 τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, καὶ καθόλου πάντα ποιεῖ μέχρι
 ἂν τρανὴν καὶ πληκτικὴν σπάσῃ τοῦ κρινομένου
 φαντασίαν, ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ κειμένην θεωρῶν τὴν τῆς
 259 καταλήψεως πίστιν. καὶ γὰρ ἄλλως τὸναντίον
 ἀδύνατόν ἐστι λέγειν, καὶ ἀνάγκη¹ τὸν ἀφιστάμενον
 τοῦ ἀξιοῦν ὅτι φαντασία κριτήριόν ἐστι, καθ' ἑτέρας
 φαντασίας ὑπόστασιν τοῦτο πάσχοντα βεβαιῶν τὸ
 φαντασίαν εἶναι κριτήριον, τῆς φύσεως οἷον ἐ-
 φέγγος ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν
 αἰσθητικὴν δύναμιν ἀναδούσης καὶ τὴν δι' αὐτῆς
 280 γινομένην φαντασίαν. ἄτοπον οὖν ἐστὶ τοσαύτην
 δύναμιν ἀθετεῖν καὶ τὸ ὥσπερ φῶς αὐτῶν ἀφαιρεῖ-
 σθαι. ὃν γὰρ τρόπον ὁ χρώματα μὲν ἀπολείπων καὶ
 τὰς ἐν τούτοις διαφοράς, τὴν δὲ ὄρασιν ἀναιρῶν ὡς
 ἀνύπαρκτον ἢ ἄπιστον, καὶ φωνὰς μὲν εἶναι λέγων,
 ἀκοὴν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀξιών, σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἄτοπος
 (δι' ὧν γὰρ ἐνόησαμεν χρώματα καὶ φωνάς, ἐκείνων
 ἀπόντων οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι δυνατοὶ χρώμασιν ἢ φωναῖς),
 οὕτω καὶ τὰ πράγματα μὲν ὁμολογῶν, τὴν δὲ
 φαντασίαν τῆς αἰσθήσεως, δι' ἧς τῶν πραγμάτων
 ἀντιλαμβάνεται, διαβάλλων τελέως ἐστὶν ἐμβρόντη-
 τος, καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἴσον αὐτὸν ποιῶν.

¹ καὶ ἀνάγκη Hirzel: κατ' ἀνάγκην mss., Bekk.

off to assent, needing nothing else to help it to be thus impressive or to suggest its superiority over all others. For this reason, too, every man, when he is 258 anxious to apprehend any object exactly, appears of himself to pursue after a presentation of this kind—as, for instance, in the case of visible things, when he receives a dim presentation of the real object. For he intensifies his gaze and draws close to the object of sight so as not to go wholly astray, and rubs his eyes and in general uses every means until he can receive a clear and striking presentation of the thing under inspection, as though he considered that the credibility of the apprehension depended upon that. Moreover it is impossible to affirm the opposite, 259 and he who abstains from asserting that presentation is the criterion, since he does so owing to the existence of another presentation, thereby of necessity confirms the fact that presentation is the criterion,—nature having kindled as it were a light for us, to aid in the discernment of truth, in the faculty of sense and the presentation which takes place by means thereof. It is absurd, then, to set aside so great a faculty and 260 to rob ourselves as it were of our own daylight. For just as the man who allows colours and the differences in them but abolishes vision as unreal or improbable, and while affirming the existence of sounds asserts the non-existence of hearing, is utterly illogical (for if the organs by which we perceive colours and sounds were absent we should be unable to experience colours or sounds),—so also he who admits the existence of objects, but inveighs against the presentation of sense by means of which he apprehends the objects, has completely lost his wits and puts himself on a level with things that have no soul.

- 261 Τοιοῦτο μὲν καὶ τὸ τῶν στωικῶν ἐστὶ δόγμα·
 πάσης δὲ σχεδὸν τῆς περὶ κριτηρίου διαφωνίας ὑπ’
 ὄψιν κειμένης, καιρὸς ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀντιρρήσεως
 ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ κριτήριον ἐπανάγειν. καθὼς
 οὖν προεῖπον, οἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς
 ἀλόγοις αἰσθήσεσιν οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις
 ἀπέλιπον, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ ὑφ’ οὗ ὡς τὸν ἄνθρωπον,
 οἱ δὲ τὸ δι’ οὗ ὡς τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ διάνοιαν,
 262 οἱ δὲ τὸ ὡς προσβολὴν καθάπερ τὴν φαντασίαν.
 πειρασόμεθα (οὖν)¹ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἐκάστη τῶν
 τοιούτων στάσεων τὰς ἀπορίας ἐφαρμόττειν, ἵνα
 μὴ κατ’ ἄνδρα πάντας τοὺς κατηγορηθῆναι
 φιλοσόφους ἐπιόντες ταυτολογεῖν ἀναγκάζωμεθα.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ

- 263 Τάξει τοίνυν πρῶτον σκοπῶμεν τὸ ὑφ’ οὗ, τουτ-
 ἐστὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον· οἶμαι γὰρ ὡς τούτου προαπορη-
 θέντος οὐδὲν ἔτι δεήσει περιττότερον περὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων κριτηρίων λέγειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἢ μέρη ἐστὶν
 ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἐνεργήματα ἢ πάθη. εἴπερ οὖν κατα-
 ληπτὸν ἐστὶ τουτὶ τὸ κριτήριον, πολὺ πρότερον
 ὀφείλει ἐπινοεῖσθαι, παρόσον πάσης καταλήψεως
 ἐπινοία προηγείται. μέχρι δὲ τοῦ δεῦρο ἀνεπι-
 νόητον εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὡς παρα-
 264 στήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα καταληπτὸς πάντως ἐστὶν ὁ
 ἄνθρωπος· ᾧ ἔπεται τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας γνῶσιν
 ἀνεύρετον ὑπάρχειν, τοῦ γνωρίζοντος αὐτὴν ἀκατα-
 λήπτου καθεστῶτος. εὐθέως γὰρ τῶν περὶ τῆς
 ἐπινοίας ζητησάντων Σωκράτης μὲν ἠπόρησε

¹ <οὖν> cj. Bekk.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

- μείνας ἐν τῇ σκέψει καὶ εἰπὼν αὐτὸν ἀγνοεῖν τί τ'
 ἔστι καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ σύμπαν· " ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκ
 οἶδα " φησὶν· " εἴτε ἀνθρωπὸς εἰμι εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο
 265 τι θηρίον Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον." Δημόκριτος
 δὲ ὁ τῇ Διὸς φωνῇ παρευκαζόμενος, καὶ λέγων τάδε
 περὶ τῶν ξυμπάντων, ἐπεχείρησε μὲν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν
 ἐκθέσθαι, πλεῖον δὲ ἰδιωτικῆς ἀποφάσεως οὐδὲν
 ἰσχυσεῖν, εἰπὼν " ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν ὁ πάντες ἴδμεν."
 266 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ καὶ κύνα πάντες ἴσμεν, ἀλλ' οὐκ
 ἐστὶν ὁ κύων ἀνθρωπος· καὶ ἵππον πάντες ἴσμεν καὶ
 φυτὸν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τούτων ἦν ἀνθρωπος. εἴτα καὶ
 τὸ ζητούμενον συνήρπασεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐκ προχείρου
 δώσειν γινώσκεισθαι τὸν ἀνθρωπον ὁποῖός ἐστιν, εἴγε
 ὁ Πύθιος ὡς μέγιστον ζήτημα προύθηκεν αὐτῷ τὸ
 γνῶθι σεαυτόν. εἰ δὲ καὶ δοίη, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ
 τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπιτρέψει μόνον
 267 τοῦτον ἐπίστασθαι. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον
 καὶ δεικτικῶς ῥήθησαν δύνασθαι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τοῦ
 ἀνθρώπου παρίστασθαι, λέγοντες " ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶ
 τοιοῦτον ἰσχυρὸν μετ' ἐμφυχίας." οὐκ ἔγνωσαν
 δ' ὅτι εἰ τὸ δεικνύμενόν ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπος, τὸ μὴ
 δεικνύμενον οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπος. καὶ πάλιν ἡ
 τοιαύτη δείξις ἦτοι ἐπ' ἀνδρὸς ἐκφέρεται ἢ γυναι-
 κός, ἢ πρεσβύτου ἢ μειρακίου, σιμοῦ γρυποῦ,
 268 τετανύτριχος οὐλοκόμου, τῶν ἄλλων διαφορῶν· καὶ
 εἰ μὲν ἐπ' ἀνδρὸς ἐκφέροιτο, ἢ γυνὴ οὐκ ἐστὶ
 ἀνθρωπος, εἰ δ' ἐπὶ γυναικός, περιγραφήσεται τὸ
 ἄρρεν, καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ νέου, αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν ἐκ-
 πεσοῦνται τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος.
- 269 Ἦσαν δὲ τινες τῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ τὸν γενικὸν

a doubter, remaining undecided and declaring him-
 self ignorant both of what he himself is and in what
 relation he stands to the Universe—"for I do not
 know," he says, "whether I am a man or some other
 kind of beast more complex than Typhon."^a But 265
 Democritus, who likened himself to the voice of Zeus,
 and spoke so about the sum of all things, attempted
 indeed to explain the conception, but was able to
 produce nothing more than a crude statement, in
 the words "Man is what we all ken." For, in the first 266
 place, we all know Dog as well, but Dog is not Man.
 And Horse we all know and Plant, but none of these
 is Man. And further, he has begged the question ;
 for no one will grant off-hand that the nature of Man
 is known, seeing that the Pythian propounded "Know
 thyself" as Man's chief problem. And even were
 one to grant this, one would not ascribe the know-
 ledge of Man to all but only to the most exact philo-
 sophers.—Epicurus and his followers supposed that 267
 the conception of Man could be conveyed by indica-
 tion, saying that "Man is this sort of a shape com-
 bined with vitality." But they did not notice that
 if the thing indicated is Man, the thing not so indi-
 cated is not Man. And again, such an indication is
 made in the case of either a man or a woman, an
 elder or a youth, snub-nosed or hook-nosed, straight-
 haired or curly-haired, and all the other differences ;
 and if it is made in the case of a man, a woman will 268
 not be Man, and if in the case of a woman, the male
 will be ruled out, and if in the case of a youth, all the
 remaining ages will be debarred from Manhood.

Some philosophers there have been who have de- 269

^a Cf. Plato, *Phædr.* 230 A. With §§ 264-282 cf. *P.H.* ii.
 22-28.

ἄνθρωπον διὰ λόγου διδάσκοντες, κἀντεῦθεν οἰόμενοι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν δύνασθαι τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπων ἀνακύβειν. τούτων δὲ οἱ μὲν οὕτως ἀπέδωσαν " ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν." οἱ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
 270 παρέδωσαν. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ τινὲ συμβεβηκὸς ἐκείνου τοῦ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν, ἐπεὶ τοι εἰ μὴ διαφέρει, οὐκ ἂν ἦν συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο. ἀμέλει γοῦν τῶν συμβεβηκότων τὰ μὲν ἀχώριστά ἐστι τῶν οἷς συμβέβηκεν, ὥς μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος σώμασι (δίχα γὰρ τῆς τούτων παρουσίας ἀμήχανόν
 271 ἐστὶν ἐπινοῆσαι σῶμα), τὰ δὲ χωρίζεται τοῦ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν καὶ ἀπαλλασσομένων μένει ἐκεῖνο, οἷον τρέχειν διαλέγεσθαι ὑπνοῦν ἐγρηγορέναι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συμβέβηκε μὲν ἡμῖν, οὐ διὰ παντός δέ· καὶ γὰρ μὴ τρέχοντες μένομεν οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡσυχάζοντες, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. διττῆς οὖν οὔσης τῶν συμβεβηκότων διαφορᾶς οὐδετέραν εὐρήσομεν τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ ὑπο-
 272 κειμένῳ πράγματι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ διαφέρουσιν. μάταιοι τοίνυν εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ζῶον λέγοντες λογικὸν θνητόν καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· οὐ γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀπέδωσαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τούτῳ κατηρίθμυσαν. ὣν τὸ μὲν ζῶον τῶν διὰ παντός αὐτῷ συμβεβηκότων ἐστίν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ μὴ ζῶον ὄντα ἄνθρωπον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ θνητόν οὐδὲ συμβεβηκὸς ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· ὅτε γὰρ
 273 ἐσμέν ἄνθρωποι, ζῶμεν καὶ οὐ τεθνήκαμεν. τὸ δὲ λογίζεσθαι καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν συμβέβηκε μὲν, οὐ διὰ παντός δέ· καὶ γὰρ μὴ λογιζόμενοί τινες

fined by logic the generic Man, imagining that from
 this the conception of particular men will also emerge.
 Of these philosophers some have given this definition
 —" Man is a rational mortal animal, receptive of
 thought and knowledge." So they too have pre-
 sented to us not Man but the properties of Man.
 But the property of a thing is different from the thing 270
 of which it is a property, since of course if it were not
 different it would not have been a property but the
 actual thing itself. And, to be sure, while some prop-
 erties are inseparable from the things to which they
 belong—as are length, breadth and depth from
 bodies, for without their presence it is impossible to
 conceive Body,—others are separated from the thing 271
 to which they belong, and it still remains when they
 are removed—as, for instance, in the case of Man,
 running, talking, sleeping, waking; for all these
 properties belong to us, but not continuously; for
 we remain the same when we are not running and
 when we are silent, and so likewise as regards the rest
 of these properties. As, then, there are two distinct
 kinds of properties, we shall find that neither of them
 is the same as the substantial thing but always dis-
 tinct. So then those who define Man as "a rational 272
 mortal animal," and so on, achieve nothing; for they
 have not given a definition of Man but merely
 enumerated his properties. And of these " animal "
 is one of his constant properties, for it is impossible
 to be Man without being animal. But " mortal "
 is not even a property but something supervenient
 which occurs to Man; for when we are men we are
 alive and not dead. " Reasoning and possessing 273
 knowledge " is indeed a property of his, but not con-
 stantly; for in fact some who are not reasoning are

ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ νηδύμῳ κατασχεθέντες ὕπνῳ, καὶ (οἱ)¹ ἐπιστήμην μὴ ἔχοντες οὐκ ἐκπεπτῶ-
 κασι τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος, ὥσπερ οἱ μεμνηότες.
 ἕτερον οὖν ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἕτερον παρεστάκασιν.

- 274 "Ἐτι τὸ μὲν ζῶον οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεὶ πᾶν
 ζῶον ἔσται ἄνθρωπος. τὸ δὲ λογικὸν εἰ μὲν ἀντὶ
 τοῦ λογιζέσθαι τάττοιτο, καὶ οἱ θεοὶ λογιζόμενοι
 ἄνθρωποι γενήσονται, τάχα δὲ καὶ τινὰ τῶν ἄλλων
 ζώων· εἰ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ σημαντικὰς προφέρεσθαι
 φωνάς, τοὺς κόρακας καὶ ψιττακοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
 275 ἀνθρώπους εἶναι λέξομεν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. καὶ μὴν εἰ
 τὸ θνητὸν φαίη τις ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἀκολουθήσει τὸ
 καὶ τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων θνητὰ ὄντα ἀνθρώπους
 ὑπάρχειν. τὸ δὲ ὁμοιον καὶ περὶ τοῦ νοῦ τε καὶ
 ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν εἶναι χρή φρονεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν
 γὰρ καὶ εἰς θεοὺς πίπτει τὰ τοιαῦτα· δεύτερον δέ,
 εἴπερ ἐπιδεκτικὸν ἔστι τούτων ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ
 ἔστι ταῦτα ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος τούτων ἐπι-
 δεκτικὸς οὗ τὴν φύσιν οὐ παρέστησαν.

- 276 Καίτοι τινὲς τῶν συνετῶν εἶναι δοκούντων κατὰ
 τὴν δογματικὴν αἵρεσιν πρὸς τοῦτο ὑπαντῶντες φασὶν
 ὅτι ἕκαστον μὲν τῶν κατηριθμημένων οὐκ ἔστιν
 ἄνθρωπος, πάντα δὲ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συναχθέντα ποιεῖ
 τοῦτον, οἷόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ μερῶν καὶ ὅλον θεωροῦμεν
 277 γινόμενον· ὥς γὰρ χεῖρ κατ' ἰδίαν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄν-
 θρωπος, οὐδὲ κεφαλὴ, οὐδὲ πούς, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν
 τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν σύνθετον ὅλον νοεῖται,
 οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὔτε ζῶόν ἐστι ψιλῶς οὔτε
 λογικόν κατ' ἰδίαν οὔτε θνητὸν κατὰ περιγραφὴν,
 ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄθροισμα, τουτέστι ζῶον ἅμα

¹ <οἱ> add. Heintz.

men, as for instance those that are "by slumber sweet o'ercome," and those who are not "possessing knowledge" have not lost manhood, as for instance madmen. Thus while we have been seeking one thing, they have offered us another.

Again, "Animal" is not "Man," since in that case 274 every animal would be a man. And if "rational" is put in place of "exercising reason," then the gods, too, when they reason will become men, and possibly some of the other animals as well; while if "rational" stands for "uttering significant sounds," we shall be saying that crows and parrots and the like are men, which is absurd. Moreover, if one should say that 275 "mortal" is Man, it will follow that the irrational animals also, being mortal, are men. And one must take a similar view of the words "receptive of thought and knowledge." For, firstly, this applies to gods as well; and secondly, if Man is receptive of these, Man is not these things but he who is receptive of these things, the real nature of whom they have not explained.

Some, however, of those who have a reputation for 276 cleverness in the Dogmatic School say, by way of reply to this, that it is not each of the properties enumerated that is "Man," but all of them combined together compose "Man"—the sort of thing we see happening in the case of parts and a whole.* For just 277 as a hand by itself is not a man, nor is a head, nor a foot, nor any other such part, but the compound made up of them is conceived as a whole,—so also "Man" is not barely "animal," nor solely "rational," nor "mortal" alone, but the aggregate of all these—that is to say, at once animal and mortal and rational.

* Cf. *P.H.* iii. 98 ff.

- 278 καὶ θνητὸν καὶ λογικόν. πρόχειρος δ' ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς
τοῦτο ὑπάντησις. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ πῶς, εἰ κατ'
ἰδίαν ἕκαστον οὐκ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἄνθρωπος, δύναται
εἰς ταῦτ' συναχθέντα ἄνθρωπον ποιεῖν, μήτε
πλεονάσαντα παρὸ ἐστὶ, μήτε ἐλλιπόντα παρὸ
ὑπόκειται, μήτε ἄλλως πως τραπέντα; εἴτ' οὐδὲ
τὴν ἀρχὴν δύναται εἰς ταῦτ' πάντα συνδραμεῖν, ἵνα
279 καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄνθρωπος γένηται. τὸ γοῦν
θνητὸν εὐθέως, ὅτ' ἐσμὲν ἄνθρωποι, οὐ συμβέβηκεν
ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμμνημόνευσιν λαμβάνεται.
θεωροῦντες γὰρ Δίωνα καὶ Θέωνα καὶ Σωκράτη
καὶ κοινῶς τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἡμῖν ὁμοίους τετε-
λευτηκέναι λογιζόμεθα ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν θνητοί,
καὶ μηδέπω τοῦ θανεῖν παρόντος ἡμῖν· ζῶμεν γὰρ
280 δῆπουθεν. καὶ μὴν τὸ λογίζεσθαι ὅτε μὲν πάρεστιν
ἡμῖν ὅτε δὲ οὐ πάρεστι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν
πάλιν οὐ τῶν διὰ παντὸς συμβεβηκότων τῷ ἄν-
θρώπῳ καθέστηκεν, ὥς ἤδη παρεστήσαμεν. λεκτέον
οὖν μηδὲ τὴν κοινὴν τούτων σύνοδον ἄνθρωπον
εἶναι.
- 281 Πλάτων δὲ χειρόν παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὀρίζεται τὸν
ἄνθρωπον, λέγων " ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῶον ἄπτερον
δίπουν πλατυώνυχον, ἐπιστήμης πολιτικῆς δεκτι-
κόν". ὅθεν καὶ προϋπτά ἐστὶ τὰ ὀφείλοντα πρὸς
αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι. πάλιν γὰρ οὐ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκτέθει-
ται, ἀλλὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα καὶ ἀποσυμβεβηκότα
282 τούτῳ κατηρίθμηνται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄπτερον ἀποσυμ-
βέβηκεν αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ ζῶον καὶ τὸ δίπουν καὶ τὸ
πλατυώνυχον συμβέβηκεν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιστήμης πολιτι-
κῆς δεκτικὸν ποτὲ μὲν συμβέβηκε ποτὲ δὲ ἀποσυμ-
βέβηκεν. ὥστε ἡμῶν ἕτερόν τι μαθεῖν ζητούντων
αὐτὸς ἕτερόν τι παρέστησεν.

But to this also there is an answer ready to hand. 278
 For, firstly, if each of these things separately is not
 "Man," how can they make "Man" when combined
 together so as neither to extend beyond what he is
 nor to fall short of his real extent nor to diverge in
 any other way? And, next, they cannot so much as
 congregate all together so that the sum of them all
 should form "Man." Thus "mortal," for instance, 279
 is not a property of ours when we are men but is
 derived from concurrent recollection. For from seeing
 that Dion and Theon and Socrates, and in general
 individuals similar to ourselves, have died we reason
 that we also are mortal, even though death is not yet
 present with us—for, to be sure, we are alive. More- 280
 over, reasoning, too, is at one time present with us,
 at another time not present; and "possessing know-
 ledge" again, as we have already explained,^a is not
 one of the constant properties of Man. It must
 be said, then, that not even the union of all these
 properties is "Man."

Plato gives a worse definition of Man than the 281
 others when he states that "Man is a wingless
 animal, with two feet and broad nails, receptive of
 political science."^b Hence the objections which
 should be brought against him are obvious. For, once
 again, he has not explained Man but has enumerated
 the positive and negative attributes of Man; for 282
 "wingless" is a negative attribute of his, while
 "animal" and "with two feet" and "with broad
 nails" are positive attributes, and "receptive of
 political science" is at one time a positive, at another
 a negative attribute. So that while we are seeking to
 learn one thing, he offers us another.

^a See § 273.

^b Cf. *P.H.* ii. 28.

Ἄλλὰ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποδεδείχθω τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι
 283 τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ προχείρου νοεῖν. παρακειμένως
 δὲ λεκτέον ὅτι καὶ ἡ κατάληψις αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀπόρων
 ἐστί, καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι ἀπὸ μέρους ἤδη τοῦτο
 συμβεβίβασται. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπινοούμενον οὐδὲ
 καταληφθῆναι πέφυκεν· ἀνεπινόητος δέ γε ὁ ἄν-
 284 θρωπος δέδεικται τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν δογματικῶν
 καὶ καθ' ἕτερον τρόπον ἐνέσται τὸ τοιοῦτο κατα-
 σκευάζειν. εἴπερ καταληπτὸν ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος,
 ἥτοι ὅλος δι' ὅλου ἑαυτὸν ζητεῖ τε καὶ καταλαμ-
 βάνει, ἢ ὅλος ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν
 κατάληψιν πίπτει, (ἢ μέρει μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ζητοῦν,
 μέρει δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον,)¹ ὥσπερ εἰ καὶ τὴν ὄρασιν
 ὑπόθοιτο τις ἑαυτὴν ὀρώσαν· ἢ γὰρ ὅλη ἔσται ὀρώσα
 ἢ ὀρωμένη ἢ μέρει μὲν ἑαυτὴν ὀρώσα μέρει δὲ ὑφ'
 285 ἑαυτῆς ὀρωμένη. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅλος δι' ὅλου ὁ
 ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτὸν ζητοίη καὶ σὺν τούτῳ νοοῖτο, σὺν
 τῷ ὅλος δι' ὅλου ἑαυτὸν νοεῖν, οὐδὲν ἔτι ἔσται τὸ
 καταλαμβάνομενον, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ ὅλος εἴη
 τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ σὺν τούτῳ νοοῖτο ὅλος, σὺν τῷ
 ζητεῖσθαι, πάλιν οὐδὲν ἀπολειφθήσεται τὸ ζητοῦν
 286 καὶ τὸ τὴν κατάληψιν ποιησόμενον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
 δυνατόν ἐστι παρὰ μέρος ὅτε μὲν ὅλον ὑποκείσθαι
 τὸ ζητοῦν ὅτε δὲ ὅλον τὸ ζητούμενον. ὅτε γὰρ
 ὅλος ὑπόκειται ζητῶν καὶ σὺν τούτῳ νοεῖται ὅλος,
 σὺν τῷ ζητεῖν ὅλος, οὐδὲν ἀπολειφθήσεται ὁ ζητή-

¹ <ἢ . . . ζητ.> sic ego lacunam explēvi: similiter Bekk.

Well, then, let us grant that it is thus proved that it is not possible to form off-hand a conception of Man. In like manner one must declare that the apprehension of Man is a thing impracticable, especially since this has been partially established already (for what is not conceived is not capable of being apprehended ; and it has been shown that Man, so far as the conceptions of the Dogmatists are concerned, is inconceivable, and therefore also non-apprehensible). All the same, it will be possible to establish this point by another line of argument as well. If Man is apprehensible either he as a whole wholly seeks and apprehends himself, or as a whole he is the object sought and coming under apprehension, (or he is partly the subject, partly the object of apprehension,) just as if one were to imagine the sense of sight seeing itself ; for either it will be wholly seeing or seen, or partly seeing itself and partly seen by itself. But if man as a whole should wholly seek himself and should be conceived therewith (that is, with the fact that he as a whole wholly conceives himself), there will no longer be any object that is apprehended, which is absurd. And if, on the other hand, he as a whole is the object sought and as a whole is conceived therewith (that is, with the fact that he is sought), then again we shall be left with no subject that seeks or is about to effect the apprehension. Moreover it is not possible to take him in parts so that at one time he should be wholly the subject seeking, and at another wholly the object sought. For when as a whole he is seeking and as a whole is conceived therewith (that is, with the fact that as a whole he is seeking), no object will be left for him to seek ; and conversely, when as a whole

σει· καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, ὅτε ὅλος δι' ὅλου ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούμενον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ζητοῦν.

- 287 Λείπεται ἄρα μὴ ὅλον αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐπιβάλλειν, ἀλλὰ μέρει τινὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κατάληψιν ποιείσθαι. ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶ τῶν ἀπόρων. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐδέν ἐστι παρὰ τὸν ὄγκον καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν
288 διάνοιαν, ὅθεν εἰ μέλλει τινὶ μέρει ἑαυτὸν καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ἥτοι τῷ σώματι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν γνωριεῖ, ἢ ἐναλλάξ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ σῶμα καταλήψεται. τῷ μὲν οὖν σώματι οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν γνωρίζειν· ἄλογον γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο καὶ κωφὸν καὶ ἀφύες πρὸς τὰς τοιουτοτρόπους ζητή-
289 σεις. ἄλλως τε, εἰ τὸ σῶμα τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας ἀντιληπτικὸν ἐστίν, ὀφείλει τὸ ταύτας καταλαμβάνον ὁμοιοῦσθαι ταύταις, τουτέστιν ὁμοίως διατίθεσθαι καὶ αἰσθησίς τε καὶ διάνοια γίνεσθαι. ὁράσεως γὰρ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον, καθὸ ὁρᾶ, ὄρασις ἐσται, καὶ γεύσεως γενομένης καταληπτικὸν ὑπάρχον γεῦσις γενήσεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ
290 ἀνάλογον. καθὰ γὰρ τὸ θερμοῦ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον ὡς θερμοῦ θερμαινόμενον ἀντιλαμβάνεται, θερμαινόμενον δὲ εὐθύς ἐστὶ θερμόν, καὶ ὡς τὸ ψυχροῦ γνῶσιν ποιούμενον ὡς ψυχροῦ ψυχόμενον εὐθέως ἐστὶ ψυχρόν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ σάρκινος ὄγκος εἰ ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὡς αἰσθήσεων, αἰσθάνεται,
291 αἰσθανόμενος δὲ πάντως αἰσθησίς γενήσεται, καὶ ταύτῃ οὐκέτι ὑποκείται τὸ ζητοῦν, ἀλλ' ἔσται τὸ ζητούμενον, σὺν τῷ καὶ τελῶς καταγέλαστον εἶναι τὸ μὴ διαφέρειν τὸν ὄγκον τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας, πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν δογματικῶς

he is wholly the object sought, the subject which seeks will not exist.

We are left, then, with the alternative that Man 287 does not as a whole perceive himself but forms the apprehension of himself by means of some part of himself. But this again is a thing impracticable. For Man is nothing more than his substance and senses and intellect, so that, if he is to apprehend himself 288 with one of his parts, either he will perceive his senses and intellect with his body, or conversely he will apprehend his body with his senses and intellect. It is, however, impossible for him to perceive his senses and intellect with his body ; for it is irrational and senseless and unsuited for suchlike investigations. And besides, if the body is capable of perceiving 289 the senses and the intellect, as apprehending these it must be similar to them, that is, it must be in a similar condition and become both sense and intellect. For when it perceives the sense of sight, in so far as it sees it will be sight, and when it is apprehensive of taste in the act of tasting it will become taste, and similarly with the other senses. For just as that which per- 290 ceives a hot thing as hot perceives it by being heated, and being heated is at once hot, and as that which acquires knowledge of a cold thing as cold by feeling cold is at once cold, so also if the fleshly substance perceives the senses as senses it has sense-perception, and having sense-perception it certainly will become sense, and in this way the seeking subject will no 291 longer subsist but it will be the object sought,— besides the fact that it is perfectly ridiculous to suppose that the body's substance does not differ from the senses and the intellect, when practically

φιλοσοφησάντων τὴν ἐν τούτοις διαφορὰν εἰσηγησαμένων.

292 Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διανοίας ἐστὶ λόγος· εἰ γὰρ ἀντιλαμβάνεται ταύτης ὁ ὄγκος ὡς διανοίας, τουτέστι νοούσης, ἔσται διάνοια ὁ ὄγκος, διάνοια δὲ ὧν οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ζητοῦν ἀλλὰ τὸ ζητούμενον. οὐ τοίνυν τὸ σῶμα καταληπτικόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

293 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ αἱ αἰσθήσεις. αἱται γὰρ πάσχουσι μόνον καὶ κηροῦ τρόπον τυποῦνται, ἄλλο δ' ἴσασι· οὐδὲ ἓν, ἐπεὶ τοι εἰς ζήτησίν τινος αὐταῖς νείμωμεν, οὐκέτ' ἄλογοι γενήσονται ἀλλὰ λογικαὶ καὶ διανοίας ἔχουσαι φύσιν. ὅπερ οὐχ οὕτως εἶχεν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ λευκαίνεσθαι καὶ μελαίνεσθαι καὶ γλυκάζεσθαι καὶ πικράζεσθαι καὶ εὐωδίζεσθαι καὶ κοινῶς πάσχειν ἰδίων ἐστὶν αὐτῶν, τὸ ζητεῖν ἐνεργητικῶς οὐκ ἔσται ἴδιον αὐτῶν.

294 εἰτα πῶς οἷόν τέ ἐστι διὰ τούτων καταληφθῆναι τὸν ὄγκον οὐκ ἔχουσῶν σωματικὴν¹ φύσιν; οἷον εὐθέως ἢ ὄρασις σχήματος μὲν καὶ μεγέθους καὶ χροῆς ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτική, οὔτε δὲ σχῆμα οὔτε μέγεθος οὔτε χρῶμά ἐστιν ὁ ὄγκος, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἄρα, τὸ ᾧ ταῦτα συμβέβηκεν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν μὲν ὄγκον οὐ δύναται λαβεῖν ἢ ὄρασις, μόνον δὲ ὁρᾷ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τῷ ὄγκῳ, οἷον τὸ
295 σχῆμα, τὸ μέγεθος, τὴν χροῶν. ναί, φήσει τις, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ τούτων συνηρανισμένον ὁ ὄγκος ἐστίν. ὅπερ ἦν ληρῶδες. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐδείξαμεν ὅτι οὐδὲ ἡ κοινὴ σύνοδος τῶν τινι συμβεβηκότων
296 ἐκεῖνό ἐστι τὸ ᾧ τινι συμβέβηκεν· εἰτα καὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχῃ, πάλιν τῶν ἀμνηχάνων ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τῆς

¹ σωματικῆς: τὴν mss., Bekk.: τὴν <αὐτὴν> cj. Mutsch.

all the dogmatic philosophers have made mention of the difference between them.

The same argument applies also to the intellect; 292 for if the bodily substance perceives it as intellect—that is, as thinking—the substance will be intellect, and being intellect it will be not the seeker but the sought. So, then, the body is not capable of apprehending Man.

Nor indeed are the senses. For these are solely 293 passive and are stamped like wax, and not a single thing else do they know, since, to be sure, if we ascribe to them a seeking for anything they will become no longer irrational but rational and endowed with the nature of intellect. But this is not the case; for if feeling the white and the black and the sweet and the bitter and the odorous, and passive feeling in general, is a peculiar property of theirs, active seeking will not be a peculiar property of theirs.—Further, how is it possible for the bodily substance to 294 be apprehended by them when they do not possess a corporeal nature? Thus the sense of sight, for instance, is perceptive of form and size and colour, but the substance is neither form nor size nor colour but, if anything, that whereof these are properties; and because of this sight is not able to perceive the substance and only sees the properties of the substance, such as its form, size, colour. "Yes," 295 someone will say, "but the aggregate made up of these is the substance." But this is fatuous. For, in the first place, we have shown^a that not even the united combination of the properties of a thing is the thing of which they are properties. And further, 296 even were it so, it is again an impossibility for the

^a See § 278.

ὄψεως ληφθῆναι τὸ σῶμα. εἰ γὰρ μήτε μήκος
 φιλόν ἐστι τὸ σῶμα μήτε σχῆμα κατ' ἰδίαν μήτε
 χρῶμα χωρίς, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τούτων σύνθετον, δεήσει
 τὴν ὄρασιν τοῦ σώματος ἀντιλαμβανομένην συν-
 297 τιθέναι ταῦτα καθ' ἕκαστον παρ' ἑαυτῇ, καὶ οὕτω
 τὸ συντιθέναι τι μετὰ τινος, καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε μέγεθος
 μετὰ τοῦ τοιούδε σχήματος λαμβάνειν, λογικῆς
 ἐστὶ δυνάμεως. ἄλογος δέ γέ ἐστιν ἡ ὄρασις·
 τοίνυν οὐ ταύτης ἔργον καθέστηκεν τὸ ἀντιλαμ-
 298 βάνεσθαι τοῦ σώματος. καίτοι οὐ μόνον τὴν
 κοινὴν σύνοδον ὡς σῶμα νοεῖν ἐστὶν ἀφύης, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστου τῶν τούτῳ συμβεβηκότων
 κατάληψιν πεπήρωται. οἷον εὐθέως μήκους· καθ'
 ὑπέρθεσιν γὰρ μερῶν τοῦτο λαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν,
 ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχομένων ἡμῶν καὶ διὰ τινος καὶ ἐπὶ τι
 καταληγόντων, ὅπερ ποιεῖν ἄλογος φύσις οὐ δύνα-
 299 ται. εἴτα καὶ βάθους· περὶ αὐτὴν γὰρ πλάζεται
 τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ἡ ὄρασις, εἰς βάθος δ' οὐκ ἐνδύνει.
 λανθάνει γοῦν αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ περίχρυσα τῶν χαλκῶν.
 εἴρητο δὲ ὅτι καὶ πρὸς χρωμάτων γνῶσιν ἦν ἀν-
 επιτήδειος, ὅτε τὴν Κυρηναικὴν στάσιν ἀνηροῦμεν.
 300 διόπερ εἰ μηδὲ τῶν συμβεβηκότων τῷ σώματι ἡ
 ὄρασις ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτική, πολὺ πλέον οὐδ' αὐτοῦ
 τοῦ σώματος ἔσται θεωρητική. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
 ἀκοῆς ἐστὶν ἔργον τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ ὁσφρήσεως ἢ γεύ-
 σεως ἢ ἀφῆς· ἐκάστη γὰρ τούτων τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν
 μόνον αἰσθητὸν ἐπίσταται, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ
 ὄγκος. ἡ γὰρ ἀκοή φωνῆς μόνον ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτι-
 κή, φωνὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁ ὄγκος. καὶ ἡ ὁσφρησις
 εὐώδους μόνον ἢ δυσώδους ἐστὶ κριτήριον· ἀλλ'

body to be perceived by the sense of sight. For if neither bare length, nor form by itself, nor colour in isolation, is the body, but the compound made up of them, it will be necessary for the sight which apprehends the body to put these together one by one in itself, and thus to call the general aggregate of them all "body." But the act of putting together one 297 thing with another, and of perceiving such and such a size together with such and such a form, belongs to the rational faculty. And the sense of sight is irrational, so that it is not its task to perceive the body.—Moreover, it is not only unsuited by nature 298 to conceive the general aggregate as body, but it is also disabled for the apprehension of each of the body's properties. That of length, for instance; for this is naturally perceived by passing over its parts, as we commence at a point and proceed through a point and end up at a point, which an irrational nature cannot do. Again, take the property of depth; for 299 sight roams over the actual surface and does not penetrate to the depth. Thus it fails to discover the copper in coins that are gilded over. And when we overthrew the Cyrenaic theory ^a it was stated that sight is also unfitted for the discerning of colour. Consequently, if the sense of sight is not even 300 perceptive of the properties of the body, much less will it be capable of discerning the body itself. Nor, indeed, is this a task for hearing or smell or taste or touch; for each of these senses is only aware of the percept proper to itself, and this will not be the bodily substance. For hearing is perceptive of sound only, and sound is not the substance. And smell is a judge only of the odorous or mal-odorous; but no

^a See §§ 190 ff.

οὐθεὶς οὕτως ἐστὶν ἄφρων ὥς τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ
περὶ ἡμᾶς σώματος ἐν τοῖς εὐώδεσιν ἢ δυσώδεσιν
ἀπολείπειν. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τῶν
ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, ἵνα μὴ μακρολογῶμεν. ὥστε
αὐταὶ μὲν τὸν ὄγκον οὐ καταλαμβάνονται.

- 301 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἑαυτάς. τίς γὰρ ὁράσει τὴν
ὄρασιν εἶδεν; ἢ τίς ἀκοῇ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἀκήκοεν; τίς
δὲ γεύσει ποτὲ τῆς γεύσεως ἐγεύσατο, ἢ ὀσφρήσει
ὀσφρήσεως ὀσφρήσατο, ἢ ἀφῆς ἔθιγεν ἀφῆ; ταῦτα
γὰρ διανοητὰ ἦν. τοίνυν μηδ' ἑαυτῶν ἀντιληπτικὰς
λεκτέον εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις. οὕτωςι δὲ οὐδὲ
ἀλλήλων. ὄρασις γὰρ ἀκούουσας ἀκοὴν οὐ δύναται
ὄρᾶν, καὶ ἀνάπαλιν ἀκοὴ ὀρώσης ὁράσεως οὐ πέφυ-
κεν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς τῆς ἐγ-
χειρήσεως τρόπος, ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ λέγωμεν ὁράσει
ληπτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀκοὴν ὡς ἀκοήν, τουτέστιν [ὡς]
ἀκούουσας, δώσομεν τὸ ὁμοιοπαθεῖν τὴν ὄρασιν
ἐκείνῃ, ὥστε μηκέτι αὐτὴν ὄρασιν εἶναι ἀλλ' ἀκοήν.
- 302 πῶς γὰρ δύναται κρῖναι ἀκούουσας ἀκοὴν αὐτὴ μὴ
ἔχουσα φύσιν ἀκουστικὴν; καὶ ἀναστροφῶς, ἵνα
καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ὡς ὀρώσης ἀντιλάβηται τῆς ὀψεως, δεῖ
πολὺ πρότερον ὄρασιν αὐτὴν γενέσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ
οὐδεμίαν ὑπερβολὴν ἔοικεν ἀτοπίας ἀπολείπειν.
λεκτέον ἄρα μηδὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἢ τοῦ σώματος
ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ ἀλλήλων.

- 303 Naί, φασὶν οἱ δογματικοί, ἀλλ' ἡ διάνοια καὶ τὸν
ὄγκον καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἑαυτὴν γνωρίζει. ὅπερ
καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀπόρων ἐστίν. ὅταν γὰρ ἀξιόσωσι
τὴν διάνοιαν ἀντιληπτικὴν γίνεσθαι τοῦ τε ὅλου
σώματος καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, πευσόμεθα πότερον ὑφ'
ἐν ὅλῳ ἐπιπεσοῦσα τῷ ὄγκῳ τὴν κατάληψιν ποιεῖ-

one is so witless as to class the substance of our body amongst things odorous or mal-odorous. And—not to make a long story of it—the same may be said regarding the rest of the senses. So that the senses do not apprehend the bodily substance.

Nor indeed do they apprehend themselves. For 301
 who has beheld sight by sight? Or who has heard hearing by hearing? And who ever tasted taste by taste, or smelt smell by smell, or touched touch by touch? For these are objects for the intellect. Hence it must be declared that the senses are not even perceptive of themselves; nor, in consequence, of one another. For sight cannot see hearing as it hears, and conversely hearing is incapable of hearing sight as it sees,—and the same method of criticism applies to the other senses,—since, of course, if we assert that hearing as hearing (that is, as in act of hearing) is perceptible by sight, we shall be admitting that sight is like to the former in quality, so that it is no longer sight but hearing; for how can it discern hearing 302
 in act of hearing unless it possesses itself a nature capable of hearing? And conversely, in order that hearing may perceive sight as in act of seeing it must itself have become vision long before. But this, it would seem, reaches the very height of absurdity. One must, therefore, declare that the senses do not perceive either the body or themselves or one another.

"Yes," say the Dogmatists, "but the intellect 303
 discerns both the bodily substance and the senses and itself." But this, too, is a thing impracticable. For when they claim that the intellect is perceptive both of the whole body and of its contents, we shall inquire whether it apprehends by making contact all

ται, ἢ τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα συντιθεῖσα τὸ
 304 ὅλον καταλαμβάνεται. καὶ τῷ μὲν ὅλῳ οὐκ ἂν
 θελήσαιεν, ὥς ἔσται συμφανὲς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφερο-
 μένων· τὰ δὲ μέρη εἰ λέγοιεν αὐτὴν συντιθέναι
 κἀντεῦθεν τὸ ὅλον γνωρίζειν, μείζονι συνεληθήσου-
 νται ἀπορία. τῶν γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου μερῶν τινὰ ἔστιν
 ἄλογα, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα ἀλόγως ἡμᾶς κινεῖ. τοίνυν ἡ
 διάνοια πρὸς τούτων ἀλόγως κινουμένη ἄλογος
 γενήσεται, ἄλογος δὲ οὕσα οὐκ ἔσται διάνοια·
 305 ὥστε οὐ καταλήψεται τὸν ὄγκον ἢ διάνοια. καὶ
 μὴν οὐδὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δύναται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
 τρόπον διαγινώσκειν. ὥς γὰρ τὸ σῶμα οὐ δύναται
 [περι]λαβεῖν τῷ αὐτῇ μὲν λογικῆς μετέχειν δυνά-
 μεως ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἄλογον εἶναι, οὕτω πάλιν ἀδυνατήσει
 τὰς αἰσθήσεις καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ περ ἄλογοί
 εἰσιν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλόγως τὸ καταλαμβανόμενον
 αὐτὰς ἐκίνησιν. εἴτα τὰς αἰσθήσεις λαμβάνουσα
 πάντως αὐτὴ αἴσθησις ἔσται. ἵνα γὰρ τὰς αἰσθή-
 σεις ὥς αἰσθήσεις λάβῃ, τουτέστιν αἰσθανομένης,
 καὶ αὐτὴ γενήσεται ὁμοιοειδῆς ἐκείναις· τὴν γὰρ
 ὄρασιν ὀρώσαν καταλαμβανομένη πολὺ πρότερον
 ὄρασις γενήσεται, καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν ἀκούουσαν κρί-
 νουσα οὐχ ἑτέρα γενήσεται τῆς ἀκοῆς. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς
 καὶ ἐπὶ ὁσφρήσεως καὶ γεύσεως καὶ ἀφῆς ἐστὶ
 306 λόγος. ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἡ γνωρίζουσα τὰς αἰσθήσεις
 διάνοια εὐρίσκεται εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων μεταβεβηκυῖα
 φύσιν, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἔτι ὑποκείμενον τὸ ζητοῦν τὰς
 αἰσθήσεις· ὁ γὰρ ὑπεθέμεθα ζητεῖν, τοῦτο ἀναπέ-
 φηνε τὸ αὐτὸ ταῖς ζητουμέναις, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ
 307 χρῆζον τοῦ καταληψομένου. ναί φασιν, ἀλλὰ ταῦ-

at once with the substance as a whole, or with its parts, and by combining these it apprehends the whole. That it is with the whole they will not agree, 304 as will be evident from what follows; and if they should say that it combines the parts and therefrom discerns the whole, they will be plunged into difficulties. For of the parts of the substance some are irrational, and those that are irrational move us irrationally. The intellect, therefore, being irrationally moved by these will become irrational, and being irrational it will not be intellect. So that the intellect will not apprehend the substance.—Nor, in fact, can 305 it distinguish the senses, according to the same argument. For just as it is unable to apprehend the body owing to the fact that it has itself a share of rational power whereas the body is irrational, so also it will be unable to apprehend the senses since they are irrational and therefore move what apprehends them irrationally. Further, in perceiving the senses it will certainly be sense itself. For in order that it may perceive the senses as senses (that is, as exercising sense-perception) it will itself become of like nature with them; for when it apprehends sight as in act of seeing it will, long before, become sight, and in discerning hearing in act of hearing it will become no different from hearing. The same argument applies to both smell and taste and touch.—But if 306 the intellect that discerns the senses is found to have passed over into their nature, there will no longer exist any subject which seeks to know the senses; for that which we assumed to be seeking has turned out to be identical with the senses sought, and consequently in need of something to apprehend it. "Yes," they say, "but the same thing is both intellect 307

τόν ἐστι διάνοια καὶ αἴσθησις, οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὸ δέ,
 ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλο μὲν διάνοια κατ' ἄλλο δὲ αἴσθησις·
 καὶ ὃν τρόπον τὸ αὐτὸ ποτήριον κοῖλόν τε καὶ
 περίκυρτον λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὸ δέ, ἀλλὰ κατ'
 ἄλλο μὲν κοῖλον, οἷον τὸ ἐντὸς μέρος, κατ' ἄλλο δὲ
 περίκυρτον, καθάπερ τὸ ἐκτός, καὶ ὥς ἡ αὐτὴ ὁδὸς
 ἀνάγτης τε καὶ κατάντης νοεῖται, ἀνάγτης μὲν τοῖς
 ἀνιούσι δι' αὐτῆς κατάντης δὲ τοῖς κατιούσιν,
 οὕτως ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις κατ' ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶ νοῦς κατ'
 ἄλλο δὲ αἴσθησις, καὶ οὐκ εἴργεται ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσα τῆς
 308 προειρημένης τῶν αἰσθήσεων καταλήψεως. πάνν
 δ' εἰσὶν εὐήθεις, καὶ κενῶς μόνον πρὸς τὰς ἐκ-
 κεμένας ἀπορίας ἀντηχοῦσιν. φαμέν γάρ, εἰ καὶ
 συγχωρηθῶσιν αἱ διάφοροι αὗται δυνάμεις περὶ τὴν
 αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ὑποκεῖσθαι, πάλιν μένει τὸ μικρῶ
 309 πρόσθεν ὑπὸ ἡμῶν κινηθὲν ἄπορον. ζητῶ γάρ,
 τοῦτο τὸ κατ' ἄλλο μὲν νοῦς εἶναι λεγόμενον κατ'
 ἄλλο δὲ αἴσθησις πῶς δύναται τῷ καθ' ὃ νοῦς ἐστὶν
 ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ καθ' ὃ αἴσθησίς ἐστιν; λογι-
 κὸν γάρ ὃν καὶ ἀλόγου ποιούμενον κατάληψιν
 ἀλόγως κινήσεται, ἀλόγως δὲ κινούμενον ἀλογόν
 ἐστὶ, τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃν οὐκ ἔσται καταλαμβάνον ἀλλὰ
 καταλαμβανόμενον. ὅπερ πάλιν ἦν ἄτοπον.

310 Διὰ τούτων μὲν δὴ παρεστάσθω ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος
 οὔτε διὰ τοῦ σώματος τὰς αἰσθήσεις δύναται λαβεῖν
 οὔτε ἀνάπαλιν διὰ τούτων τὸ σῶμα, (εἶγε) μηδὲ
 (αὐταί)· αὐτὰς ἢ ἀλλήλας. ἐξῆς δὲ ὑποδεικτέον
 ὅτι οὐδ' ἐαυτῆς ἐπιγνώμων ἐστὶν ἡ διάνοια,
 καθάπερ ἀξιοῦσιν οἱ δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων.
 εἴπερ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἐαυτὸν καταλαμβάνεται, ἥτοι
 ὁλος ἐαυτὸν καταλήψεται, ἢ ὁλος μὲν οὐδαμῶς

¹ <εἶγε> μ. <αὐταί> cj. Bekk.

and sense, but not in the same aspect, it being in one aspect intellect but in another sense ; and just as the same drinking-cup is said to be both concave and convex, though not in the same aspect, but in one aspect concave, as is the inside part, and in another convex, as is the outside,—and as the same road is conceived as being both an incline and a decline, an incline for those ascending by it but a decline for those descending,—so likewise the same faculty is in one aspect thought but in another sense, and being the same it is not precluded from the aforementioned apprehension of the senses " But they are utterly 308 simple-minded, and only make empty replies to the difficulties propounded. For we assert that, even if it be granted that these different faculties really belong to the same substance, there still remains the difficulty raised by us a little while ago. For I ask, 309 as regards this thing which is said to be thought in one aspect and sense in another, how by its aspect as thought can it perceive its aspect as sense ? For it being rational and apprehending an irrational thing will be moved irrationally, and being moved irrationally it will be irrational, and being this it will not be apprehending but apprehended. And this again is absurd.

Let it be established, then, by these arguments that 310 Man is unable to perceive either the senses by means of the body or, conversely, the body by means of the senses, seeing that these cannot perceive either themselves or one another. Next we have to show that the intellect is not cognizant of itself, as the Dogmatic philosophers claim. For if the mind apprehends itself, either it as a whole will apprehend itself, or it will do so not as a whole but employing for the purpose

- 311 μέρει δέ τινι ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς τοῦτο χρώμενος. καὶ ὅλος μὲν ἑαυτὸν καταλαμβάνεσθαι οὐκ ἂν δυνηθεῖη. εἰ γὰρ ὅλος ἑαυτὸν καταλαμβάνεται, ὅλος ἔσται κατάληψις καὶ καταλαμβάνων, ὅλου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καταλαμβάνοντος οὐδέν ἐστι ἔσται τὸ καταλαμβάνόμενον· τῶν δὲ ἀλογωτάτων ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι μὲν τὸν καταλαμβάνοντα, μὴ εἶναι δὲ τὸ οὐ ἐστὶν ἢ
- 312 κατάληψις. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ μέρει τινὶ δύναται πρὸς τοῦτο χρῆσθαι ὁ νοῦς. αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ μέρος πῶς¹ ἑαυτὸ καταλαμβάνει; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅλον, οὐδέν ἔσται τὸ ζητούμενον· εἰ δὲ μέρει τινί, ἐκεῖνο πάλιν πῶς ἑαυτὸ γνώσεται; καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. ὥστε ἀναρχὸν εἶναι τὴν κατάληψιν, ἥτοι μηδενὸς εὐρισκομένου πρώτου τοῦ τὴν κατάληψιν ποιησόμενου ἢ μηδενὸς ὄντος τοῦ καταληφθισομένου.²
- 313 ἐπεῖτα³ εἰ ἑαυτὸν καταλαμβάνει ὁ νοῦς, καὶ τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ἔστι συγκαταλήψεται· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ καταλαμβανόμενον⁴ σὺν τινὶ τόπῳ καταλαμβάνεται. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὁ νοῦς τὸν ἐν ᾧ ἔστι συγκαταλαμβάνει ἑαυτῷ, ἐχρήν μὴ διαφωνεῖσθαι τοῦτον παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, τῶν μὲν κεφαλὴν λεγόντων εἶναι τῶν δὲ θώρακα, καὶ ἐπ' εἶδους τῶν μὲν ἐγκέφαλον τῶν δὲ μήνιγγα, τινῶν δὲ καρδίαν, ἄλλων δὲ ἥπατος πύλας ἢ τι τοιοῦτο μέρος τοῦ σώματος. διαφωνοῦσι δὲ γε περὶ τούτου οἱ δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων· οὐκ ἄρα καταλαμβάνει ἑαυτὸν ὁ νοῦς.
- 314 Καὶ δὴ οὕτω κοινότερον ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου

¹ πῶς Kayser: ὅπως MSS.: ad πῶς cj. Bekk.

² καταληφθισομένου cj. Bekk.: καταληψομένου MSS.

³ ἐπεῖτα cj. Bekk.: ἐπειτά πῶς N: ἐπειπερ cet., Bekk.

⁴ καταλαμβανόμενον cj. Bekk.: καταλαμβάνον MSS., Bekk.

a part of itself. Now it will not be able as a whole to 311
 apprehend itself. For if as a whole it apprehends
 itself, it will be as a whole apprehension and appre-
 hending, and, the apprehending subject being the
 whole, the apprehended object will no longer be any-
 thing ; but it is a thing most irrational that the appre-
 hending subject should exist while the object of the
 apprehension does not exist. Nor, in fact, can the 312
 mind employ for this purpose a part of itself. For
 how does the part itself apprehend itself ? If as a
 whole, the object sought will be nothing ; while if
 with a part, how will that part in turn discern itself ?
 And so on to infinity. So that apprehension is a
 thing without beginning, as either no first subject is
 found to apprehend or no object exists to be appre-
 hended.—Further, if the mind apprehends itself it 313
 will also apprehend therewith the place in which it
 exists ; for everything that is apprehended is appre-
 hended together with some place. And if the mind
 apprehends together with itself the place also wherein
 it exists, this ought not to have been a matter of
 dispute among the philosophers,^a some of them de-
 claring it to be the head, others the breast, and, in
 particular, some the brain, others the *pia mater*, some
 the heart, others the portals of the liver or some such
 part of the body. Regarding this the Dogmatic
 philosophers do actually dispute among themselves ;
 therefore the mind does not apprehend itself.

Let this, then, stand as a statement of the diffi- 314

^a Cf. *P.H.* i. 118.

- διηπορήσθω ἡ περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου ζήτησις. ἐπειδὴ
 δὲ φιλαύτως οἱ δογματικοὶ ἄλλοις μὲν οὐ παρα-
 χωροῦσι τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, μόνους δ'
 ἑαυτοὺς ταύτην εὐρηκέναι λέγουσιν, φέρε ἐπ'
 αὐτῶν στήσαντες τὸν λόγον διδάσκωμεν ὅτι οὐδὲ
 οὕτως εὐρεθῆναί τι δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀληθείας κρι-
 315 τήριον. ἕκαστος τοίνυν τῶν ἀξιούντων τὰληθὲς
 εὐρηκέναι ἤτοι φάσει μόνον τοῦτο ἀποφαίνεται ἢ
 ἀπόδειξιν παραλαμβάνει. ἀλλὰ φάσει μὲν οὐκ ἐρεῖ·
 τῶν γὰρ ἀντικαθεζομένων αὐτῷ τις τὴν τούναντίον
 ἀξιούσαν προοίσεται φάσιν, καὶ οὕτως οὐ μᾶλλον
 ἐκεῖνος ἢ οὗτος ἔσται πιστός· ψιλῇ γὰρ φάσει ἴσον
 316 φέρεται ψιλῇ φάσει. εἰ δὲ μετ' ἀποδείξεως κρι-
 τήριον αὐτὸν ἀποφαίνεται, πάντως ὑγιούς. ἀλλ'
 ἵνα μάθωμεν ὅτι ὑγιῆς ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶν ἢ προσ-
 χρώμενος κριτήριον ἑαυτὸν ἀποφαίνεται, ὀφείλομεν
 ἔχειν κριτήριον, καὶ τοῦτο προωμολογημένον· οὐκ
 ἔχομεν δὲ γε σύμφωνον κριτήριον, ζητεῖται δέ·
 317 οὐκ ἄρα δυνατόν ἐστιν εὐρεῖν κριτήριον. πάλιν
 ἐπεὶ οἱ σφῆς αὐτοὺς κριτήρια λέγοντες τῆς ἀληθείας
 ἀπὸ διαφώνων αἰρέσεων ἀνάγονται καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ
 τοῦτο διαφωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις, δεῖ παρεῖναί τι ἡμῖν
 κριτήριον ᾧ προσχρώμενοι κρινοῦμεν τὴν διαφωνίαν
 εἰς τὸ τισὶ μὲν συγκατατίθεσθαι τισὶ δὲ μηδαμῶς.
 318 τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἤτοι πᾶσι διάφωνόν ἐστι
 τοῖς διαφωνοῦσιν ἢ ἐνὶ μόνον σύμφωνον. ἀλλ' εἰ
 μὲν πᾶσι διάφωνον, μοῖρα καὶ αὐτὸ γενήσεται τῆς
 διαφωνίας, μοῖρα δ' ὃν ταύτης οὐκ ἂν εἴη κρι-
 τήριον ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ παραπλησίως τῇ ὅλῃ δια-

* With §§ 314-316 cf. *P.H.* II, 34-36.

culties which beset the inquiry about the criterion,
 in its larger aspect as Man in general.^a But inas-
 much as the Dogmatists, in their self-conceit, do not
 pass over to others the judgement of truth but assert
 that they themselves alone have discovered it, come
 and let us base our argument upon them and demon-
 strate that not even so is it possible for any criterion
 of truth to be discovered. Now each of those who 315
 claim to have discovered the truth either makes this
 declaration by merely asserting it or adduces a proof.
 But he will not utter it by assertion ; for one of those
 who belong to the opposite side will utter an assertion
 claiming the opposite, and in this case the former will
 be no more trustworthy than the latter ; for a bare
 assertion counterbalances a bare assertion. But if 316
 his declaration of himself as criterion is accompanied
 by proof, it must be sound proof. But in order to
 ascertain that the proof which he employs in declaring
 himself as criterion is sound, we must possess a
 criterion, and one that is already agreed upon ; but
 we do not possess an undisputed criterion, it being
 the object of inquiry ; therefore it is not possible to
 discover a criterion.—Again, since those who call 317
 themselves criteria of truth derive from discordant
 Schools of thought, and just because of this disagree
 with one another, we need to possess a criterion
 which we can employ to pronounce upon their dis-
 agreement so as to give assent to the one party and
 not to the other. This criterion, then, is either in 318
 disagreement with all those who disagree or in agree-
 ment with only one. But if it disagrees with all, it
 will itself also be a party in the disagreement, and
 being a party in this it will not be a criterion but itself
 also, like the whole of the disagreement, in need of

- φωνία κρίσεως δεόμενον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ δοκιμάζειν
 319 ἅμα καὶ δοκιμάζεσθαι τῶν ἀμυγνάνων. εἰ δὲ μὴ
 πᾶσι διαπεφώνηκεν ἄλλ' ἐνὶ συμφωνεῖ, (ὁ εἰς οὗτος
 ὡ συμφωνεῖ)¹ ἐκ τῆς διαφωνίας ὧν χρεῖαν ἔχει τοῦ
 δοκιμάσοντος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ συμφωνον αὐτῷ
 κριτήριον μὴ ἕτερον ὄν παρ' ἐκεῖνο δεήσεται κρί-
 σεως, δεόμενον δὲ κρίσεως οὐκ ἔσται κριτήριον.
 320 τὸ δὲ πάντων κυριώτατον, εἴπερ τινὰ τῶν δογ-
 ματικῶν λέγομεν εἶναι κριτὴν τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ παρ'
 αὐτῷ μόνῳ ταύτην ὑπάρχειν, ἥτοι τῇ ἡλικίᾳ αὐτοῦ
 ἐνατενίζοντες τοῦτο ἐροῦμεν, ἢ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν οὐ-
 δαμῶς τῷ πόνῳ δέ, ἢ οὐδὲ τούτῳ ἀλλὰ τῇ συνέσει
 καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἢ συνέσει μὲν οὐδαμῶς μαρτυρία δὲ
 τῇ τῶν πολλῶν. οὔτε δὲ ἡλικία οὔτε φιλοπονία
 οὐτ' ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν εἰρημένων προσέχειν οἰκεῖόν
 ἔστιν ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ζητήσει, ὡς παρα-
 στήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα τινὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων ῥητέον
 321 κριτήριον εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας. καὶ δὴ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ
 μὲν οὐ προσεκτέον, ἐπεὶπερ οἱ πλείους τῶν δογ-
 ματικῶν ὁμήλικες σχεδὸν ἦσαν ὅτε αὐτοὺς ἔλεγον
 κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας· πάντες γὰρ πρεσβῦται
 γενόμενοι, ὡς Πλάτων, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ Δημόκριτος
 καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Ζήνων, ἑαυτοῖς τὴν εὑρεσιν
 322 τῆς ἀληθείας προσεμαρτύρησαν. εἴτ' οὐκ ἀπέοικεν,
 ὡς ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῇ κοινῇ συνηθείᾳ θεωροῦμεν
 ὅτι συνετώτεροι πολλάκις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἰσὶ
 νέοι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ φιλοσοφία εὐεπηβολω-
 τέρους γεγονέναι παρὰ τοὺς πρεσβύτας τοὺς νέους.
 323 ἔνιοι μὲν γάρ, ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ ἰατρός,
 διαρρηδὴν ἔλεξαν πολλῷ λείπεσθαι τῆς περὶ τοὺς
 νέους συνέσεως καὶ ἀγχυνοίας τοὺς πρεσβύτας,

¹ <ὁ . . . συμφωνεῖ> cj. Bekk.

a judgement; for that the same thing should be at once both examining and examined is a thing impracticable. And if it does not disagree with all but 319 agrees with one, the one with whom it agrees, as being involved in the disagreement, requires an examiner. And on this account the criterion which agrees with that one, being no different from it, will need judgement, and needing judgement it will not be a criterion.—But the most important argument of 320 all is this :—if we say that some one particular Dogmatist is the judge of truth, and that this attribute belongs to him alone, we shall make this statement after looking intently either at his age, or not at his age but at his labours, or not at these but at his sagacity and intellect, or not at his sagacity but at the testimony of the multitude. But in our inquiry into the truth it is not appropriate, as we shall show, to give attention either to age or to industry or to any other of the points mentioned above; therefore it should not be asserted that any one of the philosophers is the criterion of truth. Now one should not 321 attend to age, seeing that most of the Dogmatists were pretty much of the same age when they declared themselves to be criteria of truth; for it was when they had all become old—take Plato, for instance, and Democritus and Epicurus and Zeno—that they testified to their own discovery of truth. Further, it is not unlikely that, just as in ordinary life 322 and common intercourse the young are often found to be more intelligent than the old, so likewise in philosophy the young may be more keen-witted than the old. For some people, including Asclepiades the 323 physician, have asserted expressly that the old fall far short of the young in intelligence and mental

παρὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ εὐκαιωτέρων ψευδο-
 δοξίαν ἐναντίως ἔχειν ὑπελήφθη τὸ πρᾶγμα. διὰ γὰρ
 τὸ πολὺπειρον τῶν πρεσβυτῶν ἔδοξαν οἱ νεώτεροι
 λείπεσθαι κατὰ σύνεσιν, τοῦ πράγματος ἐναντίως
 ἔχοντος· πολυπειρότεροι μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔφην, εἰσὶν
 οἱ γεγηρακότες, οὐ συνετώτεροι δὲ παρὰ τοὺς
 νέους. οὐκοῦν διὰ μὲν ἡλικίαν οὐ λεκτέον κρι-
 324 τήριον εἶναι τινα τῶν δογματικῶν. καὶ μὴν
 οὐδὲ διὰ φιλοπονίαν. πάντες γὰρ ἐπ' ἴσης εἰσὶ φιλό-
 πονοι, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας
 ἀγῶνα κατελθὼν καὶ ταύτην εὕρηκέναι φήσας
 ῥαθύμως ἀνέστραπται. πάντων δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο
 ἰσότητα μαρτυρουμένων, τὸ ἐνὶ μόνῳ προσκλιθῆναι
 325 τῶν ἀδίκων ἔστιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐκ ἂν τις
 ἄλλον ἄλλου προκρίναι ἔνεκα συνέσεως. πρῶτον μὲν
 γὰρ συνετοὶ πάντες ὑπῆρχον, καὶ οὐχ οἱ μὲν νωθεῖς οἱ
 δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτοι. εἰτα πολλάκις οἱ συνετοὶ δοκοῦντες
 ὑπάρχειν οὐ τῆς ἀληθείας τοῦ δὲ ψεύδους εἰσὶ
 συνηγόροι. τῶν γοῦν ῥητόρων τοὺς μὲν τῷ ψεύδει
 γενναίως¹ συλλαμβανομένους καὶ εἰς ἴσιν αὐτὸ
 πίστιν ἀνάγοντας τῷ ἀληθεῖ δυνατούς τε καὶ
 νοερούς εἶναι φαμέν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ τοιούτους ἀνά-
 326 παλιν βραδεῖς τε καὶ ἀσυνέτους. τάχα τοίνυν καὶ
 φιλοσοφία οἱ μὲν περινοῦσται τῶν ζητησάντων
 τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῷ εὐφυεῖς εἶναι πιθανοὶ καθεστάναι
 δοκοῦσι, καὶ τῷ ψεύδει συνηγορῶσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀφυεῖς
 ἀπίθανοι, καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ συμμαχῶσιν. οὔτε οὖν
 διὰ ἡλικίαν οὔτε διὰ φιλοπονίαν οὔτε διὰ σύνεσιν
 οἰκείον ἔστι τινα τινὸς προκρίνειν καὶ τόνδε μὲν
 λέγειν εὕρηκέναι τὰληθῆς τόνδε δὲ μηδαμῶς.

¹ ψεύδει γενναίως Kalbfleisch: ψευδεῖς εἶναι ὡς MSS.: ψεύδει
 πιθανῶς Bekk.

acumen, although the opposite was supposed to be the fact owing to the false opinion held by most thoughtless people. For the young are believed to fall short in intelligence because of the great experience of the old, though the opposite is the fact ; for while the aged are, as I said, more experienced, they are *not more intelligent than the young*. So, then, one must not say that, on the ground of age, any of the Dogmatists is the criterion.—Nor yet, surely, on 324 the ground of industry. For they are all equally industrious, and there is none who, after competing in the race for truth and asserting that he has found it, conducts himself indolently. And when all give evidence of equality in this respect, it is a thing unjust to give the preference to one only.—So likewise no 325 one could prefer one as superior to another on the ground of intelligence. For, in the first place, they are all intelligent, nor are some obtuse and others not so. Further, those who are reputed to be intelligent are frequently advocates not of truth but of falsehood. Thus we call those orators who ably support what is false, and raise it to equal the true in credibility, competent and brainy, and those who are not of this class we call, on the contrary, slow of wit and unintelligent. Possibly, then, in philosophy also the most sharp- 326 witted of the seekers after truth seem to be convincing, even if they advocate what is false, owing to their natural ability, whereas those lacking this ability are unconvincing even when they contend for what is true. So, then, neither on the ground of age, nor of industry, nor of intelligence, is it proper to prefer any one to another and to say that this man has discovered the truth and that man has not.—It remains, then, 327

- 327 καταλείπεται τοίνυν τῷ πλήθει τῶν συμφωνούντων
 προσέχειν· τάχα γὰρ (ἄν)' τις τοῦτον ἄριστον
 κριτὴν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας φήσειε τὸν ὧ συμφώνως
 οἱ πλείους μαρτυροῦσιν. ὅπερ ἐστὶ ληρώδες καὶ
 τῶν προδιαβεβλημένων ἡμῶν κριτηρίων χεῖρον.
 ἵνα γὰρ τὰλλα παρῶμεν, ἴσοι εἰσὶ τοῖς περὶ τινων
 συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀντιφωνοῦντες, ὡς
 τοῖς Ἀριστοτελικοῖς οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ τοῖς Ἐπι-
 κουρείοις οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 328 ὡσαύτως. εἰ οὖν ἄριστός ἐστιν ὁ συνειρακῶς
 τάληθές ἐπεὶ ταῦτό ἀξιοῦσι πάντες οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ
 ὀρμώμενοι, τί μᾶλλον τόνδε ἢ τόνδε ἄριστον εἶναι
 φήσομεν καὶ κριτήριον ἀληθείας; ὡς εἰ Ἐπί-
 κουρον διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς περὶ αὐτοῦ συμ-
 φωνοῦντας ὅτι εὔρε τάληθές, τί μᾶλλον Ἐπίκουρον
 ἢ Ἀριστοτέλην[; ἦ]³ ὅτι οὐκ ἐλάσσους εἰσὶν οἱ καὶ
 329 τούτῳ συνασπίζονται; οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὡς πάλιν ἐν
 τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον πράγμασιν οὐκ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν
 ἓνα συνετὸν ἀμείνονα εἶναι πολλῶν ἀσυνέτων, οὕτω
 καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ οὐκ ἀπέοικεν ἓνα φρόνιμον εἶναι
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πιστόν, πολλοὺς δὲ χηνώδεις καὶ
 διὰ τοῦτο ἀπίστους, καὶ συμφώνως τινὶ προσμαρ-
 τυρῶσιν· σπάνιος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ συνετός, πολὺς δὲ
 330 ὁ εἰκαῖος. εἴτα καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν
 πλειόνων μαρτυρίᾳ προσέχωμεν, πάλιν εἰς τοῦναν-
 τίον τῇ προθέσει περιαγόμεθα· κατ' ἀνάγκην γὰρ
 τῶν περὶ τινος συμφωνούντων πλείους εἰσὶν οἱ
 περὶ αὐτοῦ διαφωνοῦντες. ὃ δὲ λέγω, σαφέστερον
 γενήσεται οἰκείου τεθέντος ἡμῖν παραδείγματος.

¹ <ἄ> cj. Bekk.² [: ἦ] secl. Heintz.³ With §§ 327-334 cf. *P.H.* ii. 43-44.

that we should attend to the majority of those in agreement ; for possibly someone will assert that he is the best judge of truth with whom the testimony of the majority is in agreement.^a But this is nonsensical and worse than the criteria which we have already rejected. For, to pass over all other points, those who disagree about any facts are equal in number to those who agree about the same facts—the Epicureans, for example, are equal to the Aristotelians, and the Stoics to the Epicureans, and so on with the rest. If, then, he that has discerned the truth is the best because all those who derive from him maintain the same view, why should we say that this man rather than that man is the best and the criterion of truth? If, for instance, we name Epicurus because those who agree about him that he has found the truth are many in number, why Epicurus rather than Aristotle, since those who side with the latter are no less numerous? But, notwithstanding, just as in the ordinary affairs of life it is not impossible that one intelligent person should be better than many unintelligent persons, so, once again, in philosophy it is not unlikely that one man should be sensible and on that account trustworthy, and many be like geese and on that account untrustworthy, even though they testify with one voice in someone's favour ; for the intelligent man is rare, the thoughtless common.—Moreover, even if we attend to general agreement and the testimony of the majority, we are brought round again to a position which contradicts our assumption ; for of necessity those who disagree about a thing are more numerous than those who agree about it. What I mean will become clearer if we take a familiar example. Let

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- 331 ἔστω γάρ, ὑποθέσεως χάριν, τῶν καθ' ἐκάστην αἵρεσιν φιλοσοφούντων πλείους εἶναι τοὺς κατὰ τὴν στωικὴν αἵρεσιν φιλοσοφούντας, λεγέτωσάν τε οὗτοι συμφώνως Ζήνωνα μόνον εὐρηκέναι τάληθές, ἕτερον δὲ μηδένα. οὐκοῦν ἀντιφθέγγονται αὐτοῖς οἱ ἀπὸ Ἐπικούρου, ψεύδεσθαι δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐροῦσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου, ἀντεροῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ καθόλου πάντες οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν
- 332 αἵρέσεων, ὥστε πάλιν τούτους τοὺς συμφώνως Ζήνωνα προκεκρικότας, συγκρινομένους τοῖς συμφώνως λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι Ζήνωνα κριτήριον, κατὰ πολὺν ἐλάσσους εὐρίσκεσθαι. καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰ τοῖς συμφώνως περὶ τινος ἀποφαινομένοις χρή γνωματεύειν ὅταν ὥσι πολλοί, οὐδένα ῥητέον τάληθές εὐρηκέναι· παντὶ γὰρ τῷ ὑπὸ τινων ἐπαινουμένῳ πολὺς ἐστὶν ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων αἵρέσεων
- 333 ἀντιφθεγγόμενος. τὸ δὲ πάντων συνεκτικώτατον, οἱ περὶ τινος ὡς εὐρηκότος τάληθές συμφωνοῦντες ἤτοι διάφορον ἔχουσι διάθεσιν καθ' ἣν συμφωνοῦσιν, ἢ διάφορον μὲν οὐδαμῶς μίαν δὲ καὶ τὴν αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ διάφορον μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἂν ἔχοιεν, ἐπεὶ πάντως αὐτοὺς δεήσει διαφωνεῖν· μίαν δὲ ἔχοντες εἰς ἰσότητα περιστάνται τῷ τούναντίον ἀποφαινομένῳ. ὥς γὰρ ἐκεῖνος μίαν ἔχει διάθεσιν καθ' ἣν ἀντι-
- 334 πέπτωκεν αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ οὗτοι τὴν ἴσην ἔχουσιν ἐκείνῳ, παρέλκοντος λοιπὸν τοῦ πλήθους αὐτῶν πρὸς πίστιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἰς ἣν

^a i.e. all who agree about the matter are in the same "condition," or state of mind, respecting it. Thus, like their single opponent, they are in *one* state of mind, and their numbers go for nothing, so that his testimony is as weighty as theirs.

us suppose, for the sake of argument, that those who belong to the Stoic School of philosophy are more numerous than those who belong to each of the other Schools, and that the former agree in saying that Zeno alone has discovered the truth and no one else. Then the Epicureans will contradict them, and the Peripatetics will declare that they are liars, and the Academics will gainsay them, as will also all the members generally of the other Schools, so that once 332 again those who have unanimously given the preference to Zeno, when compared with those who unanimously declare that Zeno is not the criterion, are found to be far fewer in number. Here, too, is another reason: If one ought to vote for those who make an unanimous statement about any matter when they are numerous, it must be asserted that no one has found the truth; for everyone who is commended by a certain number has a multitude from the other Schools who cry out against him. But the most con- 333 vincing argument of all is this: Those who agree together about a certain person that he has found the truth are in a condition with respect to their agreement which is either different or not different at all but one and the same. But they will by no means be in a different condition since then they must certainly disagree; while if they are in one condition they are brought round into a state of equality with him who states the opposite.^a For just as the latter is in one condition in respect of which he has opposed them, so also the former are in a condition equal 334 to his, their large numbers being henceforward redundant for ensuring belief; for, in fact, if it had been but one of them who was supposed to have made this

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ἐξ αὐτῶν ὁ τοῦτο λέγων, ἴσον ἂν ἐδύνατο τοῖς πᾶσιν.

335 Ἄλλ' εἴπερ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὕρηκώς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἢ διὰ ἡλικίαν ἢ διὰ φιλοπονίαν ἢ διὰ σύνεσιν ἢ τῷ πολλοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς μαρτυροῦντας εὐστοχηκέναι λέγεται, παρεστήσαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ὅτι δι' οὐδὲν τούτων ρητέον κριτήριον αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν ἀληθείας, φαίνεται ὡς ἀνεύρετόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ κριτήριον.

336 Ἐτι ὁ λέγων αὐτὸν ἀληθείης εἶναι κριτήριον τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ λέγει, καὶ οὐδὲν πλεῖον. τοίνυν ἐπεὶ καὶ ἕκαστος τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ λέγει καὶ ἐναντίον τῷ προενεχθέντι, δηλὸν ὡς ἴσου πᾶσιν ὄντος τοῦ τοιούτου οὐ δυνησόμεθα ὠρισμένως τινὰ κριτήριον εἶναι λέγειν. εἰ γὰρ οὗτος πιστὸς ὅτι φαίνεται αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν κριτήριον, πιστὸς ἔσται καὶ ὁ δεύτερος ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται κριτήριον εἶναι αὐτόν, καὶ οὕτως ὁ τρίτος καὶ οἱ λοιποί· ὥς συνεισάγεται τὸ μηδένα

337 ὠρισμένως κριτήριον ἀληθείας ὑπάρχειν. πρὸς τούτοις ἢ φάσει τις ἑαυτὸν κριτήριον εἶναι λέγει ἢ κριτηρίῳ προσχρώμενος. ἀλλὰ φάσει μὲν φάσει ἐπισχεθήσεται, κριτηρίῳ δὲ προσχρώμενος περιτραπήσεται. ἦτοι γὰρ διάφωνόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὸ κριτήριον τοῦτο ἢ σύμφωνον. καὶ εἰ μὲν διάφωνον, ἄπιστον, ἐπεὶπερ διαπεφώνηκε τῷ οἰομένῳ

338 αὐτὸν κριτήριον ὑπάρχειν· εἰ δὲ σύμφωνον, χρεῖαν ἔξει τοῦ κρίνοντος. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὗτος ὁ κριτήριον αὐτὸν ἀποφαινόμενος ἄπιστος ἦν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ

statement, he would have had as much weight as all of them.

But if he that has discovered the truth in philosophy 335 is said to have succeeded either because of his age or his industry or his intelligence, or through having many to testify for him, whereas we have established that for none of these reasons ought it to be said that he is really the criterion of truth, then it is evident that the criterion in philosophy is undiscoverable.

Further, he who declares himself to be the criterion 336 of truth says what appears to himself and nothing more. So then, since each of the other philosophers also says what appears to himself and is contrary to the previous statement, it is plain that, as each of them is on a level with all the others, we shall be unable to state definitely that any one of them is a criterion. For if the first man is trustworthy because it appears to him that he is the criterion, the second man too will be trustworthy, since to him also it appears that he himself is the criterion, and so likewise with the third, and the rest; wherefrom it follows that no one is definitely the criterion of truth. —Furthermore, a man says he is the criterion either 337 by mere assertion or by employing a criterion. But if it be by assertion, he will be checked by assertion, while if it be by employing a criterion, he will be overthrown. For this criterion is either in disagreement with him or in agreement. And if it be in disagreement it is untrustworthy, since it is in disagreement with him who believes himself to be the criterion; and if it be in agreement, it will stand in need of a 338 judge. For just as the man who declares himself to be the criterion is not to be trusted, so also the criterion

- σύμφωνον αὐτῷ κριτήριον, ἐπεὶ τρόπῳ τινὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔσχηκεν ἐκείνῳ δύναμιν, δεήσεται ἑτέρου τινὸς κριτηρίου. καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐ λεκτέον ἕκαστον τῶν φιλοσόφων εἶναι κριτήριον· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κρίσεως
- 339 δεόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἄπιστον. πάλιν ὁ λέγων ἑαυτὸν κριτήριον ἥτοι φάσει τοῦτο ἀξιοῖ ἢ ἀποδείξει. καὶ φάσει μὲν οὐ δύναται δι' αὐτοῦ προεῖπον αἰτίας· εἰ δὲ ἀποδείξει, πάντως ὑγιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἐστὶν ὑγιὲς ἢ τοιαύτη ἀπόδειξις, ἥτοι φάσει λέγεται ἢ ἀποδείξει, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς ἄπειρον. τοίνυν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον ἀνεύρετον εἶναι τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον.
- 340 Ἐρωτᾶται δὲ καὶ οὕτως. οἱ κρίνουν τάληθές ἐπαγγελλόμενοι κριτήριον ἔχειν ὀφείλουσι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἥτοι ἀνεπικριτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐπικέκριται. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνεπικριτόν ἐστι, πόθεν ὅτι πιστόν; οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητούμενων χωρὶς κρίσεως ἐστι πιστόν. εἰ δὲ ἐπικέκριται, πάλιν τὸ κρίναν αὐτὸ ἥτοι ἀνεπικριτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐπικέκριται. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνεπικριτόν, ἄπιστον· εἰ δὲ ἐπικέκριται, πάλιν τὸ ἐπικρίναν αὐτὸ ἥτοι ἐπικέκριται ἢ οὐκ ἐπικέκριται, καὶ
- 341 οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. πάλιν τὸ κριτήριον ἀμφισβητούμενον καθεστὼς δεῖται τινος ἀποδείξεως. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς, ὀφείλει καὶ ἡ εἰς πίστιν τοῦ κριτηρίου παραλαμβανομένη ἀπόδειξις διὰ τινος κριτηρίου βεβαιοῦσθαι, ὥστε εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐμπίπτειν τρόπον, τοῦ μὲν κριτηρίου τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως πίστιν περιμένοντος, τῆς δὲ ἀποδείξεως τὴν ἀπὸ
- 342 τοῦ κριτηρίου βεβαίωσιν ἀναμενούσης, μηδετέρου

¹ ὑγιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ὅτι Mutsch. : ἐπεὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον mss., Bekk.

δὲ αὐτῶν διὰ θατέρου πεπιστώσθαι δυναμένου. καὶ ἄλλως γίνεται τὸ αὐτὸ πιστόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον. πιστόν μὲν τὸ κριτήριον, ὅτι κρίνει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὅτι ἀποδείκνυσι τὸ κριτήριον· ἄπιστον δὲ τὸ μὲν κριτήριον, ὅτι ἀποδείκνυται πρὸς τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἡ δὲ ἀπόδειξις, ὅτι κρίνεται πρὸς τοῦ κριτηρίου.

- 343 Ἄλλ' ἡ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου κριτηρίου ἀγνωσία, τουτέστι τοῦ ὕφ' οὗ, διὰ τοσούτων παρὰ τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς ἀπορεῖται· εὐαπόδοτος δέ ἐστι καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ δευτέρου λόγος, φημὶ δὲ τοῦ δι' οὗ. εἰ γὰρ εὐρίσκει τᾶληθές ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἦτοι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι μόνον προσχρώμενος τοῦτο εὐρίσκει ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ, ταῖς τε αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ· οὔτε δὲ μόνον ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι προσχρώμενος δύναται τᾶληθές εὐρεῖν οὔτε καθ' αὐτὴν τῇ διανοίᾳ οὔτε κοινῶς ταῖς τε αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὥς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα εὐρίσκειν τᾶληθές ὁ
- 344 ἄνθρωπος πέφυκεν. αἰσθήσεσι μὲν οὖν μόναίς λαβεῖν τᾶληθές οὐ δύναται, καθὼς ἔμπροσθεν ἐπεδείξαμεν, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἐπ' ὀλίγον παραμυθησόμεθα. φύσει γάρ εἰσιν ἄλογοι, καὶ πλέον τοῦ τυποῦσθαι πρὸς τῶν φανταστῶν μὴ δυνάμεναι παντελῶς ἄθετοι καθεστᾶσι πρὸς εὔρεσιν τᾶληθοῦς. οὐ γὰρ μόνον λευκαντικῶς ἢ γλυκαντικῶς δεῖ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ληψόμενον τᾶληθές ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς φαντασίαν ἀχθῆναι τοῦ τοιούτου πράγματος " τοῦτο λευκόν ἐστι " καὶ " τοῦτο γλυκύ ἐστιν."
- 345 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ παραπλήσιον. τῷ δὲ τοιούτῳ πράγματι οὐκέτι τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔργον ἐστὶν ἐπι-

of them being able to be confirmed by the other. And besides, the same thing becomes both trustworthy and untrustworthy—the criterion trustworthy because it judges the proof, and the proof because it proves the criterion; but the criterion untrustworthy because it is proved by the proof, and the proof because it is judged by the criterion.

Well, then, it is by all these arguments that the 343
obscurity of the first criterion—that of the agent
“By which”—is criticized amongst the Sceptics;
and the argument regarding the second—I mean that
“By means of which” or Instrument—is easy to set
forth.^a For if Man discovers the truth, he discovers it
by employing either the senses only or the intellect
or the combination of both the senses and the intel-
lect; but, as we shall establish, he cannot discover
the truth by employing either the senses only or the
intellect by itself or both the senses and the intellect
conjointly; therefore Man is not capable of dis-
covering the truth. Now he is not able to grasp the 344
truth by the senses alone, as we have shown above,^b
and shall now briefly rehearse. For they are by nature
irrational, and having no further capacity beyond that
of being impressed by the objects imaged, they are
wholly disqualified for discovering the truth. For that
which is to perceive what is true in the real objects
must not only be moved by a whitish or sweetish
feeling but also must be brought to have an impres-
sion regarding such an object that “this thing is
white” and “this thing is sweet.” And similarly with
the rest of the senses. But to perceive an object of 345
that kind is no longer the task of sense; for sense is

^a With §§ 343-346 cf. *P.H.* II. 48-50.

^b Cf. §§ 293 ff.

- βάλλειν· χρώμα γὰρ μόνον καὶ χυμὸν καὶ φωνὴν λαμβάνειν πέφυκε, τὸ δὲ " τοῦτο λευκὸν ἐστίν " ἢ " τοῦτο γλυκύ ἐστίν " οὔτε χρώμα οὔτε χυμὸς τυγχάνον ἀνυπόπτωτόν ἐστιν αἰσθήσει. ψεύδονται τε ἐν πολλοῖς αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ διαφωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις, καθάπερ ἐδείξαμεν τοὺς παρὰ τῷ Αἰνη-
 346 σιδήμῳ δέκα τρόπους ἐπιόντες. τὸ δὲ διάφωνον καὶ ἐστασιασμένον οὐκ ἔστι κριτήριον ἀλλὰ τοῦ κρίνοντος αὐτὸ δεόμενον. τοῖνυν οὐ δύνανται καθ' αὐτὰς αἱ αἰσθήσεις κρίνειν τάληθές. συνθέσεώς¹ τε δεῖ καὶ μνήμης πρὸς ἀντίληψιν τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ὅλον ἀνθρώπου, φυτοῦ, τῶν εἰκοτῶν. χρώματος γὰρ μετὰ μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ἰδιωμάτων σύνθεσις ἐστίν ὁ ἄν-
 347 θρωπος, συνθεῖναι δέ τι μνημονικῶς οὐ δύναται ἢ αἰσθησις διὰ τὸ μήτε χρώμα μήτε χυμὸν μήτε φωνὴν εἶναι τὴν ἐπισύνθεσιν,² ὧν μόνον ἀντιληπτική ἐστίν ἡ αἰσθησις.
- 348 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἡ διάνοια. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐπιγνώμων ἐστὶ τάληθοῦς ἡ διάνοια, πρότερον ὥφειλεν ἑαυτὴν ἐπιγινώσκειν· καὶ ὡς ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων κρίνει τό τε εὐθὺ καὶ στρεβλὸν οὐ³ χωρὶς τοῦ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ κατασκευῇ τῶν κριτηρίων, ὅλον τῇ τοῦ κανόνος καὶ τῇ τοῦ διαβήτητος, οὕτως ἔχρην καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, εἴπερ διακριτική ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους, πολλῷ πρότερον τῇ ἑαυτῆς φύσει συνεπιβάλλειν, ὅλον⁴ οὐσία τῇ ἐξ ἧς ἐστί, τόπῳ τῷ ἐν
 349 ᾧ πέφυκε, τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. οὐ πάνυ δέ γε τὰ τοιαῦτα συνορᾶν δύναται, εἴγε οἱ μὲν μηδέν φασιν

¹ συνθέσεως Kochalsky: συνέσεως mss., Bekk.

² ἐπισύνθεσιν N: ἐπίθεσιν cet., Bekk.: σύνθεσιν cj. Bekk.

³ οὐ Heintz: καὶ mss., Bekk.

⁴ ὅλον Heintz: δι' ἣν Bekk.: διον mss.

of a nature to grasp only colour and flavour and sound, whereas the recognition that "this is white" or "this is sweet," being neither colour nor flavour, is incapable of being experienced by sense.^a The senses, too, in many cases give false reports and disagree with one another, as we have shown when expounding the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus.^b But that which is in 346 disagreement and at variance is not a criterion, but is itself in need of a judge. So then the senses are not able by themselves to judge the truth.—There is need, too, of combination and of memory for the perception of real objects such as man, plant, and the like. For man is a combination of colour and size and form and certain other peculiarities, whereas sense is 347 unable to combine anything by aid of memory owing to the fact that the combination is neither colour nor flavour nor sound, which things alone sense is capable of perceiving.

Nor, indeed, is the intellect.^c For if the intellect is 348 cognizant of the truth, it ought previously to have been cognizant of itself; and just as the architect does not judge of the straight and the crooked without giving attention to the structure of his criteria—such as that of the rule and of the compasses,—so too the intellect, if it is capable of distinguishing falsehood and truth, should have been aware much earlier of its own nature—the substance, for instance, whereof it is composed, the place wherein it exists, and all the rest. But it cannot altogether comprehend such 349 things, seeing that some, like Dicaearchus, say that it

^a Cf. *P.H.* ii. 51-56.

^b See *P.H.* i. 91 ff.

^c With §§ 348-352 cf. *P.H.* ii. 57-60.

εἶναι αὐτὴν παρὰ τὸ πῶς ἔχον σῶμα, καθάπερ ὁ Δικαίαρχος, οἱ δὲ εἶναι μὲν ἔλεγον, οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ τόπῳ περιέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματος, ὡς Αἰνησιδῆμος κατὰ Ἡράκλειτον, οἱ δὲ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι, καθάπερ τινὲς κατὰ Δημόκριτον, οἱ δὲ ἐν μέρει τοῦ σώματος, ὧν πάλιν
 350 πολυσχιδεῖς εἰσὶν αἱ γινώμαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν διαφέρειν αὐτὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὡς οἱ πλείους, οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθάπερ διὰ τινων ὁπῶν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων προκύπτουσιν, ἥς στάσεως ἤρξε Στράτων τε ὁ φυσικὸς καὶ Αἰνησιδῆμος. οὐκ ἄρα
 351 κριτήριόν ἐστιν ἡ διάνοια. πλείους τέ εἰσιν αἱ διάνοιαι, πλείους δὲ οὔσαι διάφωνοι καθεστᾶσιν, διαφωνοῦσαι δὲ χρεῖαν ἔχουσι τοῦ ἐπικρίνοντος αὐτάς. τοῦτ' οὖν ἦτοι διάνοια πάλιν ἐστὶν ἡ ἕτερόν τι παρ' αὐτὴν. καὶ διάνοια μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη· μέρος γὰρ τῆς διαφωνίας γενόμενον κρίσεως δεῖσεται καὶ οὐκέτι κριτήριον γενήσεται· ἕτερον δὲ παρ' αὐτὴν ὑπάρχον τὸ μὴ εἶναι διάνοιαν κριτήριον
 352 παρίστησιν. ἐξέσται δὲ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν εἰρημένοις ἐπιλογισμοῖς τὰ νῦν χρῆσθαι· ἡμῖν γὰρ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταυτολογεῖν. πρὸς τούτοις ἐπεὶ οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν διανοητικὸν κατὰ τοὺς πλείστους τῶν φιλοσόφων, ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτῳ καὶ αἰσθητικόν, ὅπερ πρόκειται τοῦ διανοητικοῦ, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο αὐτοῦ¹ προκείμενον οὐκ ἐάσει τὴν

¹ αὐτοῦ Heintz: αὐτὸ mss., Bekk.

^a Cf. P.H. 1. 210 f.; Vol. I. Intro. p. xxxviii.

^b Cf. § 313.

^c This sentence is obscure and the text probably corrupt. Heintz proposed τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν . . . χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀν. ταυτ. I suggest τοῖς αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνδρῶν . . . χρῆσθαι
 184

is nothing more than a certain condition of body, while others have said that it exists, but have not all agreed that it is contained in the same place—some, like Aenesidemus "according to Heracleitus,"^a placing it outside the body, others in the whole of the body (like some "according to Democritus"), and others in a part of the body, and the views of these last, again, are very diverse.^b Also, while some 350 assert, as do the majority, that it is distinct from the senses, others say that it is the senses,—it peering out through the sense-organs as though through peep-holes,—which theory was first held by Strato the physicist and Aenesidemus. Therefore the intellect is not the criterion.—Intellects, too, are many in 351 number, and being many they are in disagreement, and as disagreeing they have need of one to pronounce judgement upon them. This, then, is either intellect again or something different from it. Now it will not be intellect; for if so, as being a party to the disagreement it will require judging and will no longer be a criterion; and if it be something different from intellect, it supports the view that the intellect is not the criterion. It would also be possible now to make 352 use of the conclusions stated by the Dogmatists; for there is no necessity for us to repeat ourselves.^c—Furthermore, since there exists in us, according to most of the philosophers, not only an intellectual part but along with this also a sensitive part which is set in front of the intellectual, this, being set in front of the other, will of necessity prevent the intellect from *ἡμῶν* πάλιν γὰρ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταυτολογεῖν, the sense being "we can employ (as an argument for distrusting the intellect) the divergent views of the Dogmatists themselves; but there is no need to repeat them again, as they have been described already."

353 διάνοιαν τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ πεπτωκὸς σῶμα οὐκ ἔῃ τὴν ὄψιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ ὁρατοῦ, οὕτως εἰ μεταξὺ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὁρατοῦ κείται ἡ ὄρασις ἄλογος οὕσα, οὐκ ἔῃ τὴν διάνοιαν ἡ ὄρασις τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὁρατοῦ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ εἰ μεταξὺ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ἀκουστοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκοή, οὐ συγχωρήσει τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ¹ ἐπιγνώμονα γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τὸ παραπλήσιον. ἔνδον οὖν ἀποκεκλεισμένη ἡ διάνοια, καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπισκοτουμένη, οὐδενὸς ἔσται τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀντιληπτική. οὐδὲ ταύτην τοίνυν ῥητέον καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι κριτήριον.

354 Λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν ἀμφότερα, τουτέστι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥς ὑπουργῶ χρωμένην τῇ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνειν τὰ ἐκτὸς. ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον· ἡ γὰρ αἰσθησις οὐ τὰ ἐκτὸς παρίσθησι τῇ διανοίᾳ, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἀγγέλλει πάθος, οἷον ἡ ἀφή ἀπὸ πυρὸς θαλπομένη οὐ τὸ ἐκτὸς καὶ καῖον πῦρ ἀναδίδωσι τῇ διανοίᾳ, τὴν δὲ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ θάλαμῳ, τουτέστι τὸ

355 ἴδιον αὐτῆς πάθος. καίτοι οὐδὲ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ λήψεται ἡ νόησις τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος, αἰσθησις ἔσται. τὸ γὰρ ὁρατικοῦ πάθους ἀναδεκτικὸν ὁρατικῶς κινεῖται, τὸ δὲ ὁρατικῶς κινούμενον ὄρασις ἐστὶν· καὶ τὸ ἀκουστικοῦ πάθους ἀναδεκτικὸν ἀκουστικῶς κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ ἀκουστικῶς κινεῖται, ἀκοή ἐστὶν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τὸ
356 παραπλήσιον. διόπερ καὶ ἡ διάνοια, εἰ τὸ ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως ἀναλαμβάνει πάθος, αἰσθητικῶς κινεῖται,

¹ ἐστὶν . . . ἀκουστοῦ Ν: om. cet., Bekk.

perceiving the external objects. For just as the body 353
 which lies between the sight and the object of sight
 prevents the sight from perceiving the object of sight,
 so if the irrational sense of sight intervenes between
 the intellect and the external object of sight, the sight
 will prevent the intellect from perceiving the external
 object of sight, and if the hearing intervenes between
 the intellect and the external object of hearing, it will
 not permit the intellect to become cognizant of the
 object of hearing; and similarly with the rest of
 the senses. The intellect, then, being locked away
 inside, and being kept in the dark by the senses, will
 not be capable of perceiving any of the external
 objects. Neither, then, can it be said that it, taken
 by itself, is the criterion.

It remains, therefore, to say "both of them,"— 354
 meaning that the intellect, by employing sense as
 assistant, grasps external objects.^a But this again is
 impossible. For sense does not furnish the intellect
 with the external objects, but each sense reports its
 own peculiar affection—touch, for instance, when
 warmed by fire, does not supply to the intellect the
 external and burning fire but the warmth therefrom,
 that is to say, its own peculiar affection. And yet 355
 not even this. For if thought shall receive the
 affection of sense, it will be sense. For that which is
 receptive of visual affection is visually moved, and
 that which is visually moved is vision^b; that also
 which is receptive of acoustic affection is acoustically
 moved, and that which is acoustically moved is the
 sense of hearing; and similarly with the other senses.
 Wherefore the intellect also, if it receives the affection 356
 of each sense, is sensitively moved, and being sensi-

^a With §§ 354-358 cf. *P.H.* ii, 72-75.

^b Cf. § 305.

αἰσθητικῶς δὲ κινουμένη αἰσθησίς ἐστιν, αἰσθησις
δὲ οὐσα ἄλογός ἐστιν, ἄλογος δὲ γενομένη ἐκ-
πесеῖται τοῦ ἐτι νόησις ὑπάρχειν, μὴ οὐσα δὲ νόησις
οὐ λήψεται τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ὡς νόησις.

357 κὰν λάβῃ δὲ τὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάθος, οὐκ
εἴσεται τὰ ἐκτός. ἀνόμοια γάρ ἐστι τὰ ἐκτός τοῖς
περὶ ἡμᾶς πάθεσιν, καὶ μακρῶ διαφέρει ἢ φαντασία
τοῦ φανταστοῦ, οἷον ἢ ἀπὸ πυρός φαντασία τοῦ
πυρός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καίει, ἢ δ' οὐκ ἔστι καυστική.
ἄλλως τε, κὰν ὁμοία δῶμεν εἶναι τοῖς περὶ ἡμᾶς
πάθεσι τὰ ἐκτός, οὐ πάντως τὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς πάθη
λαμβάνουσα ἢ διάνοια καταλήψεται τὰ ἐκτός. τὰ
γὰρ ὁμοιά τισιν ἕτερά ἐστιν ἐκείνων τῶν οἷς ὁμοιά
358 ἐστιν. διόπερ εἰ τὰ ὁμοία τοῖς ἐκτός ἢ διάνοια
γνωρίζει, οὐ τὰ ἐκτός γνωρίζει ἀλλὰ τὰ ὁμοία
ἐκείνοις. καὶ ὃν τρόπον ὁ τὸν Σωκράτην ἀγνοῶν
τὴν δὲ Σωκράτους εἰκόνα βλέπων οὐκ οἶδεν εἰ
ὁμοίός ἐστι τῇ φαινομένῃ εἰκόνι ὁ Σωκράτης,
οὕτως ἢ διάνοια τοῖς πάθεσιν ἐπιβάλλουσα, τὰ
ἐκτός μὴ θεασαμένη, οὔτε ὁποῖά ἐστι ταῦτα
εἴσεται, οὔθ' ὅτι ὁμοιά ἐστι τοῖς πάθεσιν. μὴ
γινώσκουσα δὲ τὰ φαινόμενα οὐδὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν
ἀπὸ τούτων μετάβασιν ἀξιούμενα γνωρίζεσθαι
ἄδηλα συνήσει, οὕτως δὲ οὐδὲ κριτήριον ἔσται τῆς
ἀληθείας.

359 Ἄλλ' ἔνιοι τῶν δογματικῶν τὴν ἀνώτερον εἰρη-
μένην ὑπότευξιν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος θρυλοῦσι,
λέγοντες μὴ κεχωρίσθαι ταῦτα τὰ διαφέροντα τῆς
ψυχῆς μέρη, τουτέστι τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ἀλλ'
ὡς τὸ μέλι ὅλον δι' ὅλου ὑγρὸν ἅμα καὶ γλυκὺ

* Cf. P.H. ii. 75.

tively moved it is sense, and being sense it is irrational, and having become irrational it will cease from being any longer thought, and not being thought it will not receive as thought the affection of sense.—But even 357 if it receives the affection of the senses it will not know external objects. For external objects are unlike our affections, and the presentation is far different from the thing presented,—that of a fire, for instance, from the fire, for the latter burns whereas the former is not capable of burning. Besides, even if we grant that external objects are similar to our affections, it is not certain that by receiving our affections the intellect will apprehend external objects. For things similar to certain things are other than those things to which they are similar. Wherefore if the intellect is cognizant of 358 things similar to the external objects, it is not cognizant of the external objects but of things similar to them. And just as he who does not know Socrates but is looking at the likeness of Socrates does not know whether Socrates resembles the apparent likeness,^a so the intellect, when it perceives the affections without having discerned the external objects, will not know either the nature of these objects or whether they resemble the affections. And not knowing the apparent things, neither will it understand the non-evident things which are assumed to be known by transition therefrom; and, consequently, it will not be the criterion of truth.

But some of the Dogmatists keep repeating in this 359 case also the rejoinder which was mentioned above, saying that these different parts of the soul—that is, the rational and the irrational—are not separated, but just as honey is at once, through and through,

ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅλη δι' ὅλου δύο ἔχει
 τὰς ἀντιπαρηκούσας ἀλλήλαις δυνάμεις, ὧν ἡ μὲν
 360 ἐστὶ λογικὴ ἢ δὲ ἄλογος· καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὴν μὲν
 λογικὴν ὑπὸ τῶν νοητῶν, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἀντι-
 ληπτικὴν γίνεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν. ὅθεν καὶ μάταιον
 εἶναι τὸ λέγειν τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ κοινῶς τὴν ψυχὴν
 μὴ δύνασθαι τῆς ἐτέρας τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων
 διαφορᾶς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· διάφορον γὰρ ἔχουσα
 τὴν κατασκευὴν εὐθὺς καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἔσται ἀντι-
 361 ληπτικὴ. πάντῃ δὲ εἰσιν εὐήθεις. αὗται γὰρ αἱ
 δυνάμεις, καὶ εἰ τὰ μάλιστα δοκοῦσι περὶ τὴν
 αὐτὴν οὐσίαν συνίστασθαι καὶ ἀντιπαρῆκειν ἀλλή-
 λαις καὶ δι' ὅλης πεφοιτηκέναι τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐδὲν
 ἦσσαν ἑτερογενῶς διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἄλλο
 μὲν τί ἐστίν ἢ δὲ ἄλλο δὲ ἦδε. καὶ τοῦτο πάρεστι
 μαθεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν προδηλοτέρων εἶναι δοκούντων·
 362 συχνὰ γὰρ ἦν ἃ περὶ μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ὕλην θεωρεῖται,
 οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ εἶχε φύσιν. βάρος γοῦν καὶ
 χρῶμα περὶ μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα ἀμφοτέρᾳ ἐστίν,
 διενήνοχε δὲ ἀλλήλων· καὶ πάλιν σχῆμα καὶ
 μέγεθος τῆς μὲν αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ συμβεβηκότα,
 κεχωρισμένην δὲ εἶχε τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλου μὲν τοῦ
 μεγέθους ἄλλου δὲ τοῦ σχήματος νοουμένου. οὕτω
 τοῖνυν καὶ ἡ προειρημένη λογικὴ δύναμις, κἂν
 ἀναμιξὺ ὑποκείται τῇ¹ ἀλόγῳ δυνάμει, πάλιν αὐτῆς
 363 διώσει. ὧ λοιπὸν συνεισέρχεται τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι
 τὴν ἐτέραν ὡσαύτως τῇ ἐτέρᾳ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ὁμοιο-
 παθεῖν διὰ τὰς προκατηριθμημένας αἰτίας, ἐπεὶ
 δεήσει μίαν ἀμφοτέρας γίνεσθαι, τὴν μὲν λογικὴν
 ἄλογον, εἰς ἀλόγως πάσχῃ, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον λογικὴν,
 364 εἰς λογικῶς κινηθῇ. κἂν ὑποθώμεθα δὲ τὴν

¹ τῇ Heintz: τῷ mss., Bekk.

both liquid and sweet, so also the soul possesses through and through these two faculties, co-extensive with each other, of which the one is rational, the other irrational; and that the rational is affected by 360 intelligible objects, while the irrational is perceptive of sensible objects. Hence, too, it is vain to say that the intellect, or the soul in general, is unable to apprehend the other distinct class of such objects; for as the apparatus it possesses is twofold, it will inevitably be capable of apprehending both sorts of object.—But they are extremely silly. For even if 361 these faculties seem ever so much to be combined in the same substance and to be co-extensive with each other and to range throughout the whole soul, none the less they are generically different from each other, this being one thing and that quite another. This one can learn from facts which seem especially obvious; for there are frequent instances of things 362 which are found attached to the same matter but which have not the same nature. Thus weight and colour are both attached to the same body but are different from each other; and again, shape and size are attributes of the same substance but have separate natures, size being conceived as one thing, shape as another. In this way, then, the aforementioned rational faculty, even though it subsist in fusion with the irrational faculty, yet will differ from it. And this involves the further consequence that 363 the one faculty is not able to be moved like the other and to have similar affections, for the reasons enumerated above; since otherwise it would be necessary for both to become one, the rational irrational, if it has irrational affections, and the irrational rational, if it has rational motions.—And 364

διάνοιαν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων ὥσπερ τινῶν ὁπῶν προκύπτουσιν καὶ χωρὶς τῶν προκειμένων αὐτῆς αἰσθήσεων τοῖς ἐκτὸς πράγμασι προσβάλλουσιν, ἄπορος οὐδὲν ἦσσον καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἡ ὑπόθεσις εὐρεθήσεται. δεῖ γὰρ τὴν οὕτω τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀντιλαμβανομένην διάνοιαν ὡς ἐναργῶν τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἐστὶν ἐναργές, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα δυνατόν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἀληθὲς λαβεῖν. ἐναργὲς γὰρ ἀξιούται τυγχάνειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ λαμβανόμενον καὶ μηδενοῦς ἐτέρου χρῆζον
 365 εἰς παράστασιν. οὐδὲν δὲ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πέφυκε λαμβάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ πάθους, ὅπερ ἕτερον ἦν τοῦ ποιοῦντος αὐτὸ φανταστοῦ· γλυκανθεῖς γὰρ μέλιτος προσαχθέντος στοχάζομαι ὅτι γλυκύ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον μέλι, καὶ ἄλεανθεῖς πυρὸς προσαχθέντος σημειοῦμαι ἐκ τῆς περὶ ἐμὲ διαθέσεως ὅτι τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον πῦρ ἀλειυνόν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος.
 366 ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ ἐξ ἐτέρου ληπτὸν συμφώνως κατὰ πάντας ἀδηλόν ἐστι, πάντα δὲ ἐκ παθῶν ἡμετέρων ἕτερα ὄντα τούτων λαμβάνεται, πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀδηλα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄγνωστα· δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀφανῶν γνῶσιν ἐναργές τι παρῆναι, καὶ τούτου μὴ παρόντος οἴχεται καὶ ἡ ἐκείνων
 367 κατάληψις. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔνεστι λέγειν ὡς ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἐστὶν ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἀδηλα, καταλαμβάνεται δὲ ὑφ' ἡμῶν διὰ τὸ βέβαιον εἶναι τὴν ἐκ τῶν παθῶν σημείωσιν. οὐ γὰρ εἰ γλυκαντικῶς διατίθεμαι

^a Cf. § 350.

^b i.e. not perceptible directly but only through the medium of an "affection" of sense, or "feeling."

even if we assume that the intellect peers through the sensitive passages as through peep-holes ^a and makes contact with the external objects apart from the senses placed in front of it,—even on this assumption the theory will be found no less untenable. For the intellect which apprehends the real objects in this way must apprehend the real objects as self-evident ; but, as we shall establish, nothing is self-evident ; therefore it is not possible to grasp the truth of the real objects. For it is laid down by our opponents that the " self-evident " is " that which is perceived of itself and needs no second thing to establish it." But nothing is of a nature to be ³⁶⁵ perceived of itself, but all things through affection, and this is other than the object of presentation which produces it ; for when I feel sweetness through the application of honey I guess that the external substance of honey is sweet, and when I feel warm through the approach of fire I take my own condition as a sign that the external substance of fire is warm, and the same may be said of the other objects of sense. Since, then, that which is perceptible ³⁶⁶ through another ^b is by universal agreement non-evident, and all things are perceived through our affections, than which they are other, all external objects are non-evident and on this account unknowable by us ; for to ensure knowledge of things non-apparent there must be some self-evident fact present, and if this is not present, the apprehension of those things likewise vanishes. Nor is it possible to say ³⁶⁷ that, though those things are, so far as that goes, non-evident, yet they are apprehended by us owing to the fact that the indication derived from the affections is firm. For honey is not necessarily

sweet if I have a feeling of sweetness when honey is applied to my sense of taste, nor is gall bitter if I have a bitter feeling on tasting it,^a as though the feelings which belong to us ought necessarily to belong also to the causes which produce them. For just as the lash that falls upon the flesh gives pain to the flesh but is not also pain, and as the food or the drink gives pleasure to him that eats or drinks but is not pleasure, so also the fire is able to give warmth and yet not be necessarily warm, and the honey to sweeten and yet not be sweet ; and the same argument applies to the other objects of sense. But if, in order that we may know the truth, there must be something self-evident in existence, and it has been proved that all things are non-evident, it must be acknowledged that truth is unknowable. 368

And can it be denied that the controversy amongst the philosophers regarding the highest matters does away with the knowledge of truth ? For if some of the physicists, like Democritus, have abolished all phenomena, and others, like Epicurus and Protagoras, have established all, while others again, like the Stoics and Peripatetics, have abolished some and established others,—then, whether one assumes as criterion the intellect or the sense or both together, in every case it is by all means necessary that either some apparent or some non-evident thing should be adopted to judge between these thinkers. But to adopt an apparent thing is impossible ; for as it is derived from the controverted matter it will be controverted and on this account not a criterion. While if a non-evident thing be adopted, things are turned upside down, when that which seems to be known is confirmed by what is not known—which is absurd. 369

- 370 Πλὴν συγκεχωρήσθω γε ἡ τάνθρώπου καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὑπόστασις εἰς τὸ προβαίνειν τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν ἀξίωσιν. ἀλλ' ἵνα καὶ διὰ τούτων τι γνωσθῇ, δεῖ τὸ τρίτον ὁμολογήσαι κριτήριον, τουτέστι φαντασίαν· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις οὔτε ὁ νοῦς δίχα τοῦ φανταστικῶς ἑτεροιοῦσθαι
- 371 δύνатаί τισιν ἐπιβάλλειν. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κριτήριον πολλῆς ἀπορίας ἐστὶ πλήρες, ὥς πάρεστι σκοπεῖν τάξει τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν λόγων ἄνωθεν ποιησάμενοις. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν τῇ φαντασίᾳ τὰ πράγματα κανονιζόντων οἱ μὲν τῇ καταληπτικῇ προσέσχον οἱ δὲ τῇ πιθανῇ, τὸ κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων γένος ἡμεῖς ἐκλαβόντες, τουτέστιν αὐτὴν τὴν φαντασίαν, ἀν-
- 372 αἰρῶμεν· ταύτης γὰρ ἀναιρεθείσης αἴρονται καὶ αἱ ἐπ' εἶδους διαφοραὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν, καὶ ὥς μὴ ὄντος ζώου οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος ἔστιν, οὕτω μὴ οὐσης φαντασίας οὐδὲ καταληπτικῇ ἢ πιθανῇ τις ὑφέστηκε φαντασία. εἰ γὰρ τύπωσίς ἐστιν ἐν ψυχῇ ἡ φαντασία, ἥτοι κατ' ἐξοχὴν καὶ εἰσοχὴν τύπωσίς ἐστιν, ὥς οἱ περὶ τὸν Κλεάνθην νομίζουσιν, ἢ κατὰ ψιλὴν ἑτεροίωσιν γίνεται, καθάπερ οἱ περὶ τὸν
- 373 Χρύσιππον ἐδόξασαν. καὶ εἰ μὲν κατ' ἐξοχὴν καὶ εἰσοχὴν ὑφίσταται, ταῦτα ἀκολουθήσει τὰ ἄτοπα ἅπερ φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον. εἰ γὰρ κηροῦ τρόπον τυποῦται ἡ ψυχὴ φανταστικῶς πάσχουσα, αἰεὶ τὸ ἔσχατον κίνημα ἐπισκοτῇ τῇ προτέρᾳ φαντασίᾳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ τῆς δευτέρας σφραγίδος τύπος ἐξαλειπτικός ἐστὶ τοῦ προτέρου. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἀναιρεῖται μὲν μνήμη, θησαυρισμὸς οὐσα

^a Cf. § 344. With §§ 370-379 cf. P.H. II, 70. "Presentative alteration" means the alteration produced in the percipient (sense or intellect) by the percept, which constitutes "presentation."

However, let the substantiality of Man and of the
senses and the intellect be *granted*, so that the thesis
of the Dogmatists may go forward. Yet in order that
anything should be known even by means of these,
one must needs agree about the third criterion, that
is, presentation; for neither sense nor thought can
possibly be aware of things without presentative
alteration.^a But this criterion too is beset by mani- 371
fold doubts, as we may see in detail when we have
discussed it in a systematic way right from the begin-
ning. For since some of those who make presentation
the rule of things have had regard to the "appre-
hensive," others to the "probable" presentation,^b
we shall select the generic form that is common to
both kinds—namely, presentation itself—and abolish
it; for when this is abolished, the particular differ- 372
ences of the presentations are also abolished; and
just as when Animal is non-existent Man does not
exist either, so if presentation is non-existent neither
does any apprehensive or probable presentation sub-
sist. For if the presentation is "an impression
on the soul," it is an impression either "by way of
depression and eminence," as Cleanthes supposes,
or "by way of mere alteration," as Chrysippus
thought.^c And if it subsists by way of depres- 373
sion and eminence, those absurd results will follow
which are alleged by Chrysippus. If the soul when
presentatively affected is impressed like wax, the last
motion will always keep overshadowing the previous
presentation, just as the impression of the second seal
is such as to obliterate that of the first. But if this
be so, memory is abolished, it being "a treasury of

^a The former view is that of the Stoics, the latter that of the Academics; cf. §§ 227 ff., 174 ff. ^c Cf. § 228.

- φαντασιῶν, ἀναιρεῖται δὲ πᾶσα τέχνη· σύστημα γὰρ ἦν καὶ αἰθροισμα καταλήψεων, πλείονας δὲ φαντασίας καὶ διαφόρους οὐ δυνατόν ὑποστῆναι περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ἄλλοτε ἄλλων νοουμένων τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ τύπων. οὐ τοίνυν ἡ κυρίως νοουμένη
- 374 τύπωσίς ἐστι φαντασία. ἄλλως τε, εἰ ὄψις ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα, θεωροῦμεν δὲ τὰ πολὺ παχυμερέστερα τοῦ πνεύματος τῶν φαινομένων σώματα μὴδ' ὄντινόν περὶ αὐτοῖς τύπον δυνάμενα τηρεῖν, εὐλογόν ἐστι μὴδὲ τὸ πνεῦμα ἓνα μόνον τινὰ ἀπὸ φαντασίας τύπον φυλάττειν. καὶ μὴν τὸ ὕδωρ παχυμερέστερόν ἐστι πνεύματος· ἀλλ' οὐδέποτε δακτύλου ἐπερείσθentos αὐτῷ πέφηνε
- 375 τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπερείσεως τύπον φυλάττον. καίτοι τί λέγω τὸ ὕδωρ, ὅτε καὶ ὁ μαλακώτατος κηρός, στερρὸς ἤδη κατὰ σύγκρισιν ὑπάρχων, τυποῦται μὲν ὑπὸ τινος αἶμα νοήματι διὰ τὴν ὑγρότητα, οὐ συνέχει δὲ τὸν τύπον; εἰ οὖν αὐτὸ τὸ¹ κατὰ σύμβλησιν πεπηγὸς παρὰ τὸ ὕδωρ σῶμα καθεστὼς σφόδρα ἀδυνάτως ἔχει τύπους τινὰς περὶ αὐτῷ φυλάττειν, φανερόν δῆπουθεν ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ πνεῦμα φύσιν ἔχει πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπιτήδειον, λεπτομερέστερον καὶ εὖρου παρὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωμάτων ὑπάρχον.
- 376 Ναί, ἀλλ' οὐ κυρίως τύπωσίς ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία, ψιλή δὲ ἑτεροίωσις τῆς διανοίας. ὁ πάλιν τοῦ προτέρου χεῖρον ἦν. τῶν γὰρ ἑτεροιώσεων ἡ μὲν τίς ἐστι κατὰ πάθος ἡ δὲ ὡς ἀλλαγὴ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, καὶ κατὰ πάθος μὲν οἷον εἰ ὁ αὐτὸς κατ'

¹ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶ. Bekk.: τὸ αὐτὸ mss.

presentations," and every art is abolished ; for art is " a system and aggregation of apprehensions " ^a ; but it is not possible for many and different presentations to subsist in the regent part, when its mental impressions vary from time to time. So then the impression foremost in the mind is not a presentation. —Again, if the things apparent are " a vision of the 374 things non-evident," and we find that the bodies of things apparent which are composed of far denser parts than is breath are unable to retain any impression at all that is made upon them, it is reasonable to infer that neither does breath ^b conserve any one single impression derived from a presentation. Moreover, water is of denser parts than breath, but when a finger is pressed upon it it is never found to conserve the impression made by the pressure. Yet why do 375 I speak of water, when even very soft wax, which by comparison is already firm, although because of its elasticity it takes an impression instantaneously, yet does not retain the impression ? If, then, such a body as this—which, as compared with water, is in a solid state—is quite incapable of conserving any impressions made upon it, it is surely apparent that neither is breath endowed with a nature suited for this purpose, it being of finer parts and fluid as compared with those other bodies.

" Yes, but the presentation is not precisely an im- 376 pression, but a mere alteration of the intellect." But this again is worse than the previous definition. For of alterations one sort is by way of affection, the other consists in a change in the substance ; and it is by

^a Cf. *P.H.* iii. 241.

^b "Breath" being the substance of the "regent part," cf. *P.H.* ii. 70, 81.

οὐσίαν καὶ μορφήν ὑποκείμενος ἀνδριάς παρὰ μέρος
 ὅτε μὲν θερμαίνονται τοῦ ἡλίου προσλάμψαντος,
 ὅτε δὲ ψύχονται νυκτὸς δρόσου καταπιπτούσης, ὡς
 ἀλλαγὴ δὲ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καθάπερ εἰ χωνευθεῖς
 377 οὗτος ὁ ἀνδριάς σφαῖρα χάλκειος γένοιτο. εἰ οὖν
 ἑτεροίωσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ἢ φαντασία, ἥτοι
 κατὰ πάθος ψιλῶς ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ἢ κατὰ ἀλλαγὴν
 τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. καὶ εἰ μὲν κατὰ πάθος, ἐπεὶ
 κατὰ τὰς διαφόρους φαντασίας πάθος διάφορόν
 ἐστι, τὸ νέον πάθος ἀλλάσσει τὸ ἀρχαιότερον, καὶ
 οὕτως οὐκ ἔσται κατοχὴ τινος πράγματος περὶ
 τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· εἰ δὲ ὡς¹ ἀλλαγὴ τοῦ
 ὑποκειμένου, ἅμα τῷ φαντασίαν τινὸς λαβεῖν ἢ
 ψυχὴν ἑτεροιοιμένη ἐκβήσεται τοῦ ψυχῆ τυγχάνειν
 καὶ φθαρῆσεται, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ εἰς σφαῖραν χωνευ-
 θεῖς ἀνδριάς ἐξέβαινε τότε τοῦ ἀνδριάς ὑπάρχειν.
 οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ ἑτεροίωσις ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ἢ φαντασία,
 378 σὺν τῷ καὶ τὴν περὶ μεταβολῆς ἀπορίαν αὐτοὺς
 θλίβειν. εἰ γὰρ μεταβάλλει τι καὶ ἑτεροιοῦται,
 ἥτοι τὸ μένον μεταβάλλει τε καὶ ἑτεροιοῦται ἢ τὸ
 μὴ μένον. οὔτε δὲ τὸ μένον ἑτεροιοῦται καὶ μετα-
 βάλλει, μένει γὰρ ἐν τῷ εἶναι οἶον ἦν, οὔτε τὸ μὴ
 μένον· ἐφθαρται γὰρ καὶ μεταβέβληται, ἀλλ' οὐ
 μεταβάλλει. οἶον εἰ μεταβάλλει τὸ λευκόν, ἥτοι
 379 μένον λευκὸν μεταβάλλει ἢ μὴ μένον. οὔτε δὲ
 μένον λευκὸν μεταβάλλει, μένει γὰρ λευκόν, καὶ
 ἐφ' ὅσον ἐστὶ λευκόν, οὐ μεταβάλλει· οὔτε μὴ
 μένον, ἐφθαρται γὰρ καὶ μεταβέβληται, ἀλλ' οὐ
 μεταβάλλει. οὐκ ἄρα μεταβάλλει τὸ λευκόν. διό

¹ ὡς om. L.E., Bekk.

way of affection when, for instance, the statue that remains the same in respect of substance and shape is alternately heated at one time by the sun shining upon it, and at another time chilled by dew falling upon it at night; but it consists in change in the substance, if, for example, this statue were to be melted and become a brazen sphere. If, then, the presenta- 377
 tion is an alteration of the soul, it is an alteration either merely by way of affection or by way of change in the substance. And if it be by way of affection, then since the affection is different according as the presentations are different, the new affection changes the older, and thus there will be no retention of anything in the intellect, which is absurd; while if it consists in change of substance, at the very moment of receiving a presentation the soul through being altered will cease from being soul and will be destroyed, just as also the statue that was melted into a sphere ceased at the same time from being a statue. Neither, then, is the presentation an alteration of the soul; and besides they are crushed by the diffi- 378
 culty about change. For if a thing changes and is altered either what remains changes and is altered or what does not remain. But neither what remains is altered and changes—for it remains by being such as it was,—nor what does not remain, for this has been destroyed and been changed but does not change. For example, if white changes it changes either while remaining or while not remaining white. But it does 379
 not change while remaining white, for it remains white, and inasmuch as it is white it does not change; nor while not remaining white, for it has been destroyed and been changed but does not change. Therefore white does not change. Wherefore also,

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καὶ ἡ φαντασία εἰ μεταβολή τις ἐστὶ καὶ ἑτεροίωσις
τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν.

380 Διδομένης τε τῆς ἑτεροιώσεως οὐκ εὐθὺς καὶ ἡ
τῆς φαντασίας ὑπόστασις συγχωρηθήσεται. ἐλέ-
γετο γὰρ τύπωσις εἶναι ἡγεμονικοῦ, τοῦτο δὲ εἰ
ἐστὶ [τὸ ἡγεμονικόν],¹ καὶ ἐν τίνι τόπῳ ἐστίν, οὐχ
ὠμολόγηται, ἄλλων μὲν οὐδ' ὅλως ὑπάρχειν τι
λεγόντων ἡγεμονικόν, ὡς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀσκλη-
πιάδην, τινῶν δὲ εἶναι μὲν νομιζόντων, οὐ συμ-
φωνούντων δὲ περὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος αὐτὸ τόπου.
διόπερ ἐφ' ὅσον ἀνεπὶκριτός ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη δια-
φωνία, μένειν ἐν ἐποχῇ δεῖ ὡς ἀσυγχώρητον τὸ
τὴν φαντασίαν ἡγεμονικοῦ τύπωσιν εἶναι.

381 Δεδόσθω δὲ καὶ τὸ τύπωσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῦ ἡγε-
μονικοῦ ταύτην· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἀναγγέλλ-
εται ἡ τοιαύτη τύπωσις τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ εἰ μὴ διὰ
τῆς αἰσθήσεως, οἷον ὁράσεως ἀκοῆς ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς
τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, ζητῶ πότερον οἷα ἐστὶν ἡ
περὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἑτεροίωσις, τοιαύτη γίνεται καὶ
ἡ περὶ τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ, ἢ διάφορος. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ
αὕτη, ἐπεὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἄλογός ἐστι,
καὶ αὐτὸ² ἑτεροιοῦμενον ἄλογον ἐσται καὶ οὐ
382 διαφέρον τῆς αἰσθήσεως· εἰ δὲ διάφορος, οὐ τοιοῦ-
τον λήψεται τὸ φανταστὸν ὁποῖον ὑπόκειται, ἀλλ'
ἕτερον μὲν ἐσται τὸ ὑποκείμενον, διαφέρουσα δὲ
ἡ περὶ τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ συνισταμένη φαντασία. ὁ
πάλιν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. οὐδὲ ταύτη τοίνυν τύπωσιν
εἶναι ῥητέον ἡγεμονικοῦ καὶ ἑτεροίωσιν τὴν
φαντασίαν.

383 Πρὸς τούτοις ἡ φαντασία ἀποτελέσμά ἐστὶ τοῦ

¹ [τὸ ἡγ.] secl. Heintz.

² αὐτὸ: τὸ 1838., Bekk.: τὸ <ἡγεμονικόν> Heintz.

if presentation is a change and alteration of the soul, it is non-existent.

And even if alteration be granted, the real existence 380 of presentation will not be admitted right away. For it was declared to be an impression of the regent part, but it is not agreed whether this regent part exists or in what spot it exists, some saying (like Asclepiades) that no regent part has any existence at all, and others believing that it exists though not agreeing as to the place which contains it.^a Wherefore, in so far as this controversy is unresolved, one must remain in a state of suspension, on the ground that it is not agreed that presentation is an impression of the regent part.

But let it be granted also that presentation is an 381 impression of the regent part; yet since such an impression is not announced to the regent part otherwise than through the sense—through sight, for instance, or hearing, or any other such faculty,—I want to know whether the alteration that takes place in the regent part is of the same sort as that of the sense, or different. And if it is the same, since each of the senses is irrational, the regent part too, being altered, will be irrational and in no respect different from sense; while if the alteration is different, it will 382 not receive the presented object exactly as it exists, but the existent object will be one thing and the presentation formed in the regent part something different. And this again is absurd. Neither in this way, then, can it be said that presentation is an impression and alteration of the regent part.

Furthermore, the presentation is an effect of the 383

^a Cf. §§ 313 ff., 349.

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φανταστοῦ, καὶ τὸ φανταστὸν αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τῆς φαν-
 τασίας καὶ τυπωτικὸν καθειστῆκει τῆς αἰσθητικῆς
 δυνάμεως, διενήνοχέ τε τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τοῦ ποιοῦν-
 τος αὐτὸ αἰτίου. ὅθεν ἐπεὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις ἐπι-
 384 βάλλει ὁ νοῦς, λήφεται τὰ ἀποτελέσματα τῶν φαν-
 ταστῶν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἐκτὸς φανταστά. καὶ εἰ λέγοι
 τις ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτῷ πείσεων καὶ παθῶν τοῖς
 ἐκτὸς ἐπιβάλλειν αὐτόν, τὰς ἀνώτερον εἰρημένας
 μετοίσομεν ἀπορίας. ἤτοι γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶ ταῖς
 ἡμετέραις φαντασίαις τὰ ἐκτός, ἢ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν
 οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ὅμοια δέ. (ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ
 ἔσται·)¹ πῶς γὰρ δύναται τὸ αὐτὸ αἰτιὸν τε
 385 καὶ ἀποτέλεσμα ἑαυτοῦ νοεῖσθαι; εἰ δ' ὅμοια,
 ἐπεὶ τό τιμι ὅμοιον ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐκείνου τοῦ
 ᾧ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν, ἢ διάνοια τὰ ὅμοια τοῖς φαν-
 ταστοῖς ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ φανταστά εἴσεται, σὺν τῷ
 καὶ τοῦτο ἄπορον εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ εἴσεται ἢ
 διάνοια ὅτι ὅμοιά ἐστι ταῖς φαντασίαις τὰ φαν-
 ταστά; ἤτοι γὰρ χωρὶς φαντασίας τοῦτο αὐτὸ
 γινώσεται ἢ φαντασία τινί. καὶ χωρὶς μὲν φαν-
 τασίας ἀμήχανον· οὐδέν γὰρ ἢ διάνοια μὴ φαν-
 386 τασιουμένη πέφυκε λαμβάνειν. εἰ δὲ φαντασία,
 πάντως αὕτη ἢ φαντασία ἵνα γνωσθῇ εἰ ὅμοια
 ἐστὶ τῷ ποιοῦντι αὐτὴν φανταστῷ, ὀφείλει ἑαυτὴν
 λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον φανταστὸν. ἀλλὰ τὸ
 μὲν ὑποκείμενον φανταστὸν τάχα δυνήσεται λαβεῖν
 φαντασία οὔσα ἐκείνου· ἑαυτὴν δὲ πῶς λήφεται;
 ἵνα γὰρ τοῦτο γένηται, δεήσει ταὐτὸ καὶ φαντασίαν
 387 καὶ φανταστὸν γίνεσθαι. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἔστιν ἕτερον

¹ ἀλλὰ . . . ἔσται·> cf. Bekk.

object presented, and the object presented is the
 cause of the presentation and is capable of impressing
 the sensitive faculty, and the effect is different from
 the cause which produces it. Hence, since the mind
 apprehends the presentations, it will be receiving the
 effects of the presented objects but not the external
 objects themselves. And should anyone argue from 384
 the feelings and affections it experiences that it
 apprehends the external objects, we shall adduce the
 difficulties previously stated.^a For either the ex-
 ternal objects are the same as our presentations, or
 they will not be the same but similar. (But they are
 certainly not the same ;) for how can a cause and its
 effect be conceived as the same? And if they are 385
 similar, since what is similar to a thing is other than
 that to which it is similar, the intellect will know
 things similar to the presented objects but not the
 presented objects ; and besides, this too is beset with
 difficulties. For how will the intellect know that the
 presented objects are similar to the presentations?
 It will know this either without a presentation or by
 means of a presentation. But without a presentation
 it is impracticable, for the intellect is naturally
 incapable of receiving anything unless by experiencing
 presentation. And if it knows it by means of a 386
 presentation, this presentation ought certainly to
 perceive both itself and the presented object in order
 to ascertain whether it is itself similar to the presented
 object which produced it. Now the presentation will
 possibly be able to perceive the presented object, it
 being a presentation thereof ; but how will it perceive
 itself? For in order that this should happen it will be
 necessary for the same thing to become both presenta-
 tion and presented object. And since the presented 387

μὲν τὸ φανταστόν (αἷτιον γὰρ ἔστω) ἕτερον δέ
 ἔστω ἢ φαντασία (ἀποτέλεσμα γὰρ ἦν), ἔστω τὸ
 αὐτὸ ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ, αἷτιόν τε ἅμα καὶ ἀποτέλεσμα·
 ὧν ἑκάτερόν ἐστιν ἄλογον.

- 388 Ἡπορημένων δὴ τούτων μεταβάντες, καὶ ἐπὶ
 συγχωρήσει τοῦ εἶναι τὴν φαντασίαν τοιαύτην
 ὁποῖαν ποτὲ θέλουσιν ὑπάρχειν οἱ δογματικοί,
 ἑτέρως ἀπορώμεν. εἰ γὰρ κριτήριον ἀπολειπτόν
 τὴν φαντασίαν, ἥτοι πᾶσαν ἀληθῆ φαντασίαν λε-
 κτέον εἶναι, καθὼς ἔλεγεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, ἢ πᾶσαν
 ψευδῆ, ὡς ἔφασκε Ξενιάδης ὁ Κορίνθιος, ἢ τινὰ
 μὲν ἀληθῆ τινὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς
 389 καὶ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἔτι δὲ τοῦ περιπάτου. οὔτε
 δὲ πᾶσαν ἀληθῆ λεκτέον εἶναι οὔτε ψευδῆ οὔτε
 τινὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ τινὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, ὡς παραστήσομεν·
 οὐκ ἄρα κριτήριον εἶναι ῥητέον τὴν φαντασίαν.
 πᾶσαν μὲν οὖν φαντασίαν οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις ἀληθῆ
 διὰ τὴν περιτροπὴν, καθὼς ὁ τε Δημόκριτος καὶ ὁ
 Πλάτων ἀντιλέγοντες τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἐδίδασκον·
 390 εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής, καὶ τὸ μὴ
 πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, κατὰ φαντασίαν
 ὑφιστάμενον, ἔστω ἀληθές, καὶ οὕτω τὸ πᾶσαν
 φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ γενήσεται ψεῦδος. καὶ
 χωρὶς δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης περιτροπῆς παρὰ τὰ φαινό-
 μενά ἐστι καὶ τὴν ἐνάργειαν τὸ λέγειν πᾶσαν φαν-
 τασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, πολλῶν πάνυ ψευδῶν οὐσῶν.
 391 οὐχ ὡσαύτως γὰρ κινούμεθα πρὸς τὸ "ἡμέρα
 ἔστιν" ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος καὶ πρὸς τὸ "νύξ ἐστι,"
 τό τε ζῆν Σωκράτη καὶ τεθνάναι, οὐδὲ τὴν ἴσιν
 ποτὲ ταῦτα προσβάλλει ἐνάργειαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν
 ἡμέραν νῦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ Σωκράτη τεθνάναι πιστόν

* Cf. §§ 60, 48, 53 ; P.H. li. 18, 76, 86.

object is one thing (for it is cause) and the presentation another thing (for it is effect), the same thing will be other than itself (both cause and effect simultaneously); and both these conclusions are illogical.

From the difficulties now stated let us pass on 388 and mention other difficulties which occur even after conceding that presentation is of that nature, whatsoever it be, which the Dogmatists desire. If presentation is accepted as the criterion, we must assert either that every presentation is true, as Protagoras asserted, or that every one is false, as Xenocrates the Corinthian declared, or that some are true, some false, as the Stoics and Academicians said, and the Peripatetics as well.^a But (as we shall 389 show) we ought not to assert either that every one is true or every one false or some true and some false; therefore we must not declare that presentation is the criterion. One cannot say that every presentation is true, because this refutes itself, as Democritus and Plato^b taught in opposing Protagoras; for if 390 every presentation is true, the judgement that not every presentation is true, being based on a presentation, will also be true, and thus the judgement that every presentation is true will become false.—And even apart from self-refutation of this kind, it is contrary to apparent facts and to plain evidence to assert that every presentation is true, when many are very false. For our feelings do not respond in the 391 same way, at the present moment, to the judgement "it is day" and to the judgement "it is night," or to "Socrates is alive" and "Socrates is dead," nor do these judgements bring with them equally clear evidence, but "it is now day" and "Socrates is

^a See Plato, *Theaet.* 171 A, *Euthyd.* 286 u, c.

ἔοικεν ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ νύκτα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν
 Σωκράτη οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ πιστὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀν-
 392 υπάρκτων φαίνεται. καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐπὶ τῆς
 ἐν τισι πράγμασιν ἀκολουθίας τε καὶ μάχης
 [ἀληθῆς τε καὶ ψευδῆς ἐστὶ].¹ τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἡμέραν
 εἶναι τὸ φῶς εἶναι καὶ τῷ περιπατεῖν σε τὸ κινεῖ-
 σθαί σε ἐμφανῶς ἀκολουθεῖ, τῷ δὲ ἡμέραν εἶναι τὸ
 νύκτα εἶναι καὶ τῷ περιπατεῖν σε τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι
 σε προδήλως ἐμάχето, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐτέρου θέσις
 ἀρσις ἦν τοῦ λοιποῦ, [εἰ συνακολουθεῖ τί τινι καὶ
 μάχεται πάντως ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ].² εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τί τινι
 μαχόμενον, οὐ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθῆς· τὸ
 γάρ τινι μαχόμενον ὡς ἀληθὲς ψεύδει ἢ ὡς ψεῦδος
 393 ἀληθεῖ μάχεται. εἴπερ τε πάσας συμβέβηκε
 τὰς φαντασίας εἶναι ἀληθεῖς, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἡμῖν
 ἄδηλον. ἀληθοῦς γάρ τινος ὄντος καὶ ψεῦδους,
 εἴτ' ἀγνοουμένου τί τούτων ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς καὶ τί
 ψεῦδος, τὸ ἀδηλούμενον ἡμῖν συνίσταται, καὶ ὁ
 λέγων "ἀδηλὸν ἐστὶ μοι τὸ ἀρτίους ἢ περισσοὺς
 εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας" δυνάμει λέγει μὴ ἐπίστασθαι
 πότερον ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ καὶ πότερον ψεῦδος, τὸ ἀρτίους
 εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἢ περισσοὺς. ὥστε εἰ πάντα
 ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ πᾶσαι φαντασίαι εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς,
 οὐδέν ἐστιν ἡμῖν ἄδηλον. εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστὶν ἡμῖν
 ἄδηλον, πάντ' ἔσται πρόδηλα. εἰ δὲ πάντ' ἔσται
 πρόδηλα, οὐδέν ἔσται τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ ἀπορεῖν περὶ
 τινος· ζητεῖ γάρ τις καὶ ἀπορεῖ περὶ τοῦ ἀ-
 δηλουμένου αὐτῷ πράγματος, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ περὶ τοῦ
 φανεροῦ. ἀτοπον δὲ γέ ἐστι τὸ ζήτησιν καὶ

¹ [ἀληθῆς . . . ἐστὶ] secl. Kochalsky.

² [εἰ . . . ἐτέρῳ] secl. Heintz.

^a Cf. § 243.

dead "seem to be credible, whereas "it is night" and "Socrates is alive" are not equally credible but appear not to be actual facts.—The same argument 392 also applies to the sequence and conflict belonging to certain things. For the existence of light is plainly consequent on the existence of day, and the fact of your motion on that of your walking, whereas the existence of night obviously conflicts with the existence of day, and the fact of your not moving with that of your walking, and the affirmation of the one is the negation of the other[, if one thing is consequent on another thing, certainly also one thing is in conflict with another thing]. But if anything conflicts with anything, not every presentation is true; for that which conflicts with a thing conflicts as truth with falsehood or as falsehood with truth.—Also, if it is the fact that all presentations are 393 true, nothing is non-evident to us. For it is when one is true and another false, and we do not know which of them is true and which false, that we have a case of the non-evident, and the man who says "it is non-evident to me whether the stars are even in number or odd" ^a is virtually saying that he does not know whether it is true or whether it is false that the stars are even or that they are odd. So that if everything is true and all presentations are true, nothing is non-evident to us. And if nothing is non-evident, all things are quite evident. And if all things are quite evident, there will be no such thing as inquiring and doubting about anything; for a man inquires and doubts about a matter which is to him non-evident, but not about what is apparent. But it is absurd to abolish inquiry and doubt; not

ἀπορίαν ἀναιρεῖν· οὐκ ἄρα πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής, οὐδὲ πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ.

- 394 Καὶ μὴν εἰ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής καὶ πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, οὔτε ἀλήθευσίς τις ἔστιν οὔτε ἀπλανησία, οὐ διδασκαλία, [οὐ πλάνησις,]¹ οὐ τέχνη, οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, οὐκ ἀρετή, οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. σκοπῶμεν δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής, οὐδὲν ἐστι ψεύδος, μηδενὸς δὲ ὄντος ψεύδους οὔτε τὸ ψεύδεσθαι ἔσται οὔτε τὸ πλανᾶσθαι οὔτε τὸ ἄτεχνον εἶναι οὔτε τὸ φαῦλον ὑπάρχειν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων τοῦ ψεύδους ἔχεται
- 395 καὶ περὶ τοῦτο τὴν ὑπόστασιν λαμβάνει. μηδενὸς δὲ ψευδομένου οὐδ' ἀληθεύων τις ἔσται, καὶ μηδενὸς πλανωμένου οὐδ' ἀπλανῆς καταστήσεται τις. ὥσ-
αύτως δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἀτεχνοῦ συναναιρεῖται καὶ ὁ τεχνίτης καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος φαύλου ὁ σοφός· ταῦτα γὰρ κατὰ σύμβλησιν νοεῖται, καὶ ὃν τρόπον μὴ ὄντος δεξιῷ τινὸς οὐδὲ ἀριστερόν ἐστι μηδὲ ὄντος τοῦ κάτω οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνω ἔστιν, οὕτω μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἐτέρου τῶν ἀντικειμένων οὐδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ὑποστήσεται. οἰχῆσεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις καὶ
- 396 τὸ σημεῖον. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἀλλὰ μὴ ψεύδους ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· μηδενὸς γὰρ ὄντος ψεύδους οὐ χρεῖα τοῦ διδάσκοντος ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ψεύδος· τὸ δὲ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ τεκμήριον ἐπηγγέλλετο ἐκκαλυπτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἀδηλουμένου, πάντων δὲ ἀληθῶν ὄντων καὶ δι' αὐτῶν προφανῶν οὐ χρῆζομεν τοῦ μηνύοντος τὸ μὴ γνωσκόμενον, εἴτε ἀληθές ἐστιν εἴτε καὶ ψεύδος.

- 397 Καίτοι τί περὶ τούτων διεξιμεν, ὅτε οὔτε ζῶον οὔτε κοινῶς κόσμος ὑποκείμεται συγχωρηθέντος

¹ [οὐ πλάνησις,] secl. Kayser.

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every presentation, therefore, is true, nor are all things true.

Moreover, if every presentation is true and all 394 things are true, there is no veracity or inerrancy, no instruction, no art, no proof, no virtue, nor any other thing of the kind. Let us consider this statement. If every presentation is true, nothing is false, and nothing being false lying will not exist nor error nor lack of art nor vice ; for each of these things is connected with falsehood and derives its existence therefrom. And if no one lies neither will anyone be telling 395 the truth, and if no one is in error neither will anyone be found to be inerrant. In the same way, if there is no one inartistic the artist likewise is abolished, and the sage if no vicious man exists. For these things are conceived by way of correlation, and just as, if there is no right hand neither is there a left, and if there is no below neither is there an above, so, if one of two contraries does not exist, neither will the other subsist. Proof also and sign will vanish. For the 396 former is proof that the true exists but not the false ; but if no falsehood exists, there is no need for anything to instruct us that falsehood does not exist. As to the sign and token, it was claimed that they serve to reveal what is non-evident, but if all things are true and self-apparent we do not need anything to indicate either the truth or falsity of a thing not known.

Yet why do we dilate on these details when neither 397 animal nor universe in general^a will exist if it be agreed

^a Or "at large," "universe" being a more comprehensive notion than "animal."

τοῦ πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν; εἰ
 γὰρ πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, πάντα ἡμῖν γενήσεται
 πρόδηλα, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, ἔσται ὑγιές τε καὶ ἀληθές
 καὶ τὸ πάντα ἡμῖν εἶναι ἄδηλα, ἐν ἐκ τῶν πάντων
 καθεστώς· ἀληθοῦς δὲ ὄντος τοῦ πάντα ἄδηλα
 τυγχάνειν, οὔτε ζῶον οὔτε φυτὸν οὔτε κόσμον
 προσδεξόμεθα φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον.
 398A λεκτέον ἄρα διὰ ταῦτα πάντα μὴ πάσας τὰς φαν-
 τασίας εἶναι ἀληθεῖς καὶ πιστάς, καὶ μὴ οὐδὲ
 πάσας ψευδεῖς διὰ τὰς ἀναλόγους αἰτίας· ἰσοδυναμεῖ
 γὰρ τῷ πάσας εἶναι ἀληθεῖς καὶ τὸ πάσας εἶναι
 ψευδεῖς. διὸ καὶ πάντα σχεδὸν τὰ προειρημένα
 ἡμῖν ἔσται καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην μεταφέρειν στάσιν.
 399B εἰ γὰρ πᾶσαι αἱ φαντασίαι εἰσὶ ψευδεῖς καὶ οὐδὲν
 ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ “οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀλη-
 θές.” εἰ ἄρα μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἔστιν ἀληθές·
 καὶ οὕτως εἰς τοῦναντίον τῇ προθέσει περιήχθησαν
 οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενιάδην, λέγοντες πάσας τὰς φαν-
 τασίας εἶναι ψευδεῖς καὶ μηδὲν ὅλως ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν
 ὑπάρχειν ἀληθές. καθόλου γὰρ ἀμήχανόν ἐστι τὸν
 ἐπὶ μέρους τι λέγοντα ψεῦδος μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ ἀληθές
 ὀρίζειν. οἷον ὅτε λέγομεν ψεῦδος εἶναι τὸ Α, τοῦ
 μὲν Α τὸ ψεῦδος αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν κατηγοροῦμεν, τὸ
 δὲ “ψεῦδος ἐστὶ τὸ Α” τίθεμεν, ὥστε δυνάμει
 τοιοῦτόν τι ἀποφαίνεσθαι “ἀληθές ἐστὶ τὸ ψευ-
 dos εἶναι τὸ Α.” ἅμα οὖν τῷ ψεῦδος τι λέγειν
 400 καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀληθές ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀρίζομεν. ἔνεστι
 δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐνταυθοῖ διδάσκειν
 ὅτι ἐναργεῖς σχεδὸν εἰσι τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ δια-
 φοραί, καθ’ ἃς αἱ μὲν ἐπισπῶνται ἡμῶν τὴν
 συγκατάθεσιν αἱ δ’ ἀποκρούονται καὶ οὔτε ἅπασαι
 ἐπισπῶνται κοινῶς οὔτε ἅπασαι συλλήβδην ἀπο-

that all presentations are true? For if all things are true, all things will be quite evident to us, and if so, it will also be valid and true that all things are non-evident to us, this being one of the "all things"; and if it be true that all things are non-evident we shall not admit that either animal or plant or universe appears to us; which is absurd. For all these 398 reasons, therefore, one must declare that not all presentations are true and credible, and indeed, for analogous reasons, that not all are false. For the statement "all are false" is equipollent with "all are true." Wherefore also it will be possible for us to adduce against a position of this kind nearly all the objections previously stated. For if all the presenta- 399 tions are false and nothing is true, it is true that "nothing is true." If, therefore, nothing is true, a truth exists; and in this way Xenocrates^a was driven round to the opposite of his original position, when he said that all presentations are false and that absolutely nothing true exists in the world. For, as a universal rule, it is impossible to assert that any particular thing is false without also affirming a truth. For example, when we assert that *A* is false, we are predicating the existence of that very falsity of *A*, and we are affirming that "*A* is false," so that what we virtually declare is this—"It is true that *A* is false." Simultaneously, then, with asserting a thing to be false we necessarily affirm the existence of truth. And in the same fashion one may here show that the 400 differences in presentations are well-nigh self-evident, owing to which some attract our assent while others repel it, and neither all alike attract nor all without

^a Cf. § 388.

κρούονται, ἐπεὶ τοὶ μηδεμιᾶς οὔσης τῆς διαφορᾶς, ἀλλὰ πασῶν ἐπ' ἴσης ἀπίστων οὐσῶν ἢ πιστῶν, οὔτε τέχνη ποτ' ἂν οὔτε ἀτεχνία καθεισθῇ, οὐκ ἔπαινος, οὐκ ἐπιτίμησις, οὐκ ἀπάτη· ἐνοεῖτο γὰρ ἢ μὲν τέχνη καὶ ἀποδοχὴ καὶ τὸ ἀνεξαπάτητον κατὰ τὰς ἀληθεῖς φαντασίας, ἢ δὲ ἀπάτη καὶ ἐπιτίμησις κατὰ τὰς ψευδεῖς. οὔτε οὖν πᾶσας ἀληθεῖς εἶναι ῥητέον καὶ πιστὰς οὔτε πᾶσας ψευδεῖς καὶ ἀπίστους.

- 401 Λεῖπεται ἄρα τὰς μὲν πιστὰς τὰς δὲ ἀπίστους ἀξιοῦν, ὅπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας ἔλεγον, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς τὰς καταληπτικὰς φαντασίας ἀποδεχόμενοι, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας τὰς πιθανὰς εἶναι δοκούσας. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ¹ σκεψαμένοις ἡμῶν ἀκριβῶς
- 402 εὐχῇ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἀληθείᾳ. ἤν γὰρ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, ἵνα τις ἀπὸ ταύτης ἄρχηται, ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπесφραγισμένη, ὅποια οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην συγχωρήσειν τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τὸ δὲ "οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος" ἀσυγχώρητον εἶναι. γίνονται γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων φαντασίαι ὥς ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων. καὶ τεκμήριον τῆς ἀπαρλλαξίας τὸ
- 403 ἐπ' ἴσης ταύτας ἐναργεῖς καὶ πληκτικὰς εὗρίσκεισθαι, τοῦ δὲ ἐπ' ἴσης πληκτικὰς καὶ ἐναργεῖς εἶναι τὸ τὰς ἀκολουθοῦς πράξεις ἐπιζεύγνυσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπαρ ὁ μὲν διψῶν ἀρυόμενος ποτὸν ᾗδεται, ὁ δὲ θηρίον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν δειμαλέων φεύγων βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγεν, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τοὺς

¹ αὐτὸ cj. Bekk.: αὐτοὺς mss.

exception repel, since, to be sure, if no difference existed but all were equally untrustworthy or trustworthy, there would exist no art nor lack of art, no praise, no blame, no deceit; for art and approval and lack of deceit are conceived through true presentations, but deceit and blame through false ones. One ought not, then, to assert either that all are true and trustworthy or that all are false and untrustworthy.

It remains, therefore, to affirm that some presenta- 401
tions are trustworthy, others untrustworthy, as the Stoics and the Academics have said, the Stoics approving the "apprehensive" presentations, and the Academics those which appear to be "probable."^a But, on examining it closely, this view also seems to us more like a pious aspiration than the truth. For 402
an "apprehensive" presentation—to take this first—is one which is "imprinted and impressed by a real object and in accordance with that object itself, and such as could not be produced by anything not real."^b As to the rest of this account Carneades^c says that he will concede it to the Stoics, but the clause "Such as could not be produced by what is not real" should not be conceded. For presentations are produced by non-real objects just as by real ones. And the fact 403
that they are found equally self-evident and striking is a token of their indistinguishability, while the fact that corresponding actions are linked to them is a token of their being equally striking and self-evident. For as in waking life the thirsty man feels pleasure in indulging in drink, and the man who flees from a wild beast or any other object of terror shouts and cries aloud, so also in dreams delight is felt by the thirsty

^a Cf. §§ 227 ff., 174 ff.

^b Cf. §§ 248, 252.

^c Cf. § 164.

ὑπνους ἢ μὲν διάχυσίς ἐστι τοῖς θυψῶσι καὶ ἀπὸ
 404 κρήνης πίνειν δοκοῦσιν, ἀνάλογον δὲ φόβος τοῖς
 δειματουμένοις·

ταφῶν γὰρ ἀνόρουσεν Ἀχιλλεὺς
 χερσὶ τε συμπλατάγησεν, ἔπος τ' ὀλοφυδνὸν
 εἶπεν.

καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐν καταστάσει τοῖς τρανότατα φαινο-
 μένοις πιστεύομεν καὶ συγκατατιθέμεθα, οἷον Δίῳ
 μὲν ὡς Δίῳ, Θέῳ δὲ ὡς Θέῳ προσφερόμενοι,
 οὕτω καὶ ἐν μανίᾳ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάσχουσι τινές.
 405 ὁ γοῦν Ἡρακλῆς μανείς, καὶ λαβὼν φαντασίαν
 ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παιδῶν ὡς Εὐρυσθέως, τὴν ἀκό-
 λουθον πρᾶξιν ταύτῃ τῇ φαντασίᾳ συνῆψεν. ἀκό-
 λουθον δὲ ἦν τὸ τοὺς τοῦ ἐχθροῦ παῖδας ἀνελεῖν,
 ὅπερ καὶ ἐποίησεν. εἰ οὖν καταληπτικαὶ τινές
 εἰσι φαντασίαι παρόσον ἐπάγονται ἡμᾶς εἰς συγ-
 κατάθεσιν καὶ εἰς τὸ τὴν ἀκόλουθον αὐταῖς πρᾶξιν
 συνάπτειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ψευδεῖς τοιαῦται πεφῆνασι,
 λεκτέον ἀπαραλλάκτους εἶναι ταῖς καταληπτικαῖς
 406 φαντασίαις τὰς ἀκαταλήπτους. καὶ μὴν ὃν τρόπον
 ἀπὸ τῶν τόξων (ὡς τόξων)¹ ἐλάμβανε φαντασίαν
 ὁ ἥρως, οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παιδῶν ὅτι
 Εὐρυσθέως εἰσὶ παῖδες. μία γὰρ καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ
 προϋπέκειτο καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι φαντασία. ἀλλ'
 ἦν ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τόξων ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν
 407 παιδῶν ψευδής. ἐπ' ἴσης οὖν κινουσῶν² ἀμφο-
 τέρων ὁμολογητέον ἀπαράλλακτον εἶναι τὴν ἐτέ-
 ραν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ· καὶ εἰ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν τόξων λέγεται
 καταληπτική, ὅτι ἀκόλουθος αὐτῇ πρᾶξις ἐπε-

¹ <ὡς τόξων> Heintz.

² κινουσῶν N: κλινουσῶν cet., Bekk.

ζεύχθῃ τοῖς τόξοις αὐτοῦ ὡς τόξοις χρησαμένου,
 λεγέσθω καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν παιδίων μὴ διαφέρειν
 ταύτης, παρόσον καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐπε-
 ζεύχθῃ ἔργον, τουτέστι τὸ τοὺς τοῦ ἐχθροῦ παῖδας
 408 δεῖν ἀναιρεῖν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ αὕτη μὲν ἡ ἀπαραλλαξία
 τῶν τε καταληπτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἀκαταλήπτων φαν-
 τασιῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐναργὲς καὶ ἔντονον ἰδίωμα παρ-
 ῖσταται· οὐδὲν δὲ ἦττον δείκνυται τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς
 Ἀκαδημίας καὶ ἡ κατὰ χαρακτῆρα καὶ [ἡ] κατὰ
 τύπον. καλοῦσι δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ φαινόμενα τοὺς στωικούς.
 409 ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων μὲν κατὰ μορφήν διαφερόν-
 των δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀμήχανόν ἐστι διορί-
 ζειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῆς ψευδοῦς
 καὶ ἀκαταλήπτου· οἷον δυοῖν ὡῶν ἄκρως ἀλλήλοις
 ὁμοίων (εἰ) ἐναλλάξ τῷ στωικῷ δίδωμι πρὸς
 διάκρισιν, [εἰ] ἐπιβαλὼν ὁ σοφὸς (οὐκ)¹ ἰσχύσει
 λέγειν ἀδιαπτῶτως πότερον ἔν ἐστι τὸ δεικνύμενον
 410 ὡόν ἢ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ
 ἐπὶ διδύμων· λήψεται γὰρ ψευδῇ φαντασίαν ὁ
 σπουδαῖος καὶ [ὡς]² ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ'
 αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπεσφρα-
 γισμένην ἔχων τὴν φαντασίαν, εἰ ἀπὸ Κάστο-
 ρος ὡς ἀπὸ Πολυδεύκους φαντασιωθῇ. ἐντεῦθεν
 γοῦν καὶ ὁ ἐγκεκαλυμμένος συνέστη λόγος· εἰ
 γὰρ προκύψαντος δράκοντος θέλωμεν τῷ ὑποκει-
 μένῳ ἐπιστῆναι, εἰς πολλὴν ἀπορίαν ἐμπεσοῦμεθα,
 καὶ οὐχ ἔξομεν λέγειν πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ
 δράκων τῷ πρότερον προκύψαντι ἢ ἕτερος, πολλῶν

¹ <εἰ> . . . [εἰ] . . . <οὐκ> Heintz.

² [ὡς] secl. Kayser: κατ'επ' cj. Bekk.

^a The statement of § 403 that false presentations may be as "self-evident and striking" as true ones, and therefore 218

followed by the corresponding action when he used the bow as a bow, let it be said that the presentation of the children does not differ therefrom, inasmuch as it too was followed up by the corresponding action, —namely, the duty of slaying the enemy's children. Well then, this form of indistinguishability, in respect 408 of the characteristic of self-evidence and intensity, is established.^a And that in respect of stamp and impression is proved no less surely by the Academics. They summon the Stoics to face apparent facts. For 409 in the case of things similar in shape but differing in substance it is impossible to distinguish the apprehensive presentation from the false and non-apprehensive. If, for example, of two eggs that are exactly alike I offer each one in turn to the Stoic for him to distinguish between them, will the Sage be able on inspection to declare indubitably whether the egg exhibited is this one or that other one? And the 410 same argument also holds good in the case of twins. For the Good Man will receive a false presentation, though he has that presentation "imprinted and impressed both by a real object and according to that very object," if the presentation he gets be one of Castor as though it were of Polydeuces. It was this, too, that led to the framing of "the Veiled" argument; when a snake has thrust out its head, if we wish to examine the real object we shall be plunged into great perplexity and shall not be able to say whether it is the same snake that thrust its head out before or another one, as there are many snakes

"indistinguishable," has now been proved. The next sentence introduces the proof (in §§ 409-410) that an unreal percept may produce in the percipient an "impression" indistinguishable from that caused by a real one.

411 ἐνεσπειραμένων τῷ αὐτῷ φωλεῷ δρακόντων. οὐ
τοῦνν ἔχει τι ἰδίωμα ἢ καταληπτική φαντασία ᾧ
διαφέρει τῶν ψευδῶν τε καὶ ἀκαταλήπτων φαν-
τασιῶν.

Πρὸς τούτοις, εἴ τι ἄλλο καταληπτικόν τινός
ἐστι, καὶ ὄρασις. οὐχὶ δέ γ' αὕτη καταληπτική
τινός ἐστιν, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστι τι
412 καταληπτικόν τινος. ἡ γὰρ ὄρασις λαμβάνειν
μὲν δοκεῖ χρώματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ σχήματα καὶ
κινήσεις, τούτων δὲ οὐδὲν λαμβάνει, καθάπερ εὐθύς
ἀπὸ τῶν χρωμάτων ἀρξαμένοις ἡμῖν φανέται.
εἴπερ οὖν ἡ ὄρασις καταλαμβάνεται τι χρῶμα,
φασὶν οἱ ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
καταλήψεται· οὐ καταλαμβάνεται δὲ τοῦτο· οὐδ'
413 ἄλλο τοῦνν καταλήψεται χρῶμα. καὶ ὅτι οὐ
καταλαμβάνεται, πρόδηλον· μεταβάλλει γὰρ κατὰ
ᾧρας ἐνεργείας φύσεις ἡλικίας περιστάσεις νόσους
ὑγείαν ὕπνον ἐγρήγορσιν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν οὕτως αὐτὸ
ποικίλλεσθαι γινώσκειν ἡμᾶς, τὸ δὲ τί ἐστι τὸ
κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγνοεῖν. ταύτῃ τε εἰ τοῦτο μὴ ἐστι
καταληπτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι γενήσεται γνώριμον.
414 καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐπὶ σχήματος τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τῆς
ἀπορίας εὐρήσομεν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λεῖον καὶ τραχὺ
ὑποπίπτει ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν γραφῶν, στρογγύλον τε καὶ
τετράγωνον ὡς ἐπὶ πύργων, εὐθύ τε καὶ κεκλασ-
μένον ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐξάλου τε καὶ ἐνάλου κώπης,
καὶ ἐπὶ κινήσεως κινούμενον καὶ ἡρεμοῦν, ὡς ἐπὶ
τῶν ἐν νηὶ καθεζομένων ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰγιαλοῖς
ἐστῶτων.

415 Ἄλλως τε, εἴπερ προσαρμόζεται τῇ καταληπτι-
κῇ φαντασίᾳ ἢ ἀκατάληπτος φαντασία, οὐκ ἂν
εἴη κριτήριον ἀληθείας ἢ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ.

coiled up in the same hole. So then the apprehensive 411 presentation possesses no characteristic whereby it differs from the false and non-apprehensive presentations.

Furthermore, if anything else is apprehensive of anything, the sense of sight is so. But in fact, as we shall establish, sight is not apprehensive of anything; therefore nothing is apprehensive of anything. For 412 sight is thought to perceive colours and sizes and forms and motions, but it perceives none of these things, as will be apparent to us at once if we commence with colours. If then, as the Academics say, sight apprehends any colour it will also apprehend that of man; but it does not apprehend this; neither then will it apprehend another colour. And that 413 it does not apprehend this is quite evident; for this changes according to the seasons, occupations, natures, ages, circumstances, diseases, health, sleeping, waking, so that while we know that it is thus varied we are ignorant of what in truth it is. And thus, if this colour is not apprehensible neither will any other become known. Moreover, we shall find 414 the same kind of difficulty in the case of form. For the same thing is perceived as both smooth and rough, as in the case of pictures; and as both round and square, as in the case of towers; and as both straight and bent, as in the case of the oar when out of and in the water; and, as regards motion, both in motion and at rest, as in the case of persons seated in a ship or standing on the beach.*

Again, if the non-apprehensive presentation coincides with the apprehensive presentation, the apprehensive presentation will not be the criterion of truth.

* For these examples cf. *P.H.* i. 92, 118, 119, 102.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ προσαρμοττόμενον στρεβλῷ οὐκ ἂν εἶη κριτήριον εὐθέος, οὕτως εἰ προσαρμόττεται ψευδέσι καὶ ἀκαταλήπτοις φαντασίαις ἢ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, οὐκ ἂν εἶη κριτήριον. προσαρμόττεται δέ γε ἀκαταλήπτοις καὶ ψευδέσι πράγμασιν ἢ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, καθὼς παραστήσομεν· οὐ τοίνυν κριτήριόν ἐστι τῶν τε ἀληθῶν
 416 καὶ τῶν ψευδῶν ἢ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ. ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ σωρίτου τῆς ἐσχάτης καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας τῇ πρώτῃ ἀκαταλήπτῳ παρακειμένης καὶ δυσδιορίστου σχεδὸν ὑπαρχούσης, φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον ὅτι ἐφ' ὧν μὲν φαντασιῶν ὀλίγη τις οὕτως ἐστὶ διαφορὰ, στήσεται ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἡσυχάσει, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ πλείων προσπίπτει, ἐπὶ τούτων
 417 συγκαταθήσεται τῇ ἑτέρᾳ ὡς ἀληθεῖ. εἰάν οὖν παραστήσωμεν ἡμεῖς πολλὰ ψευδῇ καὶ ἀκατάληπτα τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ παρακείμενα, δῆλον ὡς ἐσόμεθα κατεσκευακότες τὸ μὴ δεῖν συγκατατίθεσθαι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἵνα μὴ ταύτῃ συναινέσαντες προπέσωμεν διὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν καὶ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀκαταλήπτων καὶ ψευδῶν συγκατάθεσιν, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα πολλὴ περὶ
 418 τὰς φαντασίας προσπίπτειν δοκῇ διαφορὰ. τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον σαφές ἔσται ἐπὶ παραδείγματος. ὑποκείσθω γὰρ καταληπτικῇ μὲν φαντασίᾳ ἢ "τὰ πεντήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστίν," ἥτις καὶ κατὰ πολὺ φαίνεται κεχωρισμένη τῆς "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" ἑτέρας. οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ πλείστον ἀπέχει τῆς "τὰ πεντήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστίν" καταληπτικῆς ἢ "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" ἀκατάληπτος, οὐκ ἐφέξει ὁ σπουδαῖος μεγάλης προσπιπτούσης διαφορᾶς, ἀλλὰ

For just as that which coincides with the crooked will not be the criterion of the straight, so the apprehensive presentation will not be the criterion if it coincides with false and non-apprehensive presentations. But the apprehensive presentation does coincide with non-apprehensive and false things, as we shall establish; so then the apprehensive presentation is not the criterion of the true and the false. For in the case of the 416 Sorites, when the last apprehensive presentation lies beside the first non-apprehensive one and almost defies distinction therefrom, Chrysippus declares that, in the case of presentations where the difference is so small, the Sage will pause and keep silence,* but in cases where it appears greater he will assent to the former one as true. If, then, we shall establish that many false 417 and non-apprehensive things lie beside the apprehensive presentation, it is plain that we shall have shown that one ought not to assent to the apprehensive presentation, lest by approving of it we are driven on, because of their proximity, to give assent also to those which are non-apprehensive and false, even though the greatest possible difference may seem to exist between the presentations. What I mean will be clear 418 by an example. Let us assume as an apprehensive presentation "Fifty is few," which seems far apart from this other, "Ten thousand is few." Then, since the non-apprehensive presentation "Ten thousand is few" is very far removed from the apprehensive "Fifty is few," the Good Man will not suspend judgement on perceiving this great difference but

* Cf. *P.H.* ii. 253 for the "Sorites" puzzle, and the Stoic rule of withholding assent and suspending judgement when a point is reached in the series where the difference between a true and a doubtful presentation, or judgement, becomes infinitesimal.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

συγκαταθήσεται μὲν τῇ " τὰ πεντήκοντα ὀλίγα
 ἐστὶ " καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, οὐ συγκαταθήσεται
 δὲ τῇ " τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν " ἀκαταλήπτῳ.
 419 ἄλλ' εἰ τῇ " τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν " οὐ συγκατα-
 θήσεται ὁ σοφός, παρόσον πολλῶ κεχώρισται τῆς
 " τὰ πεντήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστίν," φανερόν δὴ πούθεν
 ὅτι συγκαταθήσεται τῇ " τὰ πεντήκοντα καὶ ἐν
 ὀλίγα ἐστίν." οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι μεταξὺ ταύτης καὶ
 τῆς " τὰ πεντήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστίν." ἦν δέ γε ἡ
 " τὰ πεντήκοντα καὶ ἐν ὀλίγα ἐστὶ " καταληπτικῆς
 ἐσχάτως ὑποκειμένης τῆς " τὰ πεντήκοντα ὀλίγα
 ἐστὶ " πρώτη ἀκατάληπτος. συγκαταθήσεται ἄρα
 ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀκαταλήπτῳ φαντασίᾳ τῇ " τὰ πεν-
 τήκοντα καὶ ἐν ὀλίγα ἐστίν." καὶ εἰ ταύτῃ συγκατα-
 θήσεται, μηδεμίαν ἔχουσθ διαφοράν πρὸς τὴν " τὰ
 πεντήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστίν," συγκαταθήσεται καὶ τῇ
 420 " τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν " ἀκαταλήπτῳ. πᾶσα γὰρ
 ἀκατάληπτος φαντασία (πάσῃ)¹ ἀκαταλήπτῳ φαν-
 τασίᾳ ἐστὶν ἴση. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ μὲν " τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα
 ἐστίν " ἀκατάληπτος ἴση ἐστὶ τῇ " τὰ πεντήκοντα
 καὶ ἐν ὀλίγα ἐστίν," οὐδενὶ δὲ (ἦδε)² διέφερε καὶ
 ἐκεχώριστο τῆς " τὰ πεντήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστὶ "
 καταληπτικῆς, ἴση γενήσεται τῇ " τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα
 ἐστίν " ἀκαταλήπτῳ φαντασίᾳ ἢ " τὰ πεντήκοντα
 421 ὀλίγα ἐστὶ " καταληπτικῇ. καὶ οὕτω συνεχέξερ-
 χεται τῇ ψευδεὶ καὶ ἀκαταλήπτῳ φαντασίᾳ διὰ
 τὴν ἀπαραλλαξίαν ἢ καταληπτικῇ.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔνεστι λέγειν μὴ πᾶσαν ἀκατάληπτον
 φαντασίαν ἴσην πάσῃ ἀκαταλήπτῳ τυγχάνειν φαν-
 τασίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀκατάληπτον
 422 τὴν δὲ ἥσσον, ἐπεὶ πρῶτον μὲν μαχέσονται ἑαυτοῖς

¹ <πάσῃ> Heintz.

will assent to the apprehensive presentation " Fifty is few " and will not assent to the non-apprehensive " Ten thousand is few." But if the Sage will not 419 assent to the " Ten thousand is few " inasmuch as it is far apart from the " Fifty is few," it is plain, I presume, that he will assent to " Fifty-one is few "; for there is nothing between this presentation and that of " Fifty is few." But as " Fifty is few " was the apprehensive presentation placed last in order, " Fifty-one is few " is the first non-apprehensive one. The Good Man, therefore, will assent to the non-apprehensive presentation " Fifty-one is few." And if he will assent to this as being in no wise different from " Fifty is few," he will assent also to the non-apprehensive " Ten thousand is few "; for every 420 non-apprehensive presentation is equal to every other non-apprehensive presentation. Since, then, the non-apprehensive " Ten thousand is few " is equal to the " Fifty-one is few," and this was not at all different nor remote from the apprehensive " Fifty is few," the apprehensive " Fifty is few " will become equal to the non-apprehensive presentation " Ten thousand is few." And thus the apprehensive presentation, 421 because of its indistinguishability, passes out along with the false and non-apprehensive.

Nor indeed is it possible to argue that not every non-apprehensive presentation is equal to every non-apprehensive presentation, but this one is more, that one less non-apprehensive, since, in the first place, the 422 Stoics will be in conflict both with themselves and

* <ῥῖδε> addidi: διέφερον αὐτῇ ἢ ἐκ. Fabr.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

καὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων οἱ στωικοί. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον, καθὼ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὐ διαφέρει, οὐδὲ λίθος λίθου, οὕτως οὔτε ἀκατάληπτος φαντασία ἀκατάληπτου φαντασίας διενήνοχεν, ἢ ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν, οὔτε' ψευδὴς ψευδοῦς, ἢ ψευδὴς ἐστιν. κἀντεῦθεν ὀρμώμενοι οἱ περὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα ἐδίδασκον ὅτι ἴσα ἐστὶ τὰ ἁμαρ-
 423 τήματα. εἴτα ἔστω τὴν μὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀκατάληπτον τὴν δὲ ἥσσον. τί τοῦτο αὐτοῖς βοηθεῖν δύναται; ἀκολουθήσει γὰρ τῇ μὲν μᾶλλον ἀκατάληπτῳ μὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, τῇ δὲ ἥσσον συγκατατίθεσθαι, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον· ἀπλανὲς γὰρ εἶχε κριτήριον κατ' αὐτοὺς ὁ σοφός, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ἐθεοποιεῖτο διὰ τὸ μὴ δοξάζειν, τούτέστι ψεύδει συγκατατίθεσθαι, ἐν ᾧ ἔκειτο ἡ ἄκρα κακοδαιμονία καὶ ἡ τῶν φαύλων διάπτωσις.
 424 Ἴνα γε μὴν αἰσθητικὴ γένηται φαντασία κατ' αὐτοὺς, οἷον ὁρατικὴ, δεῖ πέντε συνδραμεῖν, τό τε αἰσθητήριον καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸ πῶς καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὥς ἐὰν τῶν ἄλλων παρόντων ἐν μόνον ἀπῇ, καθάπερ διάνοια παρὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα, οὐ σωθήσεται, φασίν, ἢ ἀντιληψις. ἐνθεν καὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἔλεγόν τινες μὴ κοινῶς κριτήριον, ἀλλ' ὅταν μηδὲν ἔχῃ
 425 κατὰ τὸν τρόπον ἕνστημα. τοῦτο μέντοι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν πόρων καὶ παρὰ τὰς τοῦ ἐκτὸς περιστάσεις καὶ παρ' ἄλλους πλείονας τρόπους οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ οὔτε ὡσαύτως ἰνδάλλεται ἡμῖν τὰ πράγματα, καθάπερ ἀνώτερον ἐπελογισάμεθα, ὥστε εἰ μὲν φαίνεται πρὸς τῇδε τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῇδε τῇ περιστάσει

¹ οὔτε cj. Bekk.: οὐδὲ mss.

with the nature of things. For just as man, *qua* man, differs not from man, nor stone from stone, so neither does non-apprehensive presentation, *qua* non-apprehensive, differ from non-apprehensive presentation, nor false, *qua* false, from false. Zeno, too, setting out from this standpoint, taught that "Sins are equal." —Further, let it be granted that this presentation is 423 more and that less non-apprehensive. How can this assist them? For it will follow that the Sage will not assent to the more non-apprehensive, but will assent to the less, which is absurd; for, according to them, the Sage possesses an infallible criterion, and is counted in all respects divine because he never opines,^a that is to say, assents to what is false, for therein consists the height of ill-fortune and the ruin of the foolish.

Moreover, in order that a sense-presentation, such 424 as that of sight, should take place, it is necessary, according to them, that five things should concur—the organ of sense, the object of sense, the place, the manner, the intellect—since if one only be absent though all the rest be present (if, for instance, the intellect is in an abnormal state), the perception, they say, will not be safely effected. Hence, too, some have said that the apprehensive presentation is not a criterion universally, but only when it has no obstacle present.^b This, however, is a thing impossible; for 425 because of differences in the (sensory) passages and because of external circumstances and because of many other conditions things do not appear to us either the same or in the same way, as we argued above^c; so that while we can say that a thing appears by this particular sense and in this particular

^a Cf. *P.H.* ii. 83.

^b Cf. §§ 254 ff.

^c Cf. § 414.

δύνασθαι λέγειν, τὸ δ' εἰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἶον καὶ φαίνεται, ἢ ἀλλοῖον μὲν ἐστιν ἀλλοῖον δὲ φαίνεται, μὴ ἔχειν ἡμᾶς διαυθεντεῖν, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο μηδεμίαν εἶναι φαντασίαν χωρὶς ἐνστήματος.

426 Πῶς δ' οὐχὶ καὶ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐμπίπτουσι τρόπον; ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν τίς ἐστιν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, ὀριζόμενοί φασιν " ἡ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὁποῖα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος." εἶτα πάλιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ ὀρικῶς διδασκόμενον ἐκ γνωσκομένων διδάσκεται, προσανακρινόντων ἡμῶν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον, ἀναστρέψαντές φασιν ὅτι ὑπάρχον ἐστὶν ὃ κινεῖ καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. ὥστε ἵνα μὲν μάθωμεν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, προειληφέναι ὀφείλομεν τὸ ὑπάρχον, ἵνα δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν βαδίζειν φαντασίαν· καὶ οὕτω μηδέτερον γίνεσθαι σαφές, περιμένον τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου

427 πίστιν. ὥσπερ τε ἐπεὶ τῶν φανταστῶν τὰ μὲν φαίνεται καὶ ὑπάρχει, τὰ δὲ φαίνεται μὲν οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ ὑπάρχει, χρήζομέν τινος κριτηρίου τοῦ παραστήσοντος τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἅμα καὶ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ τίνα τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα,¹ οὕτως ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι καταληπτικαὶ αἱ δὲ οὐ, δεόμεθα κριτηρίου τοῦ διατάξοντος τίνες εἰσὶ τοιαῦται καὶ τίνες ἀκατά-
428 ληπτοὶ τε καὶ ψευδεῖς. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἥτοι καταληπτικὴ γενήσεται φαντασία ἢ οὐ καταληπτικὴ. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐ καταληπτικὴ, ἀκολουθήσει καὶ πάντων ἀπαξ απλῶς μὴ καταληπτικὴν φαν-

¹ καὶ τίνα . . . ὑπάρχοντα N: om. cet., Bekk.

circumstance, we cannot be quite sure whether it is in very truth such as it appears, or is of one sort and appears to be of another; and on this account no presentation exists without an obstacle.

And of course they fall into the fallacy of circular reasoning.^a For when we inquire what the apprehensive presentation is, they define it as "That which is imprinted and impressed by a real object and according to that object itself, of such a kind as would not be produced by a non-real object." Then again, since everything that is definitely explained is explained by things known, when we inquire further what the "real object" is, they turn round and say that "A real object is that which excites an apprehensive presentation." So that, in order that we may understand the apprehensive presentation, we must first have grasped the real object, while in order to do this we must have recourse to the apprehensive presentation; and thus neither of them becomes clear as each awaits confirmation from the other.—And just as—since some objects of presentation both appear and are real, while others appear but are not also real—we need a criterion that will establish for us which are both apparent and real and which are apparent but unreal, so, since some presentations too are apprehensive and some not, we require a criterion which will discriminate which are of the former kind and which are non-apprehensive and false. This criterion, then, will be a presentation that is either apprehensive or not apprehensive. And if it is not apprehensive, it will follow that the not apprehensive presentation is the criterion once for

^a Cf. § 341.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

- τασίαν κριτήριον εἶναι, ἥς ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ καὶ τὴν
 καταληπτικὴν ἐξετάζειν, ὅπερ οὐ θελήσουσιν· εἰ
 δὲ καταληπτική, πρῶτον μὲν εὐηθες (αὐτὴν γὰρ
 ταύτην ἐζητοῦμεν κρίνειν πότε ἐστὶ καταληπτική),
 429 δεύτερον δέ, εἰ πρὸς τὸ διαγνῶναι τὰς καταληπτι-
 κάς καὶ ἀκαταλήπτους φαντασίας κριτήριον παρα-
 λαμβάνομεν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, δεήσει
 καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἡ κρίνουσα αὐτὰς τῷ ὄντι καταληπτική
 ἐστὶ φαντασία δοκιμάζεσθαι διὰ καταληπτικῆς φαν-
 τασίας, κακείνην πάλιν δι' ἄλλης, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρι
 ἀπείρου.
- 430 Ἄλλ' ἴσως τις ἐρεῖ τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν
 καὶ τοῦ φανταστοῦ, ὅτι κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ὑπόκειται,
 καὶ ἑαυτῆς, ὅτι καταληπτική ἐστὶ, κριτήριον ὑπάρ-
 χειν. ὅπερ οὐ διήνεγκε τοῦ φάναι κατὰ ἀναστροφὴν
 καὶ τὸ φανταστὸν ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῆς φαντασίας
 εἶναι δοκίμιον. ὥς γὰρ τῶν φαινομένων ἐν δια-
 φωνίᾳ καθεστῶτων ζητεῖται τίνι κρινοῦμεν τὸ
 ὑπάρχον καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον, οὕτω τῶν φαντασιῶν
 ἀσυμφώνων οὕσων σκεπτόμεθα τὸ τίνι κρινοῦμεν
 431 τὴν τε καταληπτικὴν καὶ τὴν μὴ τοιαύτην. διόπερ
 ὁμοίων ὄντων τῶν πραγμάτων, εἰ ἑαυτῆς κριτήριον
 εἶναι δύναται ἡ φαντασία καίπερ ἀσύμφωνος οὕσα,
 ἔσται καὶ τὸ φανταστὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πιστόν, καὶ ὅτι
 432 μάλιστα διαφωνῇται· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ἢ εἴπερ τοῦτο
 παρόσον ἐστὶ διάφωνον δεῖται τοῦ κρινούντος αὐτό,
 δεήσεται καὶ ἡ φαντασία τοῦ δοκιμάσοντος αὐτὴν
 καὶ παραστήσοντος εἰ τῷ ὄντι καταληπτική ἐστίν.
 Ἄλλως τε, εἰ πᾶσα φαύλου κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑπόληψις
 ἄγνοιά ἐστὶ καὶ μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἀληθεύει καὶ ἐπι-
 στήμην ἔχει τἀληθοῦς βεβαίαν, ἀκολουθεῖ μέχρι

all of everything, its function being to examine also the apprehensive, a result they will not admit ; and if it is apprehensive, in the first place it is silly to say so (for the object of our inquiry was to judge when this particular presentation is apprehensive) ; and 429 secondly, if we adopt the apprehensive presentation as the criterion for distinguishing the apprehensive and non-apprehensive presentations, it will be necessary also that the fact that the presentation which judges them is really apprehensive should be tested by means of an apprehensive presentation, and this again by means of another, and so on *ad infinitum*.

But perhaps someone will say that the apprehensive 430 presentation is the criterion both of the presented object, that it truly subsists, and of itself, that it is apprehensive. But this is in nowise different from the converse assertion that the presented object is the test both of itself and of the presentation. For just as, when apparent things are contradictory, the question is by what shall we judge what is real and what not real, so also, when presentations are not in accord, we inquire by what we shall judge which of them is apprehensive and which not so. Wherefore, 431 as the things are similar, if the presentation, although not in accord, can be its own criterion, the presented object also, be it ever so contradictory, will be of itself trustworthy, which is absurd. Or if this latter, in so 432 far as it is contradictory, requires something to judge it, the presentation also will require something to test it, and to certify whether it is really apprehensive.

Again, if every conception of the fool is, according to them, ignorance and only the Sage speaks the truth and possesses firm knowledge of the true,^a it

^a Cf. *P.H.* II. 83.

- δεῦρο ἀνευρέτου καθεστῶτος τοῦ σοφοῦ κατ' ἀνάγκην καὶ τάληθές ἀνεύρετον εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ πάντα ἀκατάληπτα τυγχάνειν, ἐπεὶ φάυλοι πάντες ὄντες οὐκ ἔχομεν βεβαίαν τῶν ὄντων κατά-
 433 ληψιν. τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀπολείπεται τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν στωικῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως λεγόμενα παρὰ μέρος καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σκεπτικῶν πρὸς ἐκείνους λέγεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῖς φαύλοις κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐγκαταριθμοῦνται Ζήνων τε καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Χρῦσιππος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰρέσεως, πᾶς δὲ φαῦλος ἀγνοία κρατεῖται, πάντως ἡγνῶει Ζήνων πότερον ἐν κόσμῳ περιέχεται ἢ αὐτὸς τὸν κόσμον περιέσχηκεν καὶ πότερον ἀνὴρ ἐστὶν ἢ γυνή, καὶ οὐκ ἠπίστατο Κλεάνθης εἴτε ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν εἴτε τι θηρίον Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον.
 434 καὶ μὴν ἡ ἐγίνωσκε τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο Χρῦσιππος στωικόν ὄν, φημὶ δὴ τὸ "πάντα ἀγνοεῖ ὁ φαῦλος," ἢ οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἠπίστατο. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἠπίστατο, ψεῦδος τὸ πάντα ἀγνοεῖν τὸν φαῦλον· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο φαῦλος ὢν ἐγίνωσκεν ὁ Χρῦσιππος, τὸ πάντα ἀγνοεῖν τὸν φαῦλον. εἰ δ' οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ᾗδει τὸ ὅτι πάντα ἀγνοεῖ, πῶς περὶ πολλῶν δογματίζει, τιθεὶς τὸ ἓνα εἶναι κόσμον καὶ προνοία τοῦτον διοικεῖσθαι καὶ διόλου τρεπτὴν εἶναι τὴν
 435 οὐσίαν καὶ ἄλλα παμπληθῆ; πάρεστι δέ, εἴ τιτι φίλον ἐστί, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπορίας τὸν ἀντερω-
 τῶντα, ὡς ἔθος ἔχουσιν αὐτοὶ¹ τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς, προσάγειν· δεδηλωμένου μέντοι τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐπι-
 χεῖρησιν χαρακτῆρος οὐκ ἀνάγκη μακρηγορεῖν.

¹ αὐτοὶ Kayser: αὐτοῖς mss., Bekk. (ἀπορίας <κομίσαι> . . . ἄς ἔθος . . . οἱ σκεπτικοὶ πρ. ej. Bekk.).

* Alluding to the saying of Socrates; cf. § 264.

follows that, since up till now the Sage has proved undiscoverable, the true also is necessarily undiscoverable ; and because of this, all things are non-apprehensible, seeing that we all, being fools, do not possess a firm apprehension of existent things. And 433 this being so, it is open to the Sceptics to repeat in turn against the Stoics the objections made by the Stoics against the Sceptics. For since, according to themselves, Zeno and Cleanthes and Chrysippus and the rest of their School are numbered amongst the fools, and every fool is enslaved to ignorance, Zeno certainly was ignorant whether he was contained in the universe or himself contained the universe, and whether he was a man or a woman ; and Cleanthes did not know whether he was a man or a beast more full of wiles than Typhon.^a Moreover, Chrysippus either 434 knew this dogma, which is a Stoic one (I mean, that " The fool is ignorant of all things "), or he did not know even this. And if he knew it, it is false that the fool is ignorant of all things ; for Chrysippus, who was a fool, perceived this very fact that the fool is ignorant of all things. But if he did not even know this very dogma that he is ignorant of all things, how does he dogmatize about many things, laying down that there is one universe, and that this is ordered by providence, and that its substance is to be wholly changed,^b and a multitude of other things ? And it is possible, should anyone so desire, for the 435 opponent to bring against them all the other difficulties which they themselves are accustomed to bring forward against the Sceptics ; but now that the character of the argumentation has been made clear, there is no need for a lengthy exposition.

^a *i.e.* resolved into Fire, the primal world-substance ; see Vol. I. Introd. p. xxiv.

Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς τὰς πιθανὰς ἀποδεχομένους φαν-
 τασίας σύντομος ὁ λόγος. ταυτὶ γὰρ τὰ κριτήρια,
 δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὴν
 χρήσιμα αὐτοῖς ὑπείληπται ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὴν εὕρεσιν
 436 τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀληθείας. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον
 λέγοιεν, ἄτοποι γενήσονται· οὐδεμία γὰρ τούτων
 τῶν φαντασιῶν δύναται κατ' ἰδίαν χραιοῦν πρὸς
 τὰς τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγάς, ἀλλὰ χρεῖα ἐστὶν ἐκάστη
 καὶ τῆς τηρήσεως, καθ' ἣν ἥδε μὲν διὰ τόδε ἐστὶ
 πιθανή, ἥδε δὲ διὰ τόδε διεξωδευμένη καὶ ἀπερί-
 437 σπαστος. εἰ δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν τάληθοῦς εὕρεσιν,
 διαπесоῦνται. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πιθανὴ μόνον κριτήριον
 τάληθοῦς· δεῖ γάρ, ἵνα τοῦτο εὕρεθῇ, πολὺ πρότερον
 αὐτὴν περιωδευμένην (εἶναι),¹ διὰ τὸ πάντως ἡμᾶς
 ἐν τῷ διοδεύειν ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ τὸν τόπον²
 αὐτῆς θεωρουμένων [μὴ] εἰς ὑπόνοιαν ἀνάγεσθαι,
 μήποτε (τι)³ παραλέλειπται τῶν ὀφειλόντων κατὰ
 τὸν τόπον ἐξετάζεσθαι, εἵγε περισπασμοῦ περὶ
 τὴν διάνοιαν συμβαίνοντος αἶρεται ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας
 438 γνῶσις. τὸ δὲ ὅλον μήποτε τοῖς αὐτῶν ἐλέγχοις
 κρατοῦνται. ὡς γὰρ διαβάλλοντες τὴν κατα-
 ληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἔφασκον μὴ εἶναι κριτήριον
 ταύτην τῆς ἀληθείας τῷ καὶ ἄλλας ἀπαρallάκτους
 παρακεῖσθαι αὐτῇ ψευδεῖς, οὕτως οὐκ ἀπέοικε
 καὶ τοῖς διεξωδευμένοις πράγμασιν ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ
 διαθεωρεῖν τὴν πιθανὴν φαντασίαν ἄλλα τινὰ
 ψευδῇ παρακεῖσθαι, ὥστε λόγου ἕνεκεν δοκεῖν μὲν
 ἡμᾶς ἔχειν ἀρτίαν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, μὴ
 οὕτως δὲ ἔχειν, ἢ ὡς ἐκ συμμέτρου μὲν διαστή-

¹ <εἶναι> cj. Bekk.

² τὸν τόπον N: τρόπον cet., Bekk.

³ <τι> Kayser (μὴ τι cj. Bekk.).

^a Especially the Academics, cf. §§ 174 ff., 371, 401.

Against those who accept the "probable" presentations^a the argument is brief. For of these criteria one or other of two things must be true: they are adopted by them as useful either for the conduct of life or for the discovery of the truth of existing things. And if the first is what they say, they will 436 be absurd; for none of these presentations is able of itself to suffice for the conduct of life, but each of them requires also that observation which certifies that this one is for this reason "probable," and that one for that reason "scrutinized and irreversible."^b But if they should pronounce them useful for the dis- 437 covery of truth, they will come to grief. For the probable presentation alone is not the criterion of truth; for it is necessary, for the discovery of truth, that it should be scrutinized long before, owing to the fact that in our scrutiny of each of the things observed in connexion with it we are certainly brought to suspect that possibly some one of the things that ought to be tested in that connexion has been overlooked, because, if a reversal occurs in the intellect, knowledge of the truth is done away. And in general, it 438 seems that they are defeated by their own criticisms. For just as, in their disparagement of the apprehensive presentation, they kept saying that this is not the criterion of truth since other indistinguishable presentations lie beside it which are false, so it is not unlikely that, during our examination of the probable presentation, certain false things lie beside those which have been scrutinized, so that it appears (let us say) that we are in a fit condition of soul but we are not really so, or it appears that the presented

^a For these technical terms and the distinction between them cf. §§ 184 ff., *P.H.* i. 227 ff., Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xxxvi.

ματος δοκεῖν βλέπεσθαι τὸ φανταστόν, ἄλλως δὲ
 439 ἔχειν. πλὴν τό γε κεφάλαιον, εἰ μήτε πᾶσαι αἱ
 φαντασίαι εἰσὶ πισταὶ μήτε πᾶσαι ἄπιστοι, μήτε
 τινὲς μὲν πισταὶ τινὲς δὲ ἄπιστοι, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας ἢ φαντασία. ὥ ἀκόλουθον
 τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι κριτήριον διὰ τὸ μήτε τὸ ὑφ' οὗ
 μήτε τὸ δι' οὗ μήτε τὸ καθ' ὃ βεβαίαν ἔχειν τὴν
 γνώσιν.

440 'Αλλ' εἰώθασιν ἀνθυποφέροντες οἱ δογματικοὶ
 ζητεῖν πῶς ποτὲ καὶ ὁ σκεπτικὸς τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι
 κριτήριον ἀποφαίνεται. ἥτοι γὰρ ἀκρίτως τοῦτο
 λέγει ἢ μετὰ κριτηρίου· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀκρίτως,
 ἄπιστος γενήσεται, εἰ δὲ μετὰ κριτηρίου, περι-
 τραπήσεται καὶ λέγων μηδὲν εἶναι κριτήριον ὁμο-
 λογῇσει εἰς τὴν τούτου παράστασιν κριτήριον
 441 παραλαμβάνειν. πάλιν τε ἡμῶν συνερωτώντων
 "εἰ ἔστι κριτήριον, ἥτοι κέκριται ἢ ἀκριτόν ἐστι,"
 καὶ δυοῖν θάτερον συναγόντων, ἥτοι τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον
 ἔκπτωσιν ἢ τὸ ἀτόπως ἑαυτοῦ τι κριτήριον εἶναι
 λέγεσθαι, ἀντιπαρεξάγοντές φασι μὴ ἄτοπον ὑπ-
 442 ἄρχειν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ τι κριτήριον ἀπολείπειν· καὶ γὰρ
 ἑαυτοῦ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ ἄλλων ἐστὶ δοκιμαστικόν, καὶ
 ὁ ζυγὸς τῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων ἰσότητος καὶ τῆς ἰδίας
 σταθμητικὸς ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ τὸ φῶς οὐ μόνον τῶν
 ἄλλων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν φαίνεται,
 διόπερ καὶ τὸ κριτήριον δύναται καὶ ἄλλων καὶ
 443 ἑαυτοῦ κριτήριον καθεστάναι. ῥητέον δὲ πρὸς μὲν
 τὸ πρῶτον ὅτι σκεπτικὸν ἐστὶν ἔθος τὸ τοῖς πε-
 πιστευμένοις μὴ συνηγορεῖν, ἀρκεῖσθαι δ' ἐπ'
 αὐτῶν ὡς ἀντάρκει κατασκευῇ τῇ κοινῇ προλήψει,

object is seen from a measurable distance, whereas the fact is otherwise. However, to sum up, if 439 neither all presentations are trustworthy, nor all untrustworthy, nor some trustworthy, others untrustworthy, the presentation will not be the criterion of truth. Whereupon it follows that no criterion exists because neither that of the agent, nor that of the means, nor that "according to which," provides knowledge that is secure.

But the Dogmatists are accustomed to retort by 440 inquiring "How ever does the Sceptic show that there is no criterion? For he asserts this either without judging or with the help of a criterion; but if it is without judging, he will not be trusted, while if it is with a criterion, he will be self-refuted, and while asserting that there is no criterion he will agree to adopt a criterion in order to confirm that assertion." Again, when we pose the argument "If a criterion 441 exists it is either judged or unjudged," and draw one or other of two conclusions—either the regress *ad infinitum* or the absurdity of the statement that a thing is its own criterion,—they, in hostile array, declare that it is not absurd to admit that a thing is its own criterion; for that which is straight is capable 442 of testing both itself and other things, and the balance is capable of weighing both its own equality and that of other things, and light appears capable of revealing not only other things but itself as well, and consequently the criterion can stand as a criterion both 443 of other things and of itself. But in reply to the first point it should be stated that it is the Sceptic practice not to advocate things that are believed, but in their case to be satisfied with the general presumption as a sufficient ground in itself, but, on the

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- τοῖς δὲ ἀπίστοις εἶναι δοκοῦσι συναγορεύειν καὶ εἰς ἰσοσθένειαν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἀνάγειν τῇ περὶ τὰ παραδοχῆς ἡξιωμένα πίστει. τοίνυν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἀναιροῦντες τὸ κριτήριον τοὺς κατὰ τούτου χειρίζομεν λόγους, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενοι δεῖξαι ὅτι οὐ πάντως πιστόν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι κριτήριον, διδομένων εἰς τοῦναντίον καὶ τῶν ἴσων ἀφορμῶν.
- 444 εἴτα κἂν τῷ ὄντι συναναιρεῖν δοκῶμεν τὸ κριτήριον, δυνάμεθα εἰς τοῦτο οὐχ ὡς κριτηρίῳ χρῆσθαι τῇ προχείρῳ φαντασίᾳ, καθ' ἣν τοὺς προσπίπτοντας ἡμῖν πιθανοὺς λόγους τιθέντες εἰς τὸ μὴδὲν εἶναι κριτήριον ἐκτιθέμεθα μὲν, οὐ μετὰ συγκαταθέσεως δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν διὰ τὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀντικειμένους
- 445 λόγους ἐπ' ἴσης εἶναι πιθανοὺς. νῆ Δία, ἀλλὰ δύναται τι καὶ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι κριτήριον, ὡς ἐπὶ τε κανόνος καὶ ζυγοῦ ἐγίνετο. ὅπερ ἐστὶ μεираκιῶδες. τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἐκάστου ἔστι τι ὑπερاناβεβηκὸς κριτήριον, ὡς αἴσθησις καὶ νοῦς, διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν κατασκευὴν αὐτῶν ἐρχόμεθα· τοῦ δὲ νῦν ὑπὸ τὴν ζήτησιν πεπτωκότος κριτήριον οὐδὲν θέλουσιν ὑπεράνω τυγχάνειν. τοίνυν ἄπιστόν ἐστι περὶ αὐτοῦ τι λέγον καὶ μὴ ἔχον τὸ προσμαρτυροῦν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
- 446 Τοσαῦτα μὲν περὶ κριτηρίου· μέτρον δὲ ἔχοντος αὐταρκες τοῦ ὑπομνήματος, ἀπὸ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς πειρασόμεθα καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ κατὰ ἀποτομὴν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς διαπορεῖν.

other hand, to advocate the things which seem to be unworthy of belief and to bring each of these into a position of equipollence with the trust accorded to those which are deemed worthy of acceptance. So then, in the present case also, we do not employ the arguments against the criterion by way of abolishing it but with the object of showing that the existence of a criterion is not altogether to be trusted, equal grounds being presented for the opposite view. In 444 the next place, even if we seem to be really helping to abolish the criterion, we are able to use the presentation ready to hand, though not as a criterion ; for when we state, in accordance with it, the probable arguments for the non-existence of the criterion that occur to us, we do indeed state them, but when we do this we do not add our assent, owing to the fact that the contrary arguments are equally probable. " But in sooth," say they, " a thing can also be its 445 own criterion, as was found in the case of the rule and the balance." But this is childish. For above each of these there stands a superior criterion, such as sense and mind, because of which we proceed to the task of constructing them ; but the Stoics do not allow that anything stands above the criterion which is now under discussion. So then, when it makes any statement about itself and has no evidence for its truthfulness, it is untrustworthy.

Thus much, then, concerning the criterion ; and 446 as this treatise is now sufficiently long, we shall make a fresh start and endeavour to discuss separately the subject of Truth itself.

B

- 1 Ὅσα μὲν ἀπορητικῶς εἶωθε λέγεσθαι παρὰ τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς εἰς ἀναίρεσιν τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας, διὰ τοῦ προανυσθέντος ἡμῖν ὑπομνήματος ἐπεληλύθαμεν· συναποδόντες δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν μέχρι τῶν νεωτέρων καταγομένην ἱστορίαν, τοῦπὶ πᾶσιν ὑπεσχόμεθα καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐρεῖν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ὅθεν νῦν τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν πληροῦντες ἐν πρώτοις σκεπτώμεθα εἰ ἔστι τι ἀληθές.

Α' — Εἰ ἔστι τι ἀληθές

- 2 Ὅτι μὲν μηδενὸς ὄντος σαφoῦς κριτηρίου κατ' ἀνάγκην συναδελφείται καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, πᾶσιν ἤδη φανερόν ἐστιν· ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου παρέσται διδάσκειν ὅτι καὶ μηδὲν ἀντικρυς πρὸς τὸ κριτήριον λέγωμεν, ἢ περὶ αὐτοῦ τᾷ ἀληθοῦς διάστασις ἱκανή
- 3 ἐστὶν εἰς ἐποχὴν ἡμᾶς καταστήσασθαι, καὶ ὃν τρόπον μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων εὐθέος καὶ στρεβλοῦ οὐδὲ κανῶν ἔστι δοκιμαστικὸς τούτων, καὶ μηδενὸς ὄντος βαρέος καὶ κούφου σώματος συναναίρεται ἢ τοῦ ζυγοῦ κατασκευή, οὕτω μηδενὸς ὄντος ἀληθοῦς οἴχεται καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον. τὸ δ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος
- 240

BOOK II

THE difficulties that are usually stated by the Sceptics 1
in order to abolish the criterion of truth have now
been reviewed by us in the treatise already com-
pleted ; and after giving their account of the investi-
gation from the time of the early physicists down to
the later philosophers, we promised, in addition to all
this, to discuss separately the subject of Truth itself.
So now in fulfilling our promise let us consider first
of all whether anything true exists.

I.—DOES ANYTHING TRUE EXIST ?

That, if no clear criterion exists, Truth likewise is 2
rendered non-evident is at once apparent to every-
one ; none the less it will be possible for us to show
also—by way of further confirmation—that, even if
we assert nothing directly against the criterion, the
dissension which exists about Truth itself is enough
to drive us to a position of suspended judgement ;
and just as, if nothing straight nor crooked exists in 3
the nature of things, neither does there exist a rule
capable of testing them ; and if no heavy or light
body exists, the construction of the balance like-
wise is abolished ; so too, if nothing true exists, the
criterion of truth also disappears. And the fact that
there is nothing true or false—if we are to judge by

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ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν δογματικῶν λόγοις, μάθοιμεν ἂν
τὴν γεγонуῖαν αὐτοῖς περὶ τούτου διάστασιν προ-
4 τάξαιτες. τῶν γὰρ σκεψαμένων περὶ ἀληθοῦς
οἱ μὲν οὐδὲν εἶναι φασιν ἀληθές οἱ δὲ εἶναι, καὶ τῶν
εἶναι φασμένων οἱ μὲν μόνον ἔλεξαν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ
νοητά, οἱ δὲ μόνον τὰ αἰσθητά, οἱ δὲ κοινῶς τὰ
5 αἰσθητά τε καὶ νοητά. Ξενιάδης μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίν-
θιος, ὡς ἀνώτερον ὑπεδείκνυμεν, μηθὲν εἶναι φησιν
ἀληθές· τάχα δὲ καὶ Μόνιμος ὁ κύων, τῷ φον εἰπὼν
τὰ πάντα, ὅπερ οἷσιν ἐστὶ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ὡς
6 ὄντων. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ Δημόκριτον
μόνον τὰ νοητά ὑπενόησαν ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν
Δημόκριτος διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ὑποκείσθαι φύσει αἰσθη-
τόν, τῶν τὰ πάντα συγκρινουσῶν ἀτόμων πάσης
7 αἰσθητῆς ποιότητος ἔρημον ἔχουσῶν φύσιν, ὁ δὲ
Πλάτων διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι μὲν αἰεὶ τὰ αἰσθητά
μηδέποτε δὲ εἶναι, ποταμοῦ δίκην ῥεύσεως τῆς
οὐσίας, ὥστε ταὐτὸ μὴ δύο τοὺς ἐλαχίστους χρό-
νους ὑπομένειν, μηδὲ ἐπιδέχεσθαι, καθάπερ ἔλεγε
καὶ ὁ Ἀσκληπιάδης, δύο ἐπιδείξεις διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα
8 τῆς ῥοῆς. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησιδήμον καθ' Ἡρά-
κλειτον καὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητά κοινῶς
κατενεχθέντες ἐν εἴδει διέστησαν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ
τὸν Αἰνησιδήμον λέγουσιν ὅτι τῶν φαινομένων
διαφορὰν, καὶ φασὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν κοινῶς πᾶσι
φαίνεσθαι τὰ δὲ ἰδίως τινί, ὧν ἀληθῆ μὲν εἶναι τὰ
κοινῶς πᾶσι φαινόμενα ψευδῆ δὲ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα·
ὅθεν καὶ ἀληθές φερωνύμως εἰρησθαι τὸ μὴ λῆθον

¹ περὶ N, cj. Bekk.: om. cet., Bekk.

² Cf. i. 53, 388.

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS, II. 3-8

the statements of the Dogmatists—we shall learn when we have first set out the controversy which has arisen amongst them on this subject.—Of those 4 who have inquired concerning Truth, some say that there is not, others that there is, something true; and of the latter, some have said that only intelligibles are true, others that only sensibles, and others that both sensibles and intelligibles alike are true. Thus 5 Xenias the Corinthian,^a as we indicated above, declares that nothing is true; and so also, perhaps, Monimus the Cynic when he said that "All things are vanity"^b (that is to say, a vain fancy that non-existents are existent). Plato and Democritus sup- 6 posed that only intelligibles are true; but whereas Democritus did so because nothing sensible exists by nature,—since the atoms which compose all things possess a nature which is void of every sensible quality,—Plato did so because sensibles are always 7 becoming and never being, as their substance keeps flowing like a river, so that it does not remain the same for two moments together, and (as Asclepiades said) does not admit of being pointed out twice owing to the speed with which it flows. Aenesidemus 8 "according to Heracleitus"^c and Epicurus both alike fell back on sensibles but differed as to details. For Aenesidemus says that there is a difference in things apparent, and asserts that some of them appear to all men in common, others to one person separately, and of these such as appear to all in common are true, and the other sort false; whence also that which does not escape the common knowledge is by derivation

^b "Vanity" (τὸ φανταστικόν), or "folly" (empty surmise); literally "smoke."

^c Cf. I. 349, P. II. i. 210 ff.

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- 9 τὴν κοινὴν γνώμην. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἔλεγεν ἀληθῆ καὶ ὄντα. οὐ διήνεγκε γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τι λέγειν ἢ ὑπάρχον· ἔνθεν καὶ ὑπογράφων τὰληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος "ἔστι" φησὶν "ἀληθὲς τὸ οὕτως ἔχον ὡς λέγεται ἔχειν," καὶ "ψεῦδος ἔστι" φησὶ "τὸ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον ὡς λέγεται ἔχειν." τὴν τε αἰσθησιν ἀντιληπτικὴν οὖσαν τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων αὐτῇ, καὶ μήτε ἀφαιροῦσάν τι μήτε προστιθεῖσαν μήτε μετατιθεῖσαν τῷ ἄλογον εἶναι, διὰ παντός τε ἀληθεύειν καὶ οὕτω τὸ ὄν λαμβάνειν ὡς εἶχε φύσεως αὐτὸ ἐκείνο. πάντων δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀληθῶν ὄντων, τὰ δοξαστὰ διαφέρειν καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, καθὼς
- 10 πρότερον ἐδείξαμεν. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς λέγουσι μὲν τῶν τε αἰσθητῶν τινὰ καὶ τῶν νοητῶν ἀληθῆ, οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀναφορὰν τὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ παρακείμενα τούτοις νοητά. ἀληθὲς γὰρ ἔστι κατ' αὐτοὺς τὸ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἀντικείμενόν τινι, καὶ ψεῦδος τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον καὶ [μὴ] ἀντικείμενόν τινι· ὅπερ ἀσώματον ἀξίωμα καθεστὼς νοητὸν εἶναι.
- 11 Ἄλλ' ἢ μὲν πρώτη περὶ τὰληθοῦς διαφωνία τοιαύτη τις ὑπῆρχεν· ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις παρὰ τούτοις διάστασις, καθ' ἣν οἱ μὲν περὶ τῷ σημαίνοντι τὸ ἀληθὲς τε καὶ ψεῦδος ὑπεστήσαντο, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῇ φωνῇ, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῇ κινήσει τῆς διανοίας. καὶ δὴ τῆς μὲν πρώτης δόξης προεστήκασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τὸ τε σημαίνόμενον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον,
- 12 ὧν σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φωνήν, οἷον τὴν Δίων, σημαίνόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῆς

^a i.e. ἀ-ληθές=μὴ λήθον ("not escaping notice").

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS, II. 9-12

termed "true."^a But Epicurus asserts that all 9
 sensibles are true and existent.^b For there is no
 difference between saying that a thing is "true" and
 saying that it is "subsisting." Hence too, in describ-
 ing truth and falsity, he says "That is true which is
 in the state in which it is said to be," and "False is
 that which is not in the state in which it is said to be."
 And he says that sense, being perceptive of the objects
 presented to it and neither subtracting nor adding
 nor transposing aught through being irrational, con-
 stantly reports truly and grasps the existent object as
 it really is by nature. And whereas all the sensibles
 are true, the opinables differ, and some of them are
 true, others false, as we showed before.^c But the 10
 Stoics assert that some sensibles and some intelligibles
 are true, the sensibles, however, not directly so but
 by reference to the intelligibles associated with them.
 For according to them the True is "that which sub-
 sists and is opposed to something," and the False
 "that which is not subsistent and is opposed to some-
 thing"^d; and this being an incorporeal judgement is
 an intelligible.

Such, then, was the first disagreement about Truth; 11
 but there was also another controversy, and in this
 some placed truth and falsity in the thing signified,
 others in the sound, others in the motion of the
 intellect. The champions of the first opinion were the
 Stoics who said that "Three things are linked to-
 gether, the thing signified and the thing signifying
 and the thing existing"; and of these the thing signi- 12
 fying is the sound ("Dion," for instance); and the
 thing signified is the actual thing indicated thereby,

^b Cf. i. 203 ff., 368; *infra*, 363 ff.

^c Cf. l. 210.

^d For a discussion of these definitions see §§ 85, 88 ff.

- δηλούμενον καὶ οὐ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῇ
 ἡμετέρᾳ παρυφισταμένῳ διανοίᾳ, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι
 οὐκ ἐπαίουσι καίπερ τῆς φωνῆς ἀκούοντες, τυγ-
 χάνον δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ
 Δίων. τούτων δὲ δύο μὲν εἶναι σώματα, καθάπερ
 τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ἐν δὲ ἀσώματον,
 ὥσπερ τὸ σημαινόμενον πρᾶγμα, καὶ λεκτόν, ὅπερ
 ἀληθές τε γίνεται ἢ ψεῦδος. καὶ τοῦτο οὐ κοινῶς
 πάν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐλλιπὲς τὸ δὲ αὐτοτελές. καὶ τοῦ
 αὐτοτελοῦς τὸ καλούμενον ἀξίωμα, ὅπερ καὶ ὑπο-
 γράφοντές φασιν "ἀξίωμά ἐστιν ὃ ἐστὶν ἀληθές ἢ
 13 ψεῦδος." οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ Στράτωνα
 τὸν φυσικὸν δύο μόνον ἀπολείποντες, σημαῖνόν τε
 καὶ τυγχάνον, φαίνονται τῆς δευτέρας ἔχεσθαι
 στάσεως καὶ περὶ τῇ φωνῇ τὸ ἀληθές καὶ ψεῦδος
 ἀπολείπειν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑστάτη δόξα (λέγω δὴ τὴν
 ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας ἀληθὲς ὑποτιθεμένην)
 σχολικῶς ἔοικε πλάττεσθαι.
- 14 Διόπερ καὶ τῆς κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τόπον ἱστορίας
 ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἀποδοθείσης χωρῶμεν ἐπὶ τὰς
 κατὰ μέρος ἀπορίας, ὧν αἱ μὲν κοινότερον χειρι-
 σθήσονται πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐκκειμένας στάσεις, αἱ δ'
- 15 ἰδιαιτέρον πρὸς ἐκάστην. τάξει δὲ λέγωμεν πρῶτον
 περὶ τῶν κοινῶν. ὁ τοίνυν λέγων εἶναι τι ἀληθές
 ἥτοι ἀποφαίνεται μόνον τὸ εἶναι τι ἀληθές ἢ ἀπο-
 δείκνυσιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ψιλῶς ἀποφαίνεται, ψιλῇ
 φάσει τοῦναντίον ἀκούσεται, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀληθές.
 εἰ δὲ ἀποδείκνυσιν εἶναι τι ἀληθές, ἥτοι ἀληθεῖ
 ἀποδείξει τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσιν ἢ οὐκ ἀληθεῖ. ἀλλ'

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 81, 104, and §§ 69, 75, 79 *infra*. "Writes" is an example of an "incomplete," "Socrates writes" of a "self-complete," expression (λεκτόν); cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 63.

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS, II. 12-15

and which we apprehend as existing in dependence on our intellect, whereas the barbarians although hearing the sound do not understand it; and the thing existing is the external real object, such as Dion himself. And of these, two are bodies—that is, the sound and the existing thing—and one is incorporeal, namely the thing signified and expressible,^a and this too is true or false. But this is not all alike (true or false), it being partly incomplete and partly self-complete. And of the self-complete that (part is true or false) which is termed “judgement,” and which they describe by saying “A judgement is that which is true or false.” But Epicurus and Strato the physi- 13
cist, as they admit only two of these—the thing signifying and the thing existing,—appear to hold the second view and to ascribe truth or falsity to the sound. The last opinion—that, I mean, which places truth in the motion of the intellect—seems to be merely a Schoolman’s invention.^b

So then, as a summary account has now been 14
given of the investigation of this subject, let us proceed to the particular criticisms, some of which will be directed generally against all the views put forward, others separately against each of those views. And let us discuss the general kind first. 15
He, then, who says that something true exists either only asserts that something true exists or proves it. And if he merely asserts it, he will be told the opposite of his mere assertion, namely, that nothing is true. But if he proves that something is true, he proves it either by a true proof or by one that is not true. But he will not say that it is by one not

^a See, however, §§ 137 ff., from which it would seem that this view had some supporters. With §§ 15, 16 cf. *P.H.* II. 85.

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- οὐκ ἀληθεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴπειεν· ἄπιστον γάρ ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον. εἰ δὲ ἀληθεῖ, πόθεν ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ ἀποδεικνύον τὸ εἶναι τι ἀληθές; εἰ μὲν αὐτόθεν,
- 16 ἔσται καὶ αὐτόθεν αὐτὸ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθές· εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀποδείξεως, ζητηθήσεται πάλιν πῶς ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστι, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἵνα μάθωμεν ὅτι ἐστι τι ἀληθές, δεῖ ἄπειρα προληφθῆναι, ἀδύνατον δ' ἔστιν ἄπειρα ληφθῆναι, ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι τὸ βεβαίως γνῶναι ὅτι ἐστι τι ἀληθές.
- 17 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἔστι τι ἀληθές, ἥτοι φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀδηλον ἢ κατὰ μὲν τι φαινόμενον κατὰ δέ τι ἀδηλον. οὔτε δὲ φαινόμενόν ἐστιν, ὥς παραστήσομεν, οὔτε ἀδηλον, ὥς δείξομεν, οὔτε κατὰ μὲν τι φαινόμενον κατὰ δέ τι ἀδηλον, ὥς παραμυθησόμεθα.
- 18 οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ἀληθές. εἰ γὰρ φαινόμενόν ἐστιν, ἥτοι πᾶν φαινόμενον ἀληθές ἐστιν ἢ τι φαινόμενον ἀληθές ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ πᾶν μὲν φαινόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθές· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ὑπνους ἢ τὸ κατὰ μανίαν προσπῖπτόν ἐστιν ἀληθές· ἐπεὶ δεήσει τῶν φαινομένων πολλὴν ἐχόντων μάχην ὁμολογεῖν τὰ μαχόμενα συνυπάρχειν καὶ ἐπ' ἴσης ἀληθῆ καθεστάναι· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. τοίνυν οὐ πᾶν φαινόμενόν
- 19 ἐστὶν ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ τί μὲν ἀληθές φαινόμενόν ἐστι τί δὲ ψεῦδος, ὀφείλομεν ἔχειν κριτήριον εἰς διάγνωσιν τοῦ τί ἐστὶν ἀληθές φαινόμενον καὶ τί ψεῦδος. τοῦτ' οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἥτοι πᾶσι φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν φαινόμενόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐ πᾶν φαινόμενον ἀληθές ἐστι, δεήσει καὶ τοῦτο φαινόμενον καθεστῶς ἐξ ἄλλου φαινομένου δοκιμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον

true, for such a proof is not to be trusted. And if it is
 by a true proof, whence comes it that the proof which
 proves that something is true is itself true? If it is true
 of itself, it will be possible also to state as true of itself
 that truth does not exist; while if it is derived from 16
 proof, the question will again be asked "How is it that
 this proof is true?" and so on *ad infinitum*. Since, then,
 in order to learn that there is something true, an in-
 finite series must first be grasped, and it is not possible
 for an infinite series to be grasped, it is not possible
 to know for a surety that something true exists.

Moreover, if anything true exists it is either 17
 apparent or non-evident or partly apparent and
 partly non-evident.^a But it is neither apparent, as
 we shall establish, nor non-evident, as we shall prove,
 nor partly apparent and partly non-evident, as we
 shall demonstrate; therefore, there does not exist
 anything true. For if it is apparent, either every- 18
 thing apparent is true or something apparent is
 true. But everything apparent is not true (for what
 is experienced in sleep or in madness is not true);
 since otherwise, as things apparent are frequently
 conflicting, we should have to allow that conflicting
 things are alike real and are equally true, which is
 absurd. So, then, not every apparent thing is true.
 And if something apparent is true and something 19
 false, we ought to have a criterion for discerning
 which apparent thing is true and which false. This
 criterion, then, is either apparent to all or non-evident.
 But if it is apparent, since not every apparent thing
 is true, this too, being an apparent thing, will need to
 be tested by another apparent thing, and that again
 by a different one, and so we go on *ad infinitum*. And if 20

^a With §§ 17-31 cf. *P.H.* ii. 88-93.

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- 20 ἐκπίπτομεν. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, οὐκ ἔσται μόνα τὰ
 φαινόμενα ἀληθῆ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἄδηλα. εἰ γὰρ τὸ
 εἰς τὴν τοῦ φαινομένου πίστιν παραλαμβανόμενον
 ἄδηλον λαμβάνομεν, τί ἄδηλον ὀφείλει ἀληθὲς εἶναι·
 21 οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε ψεύδει κρίνεται τὰληθές. εἰ δὲ ἐστί
 τι ἄδηλον ἀληθές, οὐ μόνον τὸ φαινόμενόν ἐστιν
 ἀληθές, ὡς ἀρχῇθεν ὑπέκειτο. εἴτα πόθεν ὅτι καὶ
 τὸ ἄδηλον τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστιν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτόθεν,
 ἔσται καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄδηλα τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτόθεν
 ἀληθῆ. εἰ δ' ὡς ἀποδειχθέν, πάντως ἢ ἐξ ἀδήλου
 ἢ ἐκ φαινομένου ἀποδειχθέν ἔσται ἀληθές. καὶ εἰ
 μὲν ἐξ ἀδήλου, ἐκείνο πάλιν ἐξ ἄλλου τινὸς δεήσει
 κεκρίσθαι, καὶ τὸ τρίτον ἐκ τετάρτου, καὶ οὕτως εἰς
 22 ἄπειρον· εἰ δὲ ἐκ φαινομένου, εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων
 ἐκπεσούμεθα τρόπον, τὸ μὲν φαινόμενον ἐξ ἀδήλου
 πιστούμενοι, τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον ἀναστρόφως πάλιν ἐκ
 23 τοῦ φαινομένου βεβαιοῦντες. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε πᾶν
 φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἀληθές μήτε τι φαινόμενον, οὐδὲν
 φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἀληθές. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ [τὸ]¹
 24 ἄδηλον. πάλιν γὰρ εἰ ἄδηλόν ἐστι τὰληθές, ἥτοι
 πᾶν ἄδηλόν ἐστιν ἀληθές ἢ οὐ πᾶν· οὔτε δὲ πᾶν
 ἄδηλόν ἐστιν ἀληθές οὔτε τι ἄδηλον, ὡς παρα-
 στησόμεν· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ ἄδηλόν ἐστι τὰληθές.* εἰ
 γὰρ πᾶν ἄδηλον ἔστιν ἀληθές, πρῶτον μὲν ἐχρῆν
 μὴ στασιάζειν τοὺς δογματικούς, οἷον τοὺς μὲν εἶναι
 λέγοντας στοιχείον τοὺς δὲ δύο καὶ τοὺς μὲν
 ἀριθμητὰ τοὺς δὲ ἄπειρα, οὐδὲ τὰς ἀλλήλων ψευδο-

¹ [τὸ] om. mss.

* τὰληθές Kochalsky: τι ἀληθές mss., Bekk.

it be non-evident, it is not the apparent things alone that will be true but the non-evident things as well. For if we accept the non-evident thing which is adopted for confirming the apparent thing, something non-evident must be true ; for assuredly the true is not judged by the false. But if something non-21 evident is true, not the apparent only is true, as was originally assumed. Further, how comes it that this non-evident thing is true ? For if it is so of itself, then all things which are non-evident will be true of themselves. But if it is so because of proof, it will certainly be either by means of a non-evident or by means of an apparent proof that it is proved to be true. And if it is by means of a non-evident proof, that in turn will need to be judged by means of some other proof, and the third by a fourth, and so on *ad infinitum*. But if it is by means of an apparent 22 proof, we shall be wrecked on the fallacy of circular reasoning, when we confirm the apparent by the non-evident, and again conversely establish the non-evident by means of the apparent. But if 23 neither every apparent thing is true nor something apparent, then nothing apparent is true—Nor, indeed, is (the true) non-evident. For, again, if 24 the true is non-evident, either everything non-evident is true, or not everything ; but neither is everything non-evident true nor something non-evident, as we shall establish ; therefore the true is not non-evident. For if everything non-evident is true, then, in the first place, the Dogmatists ought not to have quarrelled—some of them, for example, saying that there is one element, others two, some a definite number, others an infinite number,—nor ought they to have given the lie to one another's

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- 25 ποιεῖν δόξας. παντός τε ἀδήλου ἀληθοῦς ὄντος
 ἔσται τὰ μαχόμενα ἀληθῆ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀρτίους
 εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸ περισσοῦς· ἐπ' ἴσης γάρ
 ἔστιν ἀδηλα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἀδηλά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ.
 οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ μαχόμενα δύναται εἶναι ἀληθῆ· οὐκ
 26 ἄρα πάντα τὰ ἀδηλά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
 τινὰ τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ. τὸ γὰρ τουτὶ μὲν
 τὸ ἀδηλον ἀληθές εἶναι τουτὶ δὲ ψεῦδος ἦτοι αὐτό-
 θεν λέγεται καὶ χωρὶς κριτηρίου ἢ σὺν κριτηρίῳ.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἐτοίμου λέγεται, οὐδὲν ἔχομεν λέγειν
 27 πρὸς τὸν τουναντίον ἀληθές ἀποφαινόμενον. εἰ δὲ
 σὺν κριτηρίῳ, πάντως τοῦτο τὸ κριτήριον ἢ φαινό-
 μενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν φαινόμενόν ἐστι,
 ψεῦδος ἔσται τὸ ἀρχῆθεν ὑποκείμενον, τὸ μόνον
 28 ἀληθές εἶναι τὸ ἀδηλον. εἴτα καὶ τὸ ᾧ κρίνομεν τὸ
 φαινόμενον, πόθεν ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν; εἰ μὲν αὐτό-
 θεν, καὶ τὸ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθές αὐτόθεν λεγόμενον
 ἔσται πιστόν· εἰ δὲ ἐκ φαινομένου, κακείνο τὸ
 φαινόμενον ἐξ ἄλλου ληφθήσεται φαινομένου, καὶ
 29 μέχρ' ἀπείρου· εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀδήλου, ὁ δι' ἀλλήλων
 συστήσεται τρόπος, μήτε τὸ φαινόμενον δυναμένων
 ἡμῶν ἔχειν πιστὸν δίχα τοῦ ἀδήλου μήτε τὸ ἀδηλον
 βέβαιον χωρὶς τοῦ φαινομένου. τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ
 ἀδηλον δύναται εἶναι ἀληθές.
- 30 Λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν τὸ κατὰ μὲν τι φαινόμενον
 κατὰ δέ τι ἀδηλον ἀληθές (, ὅπερ εὐήθες).¹ εἰ γὰρ τὸ
 φαινόμενον, καθὸ φαινόμενόν ἐστι, τοῦτο ὑποτιθέ-
 μεθα ἀληθές, ἦτοι καθὸ πᾶν φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἀληθές

¹ <, ὅπερ εὐήθες> Kochalsky: <ὅπερ ἀδόνατον> cj. Belk.

opinions. And if everything non-evident is true, 25
 things which conflict will be true—for instance the
 statement that the stars are even in number and
 that they are odd ; for they are equally non-evident,
 and all non-evident things are true. But of course
 conflicting things cannot be true ; therefore not all
 non-evident things are true —Nor, again, are some 26
 non-evident things true. For the statement that
 this non-evident thing is true and that false is made
 either of itself and without a criterion or with a
 criterion. And if it is so stated off-hand, we shall
 have no answer to make to him who declares that
 the opposite is true. But if it is stated with a 27
 criterion, certainly this criterion is either apparent or
 non-evident. And if it is apparent the original
 assumption that only the non-evident is true will be
 false. Furthermore, whence comes it that the cri- 28
 terion itself whereby we judge the apparent thing is
 true ? If it is so of itself, then the (opponent's) state-
 ment that it is not true will also of itself be trust-
 worthy ; and if it is so because of an apparent thing,
 then that apparent thing too will be derived from
 another apparent thing, and so on *ad infinitum* ; and if 29
 it is so because of a non-evident thing, the argument
 will take the form of circular reasoning, as we are
 neither able to count the apparent thing trustworthy
 apart from the non-evident nor the non-evident
 well-founded without the apparent. So, then, the
 non-evident cannot be true either.

It remains, therefore, to say that what is partly 30
 apparent and partly non-evident is true (; but this
 is silly). For if we assume that this apparent thing,
 in so far as it is apparent, is true, we assume it to be
 true either in so far as every apparent thing, or in so

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- ὑποτιθέμεθα αὐτὸ ἀληθές, ἢ καθὸ οὐ πᾶν· καὶ εἰ τὸ
 ἄδηλον, καθὸ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, ὑπόκειται ἀληθές, ἥτοι
 καθὸ πᾶν ἄδηλον ἀληθές ἐστιν ὑπόκειται ἀληθές,
 ἢ καθὸ οὐ πᾶν. καὶ λοιπὸν τὰς αὐτὰς ἀπορίας
 31 ἐπισυνθίσομεν. ὅθεν εἰ μήτε τὸ φαινόμενόν ἐστιν
 ἀληθές μήτε τὸ ἄδηλον μήτε τὸ κατὰ μὲν τι φαινό-
 μενον κατὰ δέ τι ἄδηλον, ἄλλο δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν
 ἐστίν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀληθές.
- 32 Τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ γενικωτάτου[τοῦ ὄντος,]¹
 ἐπάγουσιν ἀπορίαν. τουτὶ γὰρ πάντων μὲν ἐστίν
 ἐπαναβεβηκὸς γένος, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἐτέρῳ ὑπέσταλ-
 κεν. ἥτοι οὖν ἀληθές ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἢ ψεῦδος ἢ ἀληθές
- 33 ἅμα καὶ ψεῦδος ἢ οὔτε ἀληθές οὔτε ψεῦδος. καὶ εἰ
 μὲν ἀληθές ἐστὶ, πάντα γενήσεται ἀληθῆ, παρόσον
 ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ εἶδη· καὶ ὅν τρόπον ἐπεὶ τὸ γένος τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρωπός ἐστι, καὶ οἱ ἐπ' εἶδους εἰσὶν
 ἀνθρωποι, καὶ ἐπεὶ λογικός, πάντες οἱ ἐπὶ μέρους
 εἰσὶ λογικοί, καὶ ἐπεὶ θνητός, ὡσαύτως θνητοί,
 οὕτως εἰ τὸ τῶν πάντων γένος ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἀνάγκη
- 34 καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα εἶναι ἀληθῆ. πάντων δὲ ὄντων
 ἀληθῶν οὐδὲν ἔσται ψεῦδος, ψεῦδους δὲ μὴ ὄντος
 οὐδὲ ἀληθές τι γενήσεται, ὡς πρότερον ὑπεμνήσα-
 μεν, δεικνύντες ἑκάτερον τούτων κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς
 θάτερον σύμβλησιν νοούμενον. καὶ ἄλλως, πάντων
 ὄντων ἀληθῶν θήσομεν τὰ μαχόμενα ἀληθῆ, τοῦτο
 δὲ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. οὐ τοίνυν ἀληθές ἐστὶ τὸ γενικώ-
- 35 τατον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ψεῦδος διὰ τὰς ὁμοίας
 ἀπορίας. εἰ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐστὶ, πάντα ἔσται τὰ μετ-
 ἔχοντα αὐτοῦ ψευδῆ· πάντα δὲ αὐτοῦ μετέχει τὰ

¹ [τοῦ ὄντος,] scr. Heintz.

^a For this all-inclusive class, or highest category, of the Stoic logic (τό τι, "Something") see Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xxvi. With §§ 32-36 cf. *P.H.* ii. 86-87.

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- τε σώματα καὶ τὰ ἀσώματα· πάντα ἄρα γενήσεται
 ψευδῇ. τῷ δὲ πάντα εἶναι ψευδῇ αἱ ἀνάλογον
 36 ἀπορίαι ἀκολουθήσουσιν. λείπεται οὖν ἀληθές
 ἅμα καὶ ψεῦδος λέγειν αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἢ οὔτε ἀληθές οὔτε
 ψεῦδος. ὁ χειρόν ἐστι τῶν πρότερον ὑποδεδειγ-
 μένων διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τούτῳ τὸ πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ
 μέρους ἀληθῇ ἅμα καὶ ψευδῇ ἢ οὔτε ἀληθῇ οὔτε
 ψευδῇ γίνεσθαι· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. οὐ τοίνυν ἔστι
 τι ἀληθές.
- 37 Καὶ μὴν τὸ ἀληθές ἦτοι τῶν κατὰ διαφορὰν καὶ
 φύσει ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν πρὸς τι· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστίν,
 ὥς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τἀληθές. κατὰ
 διαφορὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ φύσει οὐκ ἔστι τἀληθές
 παρόσον τὸ κατὰ διαφορὰν καὶ φύσει ὑποκειμένον
 ὡσαύτως τοὺς ὁμοίως διακειμένους κινεῖ, ὅσον τὸ
 θερμὸν οὐ πρὸς ἄλλον μὲν ἐστὶ θερμὸν πρὸς ἄλλον
 δὲ ψυχρόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντας τοὺς ὡσαύτως διακει-
 38 μένους θερμόν. τὸ δὲ ἀληθές οὐχ ὁμοίως πάντας
 κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτόν ὥς μὲν πρὸς τόνδε ἀληθές εἶναι
 φαίνεται, ὥς δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον ψεῦδος. οὐκ ἄρα τῶν
 κατὰ διαφορὰν καὶ φύσει ὑποκειμένων ἐστὶ τἀληθές.
 εἰ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ τὰ πρὸς τι νοεῖται
 μόνον, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ὑπάρχει, πάντως καὶ τἀληθές
 39 ἐπινοητόν ἐσται μόνον, οὐχ ὑπάρξει δέ. καὶ ἄλλως,
 εἰ τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστι τὸ ἀληθές, ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ
 ἀληθές ἅμα καὶ ψεῦδος· ὥς γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δεξιὸν τε
 καὶ ἀριστερόν ἐστι, πρὸς τῷδε μὲν δεξιὸν πρὸς
 τῷδε δὲ ἀριστερόν, καὶ ὃν τρόπον τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνω καὶ
 κάτω λέγεται, ἄνω μὲν ὥς πρὸς τὸ ὑποκειμένον
 κάτω δὲ ὥς πρὸς τὸ ὑπερκείμενον, οὕτω ταῦτό

partake of it ; all things, therefore, will be false. And analogous difficulties will follow on the statement that all things are false.—It remains, then, to say 36 that it is at once both true and false or that it is neither true nor false. But this is worse than the alternatives already stated, because it results from this that all the particulars are at once both true and false, or neither true nor false, which is absurd. There does not, then, exist anything true.

Again, the true is either an absolute ^a and natural 37 thing or a relative thing ; but it is neither of these, as we shall establish ; therefore the true does not exist. The true does not exist absolutely and by nature inasmuch as what subsists absolutely and by nature moves those who are in a like condition in the same way—the hot, for instance, is not hot to one man and cold to another but hot to all who are in the same condition. But the true does not move all alike, 38 but the same thing in relation to this man seems to be true, but in relation to that other man false. Therefore the true does not belong to the class of things which subsist absolutely and by nature.—And if it belongs to the class of things relative, then, since relatives are only conceived and have no real existence, the true also will certainly be only a concept and will not really exist. Besides, if the true is a 39 relative thing, the same thing will be at once both true and false ; for just as the same thing is both right and left—right relatively to this object, left relatively to that,—and just as the same thing is said to be both above and beneath—above relatively to what lies below it, and beneath relatively to what lies above

^a Literally, “(existing) differentially,” having a distinct and independent existence ; cf. *P.H.* i. 37 ; §§ 161 ff. *infra*.

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- ἀληθές ἅμα καὶ ψεῦδος ἐροῦμεν. καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐ
 μᾶλλον ἀληθές γενήσεται ἢ ψεῦδος, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές.
 40 Δυνάμει δὲ καὶ ὁ Αἰνησίδημος τὰς ὁμοιοτρόπους
 κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἀπορίας τίθησιν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι
 ἀληθές, ἥτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν ἐστιν, ἢ καὶ
 νοητόν ἐστι καὶ αἰσθητόν ἐστιν. [ἢ] οὔτε δὲ αἰσθητόν
 ἐστιν οὔτε νοητόν ἐστιν, οὔτε τὸ συναμφότερον, ὥς
 41 παρασταθήσεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ἀληθές. ὅτι μὲν
 οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητόν, οὕτως ἐπιλογιούμεθα. τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστι γένη τὰ δὲ εἶδη, καὶ γένη
 μὲν αἰ ἐνδιήκουσαι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος κοινότητες,
 ὥς ἄνθρωπος ὁ διὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων
 πεφοιτηκῶς καὶ ἵππος ὁ διὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἵππων,
 εἶδη δὲ αἰ καθ' ἕκαστον ιδιότητες, ὥς Δίωνος,
 42 Θέωνος, τῶν ἄλλων. εἴπερ οὖν αἰσθητόν ἐστι τὸ
 ἀληθές, καὶ τοῦτο πάντως κοινόν (ὄν)² πλείονων ἢ
 ἐν ιδιότητι κείμενον ἔσται [αἰσθητόν τὸ ἀληθές].³
 οὔτε δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν οὔτε ἐν ιδιότητι κείμενον· οὐκ
 43 ἄρα αἰσθητόν ἐστι τὸ ἀληθές. ἔτι δὲ τὸν τρόπον τὸ
 μὲν ὁρατὸν ὁράσει ληπτὸν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀκουστὸν
 ἀκοῇ γινώριμόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ὀσφρητὸν ὀσφρήσει,
 οὕτω καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν κοινῶς αἰσθήσει γνωρίζεται.
 οὐ γνωρίζεται δὲ κοινῶς αἰσθήσει· ἢ γὰρ αἰσθησις
 ἀλογός ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές οὐκ ἀλόγως γνωρί-
 44 ζεται. οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητόν τὸ ἀληθές. καὶ μὴν
 οὐδὲ νοητόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἔσται τῶν αἰσθητῶν
 ἀληθές· ὁ πάλιν ἄτοπον. ἥτοι γὰρ πᾶσι κοινῶς
 ἔσται νοητόν ἢ τισὶν ιδίως. οὔτε δὲ πᾶσι κοινῶς
 45 οἶόν τε εἶναι νοητόν τὸ ἀληθές οὔτε τισὶν ιδίως· τό

¹ δὲ N: om. cet., Bekk.: [ἢ] secl. Kochalsky.

² <ὄν> cj. Bekk. (et <ἔσται> ante κοινόν).

³ [αἰσθ. . . ἀληθές] secl. Kochalsky (τὸ ἀληθές secl. Bekk.).

it,—so we shall call the same thing both true and false. And if so, it will be no more ^a true than false, and certainly not true.

Aenesidemus, too, virtually states difficulties of a 40 similar kind regarding this topic. If anything true exists it is either sensible or intelligible or both intelligible and sensible. But it is neither sensible nor intelligible nor both at once, as shall be established ; therefore there does not exist anything true. Now 41 that it is not sensible, we shall argue in this way :—Of things sensible some are genera, some particulars, and genera are the common qualities which pervade the particulars—as Man is that which ranges through the particular men, and Horse through the particular horses,—whereas particulars are the separate individual qualities—of Dion, Theon, and the rest. If, 42 then, the true is sensible, it too will either be the common property of many or it will constitute an individual quality ; but it is neither a common nor an individual property ; therefore the true is not sensible.—Again, just as the visible object is per- 43 ceptible by vision, and the audible is known by hearing, and the odorable by smell, so too what is sensible is known by sense in general. But the true is not known by sense in general, for sense is irrational and the true is not known irrationally. Therefore the true is not sensible.—Nor, indeed, is it intelligible, 44 for if so none of the sensibles will be true ; and this again is absurd. For either it will be intelligible to all in common or to some separately. But the true is not capable of being intelligible either to all in common or to some separately ; for it is impossible 45

^a For the Sceptic formula “ No more ” see *P.H.* i. 188 ff.

- τε γὰρ κοινῶς πᾶσι νοεῖσθαι ἀδύνατον, τό τε ἰδίως
τινὶ ἢ τισὶν ἄπιστον καὶ μάχιμον. οὐδὲ νοητὸν ἄρα
ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθές. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ αἰσθητὸν ἅμα
καὶ νοητόν. ἤτοι γὰρ πᾶν αἰσθητὸν καὶ πᾶν νοητόν
46 ἀληθές ἐστιν ἢ τὶ αἰσθητὸν καὶ τὶ νοητόν. ἀλλὰ τὸ
μὲν φάσκειν πᾶν αἰσθητὸν καὶ πᾶν νοητὸν ἀληθές
εἶναι τῶν ἀμηχάνων· μάχεται γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς
αἰσθητοῖς καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ ἐναλλάξ
τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς [καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοῖς αἰσθη-
τοῖς], καὶ δεήσει πάντων ἀληθῶν ὄντων τὸ αὐτὸ
εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀληθές τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ ψεῦδος.
τί δὲ αἰσθητὸν ἀληθές καὶ τὶ νοητὸν ἀληθές ἀξιούν
47 πάλιν τῶν ἀπόρων· ζητεῖται γὰρ τί τοῦτο. καὶ
ἄλλως ἀκόλουθόν ἐστιν ἢ πάντα λέγειν ἀληθῆ ἢ
πάντα λέγειν ψευδῆ τὰ αἰσθητά· ἐπ' ἴσης γάρ ἐστιν
αἰσθητά, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δὲ ἥττον, καὶ
τὰ νοητὰ πάλιν ἐπ' ἴσης ἐστὶ νοητά, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν
μᾶλλον τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον. οὐ πάντα δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ
λέγεται ἀληθῆ, οὐδὲ πάντα ψευδῆ· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστι
τι ἀληθές.
- 48 Ναί, ἀλλ' οὐ καθὸ φαίνεται ἢ ἀλήθεια, κατ'
ἄλλην δὲ αἰτίαν λαμβάνεται. τίς οὖν ἐστὶν αὕτη
ἡ αἰτία; θέτωσαν εἰς τὸ μέσον οἱ δογματικοί, ἵνα
ἢ εἰς συγκατάθεσιν ἡμᾶς ἐπισπᾶσθται ἢ εἰς φυγὴν
49 ἀποτρέψῃται. εἴτα ταύτην αὐτὴν τὴν αἰτίαν πῶς
λαμβάνουσιν; ὥς φαινομένην αὐτοῖς ἢ ὥς μὴ
φαινομένην; εἰ μὲν ὥς φαινομένην, ψεύδονται
λέγοντες τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ ὑπάρχειν καθὸ φαίνεται·
εἰ δ' ὥς μὴ φαινομένην, πῶς τὸ μὴ φαινόμενον
50 αὐτοῖς εἰλήφασιν; ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἢ δι' ἄλλου; καὶ ἐξ
αὐτοῦ μὲν ἀδύνατον· οὐδὲν γὰρ μὴ φαινόμενον ἐξ

for it to be thought by all in common, and it becomes untrustworthy and debatable if thought by one or more persons separately. Therefore the true is not intelligible either.—Nor yet is it at once both sensible and intelligible. For either everything sensible and everything intelligible is true or something sensible and something intelligible. But to assert that every- 46
 thing sensible and everything intelligible is true is a thing impracticable; for sensibles conflict with sensibles and intelligibles with intelligibles, and conversely sensibles with intelligibles; and, if all things are true, it will necessarily follow that the same thing both is and is not existent, and that it is both true and false. Nor again is it feasible to hold that something sensible is true and something intelligible true; for 47
 this is the point at issue. And besides it is logically consistent either to say that all sensibles are true or to say that all are false; for sensibles are on an equality, not one more and one less sensible, and intelligibles again are equally intelligible and not one more and one less intelligible. But not all sensibles are termed true, nor all false; therefore there is not anything true.

"Yes, but the truth is perceived not in so far as it 48
 appears but owing to another cause." What, then, is this cause? Let the Dogmatists state it openly so that it may either attract us to assent or repel us to avoidance. Further, how do they perceive this 49
 cause itself? As appearing to them or as not appearing? If as appearing, they lie when they say that truth does not exist in so far as it appears; but if as not appearing, how have they perceived what is not appearing to them? Through itself or by means of another? To perceive it through itself is impossible, 50
 for nothing which does not appear is perceptible

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αὐτοῦ ληπτὸν ἔστιν· εἰ δὲ δι' ἄλλου, ἐκείνο πάλιν
 πότερον φαινόμενον ἔστιν ἢ μὴ φαινόμενον; καὶ
 οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον οἰχομένης τῆς ζητήσεως ἀν-
 εύρετον γίνεται τὸ ἀληθές.

- 51 Τί οὖν; τὸ πείθον ἡμᾶς, τὸ πιθανὸν ῥητέον
 ἀληθές, ὁποῖαν ποτὲ ἂν ἔχῃ οὐσίαν, εἴτε αἰσθητὴν
 εἴτε νοητὴν εἴτε τὸ συναμφότερον, αἰσθητὴν ἅμα
 52 καὶ νοητὴν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἀπόρων. εἰ γὰρ
 τὸ πιθανὸν ἀληθές ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντα
 πείθει οὐδὲ διὰ παντὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς, δώσομεν τὸ
 αὐτὸ καὶ ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
 ἀληθές ἅμα εἶναι καὶ ψεύδος· ἢ μὲν γὰρ πείθει
 τινάς, ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ὑπάρχον, ἢ δὲ ἑτέρους οὐ
 πείθει, ψεύδος καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον. ἀδύνατον δέ γε τὸ
 αὐτὸ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀληθές τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ
 53 ψεύδος· τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ πιθανόν ἔστιν ἀληθές.
 ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ τι τὸ πολλοὺς πείθον, τοῦτ' ἐροῦμεν
 ἀληθές· τὸ γοῦν μέλι πολλοὺς μὲν πείθον ὑγιαίνον-
 τας ὡς γλυκύ, καὶ ἓνα μὴ πείθον ἰκτερικόν, ἀληθῶς
 λέγομεν γλυκύ. ὅπερ ἦν ληρώδες. ὅταν γὰρ περὶ
 ἀληθείας σκεπτώμεθα, τότε οὐκ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν
 συμφωνούντων δεῖ ἀποβλέπειν ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς δια-
 θέσεις. μιᾷ δὲ διαθέσει κέχρηται ὁ νοσῶν καὶ μιᾷ
 54 κατασκευῇ πάντες οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες. οὐ μᾶλλον οὖν
 τῇδε τῇ διαθέσει ἢ τῇδε πιστευτέον ἔστί, ἐπεὶ
 ἀναστροφῶς ὑποτεθέντος τοῦ πολλοὺς μὲν πικρά-
 ζεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ μέλιτος οἶον πυρέσσοντας, ἓνα δὲ
 γλυκάζεσθαι τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα, πάντως ἀκολουθήσει
 πικρὸν λέγειν τὸ μέλι· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. τοίνυν ὡς

^a For this Academic term cf. i. 174 ff.

^b Cf. P.H. i. 101.

^c Cf. i. 333; P.H. ii. 44.

through itself ; while if it is by means of another, is this in turn appearing or not appearing ? And as the inquisition thus proceeds *ad infinitum*, the true becomes undiscoverable.

What then ? Is that which persuades us, " the probable,"^a to be termed " true " whatever be the nature it possesses, whether sensible or intelligible or a combination of both sensible and intelligible at once ? But neither is this feasible. For if the probable is true, then because the same thing does not convince all men nor the same men always, we shall be granting that the same thing both does and does not exist, and that the same thing is at once both true and false ; for in so far as it convinces some it will be true and existent, but in so far as it does not convince others it will be false and non-existent. But it is impossible that the same thing should both exist and not exist, and be both true and false ; so, then, the probable is not true either. That is, unless we shall declare that what convinces many is true ; thus, honey,^b which convinces many healthy people of its sweetness but does not convince one man who suffers from jaundice, we truly describe as sweet. But this is nonsensical. For when we are investigating truth we ought not to pay regard to the numbers of those who are in agreement but to their conditions. And the diseased person is in one condition, and all the healthy persons in one bodily state.^c One ought not, then, to trust the one condition more than the other, since if we assume, conversely, that many get a bitter taste from the honey (feverish people, for instance), while one man who is healthy gets a sweet taste, it will certainly follow that we must call the honey bitter, which is absurd. As, then, in this case we set

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ἐνθάδε παρέντες τὴν κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος μαρτυρίαν οὐδὲν ἥσσον γλυκύ φαμεν τὸ μέλι, οὕτω καὶ ὅταν πολλοὶ γλυκάζωνται εἰς δὲ πικράζηται, παρέντες τὸ διὰ πλῆθος τῶν οὕτω πασχόντων γλυκὺ καλεῖν τὸ μέλι, ἄλλως τ' ἀληθὲς ἐξετάζωμεν.

- 55 Αἱ μὲν καθόλου ἀπορίαι περὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τοιαῦται τινές εἰσιν· ἀκολουθῶς δὲ ἔλθωμεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ μέρος. καὶ δὴ τοὺς μὲν πάντα λέγοντας ψευδῇ ἐδείξαμεν πρόσθεν περιτρεπομένους. εἰ γὰρ πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῇ, ψεῦδος ἔσται καὶ τὸ "πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῇ," ἐκ πάντων ὑπάρχον. ψεύδους δὲ ὄντος τοῦ "πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῇ," τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ ἀληθὲς ἔσται, τὸ "οὐ πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῇ." εἰ ἄρα
- 56 πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῇ, οὐ πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῇ. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον καὶ Πλάτωνα ἀθετοῦντες μὲν τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἀναιροῦντες δὲ τὰ αἰσθητά, μόνοις δ' ἐπόμενοι τοῖς νοητοῖς, συγχέουσι τὰ πράγματα, καὶ οὐ μόνον τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀλήθειαν σαλεύουσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν. πᾶσα γὰρ νόησις ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως γίνεται ἢ οὐ χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἢ
- 57 ἀπὸ περιπτώσεως ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ περιπτώσεως. ὅθεν οὐδὲ τὰς λεγομένας ψευδεῖς φαντασίας, οἶον τὰς καθ' ὕπνους ἢ τὰς κατὰ μανίαν, εὐρήσομεν ἀπηρημέναις τῶν διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κατὰ περίπτωσιν ἡμῖν ἐγνωσμένων. καὶ γὰρ ὁ κατὰ μανίαν Ἑρινύας αὐτῷ ἀναπλάσσω.

τὰς αἱματώδεις καὶ δρακοντώδεις κόρας

ἐκ τῶν πεφνηότων αὐτῷ σύνθετον μορφήν νοεῖ· ὡσαύτως δὲ ὁ πτηνὸν ἄνθρωπον καθ' ὕπνους

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS, II. 54-57

aside the evidence of the multitude and none the less declare honey to be sweet, so also when many taste it sweet and one tastes it bitter, let us give up calling honey sweet because of the numbers of those who experience it as such, and let us investigate the truth in another way.

Of some such kind are the general difficulties 55 raised about "the true": let us pass on next to the particular difficulties. Now as to those who assert that all things are false, we proved above^a that they are confuted. For if all things are false, the statement "All things are false," being one of the "all things," will be false. And if the statement "All things are false" is false, its contradictory, "Not all things are false," will be true. Therefore, if all things are false, not all things are false. And Democritus and 56 Plato,^b by rejecting the senses and abolishing sensibles and following intelligibles only, throw things into confusion and shake to pieces not only the truth of existing things but even the conception of them. For every thought occurs either owing to sensation or not apart from sensation, and either owing to experience or not without experience. Hence we shall find that not even the so-called false 57 presentations—such as those in dreams or madness—are detached from things known to us by experience through sense. And in fact when the hero in his madness imagines as his Furies

Maids shaped like dragons and all blood-besprent,^c
he is conceiving a shape compounded of things that have appeared to his senses. And in the same way he who in his sleep dreams of a winged man does not

^a Cf. I. 390, 398.

^b Cf. §§ 6 ff.

^c Eurip. *Orest.* 256.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

ὄνειροπολούμενος οὐ δίχα τοῦ πτηνόν τι ἑωρακέναι
 58 καὶ ἄνθρωπον ὄνειροπολεῖται. καὶ καθόλου οὐδὲν
 ἔστιν εὐρεῖν κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ὃ μὴ ἔχει τις αὐτῷ κατὰ
 περίπτωσιν ἐγνωσμένον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἢ κατὰ ὁμοιό-
 τητα τῶν ἐν περιπτώσει πεφηνότων ληφθήσεται ἢ
 59 κατὰ παραύξησιν ἢ κατὰ μείωσιν ἢ κατ' ἐπισύν-
 θεσιν. καθ' ὁμοιότητα μὲν οὖν οἶον ὅταν ἀπὸ τῆς
 θεωρηθείσης Σωκράτους εἰκόνας τὸν μὴ ἑωραμένον
 Σωκράτην ἐπινοῶμεν, κατὰ παραύξησιν δὲ ὅταν
 ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀνθρώπου κινούμενοι νοῶμεν οἶον
 ὅς οὐκ ἐώκει

ἀνδρί γε σιτοφάγῳ ἀλλὰ ρίψι ὑλήεντι
 ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων,

60 κατὰ μείωσιν δὲ ἐπειδὴν συνελόντες πάλιν τὸ
 μέγεθος τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀνθρώπου νόησιν λαμβάνωμεν
 πυγμαίου, κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν δὲ ὅταν ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπου
 1. καὶ ἵππου τὸν μηδέποτε ὑποπεπτωκότα ἡμῖν
 Ἴπποκένταυρον νοῶμεν. πάσης οὖν ἐπινοίας προ-
 ηγεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως περίπτωσιν, καὶ
 διὰ τοῦτ' ἀναιρουμένων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 61 συναναιρεῖται πᾶσα νόησις. ὃ τε λέγων πάντ'
 εἶναι τὰ φαινόμενα ψευδῆ καὶ ἑτεῇ μόνα ὑπάρχειν
 τὰ νοητά, τοῦτ' ἔστι κατ' ἀλήθειαν, ἥτοι φάσει
 μόνον χρώμενος τοῦτ' ἐρεῖ ἢ καὶ ἀποδεικνύς. ἀλλὰ
 φάσει μὲν λέγων φάσει ἐπισχεθήσεται, ἀπόδειξιν
 62 δὲ παραλαμβάνειν πειρώμενος περιτραπήσεται. ἢ
 γὰρ φαινομένῳ τινὶ διδάξει τὸ ἑτεῇ μόνα εἶναι τὰ
 νοητά ἢ ἀδήλῳ. οὔτε δὲ φαινομένῳ τοῦτο διδάξει,

* Homer, *Od.* ix. 191, describing the Cyclops.

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dream so without having seen some winged thing and a man. And in general it is impossible to find in 58 conception anything which one does not possess as known by experience. For such a thing will be grasped either by way of resemblance to things which have been presented in experience, or by way of enlargement thereof, or of diminution, or of composition. Thus, by way of resemblance, as when because of the 59 likeness of Socrates which has been seen we conceive Socrates who has not been seen; and by way of enlargement, when starting from the common man we move on to a conception of one of such a kind that he was

Less like a corn-eating man than a forest-clad peak of the
mountains
Towering high; "

and by way of diminution, when, on the contrary, we 60 decrease the size of the common man and grasp a conception of the pygmy; and by way of composition, when from man and horse we derive the conception of a thing we have never perceived—the Hippocentaur. Every conception, then, must be preceded by experience through sense, and on this account if sensibles are abolished all conceptual thought is necessarily abolished at the same time.—Further, he 61 who declares that all apparent things are false and that only intelligibles exist "in sooth"—that is, in truth—will, in saying so, either use mere assertion or will prove it. But if he is stating it by assertion he will be checked by assertion, and if he tries to adduce proof he will be overthrown. For he will show that 62 only intelligibles exist "in sooth" by means of either an apparent thing or a non-evident. But he will show this neither by an apparent thing, for such

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οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχει, οὔτε ἀδήλῳ, ἐκ φαινομένου γὰρ ὀφείλει προπεπιστώσθαι τὸ ἀδύλον. οὐ τοίνυν ὑγιὲς ἐστὶν ἡ στάσις τῶν περὶ Δημόκριτόν τε καὶ Πλάτωνα.

- 63 Ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγε μὲν πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ἀληθῆ, καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος εἶναι, καὶ τοιαύτην ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ κινεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν, πλανᾶσθαι δὲ τοὺς τινὰς μὲν τῶν φαντασιῶν λέγοντας ἀληθεῖς τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς παρὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι χωρίζειν δόξαν ἀπὸ ἐναργείας. ἐπὶ γοῦν τοῦ Ὁρέστου, ὅτε ἐδόκει βλέπειν τὰς Ἑρινύας, ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ὑπ' εἰδῶλων κινουμένη ἀληθὴς ἦν (ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τὰ εἰδῶλα), ὁ δὲ νοῦς οἰόμενος ὅτι
- 64 στερεμνιοὶ εἰσιν Ἑρινύες ἐψευδοδόξει. καὶ ἄλλως, φησὶν, οἱ προειρημένοι τῶν φαντασιῶν διαφορὰν εἰσάγοντες οὐκ ἰσχύουσι πιστώσασθαι τὸ τινὰς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς· οὔτε γὰρ φαινομένῳ διδάξουσι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ζητεῖται γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα, οὔτε ἀδήλῳ, διὰ φαινομένου γὰρ ὀφείλει
- 65 τὸ ἀδύλον ἀποδείκνυσθαι. τοιαῦτα δὲ λέγων ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἄκων εἰς τὴν ὁμοίαν ἐκπέπτωκεν ἀπορίαν. εἰ γὰρ ὁμολογεῖ τῶν φαντασιῶν τὰς μὲν ἀπὸ στερεμνίων γίνεσθαι σωμάτων τὰς δὲ ἀπὸ εἰδῶλων, καὶ δίδωσι τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι ἐνάργειαν τὸ δὲ δόξαν, ζητῶ πῶς κρίνει τὰς ἀπὸ στερεμνίου σώματος φαντασίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ εἰδῶλου προσπιπτούσας; οὔτε γὰρ ἐνάργεια, ζητεῖται γάρ, οὔτε δόξη, δι' ἐναργείας γὰρ ὀφείλει πεπιστώσθαι.
- 66 ἄλλως τε καὶ ἄτοπός ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν μᾶλλον ζητούμενων τὰ ἡττον ζητούμενα δεικνύναι πειρώμενος·

* i.e. according to his own original assumption.

† Cf. Eurip. *Orest.* 255.

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does not exist,^a nor by a non-evident, for the non-evident must be confirmed beforehand by an apparent. So, then, the view of Democritus and Plato is not logically sound.

Epicurus asserted that "All sensibles are true and 63 every presentation is of a real object and is of the same kind as is the object which excites the sensation, and those who say that some presentations are true, others false, are led astray owing to their inability to separate opinion from clear evidence. Thus in the case of Orestes, when he fancied he saw the Furies,^b his sense excited by images^c was true (for the images really existed), but his mind, in thinking that the Furies were solid, formed a false opinion. And 64 besides," he says, "the persons mentioned above, when introducing a difference in the presentations, are not capable of confirming the view that some of them are true, others false. For neither by means of an apparent thing will they prove such a statement, since it is apparent things that are in question, nor yet by a non-evident, since the non-evident must needs be proved by means of an apparent." In 65 saying this Epicurus has unwittingly fallen into a similar difficulty. For if he allows that some presentations come from solid bodies and others from images, and grants that clear evidence is one thing, opinion another, how, I ask, does he distinguish the presentations which occur from a solid body and those from an image? For he can do so neither by evidence, this being in question, nor by opinion, for this must be confirmed by means of evidence. Besides, it is absurd of him to try to prove the less 66 questionable things by the more questionable. For

^a Cf. i. 209 n.; Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxiii; *Lucret.* iv. 34 ff.

ἡμῶν γὰρ σκεπτομένων περὶ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων πίστεως, αὐτὸς τὴν περὶ τῶν εἰδώλων τερατολογουμένην καὶ μυθώδη δόξαν ἐπεισάγει.

- 87 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῖς στωικοῖς εὐδοεῖ ὁ λόγος· θέλουσι μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε αἰσθητῶν καὶ νοητῶν εἶναι διαφοράν, καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, οὐκ ἰσχύουσι δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον συνάγειν. διακένους γὰρ εἶναί τινας φαντασίας ὠμολογήκασιν, ὅποιαι προσέπιπτον τῷ Ὁρέστῃ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑρινύων, καὶ ἄλλας παρατυπωτικὰς τὰς ἀπὸ ὑποκειμένων μὲν, οὐ κατ' αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενα, ὅποια ἦν ἡ κατὰ μανίαν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παίδων ὡς Εὐρυσθέως ὑποπεσοῦσα. ἀπὸ ὑποκειμένων γὰρ ἐγένετο τῶν παίδων, οὐ κατ' αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενα· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἰδίους ἔβλεπε παῖδας, ἀλλὰ φῆσιν

εἰς μὲν νεοσσὸς ὅδε θανὼν Εὐρυσθέως
ἔχθραν πατρίαν ἐκτίνων πέπτωκέ μοι.

- 88 τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀδιάκριτοι γίνονται αἱ φαντασίαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσι λέγειν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς τίνες τε ταῖς ἀληθείαις καταληπτικαὶ εἰσι καὶ ἀπὸ ὑποκειμένων καὶ κατ' αὐτὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα γίνονται, καὶ τίνες οὐκ εἰσὶ τοιαῦται, καθάπερ διὰ πλειόνων ἔμπροσθεν ἐδείξαμεν.
- 89 Οἷος δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ ταύτης τῆς στάσεως λόγος, τοιοῦτος γένοιτ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς λειπομένης, καθ' ἣν οἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ σημαινομένῳ, τουτέστιν ἀσωμάτῳ λεκτῷ, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὑπο-

^a Cf. i. 209 n.; Vol. I. Introd. p. xxiii; Lucret. iv. 84 ff.

^b Cf. i. 241. ^c Eurip. *Herc. Fur.* 982; cf. i. 405 ff.

^d Cf. i. 402 ff.

^e For *lekton*, "meaning" or "expression," cf. *P.H.* ii. 81.

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS, II. 66-69

when we are inquiring about the trustworthiness of things apparent, he introduces that marvellous and mythical doctrine of his about the images.^a

Nor, indeed, is the Stoic theory free from difficulty. 67 For while they urge that a difference exists in both sensibles and intelligibles, by which some of them are true, others false, they are unable to deduce this by logic. For they have allowed that some presentations are "vacuous"—such as those which Orestes received from the Furies,^b—and that others are "distorted," being derived from real objects but not in conformity with those objects themselves,—as was that which came to Heracles in his madness from his own children as though from those of Eurystheus; for it came from the children who really existed, but not in conformity with the actual real objects; for he did not see the children as his own, but declares^c—

This nestling of Eurystheus slain by me
Pays for his father's enmity by death.

And this being so, the presentations are indistinguish- 68 able and the Stoics are unable to say which are in truth apprehensive and are derived from real objects and in conformity with those objects themselves, and which are not of this kind, as we have already shown more at length.^d

What we have said regarding this view is very 69 much the same as what we have to say about the remaining view, according to which some assume truth and falsity to lie in the thing signified—that is to say in the incorporeal "expression,"^e

Regarding language and thought as both corporeal, the Stoics interpolated between them an incorporeal something, termed *lekton*, which is the subject matter of Logic; and thus they treated propositions, syllogisms, etc., as incorporeal.

τίθενται, οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς
 70 διανοίας. αὐτίκα γάρ, ἵνα ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἄρξηται
 τις, ἡξίουσι οἱ στωικοὶ κοινῶς ἐν λεκτῷ τὸ ἀληθές
 εἶναι καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. λεκτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασὶ τὸ
 κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον, λογικὴν δὲ
 εἶναι φαντασίαν καθ' ἣν τὸ φαντασθὲν ἔστι λόγῳ
 παραστήσαι. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ἔλλιπῇ καλοῦσι
 τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελῇ· ὧν τὰ μὲν ἔλλιπῇ παρείσθω νῦν,
 τῶν δὲ αὐτοτελῶν πλείους εἶναί φασι (διαφοράς)¹.
 71 καὶ γὰρ προστακτικὰ καλοῦσί τινα, ἅπερ προσ-
 τάσσοντες λέγομεν, οἷον

δεῦρ' ἴθι, νύμφα φίλη,

καὶ ἀποφαντικά, ἅπερ ἀποφαινόμενοί φαμεν, οἷον
 "ὁ Δίων περιπατεῖ," καὶ πύσματα, ἅπερ λέγοντες
 72 πυνθανόμεθα, οἷον "ποῦ οἰκεῖ Δίων;" ὀνομά-
 ζεται δέ τινα παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀρατικά, ἅπερ
 λέγοντες ἀρώμεθα,

ᾧδὲ σφ' ἐγκέφαλος χαμάδις ῥέοι ὥς ὄδε οἶνος,
 καὶ εὐκτικά, ἅπερ λέγοντες εὐχόμεθα,

Ζεῦ πάτερ, "Ἰδθην μεδέων, κύδιστε μέγιστε,
 δὸς νίκην Αἴαντι καὶ ἀγλαὸν εὖχος ἀρέσθαι.

73 προσαγορεύουσι δέ τινα τῶν αὐτοτελῶν καὶ ἀξιώ-
 ματα, ἅπερ λέγοντες ἦτοι ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα.
 ἔστι δέ τινα καὶ πλείονα ἢ ἀξιώματα, οἷον τὸ μὲν
 τοιοῦτο

Πριαμίδῃσιν ἐμφερῆς ὁ βουκόλος

¹ <διαφοράς> cj. Bekk.

^a Homer, *Il.* iii. 130.

^b Homer, *Il.* iii. 300.

^c Homer, *Il.* vii. 202.

—others in the sound, others in the motion of the intellect. Thus, for instance, to start with the 70 first view, the Stoics maintained that truth and falsity exist in the "expression." And they say that "expression" is "that which subsists in conformity with a rational presentation," and that a rational presentation is one in which it is possible to establish by reason the presented object. And of expressions they term some "defective," others "self-complete"; the defective we may now pass over, but of the self-complete there are, as they assert, several varieties; for in fact they call some "jussive," such as we utter 71 in giving an injunction, as for example—

Come thou hither, O lady dear; *

others "declaratory," such as we utter when making a statement, as for example—"Dion is walking about"; and others "interrogations," which we utter when asking a question, as for instance—"Where does Dion dwell?" And some, too, are named by 72 them "imprecatory," which we utter when we curse—

E'en as this wine is spill, so may their brains be spilt
earthwards; †

also "precatory," which we utter in prayer, of which this is an example—

Zeus, my Father, who rulest from Ida, majestic and mighty,
Victory grant unto Ajax and crown him with glory and
honour. ‡

And they also term some of the self-complete expressions "propositions," in uttering which we either speak the truth or lie. Some, too, are more than propositions. The following, for instance, is a proposition—

The cowherd doth resemble Priam's sons;

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ἀξιώμά ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ ἀληθεύομεν λέγοντες αὐτὸ ἢ
 ψευδόμεθα· τὸ δὲ οὕτως ἔχον

ὥς Πριαμίδαισιν ἐμφερῆς ὁ βουκόλος

- 74 πλέον τι ἀξιώματός ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀξίωμα. πλὴν
 ἱκανῆς οὕσης ἐν τοῖς λεκτοῖς διαφορᾶς, ἵνα τι,
 φασίν, ἀληθές ἢ ἢ ψεῦδος, δεῖ αὐτὸ πρὸ παντὸς
 λεκτὸν εἶναι, εἴτα καὶ αὐτοτελές, καὶ οὐ κοινῶς
 ὅποιονδήποτε οὖν ἀλλ' ἀξίωμα· μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο,
 καθὼς προείπον, λέγοντες ἦτοι ἀληθεύομεν ἢ
 75 ψευδόμεθα. οὐκοῦν φασίν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, τὸ
 εἶναι τι λεκτὸν ἀσώματον, ὃ κεχώρισται τῆς τε
 σημαινούσης φωνῆς, οἷον τῆς Δίων, καὶ [τῆς] τοῦ
 τυγχάνοντος, καθάπερ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Δίωνος, πόθεν
 ἔχομεν παραστήσαι; ἢ γὰρ αὐτόθεν ἐροῦσι τοῦθ'
 ὑπάρχειν οἱ στωικοί, ἢ δι' ἀποδείξεως τὴν ὑπαρξίν
 76 αὐτοῦ πιστώσονται. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτόθεν λέγοιεν
 τὸ ἀσώματον τοῦτο λεκτὸν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἡμῶν
 ἐξέσται λέγειν αὐτόθεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· ὥς γὰρ
 ἐκείνοι χωρὶς ἀποδείξεώς εἰσι πιστοί, οὕτω καὶ οἱ
 ἀπορητικοί τούναντίον διὰ ψιλῆς προφερόμενοι
 φάσεως γενήσονται πιστοί, ἢ εἴπερ ἀπιστοῦνται,
 καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὁμοίως ἀπιστοὶ γενήσονται.
 77 εἰ δὲ δι' ἀποδείξεως τὸ τοιοῦτον πιστώσονται,
 χεῖρον αὐτοῖς ἀπορον ἐπακολουθήσει. ἢ γὰρ ἀπό-
 δειξίς λόγος ἐστίν, ὃ δὲ λόγος ἐκ λεκτῶν συν-
 ἔστηκεν. τοῖς λεκτοῖς οὖν παραστήσουσι τὸ εἶναι
 τι λεκτὸν οἱ στωικοί, ὅπερ ἀπεμφαῖνον, ἐπεὶπερ ὁ
 μὴ διδούς εἶναι τι λεκτὸν οὐδὲ πολλὰ δώσει λεκτὰ
 78 εἶναι. ζητουμένων τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀποδείξει

^a *Frag. Trag. adesp.* 286 (Nauck).

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for in uttering it we are either telling the truth or lying ; but a phrase like this—

How like to Priam's sons the cowherd is,^a

is somewhat more than a proposition and is not a proposition. As, however, there is considerable 74 difference in the expressions in order that a thing may be true or false it must first of all, they say, be an expression, and next self-complete, and that, too, not of any and every kind but a proposition ; for, as I said before, it is only when we utter this that we speak a truth or a falsehood. How then, say the 75 Sceptics, can they establish that there exists any incorporeal expression which is separate both from the signifying sound, such as " Dion," and from the actual object, such as Dion himself ? For the Stoics will either declare offhand that this subsists or they will demonstrate its existence by proof. And if they 76 shall declare offhand that this incorporeal expression subsists, it will be possible for us also to declare offhand that it does not exist ; for just as they are to be trusted without proof, so likewise the Doubters are to be trusted when by means of bare assertion they maintain the opposite, or, if they are distrusted, the Stoics also will become similarly distrusted. And 77 if they shall support the statement by proof, they will find themselves faced in consequence with a worse difficulty. For proof is speech, and speech is composed of expressions. The Stoics, then, will be establishing by expressions the existence of an expression, which is nonsensical, since the man who does not grant that any expression exists will not grant either that many expressions exist. Also, when 78 the existence of the expressions of the proof is in

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λεκτῶν εἰ ἔστιν, εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἐτοίμου λαμβάνωσι τὸ εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐξ ἐτοίμου καὶ οἱ ἀπορητικοὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι λήψονται, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων ὑποπιπτούσης πίστεως ἢ ἀπιστίας, εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀποδείξεως, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπεσοῦνται· ἀπόδειξιν γὰρ ἀπαιτηθῆσονται τῶν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ ἀποδείξει ἐμπεριεχομένων λεκτῶν, καὶ τρίτην κομίσαντες τῶν ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ, καὶ τετάρτην τῶν ἐν τῇ τετάρτῃ, ὥστε ἀναρχὸν αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ εἶναι λεκτόν.

70 Καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω ἔστιν εἰς τὸν τόπον λέγειν, περὶ ὧν εὐκαιρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀποδείξεως διεξελευσόμεθα. τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐκεῖνο ῥητέον ὅτι τὸ αὐτοτελὲς ἀξίωμα σύνθετον εἶναι θέλουσιν, οἷον τὸ " ἡμέρα ἔστι " σύγκειται ἔκ τε τοῦ ἡμέρα καὶ τοῦ ἔστιν. ἀσώματον δὲ οὐδὲν οὔτε συντεθῆναι οὔτε μερισθῆναι δύναται· ἴδια γὰρ σωμάτων ἐστὶ ταῦτα. τοίνυν οὐδὲν ἔστιν αὐτοτελὲς [πρᾶγμα οὐδὲ]¹ ἀξίωμα.

80 πᾶν τε λεκτὸν λέγεσθαι δεῖ, ὅθεν καὶ ταύτης ἔτυχε τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐδὲν δὲ λεκτὸν λέγεται, ὡς παριστᾶσιν οἱ ἀπορητικοί· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι λεκτόν. ὥ ἔπεται μὴδὲ ἀξίωμα εἶναι μὴδὲ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος. λέγειν γὰρ ἔστι, καθὼς αὐτοὶ φασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τὸ τὴν τοῦ νοουμένου πράγματος σημαντικὴν προφέρεισθαι φωνήν, οἷον τοῦδε τοῦ στίχου,

μῆνιν αἶδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος.

81 ἀλλὰ τούτου γε τὴν σημαντικὴν φωνὴν ἀμήχανόν ἐστι προφέρεισθαι διὰ τὸ οὐ τὰ μέρη μὴ συνυπάρχει, μὴδὲ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ὑπάρχειν, τούτου δὲ τοῦ πράγ-

¹ [πρᾶγμα οὐδὲ] secl. Kayser.

question, if they shall perceive their existence directly, the Doubters also will perceive their non-existence directly, and if they perceive it as a result of proof, they will fall into the fallacy of regress *ad infinitum*; for they will be asked for a proof of the expressions contained in the second proof, and of those in the third when they bring forward a third, and of those in the fourth when they bring forward a fourth, so that their proof of the existence of expression is without a starting-point.

Many other arguments regarding this topic might 79 be adduced, but it will be more opportune to go through them in our chapter "Concerning Proof." For the present, let this one be stated: They hold that the self-complete proposition is a compound—"day exists," for example, is compounded of both "day" and "exists." But no incorporeal thing can be either compounded or divided; for these are things peculiar to bodies. So, then, there is no self-complete [object or] proposition.—Further, every 80 expression must be expressed, since from this it has got its name; but no expression is expressed, as the Doubters establish; therefore no expression exists. Whereupon it follows that no proposition, true or false, exists. For "to express" is, as the Stoics themselves declare, "to utter the sound capable of signifying the object conceived"—this verse, for instance,

Sing, O goddess, the fury of Peleus' offspring Achilles.*

But it is not feasible to utter the sound capable of 81 signifying this, because that object whose parts do not co-exist does not exist itself, and the parts of this

* Homer, *Il.* i.

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ματος τὰ μέρη μὴ συνυπάρχειν, ὥστε μὴδ' αὐτὸ
 ὑπαρκτὸν εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὅτι ἀσυνύπαρκτά ἐστιν
 αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη, αὐτόθεν δείκνυται. ὅτε γὰρ τὸ
 πρῶτον ἡμιστίχιον προφερόμεθα, οὐπω ἐστὶ τὸ
 δεύτερον, καὶ ὅτε τὸ δεύτερον προφερόμεθα, οὐκέτ'
 ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε τὸν μὲν ὅλον στίχον οὐ προ-
 82 φερόμεθα. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμιστίχιον· ὅταν γὰρ
 πάλιν τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ ἡμιστιχίου μέρος λέγωμεν,
 τότε οὐπω τὸ δεύτερον αὐτοῦ μέρος προφερόμεθα,
 καὶ ὅτε τὸ δεύτερον προφερόμεθα, οὐκέτι λέγομεν
 τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμιστίχιον ὑπάρχει. καὶ
 δὲ σκοπῶμεν, οὐδὲ μία λέξις, οἷον ἡ "μῆνιν".
 ὅτε γὰρ τὴν "μη" συλλαβὴν λέγομεν, οὐδέπω
 τὴν "νιν" προφερόμεθα, καὶ ὅτε τὴν "νιν"
 83 προφερόμεθα, οὐκέτι τὴν "μη." εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατόν
 ἐστὶν ὑπάρχειν τι οὐ τὰ μέρη ἀσυνύπαρκτά ἐστι,
 δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ μιᾷ λέξεως ἀσυνύπαρκτα τὰ
 μέρη, ῥητέον μηδεμίαν ὑπάρχειν λέξιν. διὰ τοῦτο
 δὲ οὐδὲ ἀξίωμα, ὃ φασὶ σύνθετον εἶναι, οἷον τὸ
 τοιοῦτο "Σωκράτης ἐστίν." ὅτε γὰρ λέγεται
 "Σωκράτης," οὐπω ἐστὶ τὸ "ἐστίν," καὶ ὅτε τὸ
 "ἐστίν" λέγεται, τὸ "Σωκράτης" οὐ λέγεται.
 οὐδέποτε ἄρα ὅλον ὑπάρχει τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ μέρη
 τοῦ ὅλου· τὰ δὲ μέρη τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀξιώματα.
 84 οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τι ἀξίωμα. καίτοι τί περὶ ὅλου τοῦ
 ἀξιώματος διεξιμένον τοῦ "Σωκράτης ἐστίν," ὅτε
 καὶ αὐτὸ κατ' ἰδίαν τὸ πτωτικὸν τὸ Σωκράτης οὐ
 δύναται ἐν ὑπάρξει νοεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν;
 φημὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνυπάρχειν τὰ συστατικὰ αὐτοῦ
 μόρια.

¹ μῆνιν Rustow: μῆνις mss., Bekk.

² τὸ Heintz: ὁ mss., Bekk.

object do not co-exist, so that neither is it capable of existing itself. And the fact that its parts are not capable of co-existing is proved directly. For when we utter the first half-verse, the second is not yet in existence; and when we utter the second, the first is no longer in existence; so that we do not utter the whole verse. Nor, indeed, even the half-verse. 82

For when, once more, we are saying the first part of the half-verse, we are not then uttering as yet the second part of it; and when we utter the second, we are no longer saying the first; so that the half-verse does not exist either. Nor, if we consider it, does even a single expression, such as "fury," exist; for when we are saying the syllable "fu" we are not as yet uttering the "ry," and when we utter the "ry" we are no longer saying the "fu." If, then, 83

it is impossible for anything to exist if its parts are incapable of co-existence, and it has been proved in the case of one locution that its parts are incapable of co-existence, we must declare that no locution exists. And for the same reason, also, no proposition exists either; for they assert it to be a compound, as for instance "Socrates exists." For when "Socrates" is being said, "exists" does not yet exist; and when "exists" is being said, "Socrates" is not being said. Therefore the whole proposition never exists, but parts of the whole; and its parts are not propositions. Therefore no proposition exists. Yet why should 84

we discuss the whole proposition "Socrates exists," when even its nominative case, "Socrates," taken by itself cannot be conceived as in existence for the same reason—I mean, for the reason that its component parts do not co-exist?

- 85 Διδομένου τε τούτου,¹ ἀξίωμα εἶναι τι ἀληθές καὶ τι ψεῦδος οὐ συγχωρήσουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως διὰ τὸ μὴ εὐαπόδοτον αὐτὸ καθεστάναι τοῖς πρὸς οὓς ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος. φασὶ γὰρ ἀληθές μὲν εἶναι ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ἀντίκειται τινι, ψεῦδος δὲ ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρχει μὲν ἀντίκειται δέ τινι. ἐρωτώμενοι δὲ τί ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον, λέγουσι τὸ
- 86 καταληπτικὴν κινοῦν φαντασίαν· εἰτα περὶ τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας ἐξεταζόμενοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον, ἐπ' ἴσης ὃν ἄγνωστον, ἀνατρέχουσι, λέγοντες “καταληπτικὴ ἐστὶ φαντασία ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον.” ὅπερ ἦν ἴσον τῷ δι' ἄγνωστούμενον τὸ ἀγνωστούμενον διδάσκειν καὶ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐμπίπτειν τρόπον. ἵνα γὰρ τὸ ὑπάρχον μάθωμεν, ἐπὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν ἡμᾶς φαντασίαν ἀποστέλλουσι, λέγοντες ὑπάρχον εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν· ἵνα δὲ τὴν καταληπτικὴν γνῶμεν φαντασίαν, ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀναποστέλλουσιν. μήτε οὖν ἐκεῖνο μήτε ταύτην γινώσκοντες οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπ' αὐτῶν διδασκόμενον ἀληθές καὶ ψεῦδος ἀξίωμα συνήσομεν.
- 87 Κἂν ταύτης δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας ἀφίστηται τις, μείζων ἄλλη παρ' αὐτὴν ἀνακύψει τοῖς τὴν στωικὴν τεχνολογίαν ἀποδεχομένοις. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ βουλοίμεθα μαθεῖν τί ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, πρότερον ὀφείλομεν ἐγνωκέναι τί τὸ ζῶον καὶ τί τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τί τὸ θνητόν (ἐκ τούτων γὰρ συνέστηκεν ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου νόησις), καὶ ὃν τρόπον εἰ προαιροίμεθα γινώσκειν τί ἐστὶ κύων, προκατειληφέναι δεήσει

¹ τούτου: τοῦ mss., Bekk. (lacunam ante ἀληθές indic., Kochalsky).

But if it be granted that a proposition exists, the 85
 Sceptics will not admit that a true or a false proposition exists, because this is not easy of explanation for those with whom they are arguing. For these assert that a true proposition is that which subsists and is opposed to something, and a false one that which is not subsisting but is opposed to something. And when asked "What is that which subsists?"^a they reply "That which excites an apprehensive presentation"; next, when examined concerning the apprehensive 86
 presentation they have recourse again to "the subsistent," which is equally unknown, saying "An apprehensive presentation is that derived from a subsisting object in conformity with that object itself." And thus is equivalent to teaching the unknown thing by means of an unknown thing and falling into the fallacy of circular reasoning. For in order that we may learn the subsistent they send us off to the apprehensive presentation, saying that the subsistent is that which excites an apprehensive presentation; and in order that we may get to know the apprehensive presentation they send us back to the subsistent. As we know, then, neither the latter nor the former, neither shall we understand the true or false proposition which is explained through them.

And even if one sets aside this difficulty, another 87
 will pop up, greater than this, for those who accept the logical system of Stoicism. For just as, if we wish to learn what Man is, we ought to know first what Animal is, and what Rational is, and what Mortal is (for the concept of Man is compounded of these),—and just as, if we desire to know what Dog is, it will first be necessary for us to have grasped

^a Cf. *P.H.* iii.

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πάλιν τὸ ζῶον καὶ τὸ ὑλακτικόν (ἐκ τούτων γὰρ
 88 ἐνοεῖτο ὁ κύων), οὕτως εἰ ἀληθές ἐστι κατὰ τοὺς
 στωικοὺς ὃ ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ἀντίκειται τινι καὶ
 ψεῦδος ὃ μὴ ὑπάρχει μὲν ἀντίκειται δέ τινι, κατ'
 ἀνάγκην ὀφείλομεν γινώσκειν εἰς τὴν τούτων
 νόησιν τί ἐστι τὸ ἀντικείμενον. οὐ πάνυ δέ γε
 δύνανται παραστήσαι τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἡμῖν οἱ
 στωικοί· τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος ἔσται
 89 γινώριμα. φασὶ γὰρ "ἀντικείμενά ἐστιν ὦν τὸ
 ἕτερον τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀποφάσει πλεονάζει," οἷον
 "ἡμέρα ἔστιν—οὐχ ἡμέρα ἔστιν." τοῦ γὰρ
 "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἀξιώματος τὸ "οὐχ ἡμέρα ἔστιν"
 ἀποφάσει πλεονάζει τῇ οὐχί, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀντι-
 κείμενόν ἐστιν ἐκείνῳ. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστι τὸ ἀντι-
 κείμενον, ἔσται καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀντικείμενα, τό τε
 "ἡμέρα ἔστι (καὶ φῶς ἔστιν)" καὶ τὸ "ἡμέρα
 ἔστιν" καὶ "οὐχὶ φῶς ἔστιν". τοῦ γὰρ "ἡμέρα
 ἔστιν (καὶ φῶς ἔστιν)" ἀξιώματος ἀποφάσει
 πλεονάζει τὸ "(ἡμέρα ἔστιν καὶ)¹ οὐχὶ φῶς ἔστιν."
 οὐχὶ δέ γε κατ' αὐτοὺς ταῦτα ἀντικείμενά ἐστιν·
 οὐκ ἄρα ἀντικείμενά ἐστι (τῷ)² τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ
 90 ἐτέρου ἀποφάσει πλεονάζειν. ναί φασιν, ἀλλὰ σὺν
 τούτῳ ἀντικείμενά ἐστι, σὺν τῷ τὴν ἀπόφασιν
 προτετάχθαι τοῦ ἐτέρου· τότε γὰρ καὶ κυριεύει
 τοῦ ὅλου ἀξιώματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν
 καὶ οὐχὶ φῶς ἔστιν," μέρος οὔσα τοῦ παντός, οὐ
 κυριεύει πρὸς τὸ ἀποφατικὸν ποιῆσαι τὸ πᾶν.
 ἐχρῆν οὖν, ἐροῦμεν, προσκεῖσθαι τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τῶν
 ἀντικειμένων ὅτι τότε ἀντικείμενά ἐστιν, ὅταν μὴ
 ψιλῶς τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἐτέρου ἀποφάσει πλεονάζῃ,

¹ <καὶ . . . ἔστιν> . . . <καὶ φῶς ἔστιν> . . . <ἡμέρα . . . καὶ>
 Arnim. ² <τῷ> Hervet.

again what Animal is, and what "Capable of barking" is (for out of these was formed the concept of Dog),—so likewise if the True is, according to the Stoics, that which subsists and is opposed to something, and the false that which is not subsistent but is opposed to something, in order to conceive these things we must necessarily know what the "opposed" thing is. But the Stoics are certainly not able to explain to us the "opposed"; neither, then, will the true or the false become known. For they say that "Opposed things are those of which the one exceeds the other by a negative."—for instance "It is day—it is not day." For the proposition "It is not day" exceeds the proposition "It is day" by the negative "not," and because of this it is opposed thereto. But if this is "opposed," such propositions as the following will also be opposed—"It is day and it is light" and "It is day and it is not light"; for the proposition "It is day and it is not light" exceeds "It is day and it is light" by the negative. But in fact, according to them, these are not "opposed"; therefore things are not "opposed" through the one exceeding the other by the negative. "Yes," they reply, "but they are opposed with this (added condition) that the negative is prefixed to one of the propositions; for then it controls the whole proposition, whereas in the case of "It is day and it is not light," the negative, being a part of the whole, does not control the whole so as to render it negative. In that case, we will reply, to the concept of "things opposed" it should have been added that they are opposed not when the one simply exceeds the other

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ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡ ἀπόφασις προτάτῃται τοῦ ἀξιώ-
ματος.

- 91 Ἄλλος δέ τις καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνος παραλήψεται
λόγον, ὃ κέχρηται ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ διδάξει
ὥς οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστι μετουσίᾳ τῆς ἀποφάσεως
πλεονάζειν τὸ ἀξίωμα παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχον τὴν ἀπό-
φασιν. ὥς γὰρ οὐδὲν μετουσίᾳ θερμοῦ γίνεται
ψυχρόν, οὕτως οὐδὲν μετουσίᾳ μικροῦ γίνεται μέγα
ἀλλὰ μικρόν· καὶ ὥς μετοχῇ τοῦ μείζονος γίνεται
τι μέγα, οὕτω καὶ μετοχῇ τοῦ μικροῦ ἔσται τι
μικρόν. διὸ καὶ τὴν ἐννεάδα κατὰ τὴν τῆς μονάδος
πρόσληψιν μὴ γίνεσθαι μείζονα. τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἡπτόν
92 ἐστι τῶν ἐννέα· τοῦτ' οὖν προσλαβοῦσα ἡ ἐννεὰς
οὐ γενήσεται πλείων τῶν ἐννέα, ἐλάττων δὲ μᾶλλον.
[τῇ¹ γὰρ προσλήψει ταύτης οὐ γενήσεται ἡ ἐννεὰς
τῆς ἐννεάδος μείζων, ἀλλὰ ἐλάσσων μᾶλλον.]
ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ἡ οὐχὶ ἀπόφασις μικρότερόν τί ἐστι
τοῦ ἀξιώματος, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἀξίωμα μείζον, διὰ
τό, ὥς μεγέθους τινὸς μετουσίᾳ γίνεται τι μείζον,
οὕτω καὶ ἐλάττονος μετουσίᾳ ἐλαττον ἀποτελεῖται.

- Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πλάτωνος λόγος οὕτως εἰς τὸν τόπον
93 ὑπὸ τινων μεταχθήσεται· ἐπισυνάπτοντες δὲ ἡμεῖς
τοῖς προκειμένοις κακεῖνο λέγωμεν ὥς εἴπερ τὸ
ἀληθὲς ἀξίωμά ἐστι, πάντως ἢ ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶν
ἀξίωμα ἢ οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἢ καὶ ἀπλοῦν καὶ οὐχ
ἀπλοῦν. τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωμάτων πρώτην σχεδὸν καὶ
κυριωτάτην ἐκφέρουσι διαφορὰν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ
καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἀπλᾶ τὰ δ' οὐχ
ἀπλᾶ. καὶ ἀπλᾶ μὲν ὅσα μῆτ' ἐξ ἐνὸς ἀξιώματος
δὺς λαμβανομένου συνέστηκεν, μῆτ' ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων

¹ τῇ N: ei cet., Bekk.—[τῇ . . . μᾶλλον] secl. Kochalsky.

by the negative, but when the negative is prefixed to the proposition.

Some other man, too, will adopt the argument of 91 Plato, which he uses in his book *On the Soul*,^a and will show that it is not possible for the proposition by participation in the negative to exceed that which has no negative. For as nothing becomes cold by participation in the hot, so nothing becomes great, but small, by participation in the small; and as a thing becomes great by participation in the greater, so also a thing will be small by participation in the small. And because of this, too, the nine does not become greater through the addition of the monad. For the one is less than the nine; so by the addition 92 of it the nine will not become more than nine, but rather less. Since, then, the negative "not" is a smaller thing than the proposition, it will not make the proposition greater, seeing that, just as a thing becomes greater by participation in a magnitude, so also it is rendered smaller by participation in a smaller thing.

By some, then, the argument of Plato will be transferred in this wise to our topic; but let us supplement the 93 arguments already put forward by stating this further argument: If the true is a proposition, it certainly is either a simple proposition or a not simple or both a simple and a not simple. For the Dialecticians proclaim that almost the first and most important distinction in propositions is that by which some of them are simple, others not simple. And simple are all those which are neither compounded of one proposition twice repeated,^b nor of different propositions, by

^a See Plato, *Phaedo* 103 c.

^b For the "duplicated" proposition cf. *P.H.* ii. 112.

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διαφερόντων διὰ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν συνδέσμων, οἷον
 "ἡμέρα ἔστιν, νύξ ἔστιν, Σωκράτης διαλέγεται,"
 94 πᾶν ὁ τῆς ὁμοίας ἐστὶν ἰδέας. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸν
 στήμονα ἀπλοῦν λέγομεν καίπερ ἐκ τριχῶν συν-
 εστῶτα, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐκ στημόνων, οἷτινές εἰσιν ὁμο-
 γενεῖς, πέπλεκται, οὕτως ἀπλᾶ λέγεται ἀξιώματα,
 ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων συνέστηκεν ἀλλ' ἐξ ἄλλων
 τινῶν. οἷον τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ
 παρόσον οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἀξιώματος δις
 λαμβανομένου οὔτε ἐκ διαφερόντων συνέστηκεν,
 ἐξ ἄλλων δὲ τινῶν συγκέκριται, οἷον τοῦ ἡμέρα
 καὶ τοῦ ἔστιν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ σύνδεσμός ἐστιν ἐν
 95 αὐτῷ. οὐχ ἀπλᾶ δὲ ἐτύγχανε τὰ οἷον διπλᾶ, καὶ
 ὅσα δ' ἐξ ἀξιώματος δις λαμβανομένου ἢ ἐξ ἀξι-
 ωμάτων διαφερόντων συνέστηκεν διὰ συνδέσμου τε ἢ
 συνδέσμων, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν· εἰ
 νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν· καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ φῶς
 ἔστιν· ἦτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν."
 96 τῶν δὲ ἀπλῶν τινὰ μὲν ὠρισμένα ἐστὶν τινὰ δὲ
 ἀόριστα τινὰ δὲ μέσα, ὠρισμένα μὲν τὰ κατὰ
 δεῖξιν ἐκφερόμενα, οἷον "οὗτος περιπατεῖ, οὗτος
 κάθηται". δείκνυμι γάρ τινα τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους
 97 ἀνθρώπων. ἀόριστα δὲ ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐν οἷς
 ἀόριστόν τι κυριεύει μόριον, οἷον "τις κάθηται,"
 μέσα δὲ τὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα "ἄνθρωπος κάθηται"
 ἢ "Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ." τὸ μὲν οὖν "τις περι-
 πατεῖ" ἀόριστόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀφώρικέ τινα
 τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους περιπατούντων· κοινῶς γὰρ ἐφ'
 ἐκάστου αὐτῶν ἐκφέρεσθαι δύναται· τὸ δὲ "οὗτος
 κάθηται" ὠρισμένον ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ περ ἀφώρικε τὸ
 δεικνύμενον πρόσωπον. τὸ δὲ "Σωκράτης κάθ-

means of some one or more conjunctions ; as for example " It is day," " It is night," " Socrates is conversing," and every proposition of similar form. For 94 just as we call the web " simple," although it is composed of threads, since it is not woven of webs, which are homogeneous with itself, so propositions are called " simple " since they are not compounded of propositions but of certain other things. For example, " It is day " is a simple proposition inasmuch as it is neither formed from the same proposition twice repeated nor compounded of different propositions, but is constructed of certain other elements, namely " day " and " it is." Moreover, 95 there is no conjunction in it either. And " not simple " are those which are, so to say, double, and all such as are compounded of a proposition twice repeated, or of different propositions, by means of one or more conjunctions, as for example—" If it is day, it is day "; " If it is night, it is dark "; " Both day exists and light exists "; " Either day exists or night exists."—And of the simple some are 96 " definite," some " indefinite," some " intermediate"; the definite are those uttered indicatively, for example " This man is walking," " This man is sitting " (for I am indicating some particular person). " In- 97 definite," according to them, are those in which some indefinite part is dominant, as for example " Someone is sitting "; and " intermediate " those like this, " A man is sitting " or " Socrates is walking." Now " Someone is walking " is indefinite since it does not define any one of the individuals who are walking ; for it can be applied in common to each one of them ; but " This man is sitting " is definite because it defines the person indicated. And " Socrates is

ηται " μέσον ὑπῆρχεν, ἐπεὶ περ οὔτε ἀόριστόν ἐστιν, ἀφώρικε γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, οὔτε ὠρισμένον, οὐ γὰρ μετὰ δείξεως ἐκφέρεται, ἀλλ' ἔοικε μέσον ἀμφοτέρων ὑπάρχειν, τοῦ τε ἀόριστου καὶ τοῦ ὠρισμέ-
 98 νου. γίνεσθαι δέ φασι τὸ ἀόριστον ἀληθές, τὸ " τίς περιπατεῖ " ἢ " τίς κάθηται," ὅταν τὸ ὠρισμένον ἀληθές εὐρίσκηται, τὸ " οὗτος κάθηται " ἢ " οὗτος περιπατεῖ "· μηδενὸς γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους καθημένου οὐ δύναται ἀληθές εἶναι τὸ " τίς κάθηται " ἀόριστον.

99 Τοιαῦτα μὲν ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίοις τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν ἀξιωμαίων λεγόμενα τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὑπῆρχεν. οἱ δὲ ἀπορητικοὶ ζητοῦσι πρῶτον εἰ δύναται τὸ ὠρισμένον ἀληθές εἶναι· τούτου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος οὐδὲ τὸ ἀόριστον δύναται ὑπάρχειν ἀληθές, ἀναιρουμένου δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἀόριστου οὐδὲ τὸ μέσον τούτων ὑποστήσεται. ταῦτα δ' ἦν ὥσπερ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἀπλῶν ἀξιωμαίων· τοίνυν ἀθετουμένων αὐτῶν οἰχθήσεται καὶ τὰ ἀπλᾶ ἀξιώματα, καὶ οὐκ ἐνέσται λέγειν τὰ ἀληθές ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς ὑπάρχειν ἀξιώμασιν.

100 καὶ δὴ τὸ ὠρισμένον τοῦτο ἀξίωμα, τὸ " οὗτος κάθηται " ἢ " οὗτος περιπατεῖ," τότε φασὶν ἀληθές ὑπάρχειν ὅταν τῷ ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν πίπτοντι συμβεβήκη τὸ κατηγορήμα, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἢ τὸ περιπατεῖν. ἀλλ' ἐν τε τῷ λέγειν " οὗτος περιπατεῖ " δεικνυμένου τινὸς τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπων, ἥτοι Σωκράτης ἐστὶ λόγου χάριν ὁ ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν πίπτων ἢ μέρος τι τοῦ Σωκράτους· οὔτε δὲ Σωκράτης ἐστὶν ὁ ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν πίπτων οὔτε μέρος τι Σωκράτους, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα
 101 δύναται ἀληθές εἶναι τὸ ὠρισμένον ἀξίωμα. καὶ Σωκράτης μὲν οὐχ ὑποπίπτει τῇ δεῖξει, παρόσον

sitting " is intermediate, because it is neither indefinite (for it defines the particular object), nor definite (for it is not uttered indicatively), but seems to be intermediate between these two, the indefinite and the definite. And they say that the indefinite— 98
 " Someone is walking " or " Someone is sitting "—becomes true when the definite—" This man is sitting " or " This man is walking "—is found to be true ; for if no one particular person is sitting the indefinite proposition " Someone is sitting " cannot be true.

Such then, to speak summarily, are the statements 99
 made by the Dialecticians regarding the " simple " propositions. But the Doubters inquire, firstly, whether the " definite " can be true ; for if this is abolished, the " indefinite " cannot be true either ; and if the indefinite also is abolished, neither will the " intermediate " subsist. But these are elements, as it were, of the simple propositions ; so that if they are rejected the simple propositions also will disappear, and it will not be possible to assert that the true exists in the simple propositions.—Now as to 100
 this definite proposition " This man is sitting " or " This man is walking," they declare that it is true when the thing predicated, such as " sitting " or " walking," belongs to the object indicated. But when, in the statement " This man is walking," some one particular man is indicated, the person indicated is either (let us say) Socrates or a part of Socrates ; but the person indicated is neither Socrates nor a part of Socrates, as we shall establish ; therefore the definite proposition cannot be true. Now Socrates 101
 is not the object indicated inasmuch as (he being

- αὐτοῦ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνεστῶτος οὐθ' ἡ ψυχὴ δεικνύται οὔτε τὸ σῶμα, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ ὅλον ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν πίπτον ἔσται.¹ καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ μόριόν τι Σωκράτους ὑπέπιπτε τῇ δείξει· εἰ γὰρ τῷ ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν πίπτοντι συμβεβηκέναι φασὶ τὸ κατηγορήμα τὸ περιπατεῖν ἢ τὸ καθῆσθαι, οὐδέποτε δὲ τῷ δεικνυμένῳ μορίῳ ὄντι ἐλαχίστῳ συμβέβηκε τὸ κατηγορήμα, οἷον τὸ περιπατεῖν ἢ τὸ καθῆσθαι, κατ' ἀνάγκην οὐδὲ τὸ μόριον ἔσται πίπτον
- 102 ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε τοῦτο μήτε Σωκράτης, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οἷχεται τὸ κατὰ δεῖξιν ἐκφερόμενον ὠρισμένον ἀξίωμα, σὺν τῷ καὶ ἀόριστον αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι σχεδόν· εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται μὲν τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ δεικνύμενον τοῦ Σωκράτους μέρος, ἐνδέχεται δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀόριστον γίνεται τὸ ὅλον. μὴ ὄντος οὖν τοῦ ὠρισμένου ἀξιώματος οὐδὲ τὸ ἀόριστον ἔσται. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὸ μέσον ὑποστήσεται.
- 103 Πρὸς τούτοις ὅταν λέγωσι τὸ μὲν "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἀξίωμα ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἶναι ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ "νῦξ ἔστι" ψεῦδος, καὶ τὸ μὲν "οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι" ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ "οὐχὶ νῦξ ἔστιν" ἀληθές, ἐπιστήσῃ τις πῶς μία οὖσα καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπόφασις τοῖς μὲν ἀληθέσι προσελθοῦσα ψευδῇ ταῦτα ποιεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ψευδέσιν ἀληθῇ. ὅμοιον γὰρ ἔστι τοῦτο τῷ κατὰ τὸ Αἰσιώπειον αἰνίγμα Σειληνῷ, ὃς ὁρῶν τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον χειμῶνος ὥρα καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ψύχεσθαι τὰς χεῖρας [ἐμφυσῶντα] καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ καίεσθαι ἐμφυσῶντα τῷ στόματι, ἔφη μὴ ἂν ὑπομεῖναι τοιοῦτῳ θηρίῳ συζῆν ἐξ οὗ

¹ ὥστε οὐδὲ . . . πίπτον ἔσται: οὔτε . . . πίπτοντα Mss., Bekk. (εἰθ' ἢ ψ. δ. εἴτε τὸ σ., οὐχὶ καὶ . . . πίπτει ej. Mutsch.).

compounded of soul and body) neither his soul nor his body is indicated, so that he will not be indicated as a whole either. Nor yet is a part of Socrates the object indicated; for if they assert that the thing predicated (walking or sitting) belongs to the object indicated, while the thing predicated, such as walking or sitting, never belongs to the part indicated, it being very small, it necessarily follows that the part will not be the object indicated. But if neither this nor ¹⁰² Socrates (is indicated), and besides these there is no other alternative, then the definite proposition as indicatively stated disappears—in addition to the fact that it also becomes practically indefinite. For if the thing indicated admits of being this part of Socrates, and admits also of being not this part but another, then the whole necessarily becomes indefinite. If, then, the definite proposition is non-existent, neither will the indefinite exist. And because of this the intermediate will not subsist either.

Furthermore, when they say that the proposition ¹⁰³ "It is day" is at present true but "It is night" false, and "It is not day" false but "It is not night" true, one will ponder how a negative, which is one and the same, when attached to things true makes them false, and attached to things false makes them true. For this is like the Silenus in the riddle of Aesop who, on seeing the same man in the winter season blowing with his mouth both to save his hands from being cold, and to save himself from being burnt, declared that he could not endure to live with a beast of a kind such that out of him proceed

- 104 τὰ ἐναντιώτατα προέρχεται. ὧδε γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ
 ἢ ἀπόφασις τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχοντα ἀνύπαρκτα ποιούσα,
 τὰ δὲ ἀνύπαρκτα ὑπαρκτά, τεραστίου φύσεως
 μετείληφεν. ἢ γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν θέλουσιν ἢ μὴ
 ὑπάρχειν ἢ (μήτε ὑπάρχειν μήτε μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἢ)¹
 ὑπάρχειν ἅμα καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὑπ-
 ἀρχειν, πῶς ὑπάρχοντι προσελθοῦσα ἀνύπαρκτον τὸ
 ὅλον ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχον; ὑπάρχον γὰρ
 ὑπάρχοντι προσγενόμενον βεβαιοὶ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπ-
 105 ἀρξιν. εἰ δὲ ἀνύπαρκτον, τίτι λόγῳ τῷ μὴ ὑπ-
 ἀρχοντι προσελθοῦσα ὑπαρκτὸν αὐτὸ ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ
 μᾶλλον ἀνύπαρκτον; ἀνυπαρκτῷ γὰρ ἀνύπαρκτον
 προστεθὲν οὐχ ὑπαρξιν ἀλλ' ἀνυπαρξίαν ἀπεργά-
 ζεται. ἢ πῶς ἀνύπαρκτος οὐσα μετατίθῃσι τὸ
 ὑπαρκτὸν εἰς ἀνυπαρξίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ μὲν τι
 ὑπαρκτὸν κατὰ δέ τι ἀνύπαρκτον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ; ὥς
 γὰρ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν συντεθέντα οὐ μέλαν ἢ
 λευκὸν ποιεῖ ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τι λευκὸν κατὰ δέ τι
 μέλαν, οὕτω καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον ὑπαρκτῷ συνελθὼν
 τὸ ὅλον ποιήσει κατὰ μὲν τι ὑπαρκτὸν κατὰ δέ τι
 106 ἀνύπαρκτον. ἄλλως τε τὸ ἀνύπαρκτὸν τι ποιῶν
 ποιεῖ τι, τὸ δὲ ποιῶν ἔστι καὶ ὑπάρχει· ἢ ἄρα
 ἀπόφασις μὴ ὑπάρχουσα οὐδὲ ποιήσει τι ἀνύπα-
 ρκτον.² λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν μήτε ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν
 μήτε μὴ ὑπάρχειν. ἀλλ' εἰ τοιαύτη ἐστί, πῶς
 πάλιν μήτε ὑπάρχουσα μήτε μὴ ὑπάρχουσα τῷ
 μὲν ὑπάρχοντι προσελθοῦσα ἀνυπαρξίαν ποιεῖ, τῷ
 107 δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχοντι ὑπαρξιν; ὥς γὰρ τὸ μήτε θερμὸν
 μήτε ψυχρὸν τῷ θερμῷ προσελθὼν οὐ δύναται
 ποιῆσαι ψυχρὸν, οὐδὲ τῷ ψυχρῷ θερμὸν, οὕτως

¹ <μήτε . . . ἢ> Heintz.² ἀνύπαρκτον Kalbfleisch: ὑπαρκτὸν mss., Bekk.

ἀλογόν¹ ἐστὶ τὸ μήτε ὑπάρχον μήτε μὴ ὑπάρχον
τῷ μὲν ὑπάρχοντι προσελθὼν ἀνυπαρξίαν ποιεῖν,
τῷ δὲ ἀνυπάρκτῳ ὑπαρξιν. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐνέσται
ἀπορεῖν καὶ εἰάν κατὰ τὶ μὲν ὑπάρχειν λέγωσι τὴν
ἀπόφασιν, κατὰ δέ τι ἀνυπαρκτον εἶναι.

- 108 Νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ ποσὸν ψηλαφηθείσης τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν
ἀπλῶν ἀξιωμαίων παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς νομο-
θεσίας, μετρίωμεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν οὐχ ἀπλῶν.
καὶ δὴ οὐχ ἀπλᾶ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀξιώματα τὰ ἀνώτερον
προειρημένα, ἅπερ ἐξ ἀξιώματος διαφορουμένου ἢ
ἀξιωμαίων διαφερόντων συνέστηκε καὶ ἐν οἷς
109 σύνδεσμος ἢ σύνδεσμοι ἐπικρατοῦσιν. λαμβανέσθω
δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ καλούμενον
συνημμένον. τοῦτο τοῖνυν συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀξιώ-
ματος διαφορουμένου ἢ ἐξ ἀξιωμαίων διαφερόν-
των διὰ τοῦ "εἶ" ἢ "εἶπερ" συνδέσμου, οἷον
ἐκ διαφορουμένου μὲν ἀξιώματος καὶ τοῦ "εἶ"
συνδέσμου συνέστηκε τὸ τοιοῦτον συνημμένον "εἶ
110 ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ἐκ διαφερόντων δὲ
ἀξιωμαίων καὶ διὰ τοῦ "εἶπερ" συνδέσμου τὸ
οὕτως ἔχον "εἶπερ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν." τῶν
δὲ ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ ἀξιωμαίων τὸ μετὰ τὸν εἶ
ἢ τὸν εἶπερ σύνδεσμον τεταγμένον ἡγούμενόν τε
καὶ πρῶτον καλεῖται, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν λήγον τε καὶ
δεύτερον, καὶ εἰάν ἀναστρόφως ἐκφέρεται τὸ ὅλον
συνημμένον, οἷον οὕτως "φῶς ἔστιν εἶπερ ἡμέρα
ἔστιν." καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ λήγον μὲν καλεῖται τὸ
"φῶς ἔστιν" καίπερ πρῶτον ἐξενεχθέν, ἡγού-
μενον δὲ τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" καίπερ δεύτερον λεγό-
μενον, διὰ τὸ μετὰ τὸν εἶπερ σύνδεσμον τετάχθαι.
- 111 ἢ μὲν οὖν σύστασις τοῦ συνημμένου, ὥς ἐν συν-

¹ ἀλογον Kalbfleisch: ἀνάλογον mss., Bekk.

contrary to reason that what is neither existent nor non-existent when attached to the existent should produce non-existence, and when attached to the non-existent, existence. And it will also be open to us to raise the same difficulties if they should declare that the negative is partly existent and partly non-existent.

And now that we have in some degree handled 108 the legislation of the Dialecticians regarding simple propositions, let us proceed also to that which concerns the non-simple. Now non-simple propositions are those already mentioned above, being such as are composed of a duplicated proposition or of differing propositions, and are controlled by a conjunction or conjunctions. Of these let us take for the present 109 the hypothetical proposition so-called. This, then, is composed of a duplicated proposition or of differing propositions, by means of the conjunction "if" or "if in fact"; thus, for example, from a duplicated proposition and the conjunction "if" there is composed such a hypothetical proposition as this—"If it is day, it is day"; and from differing propositions, and by 110 means of the conjunction "if in fact," one in this form—"If in fact it is day, it is light." And of the propositions contained in the hypothetical proposition that which is placed after the conjunction "if" or "if in fact" is called both "antecedent" and "first," and the other one both "consequent" and "second," even if the whole proposition is reversed in order of expression, as thus—"It is light, if in fact it is day"; for in this, too, the proposition "it is light" is called "consequent" although it is uttered first, and "it is day" antecedent, although it is spoken second, owing to the fact that it is placed after the conjunction "if in fact." Such then—to put it briefly—is the con- 111

τόμῳ εἰπεῖν, ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι δὲ δοκεῖ
 τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀξίωμα ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ πρώτῳ
 τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ δεύτερον καὶ ὄντος τοῦ ἡγουμένου
 ἔσεσθαι τὸ λήγον. ὅθεν σωζομένης μὲν τῆς
 τοιαύτης ἐπαγγελίας καὶ ἀκολουθοῦντος τῷ ἡγου-
 μένῳ τοῦ λήγοντος ἀληθὲς γίνεται καὶ τὸ συν-
 112 ημμένον, μὴ σωζομένης δὲ ψεῦδος. διόπερ ἀπὸ
 τούτου εὐθὺς ἀρξάμενοι σκοπῶμεν εἰ δύναται
 ἀληθὲς τι συνημμένον καὶ σῶζον τὴν εἰρημένην
 ἐπαγγελίαν εὐρεθῆναι.

Κοινῶς μὲν γάρ φασιν ἅπαντες οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ
 ὑγιὲς εἶναι συνημμένον ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ
 ἡγουμένῳ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγον· περὶ δὲ τοῦ πότε
 ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ πῶς στασιάζουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
 καὶ μαχόμενα τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἐκτίθενται κριτήρια.
 113 οἷον ὁ μὲν Φίλων ἔλεγεν ἀληθὲς γίνεσθαι τὸ συν-
 ημμένον ὅταν μὴ ἀρχηται ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγῃ
 ἐπὶ ψεῦδος, ὥστε τριχῶς μὲν γίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτὸν
 ἀληθὲς συνημμένον, καθ' ἓνα δὲ τρόπον ψεῦδος.
 καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον ἐπ' ἀληθὲς
 λήγῃ, ἀληθὲς ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς
 ἔστιν". καὶ ὅταν ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ
 ψεῦδος λήγῃ, πάλιν ἀληθὲς, οἷον τὸ "εἰ πέταται
 114 ἡ γῆ, πτέρυγας ἔχει ἡ γῆ." ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ
 ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθὲς δὲ λήγον ἐστὶν
 ἀληθὲς, ὡς τὸ "εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, ἔστιν ἡ γῆ."
 μόνως δὲ γίνεται ψεῦδος ὅταν ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ
 ἀληθοῦς λήγῃ ἐπὶ ψεῦδος, ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ "εἰ
 ἡμέρα ἔστι, νύξ ἔστιν". ἡμέρας γὰρ οὐσης τὸ μὲν
 "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἀληθὲς ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἦν ἡγούμενον,
 τὸ δὲ "νύξ ἔστι" ψεῦδός ἐστιν, ὅπερ ἦν λήγον.

struction of the hypothetical proposition, and a proposition of this kind seems to promise that its second logically follows its first, and that if the antecedent exists the consequent will exist. Hence, if this sort of promise is fulfilled and the consequent follows the antecedent, the hypothetical proposition is true; but if it is not fulfilled, it is false. Accord- 112
ingly, let us begin at once with this problem, and consider whether any hypothetical proposition can be found which is true and which fulfils the promise described.

Now all the Dialecticians agree in asserting that a hypothetical proposition is valid when its consequent follows (logically) its antecedent; but as to when and how it so follows they disagree with one another and propound conflicting criteria of this "following." Thus Philo^a declared that "the hypothetical is true 113
whenever it does not begin with what is true and end with what is false"; so that, according to him, the hypothetical is true in three ways and false in one way. For whenever it begins with truth and ends in truth it is true, as thus—"If it is day, it is light." And whenever it begins with what is false and ends in what is false, once more it is true, as for instance "If the earth flies, the earth has wings." Likewise 114
also that which begins with what is false and ends with what is true is true, as thus—"If the earth flies, the earth exists." And it is false only in this one way, when it begins with truth and ends in what is false, as in a proposition of this kind—"If it is day, it is night"; for when it is day the clause "It is day" is true, and this was the antecedent, but the clause "It is night," which was the consequent, is false.

^a Cf. *P.H.* ii. 110; Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxxvi.

- 115 Διόδωρος δὲ ἀληθὲς εἶναι φησι συνημμένον ὅπερ μήτε ἐνεδέχετο μήτε ἐνδέχεται ἀρχόμενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς λήγειν ἐπὶ ψεύδους. ὅπερ μάχεται τῇ Φίλωνος θέσει. τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον συνημμένον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι" ἡμέρας οὐσης ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος κάμου διαλεγομένου κατὰ μὲν τὸν Φίλωνα ἀληθὲς ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ περ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγει τὸ "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι," κατὰ δὲ τὸν Διόδωρον ψεύδους. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ποτὲ ἀρξάμενον τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἐπὶ ψεύδους λήγειν τὸ "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι," ἡσυχάσαντος ἐμοῦ. καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδους λήγειν τὸ "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι".
- 116 πρὶν γὰρ ἀρξωμαι διαλέγεσθαι, ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς μὲν ἤρχετο τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ἐπὶ ψεύδους δὲ ἔληγε τὸ "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι." πάλιν τὸ οὕτως ἔχον "εἰ νῦν ἔστιν, ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι," ἡμέρας οὐσης καὶ σιωπῶντος ἐμοῦ κατὰ μὲν Φίλωνα ὡσαύτως ἀληθὲς, ἀπὸ γὰρ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδους λήγει, κατὰ δὲ τὸν Διόδωρον ψεύδους. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀρξάμενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς λῆξαι εἰς ψεύδους νυκτὸς ἐπελθούσης, καὶ πάλιν ἐμοῦ μὴ
- 117 διαλεγομένου ἀλλ' ἡσυχάζοντος. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ "εἰ νῦν ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἡμέρας οὐσης κατὰ μὲν Φίλωνα διὰ τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον τοῦ "νῦν ἔστιν" εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγει τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," κατὰ δὲ Διόδωρον διὰ τοῦτο ψεύδους ὅτι ἐνδέχεται νυκτὸς ἐπισχούσης, ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον αὐτὸ τοῦ "νῦν ἔστιν," ἐπὶ ψεύδους λήγειν τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν."
- 118 Τοιαύτης οὖν οὐσης ὡς ἐν παραδείγματος μέρει τῆς ἐν τοῖς κριτηρίοις τοῦ συνημμένου ἀξιώματος

—But Diodorus^a asserts that “the hypothetical pro- 115
 position is true which neither admitted nor admits of
 beginning with truth and ending in falsehood.” And
 this is in conflict with the statement of Philo. For
 a hypothetical of this kind—“If it is day, I am con-
 versing,” when at the present moment it is day and
 I am conversing, is true according to Philo since it
 begins with the true clause “It is day” and ends with
 the true “I am conversing”; but according to Dio-
 dorus it is false, for it admits of beginning with a
 clause that is, at one time, true and ending in the
 false clause “I am conversing,” when I have ceased
 speaking; also it admitted of beginning with truth
 and ending with the falsehood “I am conversing,”
 for before I began to converse it began with the 116
 truth “It is day” and ended in the falsehood “I am
 conversing.” Again, a proposition in this form—
 “If it is night, I am conversing,” when it is day and
 I am silent, is likewise true according to Philo, for it
 begins with what is false and ends in what is false;
 but according to Diodorus it is false, for it admits of
 beginning with truth and ending in falsehood, after
 night has come on, and when I, again, am not con-
 versing but keeping silence. Moreover, the proposi- 117
 tion “If it is night, it is day,” when it is day, is true
 according to Philo for the reason that it begins with
 the false “It is night” and ends in the true “It is
 day”; but according to Diodorus it is false for the
 reason that it admits of beginning, when night comes
 on, with the truth “It is night” and ending in the
 falsehood “It is day.”

Such, then, being the contradictory character (as 118
 these examples show) of the criteria of the hypo-

^a For Diodorus Cronos cf. *P. II.* ii. 110.

- ὑπεναντιώσεως, μήποτε ἄπορος γίνεται ἢ τοῦ
 ὑγιούς συνημμένου διάγνωσις· ἵνα γὰρ μάθωμεν
 τοῦτο, πρὸ παντὸς δεῖ ἐπικριθῆναι τὴν περὶ τῆς
 ὑγιότητος αὐτοῦ τῶν διαλεκτικῶν διάστασιν. ἐφ'
 ὅσον δὲ ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστι, μένειν ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὸ
 119 ἐν ἐποχῇ. καὶ εἰκότως. ἦτοι γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς κρι-
 τηρίοις τῶν διαλεκτικῶν προσέξομεν ἢ τινι τούτων.
 ἀλλὰ πᾶσι μὲν οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστι προσέχειν· μάχεται
 γάρ, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων δυοῖν ὑπέδειξα, τὰ
 δὲ μαχόμενα οὐ δύναται ἐπ' ἴσης εἶναι πιστά. εἰ
 δὲ τινι τούτων, ἦτοι αὐτόθεν καὶ ἀκρίτως προσ-
 ἐξομέν τινι, ἢ μετὰ λόγου τοῦ δεικνύντος ὅτι ὑγιές
 120 ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον κριτήριον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀκρίτως
 καὶ αὐτόθεν συγκαταθισόμεθά τινι κριτηρίῳ, τί
 μᾶλλον τῷδε ἢ τῷδε συγκαταθισόμεθα; ὅπερ
 ἴσον ἦν τῷ μηδενὶ συγκατατίθεσθαι διὰ τὴν μάχην.
 εἰ δὲ μετὰ λόγου τοῦ δεικνύντος ὅτι ὑγιές ἐστι τὸ
 παραλαμβανόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν τοῦ συνημμένου κρι-
 τήριον, ἦτοι οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀσύνακτός ἐστι καὶ
 121 ἀπέραντος ἢ συνακτικός καὶ περαίνων. ἀλλ'
 ἀσύνακτος μὲν καθεστὼς καὶ ἀπέραντος ἄπιστός
 ἐστι καὶ μοχθηρὸς ἐν τῷ προκρίνειν τι τοῦ συν-
 ημμένου κριτήριον. εἰ δὲ συνακτικός ὑπάρχει, πάν-
 τως διὰ τοῦτο συνακτικός τυγχάνει ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ
 αὐτοῦ τοῖς λήμμασιν ἢ ἐπιφορά, ὥστε δι' ἀκολου-
 122 θίας τινὸς αὐτὸν δοκιμάζεσθαι. τὴν δὲ ἀκολουθίαν
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζητουμένην ἐπὶ τοῦ συνημμένου λόγου
 ἔδει δοκιμάζεσθαι. τοίνυν ἴσον ἦν τὸ τοιοῦτον τῷ
 εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπον ἐμπίπτειν· ἵνα γὰρ τὸ

^a i.e. Philo and Diodorus, §§ 113-117.

thetical proposition, it is to be feared that the task of distinguishing the valid hypothetical is impracticable ; for in order that we may perceive this, there must first of all be a decision of the controversy of the Dialecticians regarding its validity. And so long as this remains undecided, the valid proposition itself must also of necessity remain in suspense. And naturally 119 so. For we shall either give heed to all the criteria of the Dialecticians, or to some one of them. But it is not possible to give heed to them all ; for—as I have pointed out in the case of the two mentioned above^a—they are conflicting, and things which conflict cannot be equally trustworthy. And if we give heed to some one of them, we shall give heed to it either at once and uncritically, or with the support of reasoning which proves that a criterion of this kind is valid. And if we shall assent to any one criterion 120 uncritically and at once, why shall we assent to this one rather than to that one ? And this is equivalent to giving one's assent to none, because of the conflict. But if we assent with the support of reasoning which proves that the criterion of the hypothetical adopted by us is valid, then this reasoning is either inconclusive and indecisive or conclusive and decisive. But if it is inconclusive and indecisive it is un- 121 trustworthy and unsound when preferring a certain criterion of the hypothetical. And if it is conclusive, certainly it is conclusive for the reason that its conclusion follows its premisses, so that it is approved because of a certain consistency. But the consist- 122 ency sought in the case of the hypothetical ought to have been approved by reasoning. So, then, a result of this kind is equivalent to falling into the fallacy of circular reasoning ; for in order to perceive the

- συνημμένον ἐξ ἀκολουθίας ὀφείλον δοκιμάζεσθαι μάθωμεν, ἐπὶ λόγον τινὰ δεῖ δραμεῖν, καὶ ἵνα οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὑγιής ᾖ, τὴν ἀκολουθίαν δεῖ προπεπι-
 123 στῶσθαι, ἀφ' ἧς ὅτι ἔστιν ὑγιής κρίνεται. μὴ ἔχοντες οὖν τὸ ὑγιές συνημμένον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀπορίᾳ, οὐδὲ συνακτικὸν ἔξομεν λόγον. τοῦτον δὲ μὴ ἔχοντες οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξιν ἔξομεν λόγος γάρ ἐστι συνακτικὸς ἢ ἀπόδειξις. ἀποδείξεως δὲ μὴ παρούσης ἀναιρεῖται ἡ δογματικὴ φαντασία.
- 124 Ἐνέσται δὲ ἀπὸ τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ συμπεπλεγμένα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ διεξευγμένα κοινῶς ἐπὶ τε τὰ λοιπὰ εἶδη τῶν οὐχ ἀπλῶν ἀξιωματῶν διαβαίνειν. τὸ γὰρ συμπεπλεγμένον ἐξ ἀπλῶν ὀφείλει ἢ οὐκ ἐξ ἀπλῶν ἢ ἐκ μικτῶν συνεστάναι, πάντα δὲ
 125 ταῦτα ἡπόρηται τῶν ἀπλῶν προηπορημένων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν λέγωσι ὑγιές εἶναι συμπεπλεγμένον τὸ πάντ' ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθῆ, οἷον τὸ "ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ φῶς ἔστιν," ψεῦδος δὲ τὸ (ἐν)¹ ἔχον ψεῦδος, πάλιν νομοθετοῦσιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς. ἀκόλουθον γὰρ ᾗν, εἰ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ ἐκ πάντων ἀληθῶν σύνθετον εὐθὺς ἀληθές εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐκ πάντων ψευδῶν συγκείμενον ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ ἐκ ψευδῶν ἅμα καὶ ἀληθῶν μὴ μᾶλλον ἀληθές εἶναι
 126 ἢ ψεῦδος. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔξεστιν αὐτοῖς ἂ θέλουσι νομοθετεῖν καὶ ὥς προαιροῦνται περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διατάττεσθαι, ἐπιτρεπτόν μὲν τὸ ἐν ἔχον ψεῦδος συμπεπλεγμένον λέγεσθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς ψεῦδος, ἐξέσται δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀντιδιατάττεσθαι καὶ λέγειν τὸ ἐκ πλειόνων ἀληθῶν ἐνὸς δὲ ψεύδους

¹ (ἐν) Heintz.^a "Parade," or "outward show," seems the only possible

hypothetical which requires to be approved by its consistency, we are obliged to have recourse to a form of reasoning, and in order that this reasoning may be valid, the consistency by which its validity is judged must be confirmed beforehand. If then, judging by ¹²³ this *impasse*, we do not possess the valid hypothetical, neither shall we possess conclusive reasoning; and not possessing this, we shall not possess proof either; for proof is conclusive reasoning. And if proof is absent, the parade^a of Dogmatism is destroyed.

From these we may pass over both to the conjunc- ¹²⁴ tive and to the disjunctive, and generally to all the remaining forms of non-simple propositions. For the conjunctive must be composed either of simple or of non-simple or of mixed propositions, and all these are subject to doubt when the simple sort are already doubted. Moreover, when they declare that the ¹²⁵ conjunctive which has all its parts true is valid—as, for instance, “It is day and it is light,”—and that that which has a false part is false, they are again laying down the law for themselves. For it should have followed at once that, if the compound with all its parts true is true, the compound with all its parts false is false, but that which has some parts false and at the same time some true is no more true than false. For if it is open to them to lay down what laws they ¹²⁶ please and to make rules about these matters just as they choose, we must allow their assertion that the conjunctive which contains one false clause is false; but it will be open also to others to make a contrary rule and assert that the conjunctive with several true

sense of *παράστασις* here. Very probably the text is corrupt, but Hemtz's *φιλοσοφία*, adopted by Mutschmann, is not convincing.

- 127 συμπεπλεγμένον ἀληθές ὑπάρχειν. εἰ δὲ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων προσεκτέον ἐστίν, ἀκόλουθον δῆπουθεν τὸ τί μὲν ψεῦδος ἔχον τί δὲ ἀληθές συμπεπλεγμένον μὴ μᾶλλον ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος εἶναι λέγειν· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ ἐκ μέλανος μεμιγμένον οὐ μᾶλλον λευκὸν ἐστίν ἢ μέλαν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸν λευκὸν ἦν καὶ τὸ μέλαν μέλαν ὑπῆρχεν), οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἀληθές μόνον ἀληθές εἶναι συμβέβηκεν, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος μόνον ψεῦδος ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ σύνθετον ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων οὐ μᾶλλον ἀληθές ἢ
- 128 ψεῦδος προσαγορευτέον. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ βίῳ, φασί, τὸ κατὰ μὲν τὰ πλείστα μέρη ὑγιές ἰμάτων κατ' ὀλίγον δὲ διερρωγὸς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν πλείστων καὶ ὑγιῶν μερῶν ὑγιές εἶναι λέγομεν ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀλίγου καὶ διερρωγότος διερρωγός, οὕτω καὶ τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον, καὶ ἐν μόνον ἔχη ψεῦδος πλείονα δὲ ἀληθῆ, λεχθήσεται τὸ ὅλον ἀπὸ τοῦ
- 129 ἐνὸς ψεῦδος. ὅπερ ἐστίν εὐθες. τῷ μὲν γὰρ βίῳ συγχωρητέον καταχρηστικοῖς ὀνόμασι χρῆσθαι, μὴ πάντως τὸ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἀληθές ζητοῦντι ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν. φρέαρ γοῦν ὀρύσσειν φαμέν καὶ χλαμύδα ὑφαίνειν καὶ οἰκίαν οἰκοδομεῖν, οὐ κυρίως· εἰ γὰρ φρέαρ ἐστίν, οὐκ ὀρύσσεται ἀλλ' ὀρώρυκται, καὶ εἰ χλαμύς ἐστίν, οὐχ ὑφαίνεται ἀλλ' ὕφανται. ὥστε ἐν μὲν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῇ κοινῇ συνηθείᾳ τόπον εἶχεν ἡ κατάχρησις· ὅταν δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ζητῶμεν πράγματα, τότε ἔχεσθαι δεῖ τῆς ἀκριβείας.
- 130 Ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν ἀπορός ἐστίν ὁ λόγος καὶ πολλὴν ἔχων τὴν ταραχὴν τοῖς ἐν ἁσωμάτῳ τινὶ λεκτῷ τὸ ἀληθές καὶ ψεῦδος ἀπολείπουσιν, ἐκ τούτων αὐτάρκως ὑποδέδεικται· ὅτι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φωνῇ

clauses and one false is true. But if we ought to give heed to the real nature of these things, it is surely logical to say that the conjunctive which has one part true and one part false is no more true than false ; for just as what is compounded of white and black is no more white than black (for the white was white and the black was black), so also the true is in fact only true and the false is only false, and the compound of the two must be described as no more true than false.—But, they say, just as in ordinary speech ^a we do not say that the garment which is in most parts sound, but in a small part torn, is sound because of its more numerous and sound parts, but we call it torn because of its small part which is torn, so also with the conjunctive,—if it has only one part false and several true, the whole will be named after the one false part. But this is silly. For we must allow ordinary speech to make use of inexact terms, as it does not seek after what is really true but what is supposed to be true. Thus we speak of digging a well and weaving a cloak and building a house, but not with exactness ; for if there is a well, it is not being dug but it has been dug ; and if there is a cloak, it is not being woven but it has been woven. So that in ordinary life and common conversation inexact speech is in place, but when we are inquiring into real facts, then we must stick to accuracy.

By all this it has been made sufficiently clear that the argument of those who make truth and falsehood to lie in incorporeal " expression " is hopeless and full of confusion ; and it is easy also to see that

^a Lit. " in life."

- ταῦθ' ὑποστησαμένοις οὐκ ἔστιν εὐπορος, ῥᾷδιον
 131 μαθεῖν. πᾶσα γὰρ φωνή, εἰ ἔστιν, ἤτοι γινομένη
 ἔστιν ἢ σιωπωμένη· οὔτε δὲ ἡ γινομένη ἔστι τῷ
 μὴ ὑφεστάναι οὔτε ἡ σιωπωμένη τῷ μήπω γίνε-
 σθαι· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἡ φωνή. ἡ μὲν οὖν γινομένη
 οὐκ ἔστιν, καθάπερ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων δείκνυται· οὔτε
 γὰρ οἰκία γινομένη οἰκία ἔστιν, οὐ ναῦς, οὐκ ἄλλο
 τι τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστ' οὐδὲ φωνή. ὅτι δ' οὐδ' ἡ
 σιωπωμένη ὑφέστηκεν, ὁμολογον. εἴπερ οὖν ἡ
 γίνεται φωνή ἢ σιωπᾶται, κατ' οὐδέτερον δὲ
 τούτων τῶν χρόνων ἔστιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη φωνή.
- 132 Καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ἐν φωνῇ ἔστι τὸ ἀληθές, ἤτοι ἐν
 ἐλαχίστῃ ἐστὶ φωνῇ ἢ ἐν μακρᾷ· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ἐλα-
 χίστῃ, ἀμερές γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐλάχιστον, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές
 οὐκ ἀμερές· οὔτε ἐν μακρᾷ, ἀνυπόστατος γάρ ἐστιν
 αὕτη διὰ τό, ὅτε μὲν τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς προφέρεται
 μέρος, μήπω εἶναι τὸ δεύτερον, ὅτε δὲ τὸ δεύτερον,
 μηκέτι εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον. οὐ τοίνυν ἐν φωνῇ ἔστι
- 133 τὸ ἀληθές. πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἐν φωνῇ ἔστιν,
 ἤτοι ἐν σημαινούσῃ ἢ μὴ ἐν σημαινούσῃ. ἀλλ'
 ἐν μὲν τῇ μὴ σημαινούσῃ τι, οἷον τῇ βλίτυρι καὶ
 τῇ σκινδαψός, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τι· πῶς γὰρ τοῦ μὴ
 σημαινομένου πράγματος οἷον τέ ἐστιν ὡς ἀληθοῦς
- 134 ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι; λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν ἐν τῇ σημαι-
 νούσῃ. ὁ δὲ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον· οὐδεμία γὰρ
 φωνή ὡς φωνή σημαντική ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ ἐχρῆν πάν-
 τας τοὺς ἀντιλαμβανομένους φωνῆς Ἑλλήνας καὶ
 βαρβάρους ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ τοῦ σημαινομένου
 ὑπ' αὐτῆς. ὥστε οὐδὲ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐν φωνῇ θετέον
- 135 τὰ ληθές. τῶν τε φωνῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀπλαῖ

the argument of those who place them in speech is not satisfactory. For every speech, if it exists, is 131 either coming to be or silenced; but neither does that which is coming to be exist, owing to its non-subsistence, nor that which is silenced, owing to its not as yet coming to be. Speech, therefore, does not exist. Now that which is coming to be does not exist, as is shown by parallel instances; for a house when coming to be is not a house, nor is a ship, nor anything else of the sort; nor, consequently, speech. And that silent speech has no existence either is admitted. If, then, speech is either becoming or silenced, and at neither of these periods exists, speech will not exist.

Another objection,—if the true resides in speech, 132 it is either in a minimal or in a long speech; but it is not in a minimal, for the minimal object is indivisible and the true is not indivisible; nor is it in a long speech, for this is not really existent because, when the first part of it is being uttered, the second does not as yet exist, and when the second is being uttered the first no longer exists. So, then, the true does not reside in speech.—Furthermore, if it resides in speech, 133 it is either in significant or in non-significant speech. But it will not exist in that which has no significance, such as the words "Bhturi" and "Skindapsos"; for how is it possible to accept as true a thing which is not significant? It only remains, therefore, to say 134 that it resides in significant speech. But this again is impossible; for no speech as speech is significant, for, were it so, all the Greeks and barbarians on perceiving speech ought also to have perceived what is signified by it. So that on this ground, too, the true must not be located in speech.—Also, some forms of 135

- αἱ δὲ σύνθετοι, ἀπλαῖ μὲν οἶον ἡ Δίων, σύνθετοι δὲ ὥσπερ ἡ "Δίων περιπατεῖ." εἰ οὖν ἐν φωνῇ ἔστι τάληθές, ἤτοι ἐν ἀπλῇ ἔστιν ἢ ἐν συνθέτῳ. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ἀπλῇ καὶ ἀσυνθέτῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀξίωμα γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ τάληθές, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀξίωμα ἀσύνθετον.
- 136 ἐν συνθέτῳ δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν σύνθετον ὑφessestάναι λέξιν, οἶον τὴν "Δίων ἔστιν". ὅτε γὰρ λέγομεν τὴν Δίων, οὕτω λέγομεν τὴν ἔστιν, καὶ ὅτε ταύτην προφερόμεθα, οὐκέτ' ἐκείνην λέγομεν. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐν φωνῇ τάληθές.
- 187 Καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας, ὡς ὑπενόησαν τινες. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας ἔστι τάληθές, οὐδὲν ἔσται τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀληθές· τὸ γὰρ κίνημα τῆς διανοίας ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐκτὸς. ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ λέγειν μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀληθές· ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας ἀπολείπειν τάληθές.
- 138 Τῶν τε κινήματων τῆς διανοίας ἰδίων ὄντων ἐκάστου οὐδὲν ἔσται κοινὸν ἀληθές, μηδενοῦ δὲ ὄντος κοινοῦ τινὸς ἀληθοῦς πάντ' ἔσται ἀσαφὴ καὶ διάφωνα· ὁ γὰρ ἔχει οὗτος ἀληθές, τουτέστι τὸ κίνημα τῆς διανοίας, τοῦθ' ἕτερος οὐκ ἔχει, καὶ ἀναστροφῶς, ὁ ἐκείνος ἔχει, τοῦθ' οὗτος οὐκ εἴληφεν. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι λέγειν συμ-
- 139 φώνως ἀληθές· τοίνυν καὶ τὸ ἀξιούν ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας ὑποκεῖσθαι τάληθές ἄτοπόν ἐστι καὶ οὐχ ὑγιές.

Ἀκόλουθόν τέ ἐστι τοῖς ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας ἀπολείπουσι τάληθές πάνθ' ὁμολογεῖν ἀληθῆ εἶναι, οἶον τὸ κίνημα τῆς Ἐπικούρου διανοίας καὶ Ζήνωνος καὶ Δημοκρίτου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· πᾶσι

speech are simple, others composite—simple as, for instance, “Dion”; and composite, as “Dion walks.” If, then, the true exists in speech, it exists either in simple or in composite speech; but it does not exist in the simple and non-composite; for the true must be a proposition, and no proposition is non-composite. And it will not exist in composite speech because no 136 composite expression (such as “Dion exists”) subsists; for when we are saying “Dion” we are not as yet saying “exists,” and when we are uttering the latter we are no longer saying the former. So that the true is not in speech.

Nor yet is it in the motion of the intellect, as some 137 have surmised. For if the true is in the motion of the intellect, none of the external things will be true; for the motion of the intellect is within us and not external. But it is absurd to say that none of the external things is true; therefore it is also absurd to locate the true in the motion of the intellect.

Also, as the motions of the intellect are peculiar 138 to each individual, there will be nothing generally true, and when there is nothing that is true for all in common everything will be doubtful and discordant; for what this man holds as true (that is the motion of his intellect), that another man does not hold; and conversely, what that man holds, this man has not experienced. But it is absurd to say that there is nothing which by common consent is true; hence 139 also it is absurd and unsound to assert that the true resides in the motion of the intellect.

It follows, also, that those who locate the true in the motion of the intellect must agree that all such motions are true—the motion, for instance, of the intellects of Epicurus and of Zeno and of Democritus

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γὰρ αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν ἐπ' ἴσης κινήμασιν εἶναι τῆς διανοίας. ἀδύνατον δέ γέ ἐστι τὸ πάντα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὥς καὶ τὸ πάντα ψευδῆ· τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ κίνημα τῆς διανοίας τάληθές ἐστιν.

- 140 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ διὰ τοσούτων περί τε κριτηρίου καὶ περί ἀληθοῦς ἀπορήσαντες, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτώμεθα καὶ περί τῶν συντιθεμένων ἐφόδων ἀπὸ τοῦ κριτηρίου πρὸς κατάληψιν τοῦ μὴ αὐτόθεν ὑποπίπτοντος ἀληθοῦς, τουτέστι τοῦ τε σημείου καὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως. καὶ τάξει γε πρῶτον περί σημείου λέγωμεν· μετουσία γὰρ τούτου ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἐκκαλυπτική γίνεται τοῦ συμπεράσματος.

Β'.—Εἰ ἐστὶ τι σημεῖον

- 141 Ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διττὴ τις ἔστι κατὰ τὸ ἀνωτάτω διαφορά, καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ πρόδηλα τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, καὶ πρόδηλα μὲν τὰ αὐτόθεν ὑποπίπτοντα ταῖς τε αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἄδηλα δὲ τὰ μὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν ληπτὰ, μεθοδικώτερον [δὲ] εἰς μὲν τὴν τῶν ἐναργῶν ἀπορίαν ὁ περί κριτηρίου λόγος
- 142 ἡμῖν ἀποδέδοται· τούτου γὰρ ἀβεβαίου δειχθέντος ἀδύνατον γίνεται καὶ τὸ περί τῶν φαινομένων δισχυρίζεσθαι ὅτι τοιαῦτά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὅποια φαίνεται. λειπομένης δὲ ἔτι τῆς τῶν ἀδηλῶν διαφορᾶς, καλῶς ἔχειν ἡγούμεθα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ταύτης ἀθέτησιν συντόμῳ τινὶ χρῆσασθαι ἐφόδῳ, τῇ τό τε σημείον καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀναιρούσῃ· τούτων γὰρ πάλιν ἀναιρουμένων ἀβεβαίος

* Cf. P. II. I. 138.

and of the rest ; for it happens that all alike are motions of the intellect. But it is impossible that they should all be true, as likewise that they should all be false ; neither, then, is the true the motion of the intellect.

And now that we have presented all these 140 difficulties concerning the criterion and concerning the true, let us consider in the next place the methods, based on the criterion, which are devised for the apprehension of the true that is not immediately presented—that is to say, Sign and Proof. And first in order let us speak of Sign ; for it is by participation in it that Proof becomes capable of revealing the conclusion.

II.—DOES A SIGN EXIST ?

Since there is a certain twofold distinction of a most 141 general kind in things by which some are pre-evident,^a others non-evident—those being pre-evident which are immediately and of themselves presented to the senses and the intellect, and those non-evident which are not apprehensible of themselves,—our discussion of the criterion has been given its due place,^b as serving to show the doubtfulness of things evident ; for if the criterion is proved to be 142 precarious, it also becomes impossible to affirm, regarding things apparent, that they are in reality such as they appear. And as the distinct class of things non-evident is still left, we deem it well, for the purpose of refuting it also, to employ a concise method of attack which destroys both sign and proof ; for when these in turn are abolished, the apprehension of the

^a *i.e.* the criterion has been discussed first (lit. "more methodically," *i.e.* observing the proper order of treatment).

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γίνεται καὶ ἡ δι' αὐτῶν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς κατάληψις.
βραχεία δ' ἴσως οἰκείον ἐστὶ πρὸ τῶν κατὰ μέρος
διελθεῖν περὶ τῆς τοῦ σημείου φύσεως.

- 143 Λέγεται τοίνυν τὸ σημεῖον διχῶς, κοινῶς τε καὶ
ιδίως, κοινῶς μὲν τὸ δοκοῦν τι δηλοῦν, καθὸ καὶ
τὸ πρὸς ἀνανέωσιν τοῦ συμπαρατηρηθέντος αὐτῷ
πράγματος χρησιμεῖον εἰώθαμεν καλεῖν σημεῖον,
ιδίως δὲ τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν τοῦ ἀδηλουμένου πράγ-
ματος, περὶ οὗ καὶ πρόκειται ζητεῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ
144 παρόντος. εἰ δέ τις τρανότερον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῦ
τῇ φύσει, πάλιν προληπτέον ὅτι, ὡς ἀνώτερον
ἐλέγομεν, τῶν πραγμάτων πρόδηλα μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ
ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς γνῶσιν ἡμῶν ἐρχόμενα, οἷον ἦν ἐπὶ
τοῦ παρόντος τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐμὲ δια-
λέγεσθαι, ἀδηλα δὲ τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα.

Γ.—ΠΟΣΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΔΗΛΩΝ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑΙ

- 145 Τῶν δὲ ἀδήλων τὰ μὲν τινα ἦν καθάπαξ ἀδηλα,
τὰ δὲ φύσει ἀδηλα, τὰ δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἀδηλα. ὧν
πρὸς καιρὸν μὲν ἀδηλα καλεῖται ἅπερ τὴν φύσιν
[μὲν] ἔχοντα ἐναργῇ παρά τινος ἔξωθεν περι-
στάσεις κατὰ καιροὺς ἡμῶν ἀδηλεῖται, οἷον νῦν ἡ
τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις ἡμῶν φύσει μὲν γὰρ ἐναργῆς
ἐστὶ καὶ πρόδηλος, παρὰ δὲ τὸ μεταξὺ διάστημα
146 ἀδηλεῖται. φύσει δὲ ἦν ἀδηλα τὰ δι' αἰῶνος ἀπο-
κεκρυμμένα καὶ μὴ δυνάμενα ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν

* Cf. P.H. II. 100.

† Cf. P.H. II. 98.

true by means of them likewise becomes precarious. But it is, perhaps, fitting, before going into particulars, to discuss briefly the nature of sign.

The term "sign," then, has two senses, the general 143 and the particular." In the general sense it is that which seems to make something evident—in which sense we are accustomed to call that a sign which serves to effect the renewal of the object observed in conjunction with it,—and in the particular sense it means that which is indicative of a non-evident object; and it is this latter which we propose at present to investigate. But if one is to understand its nature 144 clearly, one must, again, grasp first the fact that, as we said above, those things are pre-evident which come to our knowledge of themselves—such as, at the present moment, the fact that "it is day" and that "I am conversing,"—and those things are non-evident which are not of this character.

III.—HOW MANY ARE THE DISTINCT CLASSES OF THINGS NON-EVIDENT?

Of things non-evident some are absolutely non- 145 evident, some naturally non-evident, and some temporarily non-evident. And of these, those are called "temporarily" non-evident which are in their nature manifest but are at certain times rendered non-evident to us owing to certain external circumstances—as for instance the city of Athens is to us at the present moment^b; for though it is naturally manifest and pre-evident, owing to the intervening distance it is rendered non-evident. "Naturally" 146 non-evident are the things which are everlastingly hidden away and are not capable of presenting

- πεσεῖν ἐνάργειαν, καθάπερ οἱ νοητοὶ πόροι καὶ τὸ
 ἀξιούμενον ἐκτὸς εἶναι τοῦ κόσμου τισὶ φυσικοῖς
 147 ἄπειρον κενόν. καθάπαξ δὲ ἄδηλα λέγεται τυγ-
 χάνειν τὰ μηδέποτε ὑπ' ἀνθρωπίνην κατάληψιν
 πεφυκότα πίπτειν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς
 ἀστέρας ἢ περισσοὺς καὶ τὸ τοσάσδε ὑπάρχειν ἐν
 148 Λιβύῃ ψάμμους. τεσσάρων οὖν οὐσῶν ἐν τοῖς
 πράγμασι διαφορῶν, μιᾶς μὲν τῆς τῶν ἐναργῶν,
 δευτέρας δὲ τῆς τῶν καθάπαξ ἀδήλων, τρίτης δὲ
 τῆς τῶν φύσει ἀδήλων, τετάρτης τῆς τῶν πρὸς
 καιρὸν, οὐ πᾶσαν φαμεν διαφορὰν σημείου δεῖσθαι
 149 ἀλλὰ τινά. εὐθέως γὰρ οὔτε τὰ καθάπαξ ἄδηλα
 ἐπιδέχεται τι σημεῖον οὔτε τὰ ἐναργῇ, ἀλλὰ τὰ
 μὲν ἐναργῇ ὅτι ἐξ αὐτῶν προσπίπτει καὶ οὐδενὸς
 ἑτέρου δεῖται πρὸς μῆνυσιν, τὰ δὲ καθάπαξ ἄδηλα
 ὅτι κοινῶς πᾶσαν ἐκπεφευγότα κατάληψιν οὐδὲ
 150 τὴν διὰ σημείου ἐπιδέχεται. τὰ δὲ φύσει ἄδηλα
 καὶ τὰ πρὸς καιρὸν χρεῖαν ἔχει τῆς ἐκ τοῦ σημείου
 παρατηρήσεως, τὰ μὲν πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα ὅτι
 κατὰ τινας περιστάσεις αἶρεται ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς
 ἐναργείας, τὰ δὲ φύσει ἄδηλα ὅτι διὰ παντός ἐστιν
 151 ἀφανῆ. διττῆς οὖν οὐσης διαφορᾶς τῶν σημείου
 δεομένων πραγμάτων διττὸν ἀνεφάνη καὶ τὸ ση-
 μείον, τὸ μὲν τι ὑπομνηστικόν, ὅπερ μάλιστα ἐπὶ
 τῶν πρὸς καιρὸν ἀδήλων φαίνεται χρησιμεῖον, τὸ
 δὲ ἐνδεικτικόν, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει ἀδήλων ἀξιοῦται
 152 παραλαμβάνεσθαι. καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὑπομνηστικὸν
 συμπαρατηρηθὲν τῷ σημειωτῷ δι' ἐναργείας, ἅμα

* i.e. excretory ducts, called "intelligible" because not perceptible by sense but only by an intellectual act of inference; cf. *P. II.* ii. 98, 140.

^b Cf. i. 243.

themselves clearly to our perception, such as the intelligible pores ^a and the existence (maintained by certain physicists) of an infinite Void outside the universe. And "absolutely" non-evident are said to be ¹⁴⁷ those things whose nature it is never to be presented to human apprehension, as is the fact that the stars are even in number or odd, ^b and that the grains of sand in Libya are of a certain definite number. Since, ¹⁴⁸ then, there are four distinct classes of objects—one being that of things manifest, the second of things absolutely non-evident, the third of things naturally non-evident, the fourth of things temporarily so, we assert that not every distinct class, but some of them, require a sign. For obviously neither the absolutely ¹⁴⁹ non-evident nor the manifest things admit of a sign—the manifest because they strike on the senses of themselves and require no other thing to announce them, and the absolutely non-evident because they elude every kind of apprehension without exception and thus do not admit of apprehension by means of sign. But things naturally non-evident, and things ¹⁵⁰ temporarily so, have need of the kind of observation effected by sign—the temporarily non-evident because, in certain circumstances, they are removed from our clear perception, and the naturally non-evident because they are for ever non-apparent. As, ¹⁵¹ then, there are two distinct classes of things which require sign, Sign also has revealed itself as twofold—the "commemorative," which appears to be chiefly of use in the case of things temporarily non-evident, and the "indicative," which is deemed proper for adoption in the case of things naturally non-evident.—Thus the commemorative sign, when observed ¹⁵² in conjunction with the thing signified in a clear

- τῷ ὑποπесеῖν ἐκείνου ἀδηλουμένου, ἄγει ἡμᾶς εἰς
 ὑπόμνησιν τοῦ συμπαρατηρηθέντος αὐτῷ, νῦν δὲ
 ἐναργῶς μὴ προσπίπτοντος, ὥς ἐπὶ τοῦ καπνοῦ
 καὶ τοῦ πυρός· ταῦτα γὰρ πολλάκις ἀλλήλοις συν-
 εξευγμένα παρατηρήσαντες ἅμα τῷ τὸ ἕτερον ἰδεῖν,
 153 τουτέστι τὸν καπνόν, ἀνανεούμεθα τὸ λοιπόν,
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τῷ ἔλκει ἐπιγινομένης οὐλλῆς καὶ ἐπὶ
 τῆς τοῦ θανάτου προηγουμένης καρδίας τρώσεως·
 οὐλήν τε γὰρ ἰδόντες προηγησάμενον ἔλκος ἀνα-
 νεούμεθα, καρδίας τε τρώσειν θεασάμενοι μέλλοντα
 θάνατον προγινώσκομεν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὑπομνη-
 154 στικὸν σημεῖον τοιαύτην εἶχε τὴν ιδιότητα, τὸ δὲ
 ἐνδεικτικὸν διέφερε τούτου. οὐκέτι γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ
 συμπαρατήρησιν τῷ σημειωτῷ ἐπιδέχεται (ἀρχῇθεν
 γὰρ ἀνυπόπτωτόν ἐστι τὸ φύσει ἀδύνατον πρᾶγμα,
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ δύναται τινι τῶν φαινομένων
 συμπαρατηρηθῆναι), ἀλλ' ἀντικρυς ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας
 φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς μόνον οὐχὶ φωνὴν ἀφίεν
 155 λέγεται σημαίνειν τὸ οὐ ἐστὶν ἐνδεικτικόν. οἷον
 ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν φύσει ἀδύνατων ἐστὶ πραγμάτων· οὐδέ-
 ποτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν πέφυκε πίπτειν ἐν-
 ἀργειαν. τοιαύτη δὲ οὐσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα
 κινήσεων ἐνδεικτικῶς μηνύεται· λογιζόμεθα γὰρ
 ὅτι δυνάμεις τις ἐνδεδυκυῖα τῷ σώματι τοιαύτας
 αὐτῷ κινήσεις ἐνδίδωσιν.
- 156 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ δυοῖν ὄντων σημείων, τοῦ τε ὑπο-
 μνηστικοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸς καιρὸν ἀδύλων τὰ
 πολλὰ χρησιμεύειν δοκοῦντος, καὶ τοῦ ἐνδεικτικοῦ,
 ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει ἀδύλων ἐγκρίνεται, μελλή-
 σομεν πᾶσαν ποιεῖσθαι ζήτησιν καὶ ἀπορίαν οὐ

perception, brings us, as soon as it is presented and when the thing signified has become non-evident, to a recollection of the thing observed along with it and now no longer clearly perceived—as in the case of smoke and fire ; for as we have often observed these to be connected with each other, as soon as we see the one—that is to say, smoke—we recall the other—that is to say, the unseen fire. The same 153 account applies to the scar which follows on the wound, and to the puncture of the heart which precedes death ; for on seeing the scar we recall the wound which preceded it, and on viewing the puncture of the heart we foretell the imminence of death.—Such, then, is the special character of the “ commemorative ” sign ; but the “ indicative ” is of a 154 different kind. For it does not, like the former, admit of being observed in conjunction with the thing signified (for the naturally non-evident object is, from the start, imperceptible and therefore cannot be observed along with any of the things apparent), but entirely of its own nature and constitution, all but uttering its voice aloud, it is said to signify that whereof it is indicative. The soul, for instance, 155 is one of the things naturally non-evident ; for such is its nature that it never presents itself to our clear perception ; and being such, it is announced “ indicatively ” by the bodily motions ; for we argue that it is a certain power residing within the body which inwardly excites in it such motions.

So then, as there are two signs—that which is 156 “ commemorative ” and held to be mainly of use in the case of things temporarily non-evident, and the “ indicative ” which is employed in the case of things naturally non-evident—we propose to devote all our

- περὶ τοῦ ὑπομνηστικοῦ, τοῦτο γὰρ παρὰ πᾶσι
κοινῶς τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ βίου πεπίστευται χρησιμεύειν,
ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐνδεικτικοῦ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν
δογματικῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἰατρῶν,
ὥς δυνάμενον τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην αὐτοῖς παρέχειν
157 χρεῖαν, πέπλασται. ὅθεν οὐδὲ μαχόμεθα ταῖς
κοιναῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων προλήψεσιν, οὐδὲ συγχέομεν
τὸν βίον, λέγοντες μηθὲν εἶναι σημεῖον, καθάπερ
τινὲς ἡμᾶς συκοφαντοῦσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ πᾶν ἀν-
ηροῦμεν σημεῖον, τάχ' ἴσως ἂν καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ
πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐμαχόμεθα· νυνὶ δὲ οὕτω καὶ
αὐτοὶ ἔγνωμεν, ἐκ μὲν καπνοῦ πῦρ, ἐκ δὲ οὐλῆς
προηγησάμενον ἔλκος, ἐκ δὲ προηγουμένης καρδίας
τρώσεως θάνατον, ἐκ δὲ προκειμένης ταινίας
158 ἄλειμμα λαμβάνοντας. νῦν οὖν ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπο-
μνηστικὸν σημεῖον τίθεμεν, ᾧ χρῆται ὁ βίος, τὸ
δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν ψευδῶς δοξασθὲν ἀναιροῦ-
μεν, μήποτε πρὸς τῷ μὴ μάχεσθαι τῷ βίῳ ἔτι
καὶ συναγορεύομεν αὐτῷ, ἐπεὶ περ τοὺς κατεξανα-
στάντας τῆς κοινῆς προλήψεως δογματικούς καὶ
τὰ φύσει ἄδηλα γινώσκειν λέγοντας σημειωτικῶς
ἐκ φυσιολογίας ἐλέγχομεν.
- 159 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὥς ἐν κεφαλαίοις περὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ
τὴν ζήτησιν πίπτοντος σημείου λελέχθω· χρή δὲ ἐπὶ
τοῦ παρόντος διὰ μνήμης ἔχειν τὸ σκεπτικὸν ἔθος.
τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ μετὰ πείσματος καὶ συγκατα-
θέσεως ἐκτίθεσθαι τοὺς κατὰ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ
σημείου λόγους (ἴσον γὰρ ἦν τὸ τοιοῦτο ποιεῖν τῷ
ἀξιοῦν εἶναι τι σημεῖον παραπλησίως τοῖς δογμα-
τίζουσιν), ἀλλ' ὥστε εἰς ἰσοσθένειαν τὴν ζήτησιν

* The "Logical," or "Dogmatic," was one of the chief Schools of Medicine in the Hellenistic age. Cf. *P.H.* i. 236 n. 318

investigation and criticism not to the commemorative sign (for this is generally believed by all ordinary folk to be useful) but to the indicative ; for this has been devised by the Dogmatic philosophers and by the Logical physicians,^a as capable of affording them most necessary assistance. Hence we are not attacking 157 the common preconceptions of mankind, nor are we turning life upside down by asserting that no sign exists, as some slanderously affirm of us. For if we were abolishing every sign we might, perhaps, have been attacking ordinary life and all mankind ; but as it is, we ourselves also are of the same mind and infer fire from smoke, and a previous wound from a scar, and death from a previous puncture of the heart, and oil from a previous fillet.^b As it is, then, 158 seeing that we affirm the commemorative sign which ordinary folk employ, but abolish the sign falsely imagined by the Dogmatists, one should rather say that not only do we not attack ordinary life but we even act as its advocates, inasmuch as we refute by means of natural science the Dogmatists who have risen up against the common judgement and declared that they discern by means of signs things naturally non-evident. c.

Let this, then, serve as a summary account of the 159 sign now under investigation ; and at this point it is right to keep in mind the practice of the Sceptics.^c This is to set out the arguments against the existence of the sign, but not with conviction or assent (for to do it with assent would be on a par with maintaining, like the Dogmatists, that a sign exists), but so as to

^b Alluding to the custom of athletes to wear fillets and anoint themselves.

^c Cf. *P.H.* ii. 79, 103.

- ἄγειν, καὶ δεικνύναι ὅτι ἐπ' ἴσης ἐστὶ πιστὸν τῷ εἶναι τι σημεῖον τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἢ ἀνάπαλιν ἐπ' ἴσης ἄπιστον τῷ μὴδὲν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ὑπάρχειν τι σημεῖον· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἢ ἀρρεψία καὶ ἢ ἐποχὴ γίνεται τῇ
 160 διανοίᾳ. ἀμέλει γοῦν διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ δοκῶν ἡμῖν ἀντιλέγειν φάσκουσι μὴδὲν εἶναι ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον βοηθός ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ ὀφείλον κατασκευάζεσθαι μέρος σκεπτικῶς, τοῦτ' αὐτὸς προλαβὼν κατασκευάζει· εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ τοῦ σημείου κομιζόμενοι παρὰ τοῖς ἀπορητικοῖς λόγοι σφόδρ' εἰσὶ σθεναροὶ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀναντίρρητοι, τούτων δὲ οὐ λείπονται καὶ οἱ παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς τὴν ὑπαρξίν αὐτοῦ κατασκευάζοντες, αὐτόθεν ἐφεκτέον ἐστὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως καὶ μὴ ἀδίκως τῷ ἑτέρῳ μέρει
 161 προσθετέον. πλὴν καὶ τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ ἔθους παρασταθέντος, χωρῶμεν λοιπὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ προκειμένου κατασκευήν.

- Τῶν οὖν ὄντων, φασὶν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ διαφορὰν τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχοντα. καὶ κατὰ διαφορὰν μὲν ὅποσα κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἀπολύτως νοεῖται, ὡς λευκὸν μέλαν, γλυκὺ πικρὸν, πᾶν τὸ τούτοις παραπλήσιον· ψιλοῖς γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ κατὰ περιγραφὴν ἐπιβάλλομεν καὶ δίχα
 162 τοῦ ἑτερόν τι συνεπινοεῖν. πρὸς τι δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ὥς πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν νοούμενα καὶ οὐκέτι ἀπολελυμένως λαμβανόμενα, τουτέστι κατ' ἰδίαν, ὡς τὸ λευκότερον καὶ μελάντερον καὶ γλυκύτερον καὶ πικρότερον, καὶ πᾶν εἴ τι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἰδέας. οὐ γὰρ ὅν τρόπον τὸ λευκὸν ἢ τὸ μέλαν κατ' ἰδίαν ἐνοεῖτο περιγραφὴν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ λευκότερον ἢ

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 130.

^b Cf. P.H. i. 190.

^c Cf. P.H. i. 135, 137.

bring the inquiry to a position of equipollence,^a and prove that the non-existence of a sign is equally credible with its existence, or, conversely, that the existence of a sign is equally incredible with its non-existence; for thereby there is produced in the intellect neutrality and suspension of judgement.^b Moreover, on this account even the man who appears 160 to contradict us, when we assert that no indicative sign exists, is actually supporting us, and by already adopting it himself he establishes the view that ought to be established sceptically; for if the arguments brought against the sign by the Doubters are exceedingly strong and almost incontrovertible, and those of the Dogmatists establishing its existence are not less weighty, we must at once suspend judgement regarding its existence and must not attach ourselves unjustly to either side. And now 161 that the practice of the Sceptics has been set forth, let us next proceed to develop the theme before us.

Of existing things, then, some, as the Sceptics assert, have an absolute, others a relative, existence. Absolutely existing are all such things as are perceived with a subsistence of their own and absolutely,^c as for instance white, black, sweet, bitter, and everything of a similar kind; for we apprehend these by themselves alone and separately and without the accompaniment of any other percept. But those things 162 are relative which are perceived as standing in some relation to another thing and no longer apprehended absolutely (that is, separately by themselves); as, for example, the whiter and blacker and sweeter and bitterer, and whatever else is of the same character. For the whiter or blacker is not perceived separately in the same way as the white or black; but in order

- μελάντερον· ἀλλ' ἵνα τοῦτο νοήσωμεν, συνεπιβάλ-
 λειν δεῖ καὶ ἐκείνῳ τῷ οὐ λευκότερόν ἐστιν ἢ τῷ
 οὐ μελάντερόν ἐστιν. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ γλυκυτέρου καὶ
 163 πικροτέρου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. ἐπεὶ οὖν δύο εἰσὶ τῶν
 πραγμάτων διαφοραί, μία μὲν ἡ τῶν κατὰ διαφορὰν
 δευτέρα δὲ ἡ τῶν πρὸς τι πῶς ἐχόντων, δεήσει καὶ
 τὸ σημεῖον τό γε ἐνδεικτικὸν ἦτοι τῶν κατὰ δια-
 φορὰν ἢ τῶν πρὸς τι ὑπάρχειν· τρίτη γὰρ μεταξὺ
 τούτων ἰδέα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ τῶν
 κατὰ διαφορὰν μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ὥς αὐτόθεν συγκεχώ-
 164 ρηται καὶ πρὸς τῶν ἑτεροδόξων. τοίνυν τῶν πρὸς
 τι γενήσεται. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ σημειωτὸν κατὰ τὴν
 ὥς πρὸς τὸ σημεῖον σχέσιν νοούμενον τῶν πρὸς τι
 ἐστίν (οὕτω καὶ τὸ σημεῖον τῶν πρὸς τι ἐστίν)¹
 τινὸς γάρ ἐστι σημεῖον, καθάπερ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ.
 εἰάν γοῦν τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ἀνέλωμεν,
 καὶ τὸ λειπόμενον συναναιρεθήσεται, οἷόν τι καὶ
 ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ καὶ ἀριστεροῦ φαίνεται γιγνόμενον·
 μηδενὸς γὰρ ὄντος δεξιοῦ οὐδὲ ἀριστερόν τι ἔσται
 διὰ τὸ τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι τούτων ἐκάτερον, καὶ
 μηδενὸς ὄντος ἀριστεροῦ συμπεριγράφεται καὶ ἡ τοῦ
 165 δεξιοῦ ἐπίνοια. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ πρὸς τι συγκατα-
 λαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις· οὔτε γὰρ λευκότερόν τι, ὥς
 ἔφην, δυνατόν ἐστι γνωρίζειν μὴ συνυποπίπτοντος
 τοῦ οὐ λευκότερόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ μελάντερόν (μὴ
 συνεπινοουμένου τοῦ οὐ μελάντερόν)² ἐστιν. τοίνυν
 ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ σημεῖον τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστιν, ὥς παρεμυ-
 θησάμεθα, συγκαταληφθήσεται τῷ σημείῳ τὸ οὐ
 ἐστὶ σημεῖον. τὸ συγκαταλαμβανόμενον δὲ αὐτῷ
 οὐκ ἔσται σημεῖον αὐτοῦ. τὸ γὰρ ὑπονοεῖν ὅτι

¹ <οὕτω . . . ἐστίν> cj. Bekk.² <μὴ . . . μελάντερον> add. N: similiter cj. Bekk.

to perceive the former, one must also apprehend along with it the object than which it is whiter, or than which it is blacker. And the same account applies to the sweeter and the bitterer. Since, then, there are two distinct classes of things, one being that of things absolute, the second that of things relative, the indicative sign must belong either to the class of absolutes or to that of relatives; for there is no third class of things between these two. But it will not belong to the absolutes, as is at once agreed even by those of the other persuasion. So, then, it will belong to the relative class. For just as the thing signified, because it is perceived as standing in relation to the sign, is a relative thing, (so too the sign is a relative thing,) for it is a sign of something, namely, of the thing signified. Certainly, if we take away, let us suppose, one of the two, the remaining one also will be taken away along with it, a thing which plainly happens also in the case of right and left; for if there is no right, neither will there be a left, owing to the fact that each of these is a relative; and if there is no left, the notion of right also is cancelled at the same time. —Further, relatives are apprehended together; for, as I said, it is impossible to be aware of a whiter thing without a joint perception of that than which it is whiter, or of a blacker thing (without a joint apprehension of that than which it is blacker). So then, since the sign is, as we showed,^a a relative thing, that whereof it is a sign will be apprehended along with the sign. But the thing apprehended along with it will not be a sign of it. For to imagine that what is

^a Cf. *P.H.* ii. 118 ff.

- δύνатаι τό τινι συγκαταλαμβανόμενον σημεῖον
 ἐκείνου γίνεσθαι τελέως ἀπερρωγός· ἀμφοτέρων
 γάρ ὑπὸ μίαν προθεσμίαν λαμβανομένων οὔτε τόδε
 τοῦδε ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστίν οὔτε τόδε τοῦδε μηνυ-
 τικόν, ἐκάτερον δὲ δι' αὐτοῦ προσπίπτον ἀποδεῖ τῆς
 166 τοιαύτης δυνάμεως. συνθείη δ' ἂν τις ἀνά-
 παλιν λόγον τοιοῦτον. τὸ σημεῖον εἶπερ καταλη-
 πτόν ἐστιν, ἥτοι προκαταλαμβάνεται τοῦ σημειωτοῦ
 ἢ συγκαταλαμβάνεται αὐτῷ ἢ ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται
 αὐτῷ· οὔτε δὲ προκαταλαμβάνεται οὔτε συγκατα-
 λαμβάνεται οὔτε ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται, ὥς παραστή-
 167 σομεν· οὐκ ἄρα καταληπτόν ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον. καὶ
 δὴ τὸ μὲν λέγειν ὅτι ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται τῷ σημει-
 ωτῷ τὸ σημεῖον, αὐτόθεν φαίνεται ἄτοπον· πῶς γὰρ
 ἔτι δύνатаι ἐκκαλυπτικόν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον, ὅτε οὐ
 ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστι, τὸ σημειωτόν, προκαταλαμ-
 βάνεται αὐτοῦ; ἄλλως τε καὶ μαχόμενόν τι προσ-
 δέχονται οἱ δογματικοὶ τῷ συνήθως ὑπ' αὐτῶν
 δογματιζομένῳ, ἐὰν τοῦτο λέγωσιν. φασὶ γὰρ τὸ
 σημειωτόν ἄδηλον εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατα-
 ληπτόν· εἰ δέ γε μετὰ τὴν τούτου κατάληψιν
 ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται τὸ σημεῖον, οὐκ ἔσται τοῦτ'
 ἄδηλον ὃ γε πρὸ τῆς τοῦ μηνύοντος αὐτοῦ παρουσίας
 πεφώραται. ὥστε οὐκ ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται τῷ ση-
 168 μειωτῷ τὸ σημεῖον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ συγκατα-
 λαμβάνεται διὰ τὴν μικρῷ πρόσθεν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν·
 τὰ γὰρ συγκαταλαμβανόμενα ἀλλήλοις οὐ δέεται
 τῆς ἐξ ἀλλήλων μηνύσεως ἀλλ' ὑφ' ἑν ἐξ αὐτῶν
 προσπίπτει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε τὸ σημεῖον λέγοιτ'
 ἂν εἶναι σημεῖον οὔτε τὸ σημειωτόν ἔτι ὑπάρχειν
 169 σημειωτόν. καταλείπεται οὖν λέγειν ὅτι
 προκαταλαμβάνεται τὸ σημεῖον τοῦ σημειωτοῦ. ὃ

apprehended along with a thing can be a sign of that thing is perfectly absurd; for when both are perceived at one and the same moment, neither does this serve to reveal that nor that serve to indicate this; and each, when it is presented by itself, lacks any such efficacy.—Again, one might construct an argument of this sort: The sign, if it is apprehensible, is either apprehended before the thing signified, or apprehended along with it, or apprehended after it; but, as we shall establish, it is not apprehended either before, or along with, or after it; therefore the sign is not apprehensible. Now to state that the sign is apprehended after the thing signified is seen at once to be absurd; for how can the sign still be capable of revealing when that which it serves to reveal—the thing signified—is apprehended before it? And, besides, if they make this statement, the Dogmatists will be accepting something which is in conflict with one of their usual dogmas. For they assert that the thing signified is non-evident and not apprehensible of itself; but if, after the apprehension of this, the sign is apprehended subsequently, this thing, which was detected before the presence of that which announces it, will not be non-evident. So that the sign is not apprehended after the thing signified.—Nor yet, indeed, is it apprehended along with it, 168 for the reason stated a little while ago^a; for things apprehended along with one another do not require announcement by one another but are presented of themselves simultaneously; and because of this, neither will the sign be said to be a sign, nor the thing signified to be any longer signified.—It only remains, 169 then, to declare that the sign is apprehended before

^a Cf. § 165.

- πάλιν εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐλέγχους κυλίεται. πρότερον γὰρ ὀφείλουσιν οἱ δογματικοὶ δεῖξαι ὅτι οὐ τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστι τὸ σημεῖον ἢ ὅτι οὐ συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις τὰ πρὸς τι, εἴτα τότε καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνειν τὸ δύνασθαι τοῦ σημειωτοῦ προκατα-
- 170 λαμβάνεσθαι τὸ σημεῖον. ἀμετακινήτων δὲ ὄντων τῶν πρώτων οὐχ οἷον τέ ἐστι τὴν προκατάληψιν τῷ σημείῳ μαρτυρεῖν ἐκ τοῦ γένους ὄντι τῶν πρὸς τι καὶ ὀφείλονται συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τῷ οὐ ἔστι σημεῖον. ἀλλ' εἶπερ, ἵνα καταληφθῇ τὸ σημεῖον, δεῖ ἢ προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι αὐτὸ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ ἢ συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τούτῳ ἢ ἐπικαταλαμβάνεσθαι, δέδεικται δὲ μηδὲν τούτων δυνατόν, ῥητέον ἢν' ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον.
- 171 "Ἐτι ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως ἄλλον λόγον συν-ερωτῶσί τινες τοὺς δογματικούς, οὕτως ἔχοντα. εἶπερ ἔστι τι ἐνδεικτικόν τινος σημείου, ἥτοι φαινόμενον φαινομένου σημείον ἐστὶν ἢ ἀφανὲς ἀφανοῦς ἢ φαινόμενον ἀφανοῦς ἢ ἀφανὲς φαινομένου· οὔτε δὲ φαινόμενον φαινομένου σημείον ἐστὶν οὔτε ἀφανοῦς ἀφανὲς οὔτε φαινόμενον ἀφανοῦς οὔτε [δὲ]
- 172 ἐναλλάξ· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι σημεῖον. καὶ ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, πρόδηλος δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτου κατασκευὴ ἐστίν. καὶ προδηλοτέρα μᾶλλον γενήσεται ὑποδειξάντων ἡμῶν τὴν κομιζομένην πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν ἔνστασιν. φασὶ γὰρ μόνον τὰς δύο συγχωρεῖσθαι συζυγίας, περὶ δὲ τῶν λειπομένων
- 173 δυοῖν δίστασθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαινόμενον φαινομένου καὶ ἀφανοῦς φαινόμενον γίγνε-

¹ ἢν : οὐν mss., Bekk. (secl. Mutsch.).

the thing signified. And this, again, lies open to the same criticisms. For the Dogmatists ought first to prove that the sign is not a relative thing, or that relatives are not apprehended along with each other, and then in the next place get us to admit that the sign can be apprehended before the thing signified. But as our primary assumptions remain unaltered, 170 it is impossible to get evidence for the anterior apprehension of the sign, owing to the fact of its belonging to the class of relatives and having necessarily to be apprehended along with that whereof it is a sign.—But if it be so that the sign, in order to be apprehended, must either be apprehended before the thing signified, or apprehended along with this, or apprehended after it, and it has been proved that none of these alternatives is possible, one must declare that the sign is non-apprehensible.

Further, some confront the Dogmatists with 171 another argument, to the same effect, in this form : If there exists an indicative sign, either it is an apparent sign of an apparent thing, or a non-apparent of a non-apparent, or an apparent of a non-apparent, or a non-apparent of an apparent^a; but it is neither an apparent sign of an apparent thing, nor a non-apparent of a non-apparent, nor an apparent of a non-apparent, nor the converse ; therefore no sign exists. Such is the argument, and its demonstrative 172 force is quite evident. And it will become yet more evident when we have indicated the objection brought against it by the Dogmatists. For they declare that they allow only two of these combinations, and as regards the remaining two they are at variance with us. For, (say they,) whereas it is true 173 that the apparent is a sign of the apparent and the

σθαι σημείον ἀληθές ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ μὴ φαινόμενον φαινομένου ἢ μὴ φαινόμενον ἀφανοῦς ὑπάρχειν δηλωτικὸν ψεύδους ἦν.¹ αὐτίκα γὰρ φαινόμενον μὲν φαινομένου σημείον ἐστίν, (οἶον)² ἡ σκιά τοῦ σώματος· αὐτὴ τε γὰρ σημείον οὕσα φαινόμενόν ἐστι, τό τε σῶμα σημειωτὸν καθεστῶς ἐναργές ὑπάρχει. φαινόμενον δὲ ἀφανοῦς δηλωτικὸν καθειστῆκει, καθάπερ τὸ ἔρευνθος τῆς αἰδοῦς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐναργές καὶ αὐτοφώρατον ἦν, ἡ δὲ αἰδῶς ἀφαντος.
 174 φαντος. τελέως δὲ εἰσιν εὐθήβεις οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες. ὁμολογηθέντος γὰρ τοῦ πρὸς τι εἶναι τὸ σημείον καὶ τοῦ κατ' ἀνάγκην συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις τὰ πρὸς τι, οὐ δύναται τῶν ἐπ' ἕως συνυποπιπτόντων ἀλλήλοις τὸ μὲν σημείον εἶναι τὸ δὲ σημειωτόν, ἀλλὰ πάντῃ τε καὶ πάντως διὰ τὴν ἐναργῆ ἀμφοτέρων συνυπόπτωσιν μήτε σημείον τι ἐξ αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν μήτε σημειωτόν, τοῦ μὲν μὴ ἔχοντος ὁ ἐκκαλύψει, τοῦ δὲ μὴ χρήζοντος τοῦ ἐκκαλύ-
 175 ψοντος. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τῆς λειπομένης συζυγίας, καθ' ἣν ἡξίουσιν τὸ φαινόμενον τοῦ ἀφανοῦς εἶναι σημείον· δεῖ γάρ, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ σημείον τοῦ σημειωτοῦ καὶ ἐπικαταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ σημειωτὸν τῷ σημείῳ, ὅπερ ἦν ἀδύνατον διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ γένους εἶναι τῶν πρὸς τι καὶ ὀφείλειεν ἀλλήλοις συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι.
 176 Τῶν γε μὴν καταλαμβανομένων ἀνθρώπῳ πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν δι' αἰσθήσεως καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ τὰ δὲ διανοία, καὶ δι' αἰσθήσεως μὲν ὥς λευκὸν μέλαν, γλυκὺ πικρὸν, διανοία δὲ καλὸν αἰσχρόν, νόμιμον παράνομον, εὐσεβὲς ἀσεβές. καὶ τὸ σημείον οὖν εἴπερ καταληπτὸν ἐστίν, ἥτοι τῶν

¹ ἦν cf. Bekk. : εἶναι MSS.² <οἶον> Heintz.

apparent of the non-apparent, it is false that the non-apparent is indicative of the apparent or the non-apparent of the non-apparent. Thus, for example, an apparent thing is a sign of an apparent thing, as the shadow of the body; for it, being a sign, is an apparent one, and the body, being a thing signified, is an evident thing. And an apparent thing may really be indicative of a non-apparent, as blushing of shame; for the former is obvious and self-detected, but shame is invisible. But those who speak thus are perfectly 174 stupid. For if it be agreed that the sign is a relative thing and that relatives must necessarily be apprehended together, then, of the things thus simultaneously presented, it is not possible that one should be the sign, the other the thing signified; but always and in every case, because of the evident joint-presentation of the two together, neither one of them can be either sign or thing signified, as the one has nothing to reveal, and the other requires nothing to reveal it. And the same may also be said about the 175 remaining combination, in which they claim that the apparent is a sign of the non-apparent; for, if this is so, the sign must be apprehended before the thing signified and the thing signified apprehended after the sign, which is impossible because they belong to the class of relatives and must be apprehended along with each other.

Now, of the objects apprehended by man, some 176 appear to be apprehended by means of sense, others by the intellect,—by means of sense, as white, black, sweet, bitter; and by intellect, fair, foul, lawful, lawless, pious, impious. So the sign also, if it is apprehensible, is one of the sensible or of the intelligible

- αἰσθητῶν ἐστὶ πραγμάτων ἢ τῶν νοητῶν, ὥς ἐὰν μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου γένους τούτων ὑπάρχει, οὐδ' ὅλως
 177 ἔσται τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑπάρχον. ἀμέλει γέ τοι τοῦτ' εὐθὺς τεκμήριον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἄληπτον αὐτὸ τυγχάνειν, φημί δὲ τὸ μέχρι δεῦρο διέλκεσθαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ, τῶν μὲν αἰσθητὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντων τοῦτο εἶναι τῶν δὲ νοητόν. Ἐπίκουρος μὲν γὰρ καὶ οἱ προεστῶτες αὐτοῦ τῆς αἰρέσεως ἔλεξαν αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς νοητόν. μένει δ' ἡ τοιαύτη διάστασις σχεδὸν ἀνεπικρίτος δι' αἰῶνος, καὶ μενούσης αὐτῆς ἀνεπικρίτου πᾶσα ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλάσσεσθαι, ὁφείλον ἢ
 178 αἰσθητὸν ἢ νοητὸν ὑπάρχειν. καὶ τὸ πάντων δεινότατον ὅτι μεταπέπτωκεν ἡ ὑπόσχεσις αὐτοῦ, εἶγε ὑπισχνεῖται μὲν ἐκκαλυπτικὸν ἔσεσθαι τινος ἐτέρου, ἀνάπαλιν δὲ αὐτὸ νῦν εὗρηται χρῆζον ἐτέρου τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ διάφωνον ἄδηλόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον ἐκ σημείου ληπτόν, πάντως καὶ τὸ σημεῖον διαφωνούμενον δεῖσεται τινος σημείου
 179 πρὸς παράστασιν ὥς ἄδηλον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ δύνανται λέγειν ὅτι τὸ διαφωνούμενον αὐτοῖς¹ ἔνεστιν ἀποδείξει καταστήσασθαι καὶ πιστὸν ἔχειν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἀποδείξωσιν, τότε ὥς πιστὸν αὐτὸ λαμβανέτωσαν· ἐφ' ὅσον δὲ ψιλὴ μόνον αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν ὑπόσχεσις ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ἔστηκε καὶ τὰ
 180 τῆς ἐποχῆς. εἰτα καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἐστίν, διαφωνουμένη δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ χρεῖαν ἔχει τοῦ τὴν πίστιν περιβήσοντος· διὰ δὲ ζητουμένου τὸ ζητούμενον δεικνύναι θέλειν τελέως ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. ἄλλως τε καὶ τῷ γένει σημειῶν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις· ἐκκαλυπτικὴ γὰρ ἦν τοῦ συμ-

¹ αὐτοῖς . αὐτὸ MSS., Bekk.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

- 181 περάσματος. ἵνα οὖν τὸ σημεῖον βεβαιωθῇ, δεῖ πιστὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἵνα δὲ ἡ ἀπόδειξις πιστὴ γένηται, δεῖ προβεβαιωθῆναι τὸ σημεῖον, ὥστε ἑκάτερον τὴν ἐκ θατέρου πίστιν περιμένον
- 182 ἐπ' ἴσης τῷ λοιπῷ ἐστὶν ἄπιστον. πρὸς τούτοις τὸ ἐν ἀποδείξεως μέρει λαμβανόμενον εἰς τὴν τοῦ σημείου βεβαίωσιν ἤτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν. καὶ εἰ μὲν αἰσθητόν, πάλιν ἡ ἀρχῇθεν μένει ζήτησις τῷ τὰ αἰσθητὰ κοινῶς διαπεφωνῆσθαι· εἰ δὲ νοητόν, ὁμοίως ἄπιστον καθέστηκεν· οὐ χωρὶς γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν δύναται τοῦτο ληπτὸν ὑπάρχειν.
- 183 Πλὴν συγκεχωρήσθω τε καὶ ἐκ περιουσίας δεδῶσθω τὸ ἤτοι αἰσθητόν ἢ νοητόν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον. ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτως ἀδύνατον τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ πιστὴν ὑπάρχειν. λεκτέον δὲ ἐν μέρει περὶ ἑκατέρου, καὶ εὐθέως γε περὶ τοῦ [μὴ]¹ αἰσθητόν αὐτὸ τυγχάνειν. ἵνα τοίνυν τοῦθ' ὁμόλογον ᾖ, δεῖ προσυμπεφωνῆσθαι τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑπαρξίν καὶ ὁμόλογον εἶναι παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς φυσικοῖς, ἵνα² ὡς ἀπὸ ὁμολόγου ταύτης ἡ περὶ τοῦ σημείου ἀνάγηται
- 184 σκέψις. οὐ συμπεφώνηται δέ, ἀλλ'

ἔστ' ἂν ὕδωρ τε ῥέη καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ τεθήλη

οὔποτε πεπαύσονται περὶ αὐτῆς οἱ φυσικοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολεμοῦντες, ἐπεὶ περ ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος μηδὲν ὑποκείσθαι φησι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ κενοπαθείας τινὰς αἰσθήσεων εἶναι τὰς ἀντιλήψεις αὐτῶν, καὶ οὔτε γλυκύ τι περὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὑπάρχειν, οὐ πικρὸν ἢ θερμόν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν, οὐκ

¹ [μὴ] secl. Kochalsky.

² ἵνα cj. Bekk.: καὶ MSS.

^a With §§ 179-181 cf. *P.H.* ii. 121, 122.

In order, then, that the sign may be established, the 181
proof must be trustworthy; and in order that the
proof may be trustworthy, the sign must be pre-
established; so that each one of the two, as awaiting
its confirmation from the other, is just as untrust-
worthy as the other. Besides this, that which is 182
taken as a proof for the establishment of sign is either
sensible or intelligible. And if it is sensible, the
original inquiry remains once more, by reason of the
general disagreement about sensibles^a; while if it
is intelligible, it is equally untrustworthy, for this
latter cannot be apprehended apart from things
sensible.

However, let it be agreed and granted, into the 183
bargain, that the sign is either sensible or intelligible.
Yet, even so, it is impossible that its real existence
should be worthy of confidence. We must discuss in
turn each of these alternatives, and, first and at once,
the view that it is sensible. In order, then, that this
may be admitted, the real existence of sensibles must
first be unanimously allowed and be admitted by all
the Physicists, so that the investigation of the sign
may proceed from this as admitted. This, however, is 184
not unanimously allowed, but

*Long as the waters flow and the tall trees cease not to
burgeon,*^b

the Physicists will never stop warring with one
another about it; for Democritus^c asserts that none
of the sensibles really exists, but our perceptions of
them are certain empty affections of the senses, and
in things external there exists nothing sweet or bitter
or hot or cold or white or black or any other of the

^b Cf. *P.H.* II. 37.

^c Cf. I. 135 ff.; *P.H.* I. 213 ff.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

ἄλλο τι τῶν πᾶσι φαινομένων· παθῶν γὰρ ἡμετέρων
 185 ἦν ὀνόματα ταῦτα. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος πάντα ἔλεγε
 τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοιαῦτα ὑποκεῖσθαι ὅποια φαίνεται καὶ
 κατ' αἰσθησιν προσπίπτει, μηδέποτε ψευδομένης
 τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν¹ ψεύδεσθαι ταύτην
 δοκούντων. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς καὶ τοῦ περιπάτου
 μέσσην ὁδὸν τέμνοντες ἔνια μὲν ὑποκεῖσθαι τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν ἔλεξαν ὡς ἀληθῆ ἔνια δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν,
 186 ψευδομένης περὶ αὐτῶν τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἀλλὰ τό
 γε κεφάλαιον, εἴπερ αἰσθητὸν εἶναι θέλομεν τὸ
 σημεῖον, πρὸ παντὸς ὁμολογηθῆναι δεῖ καὶ βεβαίως
 παραστήναι τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑπόστασιν, ἵνα καὶ
 τοῦτο δοθῇ παγίως καταληπτὸν εἶναι· ἢ εἴπερ
 ἐκείνην δι' αἰῶνος ἐστασιάσθαι συμβέβηκεν, ὁμο-
 λογεῖν δεήσει καὶ τοῦτο τῆς αὐτῆς ἀσυμφωνίας
 187 ἔχεσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμα οὐ δύναται
 ἀπτῶτως καταληφθῆναι μὴ ὁμολογηθείσης τῆς τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν ὑποστάσεως, διὰ τὸ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν αἰσθη-
 τῶν ὑπάρχειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ σημεῖον, εἴπερ κατὰ
 γένος αἰσθητὸν, λεχθήσεται πάγιον καθεστάναι με-
 νούσης τῆς περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν μάχης. ἔστω δὴ
 καὶ συμπεφωνῆσθαι τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ μὴδ' ἡντιοῦν
 γεγονέναι περὶ αὐτῶν διάστασιν. ζητῶ πῶς δύ-
 νανται οἱ ἑτερόδοξοι ἡμᾶς διδάσκειν ὅτι τῷ ὄντι
 αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον; πᾶν γὰρ αἰσθητὸν πᾶσι
 τοῖς ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν ὑποπίπτειν πέφυκε καὶ ἐπ'
 ἴσης λαμβάνεσθαι. οἷον τοῦ λευκοῦ χρώματος οὐκ
 ἄλλως μὲν οἱ Ἕλληνες ἀντιλαμβάνονται ἄλλως δὲ
 οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ διαφερόντως μὲν οἱ τεχνῖται ἐξηλ-
 λαγμένως δὲ οἱ ἰδιῶται, ἀλλ' ὡσαύτως πάντες οἱ
 188 γε ἀπαραποδίστους ἔχοντες τὰς αἰσθήσεις. τοῦ τε

¹ ἀλλ' ἡμῶν Helntz: ἄλλων mss., Bekk.

things apparent to all ; for these are names for our affections. But Epicurus declared that all sensibles 185 really exist such as they appear and present themselves in sensation, as sense never lies, though we think that it lies. And the Stoics and Peripatetics, pursuing a middle course, have said that some sensibles really exist, as being true, and some do not exist, as sensation lies about them. But now, to sum 186 up : If we claim that the sign is sensible, it must first of all be agreed and firmly established that sensibles have substantial existence, in order that it may be granted that the sign also is definitely apprehensible ; or else, if it is the case that their existence has been quarrelled over eternally, we shall have to admit that the sign also partakes of the same controversial character. For just as white colour cannot 187 be apprehended securely if the substantial existence of sensibles be not admitted, because it is itself one of the sensibles, so neither can the sign—if it belongs to the class of sensibles—be said to have stable existence so long as the conflict regarding sensibles continues. Let us suppose now that there is unanimity about sensibles and that there exists no dispute whatsoever regarding them. How, I ask, can our opponents show us that the sign is in reality sensible ? For every sensible thing ought naturally to present itself alike to all who are in a like condition and be similarly apprehended. Take white colour, for instance : it is not apprehended in one way by Greeks, in another by barbarians ; or in a special way by craftsmen and differently by ordinary folk ; but in one and the same way by all those who have their senses unimpeded. Bitter and sweet, again, are not 188

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πικροῦ πάλιν ἢ γλυκέος οὐκ ἄλλως μὲν ὁδε γεύεται
 καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον ὁδε, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ὅμοιον
 ἕκαστος τῶν ὁμοίως διακειμένων. τὸ δὲ γε ση-
 μείον ὡς σημεῖον οὐχ ὡσαύτως πάντας τοὺς ὁμοίως
 διακειμένους φαίνεται κινεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷς μὲν οὐδ'
 ὅλως ἐστὶ σημεῖόν τις, καίπερ δι' ἐναργείας
 αὐτοῖς προσπίπτον, τισὶ δὲ σημεῖον μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ
 τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ πράγματος ἀλλὰ διαφέροντος· τὰ γὰρ
 αὐτὰ φαινόμενα λόγου χάριν ἐν ἱατρικῇ ἄλλου μὲν
 ἐστὶ σημεῖα τῶδε, καθάπερ Ἑρασιστράτῳ, ἄλλου
 δὲ τῶδε, καθάπερ Ἡροφίλῳ, ἄλλου δὲ τῶδε,
 καθάπερ Ἀσκληπιάδῃ. οὐ τοίνυν λεκτέον αἰσθη-
 τὸν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν πάντας
 ὁμοίως κινεῖ, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον οὐ πάντας ὁμοίως
 189 κινεῖ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη αἰσθητὸν τὸ σημεῖον. πάλιν
 εἴπερ αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον, ἐχρήν, ὥσπερ τὸ
 πῦρ αἰσθητὸν ὃν πάντας τοὺς καίεσθαι δυναμένους
 καίει καὶ ἡ χιών αἰσθητὴ καθεστηκυῖα πάντας τοὺς
 ψύχεσθαι δυναμένους ψύχει, ὥδε καὶ αὐτὸ εἴπερ ἐκ
 τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστὶ, πάντας ὥφειλεν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
 ἄγειν σημειωτόν. οὐκ ἄγει δέ γε· οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθη-
 190 τὸν ἐστίν. πρὸς τούτοις εἴπερ αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ
 τὸ σημεῖον, ἥτοι καταληπτὰ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν τὰ ἄδηλα ἢ
 ἀκατάληπτα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀκατάληπτα ἡμῖν ἐστίν,
 οἴχεται τὸ σημεῖον· δυοῖν γὰρ ὄντων πραγμάτων,
 τῶν μὲν ἐναργῶν τῶν δὲ ἀδῆλων, εἰ μήτε τὸ ἐναργὲς
 ἔχει σημεῖον διὰ τὸ αὐτοφώρατον εἶναι μήτε τὰ
 ἀδηλα διὰ τὸ ἀκατάληπτα τυγχάνειν, οὐδέν ἐστὶ
 191 σημεῖον. εἰ δὲ καταληπτὰ, πάλιν ἐχρήν, ἐπεὶ
 αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητὸν ἐπ' ἴσης
 πάντας κινεῖ, πᾶσι τὰ ἄδηλα καταλαμβάνεσθαι.

tasted in this way by this man and in a different way by that man, but similarly by each of those who are in a similar condition. But the sign, as sign, does not seem to affect in the same way all those who are in a similar condition ; but to some it is not a sign of anything at all, although it presents itself to them plainly, while to some it is a sign, yet not of the same thing but of something different ; thus in medicine, for instance, the same appearances are signs of one thing to this man (such as Erasistratus), but of another to that man (say, Herophilus), and of another to a third (such as Asclepiades).^a We must not, then, say that the sign is sensible ; for if the sensible affects all similarly, but the sign does not affect all similarly, the sign will not be sensible.—Again, if 180 the sign is sensible, it ought to follow that, just as fire, which is sensible, burns all those capable of being burnt, and snow, being sensible, chills all those capable of being chilled, so also the sign, if it belongs to the sensibles, leads all to the same signified thing. But, in fact, it does not so lead them ; therefore it is not sensible.—Furthermore, if the sign is sensible, the 190 things non-evident are either apprehensible by us or non-apprehensible. If, then, they are non-apprehensible by us, the sign disappears ; for things being of two kinds, some evident, others non-evident, if neither the evident thing possesses a sign owing to its being self-revealed, nor the non-evident things because they are non-apprehensible, there is no sign. But if the non-evident things are apprehensible, it 191 ought to follow again that, since the sign is sensible and the sensible affects all men alike, the things

^a These three were physicians of the Dogmatic (or "Logical") School of Medicine, cf. § 156 *supra* ; *P.H.* i. 236 n.

- ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν φασιν αὐτὰ μὴ καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἰατροὶ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως φιλόσοφοι, οἱ δὲ καταλαμβάνεσθαι μὲν, οὐχ ὁμοίως δέ. οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον.
- 192 **Ναὶ φασιν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πῦρ αἰσθητὸν καθεστὼς** παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὑλῶν διαφερούσας ὑποφαίνει δυνάμεις, καὶ πρὸς μὲν κηρῷ τήκει πρὸς δὲ πηλῷ πήσσει πρὸς δὲ ξύλῳ καίει, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἰκὸς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ σημεῖον αἰσθητὸν ὑπάρχον παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἀντιλαμβανομένων
- 193 **αὐτοῦ διαφόρων εἶναι πραγμάτων μηνυτικόν.** καὶ οὐ παράδοξον, ὅτε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπομνηστικῶν σημείων θεωρεῖται οὕτω γιγνόμενον· ὁ γὰρ ἀνατεινόμενος πυρρὸς τισὶ μὲν πολεμίων ἔφοδον σημαίνει τισὶ δὲ φίλων ἄφιξιν δηλοῖ, καὶ ὁ τοῦ κώδωνος ψόφος οἷς μὲν <σημεῖον>¹ ὄψου πράσεως ἐστὶν οἷς δὲ τοῦ δεῖν ραίνειν τὰς ὁδοὺς. καὶ τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν ἄρα σημεῖον δυνήσεται φύσιν αἰσθητὴν ἔχον ἄλλων
- 194 **καὶ ἄλλων εἶναι μηνυτικόν.** ἀξιῶσκει δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς μὲν τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρρὸς μεταβάσει χρωμένους τοῦτο [δὲ] δεικνύναι γινόμενον ἐπὶ τοῦ σημείου ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρρὸς γίνεσθαι συμβέβηκεν. τουτὶ μὲν γὰρ ὁμολόγους ἔχει τὰς προειρημένας δυνάμεις, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς διαφέρεται περὶ <τοῦ ὑπ'>² αὐτοῦ τὸν μὲν κηρὸν τήκεσθαι τὸν
- 195 **δὲ πηλὸν πήσσεσθαι τὸ δὲ ξύλον καίεσθαι.** ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐνδεικτικοῦ σημείου ἐὰν τὸ ἀνάλογον προσδεχώμεθα γίνεσθαι, εἰς τὴν μεγίστην ἀπέμφασιν περιστησόμεθα, λέγοντες ἕκαστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένων ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε εἰ οὕτω τύχοι, καὶ πλῆθος νοσοποιεῖν καὶ δριμύτητα καὶ σωματικὴν

¹ <σημεῖον> post ἐστὶν add. Mutsch.² <τοῦ ὑπ'> cf. Bekk.

non-evident are apprehended by all. But some—like the Empirical doctors and the Sceptic philosophers^a—assert that they are not apprehended, and others that they are apprehended but not equally. The sign, therefore, is not sensible.

"Yes," they reply, "but just as fire, being sensible, 192 exhibits different potencies owing to differences in the material subjected to it, and when applied to wax melts it, to clay hardens it, to wood burns it; so likewise it is probable that the sign also, being sensible, should serve to indicate different things according to the differences in those who apprehend it. Nor is this paradoxical, since this is also 193 seen to happen even in the case of commemorative signs; for the raising high of a torch signifies to some the approach of enemies, but to others indicates the arrival of friends; and the sound of a bell is to some a sign of the selling of meat, but to others of the need for watering the roads. Therefore the indicative sign also, having a sensible nature, will be capable of revealing things of different sorts."—But here, too, one 194 might require those who make use of the inference from fire to prove that what happens to take place in the case of fire takes place also in the case of the sign. For the former possesses potencies, as stated above, which are undisputed, and there is nobody who differs about the fact that wax is melted by it, clay hardened, and wood burned. But in the case of the 195 indicative sign, if we allow that a similar result takes place we shall find ourselves in the most absurd position—that of asserting that each of the things indicated by it exists, so that, let us say, plethora and acrid humours and bodily constitution

^a Cf. § 156.

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- 196 κατασκευήν. ὅπερ ἄτοπον· τὰς γὰρ οὕτω μαχο-
 μένας καὶ ἀνασκευαστικάς ἀλλήλων αἰτίας οὐχ
 οἷόν τε συνυπάρχειν. ἢ τοῦτο οὖν ὁμολογεῖσθαι,
 καίπερ ὃν ἀδύνατον, οἱ δογματικῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες,
 ἢ ὅτι τὸ σημεῖον αἰσθητὸν ὃν οὐδενὸς τὸ ὅσον ἐφ'
 197 ἐαυτῷ ἐνδεικτικόν ἐστίν, ἡμεῖς δὲ διαφόρους ἔχον-
 τες διαθέσεις οὐχ ὡσαύτως ἐπ' αὐτῷ κινούμεθα.
 ὅπερ οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείναιεν ὁμολογεῖν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ
 τὰς τοιαύτας τοῦ πυρὸς δυνάμεις μὴ εἶναι συμ-
 198 φώνους ἀλλ' ἠπορησθαι. εἰ γὰρ καυστικὴν ἔχει φύσιν
 τὸ πῦρ, ὥφειλε πάντα καίειν καὶ μὴ τινὰ μὲν καίειν
 τινὰ δὲ μηδαμῶς· καὶ εἰ τηκτικὴν εἶχε δύναμιν, πᾶν
 199 ὥφειλε διαλύειν καὶ μὴ τινὰ μὲν τινὰ δ' οὐ. νῦν δὲ
 ταῦτα ἔοικε ποιεῖν οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν ἀλλὰ
 παρὰ τὰς προσομιλούσας αὐτῷ τῶν ὑποκειμένων
 ὕλας, οἷον τὸ ξύλον καίει οὐχ ὅτι αὐτὸ καυστικόν
 ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ξύλον ἐπιτηδείως ἔχει συνεργοῦ
 λαβόμενον ἐκείνου καῆναι, καὶ τήκει τὸν κηρὸν οὐχ
 ὅτι τηκτικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὁ κηρὸς ἐπιτη-
 δεϊότητα ἐκέκτητο πρὸς τὸ συνεργοῦ λαβόμενος¹
 ἐκείνου τήκεσθαι. ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τούτων δι-
 δάξομεν, ὅταν περὶ τῆς τῶν τοιούτων ὑπάρξεως
 200 σκεψώμεθα. τὰ νῦν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς μετιόντας
 ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπομνηστικοῦ σημείου καὶ τὸν πυρσὸν
 παραλαμβάνοντας, ἔτι δὲ τὸν τοῦ κώδωνος ψόφον,
 λεκτέον ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ὅτι οὐ παράδοξον εἰ τὰ τοιαῦτα

¹ λαβόμενος N, cf. Bekk.; λαβόμενος E; λαμβανόμενον L, Bekk.

* The text here is doubtful; read perhaps συνυπάρχειν. ὥστε, . . . πλήθος νοσποίων <μηνύειν> κτλ. ("the sign indicates morbid plethora" etc.). Fabr. gives πλ. νόσων ποιεῖν, "(quo fiet ut . . . ignis) multitudinem morborum faciat"; Hervetus, "multitudinem unum faciant" (= ἐνοποιεῖν); Kayser, πλ. νόσων μηνύειν.

are all causes of disease.^a But this is absurd ; for it is 196
 not possible for causes so conflicting and mutually
 destructive to co-exist. Let the dogmatizing philo-
 sophers, then, agree either to this, impossible though
 it be, or that the sign, being sensible, is indicative of
 nothing, so far as its own power goes, but that we with 197
 our differing dispositions are not all affected alike by
 it. But this they would not endure to agree to ; and
 besides, these potencies of fire are not unanimously
 allowed but are matters of doubt. For if fire was of a 198
 nature capable of burning, it ought to burn every-
 thing and not burn some things and not others ; and if
 it had a power of melting, it ought to dissolve every-
 thing instead of dissolving some and not others. But 199
 as it is, it seems to do these things not on account of
 its own nature but on account of the materials of the
 substances with which it is brought into contact ; for
 instance, it burns wood, not because it is itself capable
 of burning, but because wood is in a fit state to be
 burnt when it receives the co-operation of fire ; and it
 melts wax, not because it has a power of melting,
 but because wax possesses a fitness for being melted
 when it receives the co-operation of fire. But this we
 shall explain more exactly when we come to consider
 the existence of such substances.^b For the present, 200
 in reply to those who draw inferences from the com-
 memorative sign and quote the case of the torch, and
 also of the sound of the bell, we must declare that
 it is not paradoxical for such signs to be capable

The argument seems to be that if the same sign (or symptom)
 indicates a number of different things (such as diseases, the
 "causes" of the symptoms) these things must co-exist ; but
 the diseases mentioned cannot co-exist ; therefore a sign
 cannot indicate different things.

^a See *Adv. Phys.* i. 237 ff.

- τῶν σημείων πλειόνων ἐστὶ δηλωτικά· θεμένων γὰρ νόμους, ὡς φασίν, ὀρίσαι¹ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν κείμεναι, ἔάν τε ἐν θέλωμεν αὐτὰ μηνύειν ἔάν τε καὶ πλειόνων
 201 ὑπάρχειν δηλωτικά. τὸ δὲ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον ἐκ φύσεως ὑπαγορευτικὸν εἶναι δοκοῦν τοῦ σημειωτοῦ κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐνὸς δεῖ πράγματος ἐνδεικτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου πάντως μονοειδοῦς, ἐπεὶ τοι ἔαν κοινὸν πολλῶν ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔσται σημεῖον. ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἐν βεβαίως διὰ τινος λαμβάνεσθαι, πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν δηλουμένων. οἷον τὸ ἐκ πλουσίου πένητα γενέσθαι κοινόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦ ἡσσωτεῦσθαι καὶ τοῦ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπταικέναι καὶ τοῦ φίλοις μεταδεδω-
 κέναι, πολλῶν δὲ κοινόν ὑπάρχον οὐκέτι τινὸς αὐτῶν ἐξαιρέτως μηνυτικὸν εἶναι δύναται· εἰ γὰρ τούτου, τί μᾶλλον τούτου ἢ ἐκείνου; καὶ εἰ ἐκεί-
 202 νου, τί μᾶλλον ἐκείνου ἢ τούτου; καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πάντων· ἀσυνύπαρκτα γάρ ἐστι τὰ πάντα. διαφέρει τοίνυν τοῦ ὑπομνηστικοῦ σημείου τὸ ἐνδεικτικόν, καὶ οὐ μεταβατέον ἐστὶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἐπὶ τοῦτο, παρόσον τὸ μὲν ἐνὸς μόνου δεῖ μηνυτικὸν ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ πλειόνων δύναται εἶναι παραστατικὸν καὶ ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς θεματίσωμεν σημαίνειν.
 203 Ἔτι πᾶν αἰσθητὸν ὡς αἰσθητὸν ἀδιδάκτον ἐστίν. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμα διδάσκεται τις ὁρᾶν οὔτε τοῦ γλυκέος μανθάνει γεύεσθαι, οὐ θερμοῦ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου· ἀλλ' ἐκ φύσεως καὶ ἀδιδάκτως πάντων αὐτῶν πάρεστιν ἡμῖν ἢ γνῶσις. τὸ δὲ σημεῖον ὡς σημεῖον μετὰ πολλῶν, ὡς φασί, μόχθων διδάσκεται, οἷον τὸ κατὰ

¹ ὀρίσαι Fabr.: ὀρίσται mss., Bekk.

of announcing more things than one. For they are determined, as they say, by the lawgivers and lie in our power, whether we wish them to indicate one thing or to be capable of announcing several things. But as the indicative sign is supposed to be essentially 201 suggestive of the thing signified, it must necessarily be indicative of one thing ; and this must certainly be a thing of single form, since of course, if it is common to many things, it will not be a sign. For it is impossible for one object to be firmly apprehended by means of anything when the things indicated thereby are many. For example, a man's fall from wealth to poverty is a sign alike of a life of dissipation, and of disaster by sea, and of contributions to friends ; and being thus common to many things, it can no longer be indicative of any one of them in special ; for if it is indicative of this one, why of this one rather than of that one ? And if of that one, why of that one rather than of this one ? Nor, indeed, can it be indi- 202 cative of all ; for they are not all capable of co-existing. So, then, the indicative sign differs from the commemorative, and one must not draw inferences about the former from the latter, inasmuch as the one ought to serve to indicate one object alone, whereas the other can serve to manifest several objects, and to possess such significations as we ourselves may determine.

Further, every sensible thing, *qua* sensible, is 203 incapable of being taught. For a man is not taught to see a white colour, nor does he learn to taste sweetness, nor to feel heat, nor anything else of the kind ; but it is from nature and without teaching that the knowledge of all these things comes to us. But the sign, *qua* sign, is taught, as they say, with much

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- κυβερνητικήν, ὅτι ἀνέμων ἐστὶ δηλωτικὸν καὶ
 204 χειμώνων ἢ εὐδίας. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς τὰ
 οὐράνια πραγματευσαμένοις, καθάπερ Ἀράτω καὶ
 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τῷ Αἰτωλῷ. κατὰ ταῦτά δὲ καὶ τοῖς
 ἐμπειρικῶς ἰατρούουσιν, οἷον τὸ ἔρευθος καὶ ἡ
 κυρτότης τῶν ἀγγείων¹ καὶ τὸ δίψος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα,
 ὧν ὁ μὴ διδαχθεὶς οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται ὡς σημείων.
 206 οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν
 αἰσθητὸν ἀδίδακτον, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον ὡς σημείον ἐστὶ
 διδακτόν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σημεῖον αἰσθητόν.
 208 Τό τε αἰσθητόν, ἥ αἰσθητόν ἐστι, κατὰ διαφορὰν
 νοεῖται, οἷον τὸ λευκόν, τὸ μέλαν, γλυκὺ πικρόν,
 πᾶν τὸ τοιουτῶδες. τὸ δὲ σημεῖον, ἥ σημεῖον ἐστὶ,
 τῶν πρὸς τι καθέστηκεν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ὡς πρὸς
 τὸ σημειωτὸν σχέσιν ἔθεωρεῖτο. οὐκ ἄρα τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον.
 207 Καὶ μὴν πᾶν αἰσθητόν, ὡς ἡ κλῆσις παρίστησιν,
 αἰσθήσει ληπτὸν ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον ὡς σημεῖον
 οὐκ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεται ἀλλὰ διανοίᾳ. λέγομεν
 γοῦν ἀληθὲς εἶναι σημεῖον καὶ ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς
 καὶ ψεῦδος οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητόν· ἀξίωμα γὰρ ἐκά-
 τερον, τὸ δὲ ἀξίωμα οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀλλὰ τῶν
 νοητῶν ὑπῆρχεν. λεκτέον ἄρα μὴ εἶναι τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν τὸ σημεῖον.
 208 Ἐπιχειρητέον δὲ καὶ οὕτως. εἴπερ αἰσθητόν
 ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον, πολὺ πρότερον ὀφείλει
 τὸ αἰσθητόν τινος ἐνδεικτικὸν ὑπάρχειν· ὅπερ οὐχ
 οὕτως εἶχεν. εἰ γὰρ ἐνδείκνυται τι τὸ αἰσθητόν,
 ἦτοι τὸ ὁμογενὲς τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς ἔσται ἐνδεικτικὸν
 ἢ τὸ ἀνομογενὲς τοῦ ἀνομογενοῦς· οὔτε δὲ τὸ

¹ ἀγγείων Kalbfleisch: αἰρίων LE, Bekk.: ὠρίων N.

labour—that, for example, in navigation, which serves to indicate winds and storms or fine weather. So likewise the signs dealt with by those who treat of things in the heavens, like Aratus and Alexander the Aetolian^a; and similarly those of the Empiric physicians, such as blushing and swelling of the vessels and thirst and so on, which the uninstructed person does not apprehend as signs. The sign, therefore, is not sensible; for if the sensible is incapable of being taught, but the sign, *qua* sign, is capable of being taught, the sign will not be sensible.

The sensible, too, *qua* sensible, is conceived as absolute^b—white, for instance, and black, sweet and bitter, and everything of that sort. But the sign, *qua* sign, is a relative thing; for it is viewed in regard to its relation to the thing signified. Therefore the sign does not belong to the class of sensibles.

Moreover, every sensible—as the term shows—is apprehensible by sense, but the sign, *qua* sign, is apprehended not by sense but by intellect. Thus we say that a sign is true or false, but the true and the false are not sensible; for each of them is a judgement, and the judgement belongs not to the sensibles but to the intelligibles. We must declare, therefore, that the sign does not belong to the class of sensibles.

We may also use this argument: If the indicative sign is sensible, the sensible ought, long before, to be indicative of something; but this is not the case. For if the sensible indicates anything, either the homogeneous will be indicative of the homogeneous or the heterogeneous of the heterogeneous; but neither

^a Greek poets of 3rd century B.C., who wrote on astronomical themes.

^b Cf. § 163.

- ὁμογενές τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς οὔτε τὸ ἀνομογενές τοῦ
 ἀνομογενοῦς· οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδεικτικόν τινός ἐστι τὸ
 209 αἰσθητόν. οἷον ἔστω μηδέποτε ἡμᾶς καθ' ὑπό-
 θεσιν λευκῶ περιπεπτωκέναι χρώματι, μηδὲ μέλανι,
 πρῶτως δὲ ὁρᾶν τὸ λευκόν. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἰσχύσαι-
 210 μεν ἀπὸ τῆς τούτου καταλήψεως τὸ μέλαν κατα-
 λαμβάνεσθαι χρώμα· ἔννοιαν μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν τοῦ
 ἕτερον εἶναι χρώμα τὸ μέλαν, καὶ μὴ τοιοῦτο οἷον
 ἐστι τὸ λευκόν, τάχα δυνατόν ἐστι, κατάληψιν δὲ
 ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ μέλανος χρώματος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λευκοῦ
 παρουσίας τῶν ἀμηνάων. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φωνῆς ὁ
 αὐτός ἐστι λόγος, καὶ κοινῶς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰ-
 σθητῶν. οὐκοῦν τὸ ὁμογενές αἰσθητόν οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς ἐνδεικτικόν, τουτέστι τὸ ὁρατόν τοῦ
 ὁρατοῦ ἢ τὸ ἀκουστόν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ ἢ τὸ γευστόν
 211 τοῦ γευστοῦ. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνομογενές
 τοῦ ἀνομογενοῦς, οἷον τὸ ὁρατόν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ
 ἢ τὸ ἀκουστόν τοῦ γευστοῦ ἢ ὁσφραντοῦ· οὐ γὰρ
 ἐὰν ὁσφραίνηται τις εὐώδους τινός, εἰς κατάληψιν
 ἔρχεται τοῦ λευκοῦ χρώματος, οὐδὲ φωνῆς ἀντι-
 λαμβανόμενος γλυκαίνεται τὴν γεῦσιν.
 212 Καίτοι μακρόν ἐστι ζητεῖν εἰ δύναται τὸ
 ὁμογενές τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς καὶ τὸ ἀνομογενές τοῦ
 ἀνομογενοῦς εἶναι σημεῖον, ὅτε καὶ τὸ τούτου
 ἔγγιον ἀπελπίσειεν ἂν τις νοῦν ἔχων, φημὶ δὲ
 τὸ μηδὲ ἑαυτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐνδεικτικόν εἶναι τὸ
 213 αἰσθητόν. τῶν γὰρ περὶ τούτου σκεψαμένων, ὡς
 πολλάκις ἐδείξαμεν, οἱ μὲν φασιν αὐτὸ μὴ τοιοῦτο
 λαμβάνεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον ἐστι φύσει·
 οὔτε γὰρ λευκόν οὔτε μέλαν, οὔτε θερμόν, οὐ ψυ-
 χρόν, οὐ γλυκύ, οὐ πικρόν, οὐκ ἄλλην τοιαύτην ἔχον

° Cf. I. 135, 298; P.H. I. 49, 213 ff.

is the homogeneous indicative of the homogeneous nor the heterogeneous of the heterogeneous ; therefore the sensible is not indicative of anything. Suppose, for instance, that we had never experienced 209 white colour or black, and were to see white for the first time. Then, from our apprehension of the white we would not be able to apprehend black ; for 210 though it is, perhaps, possible to form a notion that black is another colour, and not of the same sort as white, yet to arrive at an apprehension of black colour through the presence of white is a thing impossible. And the same account may be given of voice, and in general of all the other sensibles. So, then, the homogeneous sensible will not be indicative of the homogeneous—that is to say, the visible of the visible, or the audible of the audible, or the gustable of the gustable.—Nor, again, is the heterogeneous 211 indicative of the heterogeneous—as, for example, the visible of the audible, or the audible of the gustable or odorable ; for one does not by smelling a sweet scent arrive at an apprehension of white colour, nor get a sweet taste by perceiving a voice.

However, it is far-fetched to inquire whether the 212 homogeneous can be a sign of the homogeneous, or the heterogeneous of the heterogeneous, when any man of sense would despair of a thing much nearer to hand—I mean the fact that the sensible is not even able to be indicative of its own self. For, as we have 213 often pointed out,^a of those who have investigated the sensible, some ^b assert that, as apprehended by sense, it is not the same as it is by nature ; for it is not white or black, hot or cold, sweet or bitter, or possessed of any other such quality, but appears to

^a *e.g.* Democritus, *cf.* § 184.

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ποιότητα αὐτὸ καθεστάναι, κenoπαθούσης δὲ καὶ
 ψευδομένης ἡμῶν τῆς αἰσθήσεως τοιοῦτο δοκεῖν
 ὑποκεῖσθαι· οἱ δὲ τινὰ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔδοξαν
 κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑποκεῖσθαι τινὰ δὲ μηδαμῶς, ἄλλοι
 δὲ πᾶσι τὴν ὑπαρξιν ἐπ' ἴσης προσεμαρτύρησαν.

214 τοσαύτης οὖν καὶ ἀδιακρίτου στάσεως οὔσης περὶ
 τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑποστάσεως, πῶς οἷόν τε λέγειν
 αὐτοῦ παραστατικὸν εἶναι τὸ αἰσθητόν; ὅτε οὐδέ-
 πω γινώσκεται τίς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀληθὴς τῶν οὕτως
 διαφωνούντων στάσις. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό γε κρατεῖν χρή,
 ὡς εἶπερ οὔτε τὸ ὁμογενὲς αἰσθητὸν τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς
 αἰσθητοῦ οὔτε τὸ ἀνομογενὲς τοῦ ἀνομογενοῦς οὐτ'
 αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνδεικτικὸν ἐστίν, ἀδύνατον ἄρα λέγειν
 αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον.

215 Ὁ δὲ Αἰνησιδῆμος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῶν Πυρ-
 ρωνείων λόγων εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς
 αὐτῆς σχεδὸν δυνάμειος λόγον ἐρωτᾷ τοιοῦτον. εἰ
 τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παρα-
 πλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεία ἐστὶ φαινόμενα, τὰ
 σημεία πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως
 φαίνεται. οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ σημεία πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως
 διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· τὰ δὲ φαινό-
 μενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως

216 φαίνεται· οὐκ ἄρα φαινόμενά ἐστι τὰ σημεία. καὶ
 δὴ τοίνυν φαινόμενα μὲν ἔοικε καλεῖν ὁ Αἰνησιδῆμος
 τὰ αἰσθητά, λόγον δὲ ἐρωτᾷ καθ' ὃν δεύτερος
 ἀναπόδεικτος ἐπιβάλλει τρίτῳ, οὐ τὸ σχῆμά ἐστι
 τοιοῦτο “ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ τρίτον·
 οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ τρίτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ

217 δεύτερον.” καὶ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οὕτως ἔχει, μικρὸν
 ὕστερον διδάξομεν· νῦν δ' ὡς ὑγιῇ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ τὰ

be really such when our sense has empty affections and gives false reports; but others^a have thought that some sensibles are truly existent and some not; while others, again, have attributed existence to all equally. Since, then, there exists an unsettled dispute 214 of this magnitude regarding the real existence of sensibles, how is it possible to assert that the sensible is capable of manifesting itself, when it is not known as yet which of the discordant views is the true one? But this fact, at least, ought to stand fast—that if neither the homogeneous sensible is indicative of the homogeneous sensible, nor the heterogeneous of the heterogeneous, nor the sensible itself of itself, it is, consequently, impossible to declare that the sign is sensible.

Aenesidemus, in the Fourth Book of his *Pyrrhonian Discourses*, propounds an argument on the same subject and to much the same effect in the following form: "If apparent things appear alike to all those in a similar condition, and signs are apparent things, signs appear alike to all those in a similar condition. But signs do not appear alike to all those in a similar condition; and apparent things appear alike to all those in a similar condition; therefore signs are not apparent things." Now Aenesidemus seems here to 216 be terming sensibles "apparent things," and he propounds an argument in which a second non-demonstrable^b is superadded to a third, the scheme of it being this: "If the first and the second, then the third; not the third, but the first; therefore not the second." That this is really so we shall show a 217 little later on^c; at the moment we shall prove more

^a i.e. Aristotle and the Stoics; the third view is that of Epicurus; cf. §§ 9, 10, 185.

^b Cf. *P.H.* ii. 157 ff.

^c See §§ 234 ff.

- λήμματα καὶ ἔπεται τούτοις ἡ ἐπιφορά, ἀπλού-
στερον ἀποδείξομεν. αὐτίκα τοίνυν τὸ συνημμένον
ἀληθές ἐστιν. ἔπεται γὰρ τῷ κατ' αὐτὸ συμπε-
πλεγμένῳ τὸ λήγον, τουτέστι τῷ "τὰ φαινόμενα
πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαί-
νεται καὶ τὰ σημεία ἐστὶ φαινόμενα" τὸ τὰ σημεία
πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαί-
218 νεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ τοῦ λευκοῦ χρώματος πάντες οἱ
ἀπαραποδίστους ἔχοντες τὰς ὀψεις ὁμοίως ἀντιλαμ-
βάνονται ἀλλ' οὐ διαφόρως, καὶ εἰ τοῦ γλυκέος
πάντες οἱ κατὰ φύσιν τὴν γεῦσιν ἔχοντες γλυκαν-
τικῶς ἀντιλαμβάνονται, κατ' ἀνάγκην ὀφείλουσι
καὶ τοῦ σημείου, εἵπερ ἐστὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καθάπερ τὸ
λευκὸν ἢ γλυκὺ, πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν ὄντες
219 διάθεσιν ὁμοίως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. ὥστε τὸ μὲν συ-
νημμένον ὑγιές ἐστιν· ἀληθές δέ γε καὶ τὸ δεύτερον
λήμμα, τὸ "οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ σημεία πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως
διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται." τὸ γοῦν ἐπὶ
τῶν πυρεσσόντων ἔρευθος καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀγγείων¹ προ-
πάλεια καὶ ὁ ἐνικμος χρῶς καὶ ἡ πλείων θερμασία καὶ
ἡ σφοδρότης τῶν σφυγμῶν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ σημεία τοῖς
ὁμοίως κατὰ τε τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σύγκρισιν
διακειμένοις οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσπίπτει σημεία, οὐδ'
220 ὡσαύτως πᾶσι φαίνεται, ἀλλ' Ἡροφίλῳ μὲν λόγου
χάριν ὡς ἀντικρυς χρηστοῦ² αἵματος σημεία, Ἑρασι-
στράτῳ δὲ ὡς μεταπτώσεως τῆς ἐκ φλεβῶν εἰς
ἀρτηρίας, Ἀσκληπιάδῃ δὲ ὡς ἐνστάσεως νοητῶν
ὄγκων ἐν νοητοῖς ἀραιώμασιν. τοίνυν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον
221 λήμμα ὑγιές ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ τρίτον, τὸ τὰ φαινό-
μενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως

¹ ἀγγείων Kalbfleisch: αἰτίων LE, Bekk.: ὥτιων N.² An ἀχρήστου?

simply that the premisses of the argument are sound and that the conclusion follows from them. Thus, to start with, the major premiss is true; for the consequent follows from the conjunctive clause—that is, from “Apparent things appear alike to all those in a similar condition, and signs are apparent things,” there follows “Signs appear alike to all those in a similar condition.” For if all those who have 218 unimpeded sight perceive white colour similarly and not differently; and if all whose taste is in a natural state apprehend what is sweet as sweet; then all who are in a similar condition ought of necessity to apprehend the sign similarly, if it is a sensible thing like the white and the sweet. So that the major 219 premiss is sound. And the second premiss is also true, namely “But signs do not appear alike to all those in a similar condition.” Thus, in the case of fever patients, flushing and prominence of the vessels and a moist skin and increased temperature and quickening of the pulses and all the other signs do not manifest themselves as signs of the same thing to those who are in a similar condition as regards their senses and the rest of their bodily constitution, nor do they appear alike to all; but to Herophilus, 220 for instance, they seem to be definite signs of good blood, and to Erasistratus of the transference of the blood from the veins to the arteries, and to Asclepiades of the lodgement of intelligible molecules^a in intelligible interstices. So, then, the second premiss also is sound. But so is the third as well, namely 221 “Apparent things appear alike to all those in a

^a i.e. non-sensible (invisible) molecules of matter in non-sensible passages of the body. Cf. *P.H.* iii. 32.

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φαίνεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ λευκόν, εἰ τύχοι, χρώμα τῷ
 μὲν ἱκτεριῶντι καὶ τῷ ὑφαίμους ἔχοντι τοὺς ὀφ-
 θαλμοὺς καὶ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν διακειμένῳ οὐχ ὡσαύ-
 τως προσπίπτει (ἀνομοίως γὰρ διέκειντο, παρ' ἣν
 αἰτίαν τῷ μὲν φαίνεται ὠχρὸν τῷ δὲ ἐνερευθές τῷ
 δὲ λευκόν), τοῖς μέντοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διάθεσιν
 οὖσι, τουτέστι τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσι, λευκὸν μόνον φαί-
 222 νεται. τοίνυν ἀληθέσιν οὖσι τοῖς λήμμασι συνεισ-
 αχθήσεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορὰ ἡ " οὐκ ἄρα φαινόμενόν
 ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον."

Αὐτόθεν μὲν οὖν ἐφοδεύσασιν ἡμῖν ἀληθῆς ὁ
 223 λόγος ὑποδεδεικται· ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀναπόδεικτός ἐστι
 καὶ συλλογιστικός, ἀναλύσασιν αὐτὸν φανήσεται.
 εὐθέως γάρ, ἵνα μικρὸν ἄνωθεν προλάβωμεν, ἀναπό-
 δεκτοὶ λέγονται διχῶς, οἳ τε μὴ ἀποδεδειγμένοι
 καὶ οἱ μὴ χρεῖαν ἔχοντες ἀποδείξεως τῷ αὐτόθεν
 εἶναι περιφανές ἐπ' αὐτῶν τὸ ὅτι συνάγουσιν.
 ἐπεδείξαμεν δὲ πολλάκις ὡς κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον ση-
 μαυνόμενον ταύτης ἡξίωνται τῆς προσηγορίας οἱ
 κατ' ἀρχὴν τῆς πρώτης περὶ συλλογισμῶν εἰσαγω-
 224 γῆς παρὰ τῷ Χρυσίππῳ τεταγμένοι. νυνὶ δὲ ἐφ'
 ὁμολόγῳ τούτῳ γνωστόον ὅτι πρῶτος μὲν ἐστὶν
 ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου,
 τὸ λῆγον ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ ἔχων συμ-
 πέρασμα. τουτέστιν, ὅταν λόγος δύο ἔχῃ λήμματα,
 ὧν τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν ἐστι συνημμένον τὸ δὲ ἕτερον
 ἡγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ, ἔχῃ δὲ καὶ ἐπιφορὰν
 τὸ λῆγον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ συνημμένῳ, τότε ὁ τοιοῦτος
 λόγος πρῶτος ἀναπόδεικτος καλεῖται, οἷον ὁ οὕτως

* Cf. P.H. i. 44.

• Cf. P.H. ii. 149 n., 146 ff.

similar condition." Thus, for example, white colour does not present itself in the same way to the man with jaundice, and to one who has blood-shot eyes,^a and to him who is in a natural condition (for their conditions are dissimilar, and because of this it appears yellow to the first, reddish to the second, and white to the third); yet to those who are in the same condition, that is to say in sound health, it appears white only. So from 222 these true premisses there will be drawn the conclusion "Therefore the sign is not an apparent thing."

This argument, then, has been shown by our examination of it to be true; and that it is both non- 223 demonstrable and syllogistic^b will appear when we have analysed it. For—to go back to first principles—the term "non-demonstrable," to start with, has two senses, being used both of arguments which are not demonstrated, and of those which have no need of demonstration owing to its being at once obvious in their case that they are conclusive. And we have often pointed^c out that the arguments set out by Chrysippus, at the beginning of his first *Introduction to Syllogisms*, are given this title in the second sense. So now, this being assumed, one must understand 224 that the first non-demonstrable argument is that composed of a hypothetical major premiss and its antecedent, having as its conclusion the consequent in the major.^d That is to say, when an argument has two premisses, of which the one is a hypothetical major and the other the antecedent in the major, and also has as its conclusion the consequent in the same major, then such an argument is called a "first non-demonstrable," for example one in this form—"If it is day,

^a Cf. *P.H.* ii. 156.

^b With §§ 224-226 cf. *P.H.* ii. 157, 158.

- ἔχων “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν.” οὗτος γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῶν λημμάτων ἔχει συνημμένον, τὸ “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι,” τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τὸ ἡγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ “ ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν,” τὸ δὲ “ φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν” τρίτον τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, τὸ λήγον τοῦ
- 225 συνημμένου. δεύτερος δ’ ἐστὶν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῷ λήγοντι ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ, τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἡγούμενῳ ἔχων συμπέρασμα. τουτέστιν, ὅταν λόγος πάλιν ἐκ δυοῖν <ῆ> συνεστῶς λημμάτων, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν ἐστι συνημμένον τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀντικείμενον τῷ λήγοντι ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ, ἔχη δὲ καὶ ἐπιφορὰν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἡγούμενῳ, τότε ὁ τοιοῦτος γίνεται δεύτερος ἀναπόδεικτος, ὡς τὸ “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· οὐχὶ δέ γε φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἡμέρα.” τό τε γὰρ “ εἰ ἔστιν ἡμέρα, φῶς ἔστιν,” τὸ ἕτερον λῆμμα τοῦ λόγου, συνημμένον ἐστί, τό τε “ οὐχὶ δέ γε φῶς ἔστι,” λοιπὸν λῆμμα τοῦ λόγου καθεστῶς, ἀντικείμενόν ἐστι τῷ λήγοντι ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ· ἥ τε ἐπιφορὰ ἡ “ οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν” τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἦν τοῦ ἡγούμενου.
- 226 τρίτος δέ ἐστι λόγος ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ ἐξ ἀποφατικοῦ συμπλοκῆς καὶ ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ, τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ ἔχων συμπέρασμα, οἷον “ οὐχὶ καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νῦξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δὲ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι νῦξ.” τὸ μὲν γὰρ “ οὐχὶ καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νῦξ ἔστιν” ἀποφατικὸν ἦν συμπεπλεγμένου τοῦ “ καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νῦξ ἔστι,” τὸ δὲ “ ἡμέρα ἔστι” τὸ ἕτερον ἐτύγχανε τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ, τὸ δὲ “ οὐκ ἄρα

¹ <ῆ> cf. Bekk.

it is light ; but in fact it is day ; therefore it is light." For this has a hypothetical major as one of its premisses, namely, " If it is day, it is light " ; and as the second, the antecedent of the major, " But in fact it is day " ; and thirdly, as its conclusion, the consequent of the major, " Therefore it is light."—The second non-demonstrable is that composed of a 225 hypothetical major premiss and the contradictory of the consequent in that major, and having as its conclusion the contradictory of the antecedent. That is to say, when an argument, composed once more of two premisses, of which the one is a hypothetical major and the other the contradictory of the consequent in that major, has also as its conclusion the contradictory of the antecedent, then such an argument is a " second non-demonstrable "—as for example " If it is day, it is light ; but it is not light ; therefore it is not day." For the one premiss of the argument—namely, " If it is day, it is light "—is a hypothetical major ; and " But it is not light," which is the other premiss of the argument, is the contradictory of the consequent in the major ; and the conclusion, " Therefore it is not day," is the contradictory of the antecedent.—The third non-demonstrable argument is 226 that composed of a negative conjunctive premiss and one of the clauses of that conjunctive, and having as its conclusion the contradictory of the other clause in the conjunctive premiss ; for example, " It is not both day and night ; but it is day ; therefore it is not night." For the premiss " It is not both day and night " is the negative of the conjunctive, " It is both day and night," and " It is day " is one of the clauses in the conjunctive, and " Therefore it is not night "

ἔστι νύξ" τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἦν τῷ λοιπῷ τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ.

- 227 Οἱ μὲν οὖν λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινές εἰσι, τρόποι δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὥσπερ εἰ σχήματα ἐν οἷς ἠρώτηνται οἱ οὕτως ἔχοντες, τοῦ μὲν πρώτου ἀναποδείκτου " εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον· τὸ δέ γε πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον," τοῦ δὲ δευτέρου " εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον· οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ δεύτερον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον," τοῦ δὲ τρίτου " οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον· τὸ δέ γε πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον."
- 228 Ἔτι χρὴ γινώσκειν ὅτι τῶν ἀναποδείκτων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀπλοῖ οἱ δὲ οὐχ ἀπλοῖ. ὧν ἀπλοῖ μὲν εἰσιν οἱ αὐτόθεν σαφὲς ἔχοντες τὸ ὅτι συνάγουσιν, τουτέστι τὸ ὅτι συνεισάγεται αὐτῶν τοῖς λήμμασιν ἢ ἐπιφορά. ὁποῖοί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκκείμενοι· ἐὰν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πρώτου εὐθὺς δῶμεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ " εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι," λέγω δὲ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ἡμέραν εἶναι τὸ φῶς εἶναι, ὑποθώμεθα δὲ ἀληθὲς τὸ πρῶτον τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι, ὅπερ ἦν ἡγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὸ φῶς εἶναι, ὅπερ ἦν συμπέρασμα τοῦ λόγου.
- 229 οὐχ ἀπλοῖ δὲ εἰσιν οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἀπλῶν πεπλεγμένοι καὶ ἔτι χρεῖαν ἔχοντες τῆς εἰς ἐκείνους ἀναλύσεως, ἵνα γνωσθῶσιν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ συνάγουσιν. τούτων δὲ τῶν οὐχ ἀπλῶν οἱ μὲν ἐξ ὁμογενῶν εἰσὶ συνεστῶτες οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἀνομογενῶν, καὶ ἐξ ὁμογενῶν μὲν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ δυοῖν πρώτων ἀναποδείκτων πε-
- 230 πλεγμένοι ἢ ἐκ δυοῖν δευτέρων, ἐξ ἀνομογενῶν δὲ ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ πρώτου (καὶ τρίτου)¹ ἀναποδείκτου

¹ <καὶ τρίτου> Kochalsky.

is the contradictory of the other clause in the conjunctive.

Such, then, are these arguments; and the "moods" 227
 or "schemes," so to say, in which the arguments of this kind are propounded are as follows: Of the first non-demonstrable—"If the first, then the second (is true); but the first (is true); therefore the second (is true)." Of the second—"If the first, then the second (is true); but the second is not (true); therefore the first is not (true)." Of the third—"The first and the second are not both (true); but the first is (true); therefore the second is not (true)."

Further, one should observe that some of the non- 228
 demonstrables are simple, others not simple. Simple ones are those which at once clearly declare that they draw a conclusion—that is to say, that the inference is introduced together with the premisses themselves. The arguments stated above are of this kind; for, in the case of the first, if we grant it to be true that "If it is day, it is light,"—true, I mean, that the existence of light follows on that of day,—and if we assume as true the first clause, that "it is day," which is the antecedent in the major premiss, it will necessarily follow that it is also light, which is the conclusion of the argument. Not simple are those which are 229
 woven together out of simple ones, and which require to be broken up first into simple ones before it can be known that they, too, draw conclusions. And of these not simple arguments, some are composed of homogeneous parts, others of heterogeneous—of homogeneous, as in the case of those woven out of two first non-demonstrables, or of two second; and of 230
 heterogeneous, as in the case of those compounded of a first non-demonstrable (and a third), or of a

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- συνεστῶτες ἢ ἐκ δευτέρου καὶ τρίτου, καὶ κοινῶς οἱ τούτοις παραπλήσιοι. ἐξ ὁμογενῶν μὲν οὖν συνέστηκεν οἶον ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." πέπλεκται γὰρ ἐκ πρώτων δυοῖν ἀναποδείκτων,
- 231 ὥς ἀναλύσαντες αὐτὸν εἰσόμεθα. γνωστέον γὰρ ὅτι θεώρημα διαλεκτικὸν ἔστιν εἰς τὰς τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἀναλύσεις παραδιδόμενον τοιοῦτον "ὅταν τὰ τινος συμπεράσματος συνακτικὰ λήμματα ἔχωμεν, δυνάμει καὶ ἐκείνῳ ἐν τούτοις ἔχομεν τὸ συμπεράσμα, καὶ κατ' ἐκφορὰν μὴ λέγεται."
- 232 ἐπεὶ οὖν δύο ἔχομεν λήμματα, τό τε συνημμένον τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, φῶς ἔστιν," ὅπερ ἀρχεται μὲν ἀπὸ ἀπλοῦ ἀξιώματος τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," λήγει δὲ εἰς οὐχ ἀπλοῦν συνημμένον τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, φῶς ἔστιν," καὶ ἔτι τὸ ἡγούμενον ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ἐκ τούτων συναχθήσεται ἡμῖν πρώτῳ ἀναποδείκτῳ τὸ λήγον ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ τὸ "εἰ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν, φῶς ἔστιν." τοῦτ' οὖν δυνάμει μὲν ἔχομεν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ συναγόμενον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκφορὰν παραλείμμενον τάξαντες μετὰ τῆς τοῦ ἐκκειμένου λόγου προσλήψεως¹ τῆς "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ἔχομεν συναγόμενον τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν" πρώτῳ ἀναποδείκτῳ, ὅπερ ἦν ἐπιφορὰ τοῦ ἐκκειμένου λόγου. ὥστε δύο γίνεσθαι πρώτους ἀναποδείκτους, ἓνα μὲν τοιοῦτον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν," ἕτερον δὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν."
- 234 Τοιόσδε μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ χαρακτήρ τῶν ἐξ ὁμογενῶν τὴν πλοκὴν ἐχόντων λόγων· ἐξ ἀνομογενῶν

¹ προσλήψεως Heintz: προλήψεως ms., Bekk.

second and a third, and in general such as are similar to these. Thus an argument such as the following is composed of homogeneous parts—"If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light." For it is woven out of two first non-demonstrables, as we shall learn when we analyse it. For one should 231 observe that there is a dialectical rule handed down for the analysis of syllogisms, namely this—"When we know the premisses which imply a certain conclusion, we know also potentially the conclusion involved in them, even though it be not explicitly stated." Since, then, we have two premisses,— 232 the major "If it is day, it is light," which begins with the simple proposition "it is day" but ends with the not-simple major "if it is day, it is light," and also its antecedent "it is day,"—from these we shall infer, by the first non-demonstrable, the consequent of that major, namely "Therefore if it is day, it is light." Potentially, then, we have this 233 inference drawn in the argument, but as it is omitted in the explicit statement, when we have put it beside the minor premiss of the expressed argument "it is day" we shall have the clause "it is light" deduced by the first non-demonstrable, which clause is the conclusion of the expressed argument. So that two first indemonstrables are formed, the one being of this sort—"If it is day, it is light," and the other of this—"If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light."

Such then is the type of the arguments which are 234 woven out of homogeneous parts. Next come those

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δὲ λοιπόν ἐστι καθάπερ ὁ παρὰ τῷ Αἰναιοδῆμῳ
 περὶ τοῦ σημείου ἐρωτηθεὶς, ἔχων δὲ οὕτως "εἰ
 τὰ φαινόμενα ἅπασιν τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις
 παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεία ἐστι φαινό-
 μενα, τὰ σημεία πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις
 παραπλησίως φαίνεται· τὰ δὲ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς
 ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· τὰ
 δέ γε σημεία οὐ πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις
 παραπλησίως φαίνεται· οὐκ ἄρα φαινόμενά ἐστι
 235 τὰ σημεία." συνέστηκε γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἐκ
 δευτέρου τε ἀναποδείκτου καὶ τρίτου, καθὼς
 πάρεστι μαθεῖν ἐκ τῆς ἀναλύσεως, ἥτις σαφεστέρα
 μᾶλλον γενήσεται ἐπὶ τοῦ τρόπου ποιησαμένων
 ἡμῶν τὴν διδασκαλίαν, ἔχοντος οὕτως "εἰ τὸ
 πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ τρίτον· οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ
 τρίτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον."
 236 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔχομεν συνημμένον ἐν ᾧ ἡγείται συμ-
 πεπλεγμένον τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, λήγει δὲ
 τὸ τρίτον, ἔχομεν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ
 λήγοντος τὸ "οὐ τὸ τρίτον," συναχθήσεται ἡμῖν
 καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἡγουμένου, τὸ "οὐκ ἄρα
 τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον," δευτέρῳ ἀναπο-
 δείκτῳ. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο αὐτὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν
 δύναμιν ἔγκειται τῷ λόγῳ, ἐπεὶ ἔχομεν τὰ συν-
 εκτικὰ αὐτοῦ λήμματα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν προφορὰν
 παρέϊται. ἅπερ τάξαντες μετὰ τοῦ λειπομένου
 λήμματος τοῦ πρώτου ἔχομεν συναγόμενον τὸ
 συμπέρασμα τὸ "οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον" τρίτῳ
 ἀναποδείκτῳ. ὥστε δύο εἶναι ἀναποδείκτους, ἓνα
 μὲν τοιοῦτον "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ
 τρίτον· οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ τρίτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον

with heterogeneous parts, such as that concerning the Sign propounded by Aenesidemus,^a which runs thus : " If the things apparent appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition, and the signs are things apparent, the signs appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition ; and the things apparent appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition ; but the signs do not appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition ; therefore the signs are not things apparent." For an argument like this is compounded 235 of the second non-demonstrable and the third, as one may learn from its analysis ; and this will become clearer when we have given instruction as to its " scheme," which goes thus : " If the first and the second, the third (is true) ; but the third is not (true), whereas the first is ; therefore the second is not (true)." For when we have a major premiss in which the ante- 236 cedent consists of the first and second conjoined, while the third is the consequent, and have also the clause " the third is not (true) " as the contradictory of the consequent, we shall also get for our conclusion the contradictory of the antecedent, namely " therefore the first and the second are not (true)," by the second non-demonstrable. But, in fact, this very conclusion is potentially contained in the argument, since we possess the premisses which go to prove it, but in the explicit statement it is omitted. And when we have placed these alongside of the remaining premiss, the first, we shall have deduced the conclusion, " therefore the second is not (true)," by the third non-demonstrable. So that there are two non-demonstrables, one in the form " If the first and the second, the third (is true) ; but the third is not (true) ; therefore the

^a Cf. § 215.

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καὶ τὸ δεύτερον," ὅς ἐστι δεύτερος ἀναπόδεικτος, ἕτερον δὲ τρίτον τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα "οὐχὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον."

- 237 Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ τρόπου ἡ ἀνάλυσις ἐστι τοιαύτη, ἀναλογεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου· παραλείπεται γὰρ τὸ τρίτον τὸ "οὐχὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεία ἐστι φαινόμενα," ὃ μετὰ τοῦ τὰ φαινόμενα ἅπασιν τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεσθαι συνάγει τὸ τοῦ ἐκκειμένου τρίτῳ ἀναποδείκτῳ. ὥστε δεύτερον μὲν γίνεσθαι ἀναπόδεικτον τοιοῦτον "εἰ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεία ἐστι φαινόμενα, τὰ σημεία πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ σημεία πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· τὰ σημεία ἄρα οὐκ
238 ἔστι φαινόμενα," τρίτον δὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον "οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεία ἐστι φαινόμενα· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ σημεία ἐστι φαινόμενα."

- 239 Κατὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν τῆς συναγωγῆς καὶ τοιοῦτός τις προταθήσεται λόγος "εἰ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶ σημεία, τὰ ἀδηλα πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης φαίνεται· οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ ἀδηλα πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης
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first and the second are not $\langle \text{true} \rangle$," which is a second non-demonstrable ^a; and the other, which is a third non-demonstrable, in the form "The first and the second are not $\langle \text{true} \rangle$; but in fact the first is $\langle \text{true} \rangle$; therefore the second is not $\langle \text{true} \rangle$."

Such, then, is the analysis in the case of the 237 "scheme," and in the case of the argument it is analogous; for the third premiss is missing, namely, "It is not $\langle \text{true} \rangle$ both that apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition, and that the signs are apparent," which, taken in conjunction with the premiss that "apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition," proves the $\langle \text{conclusion} \rangle$ of the expressed $\langle \text{argument} \rangle$ by the third non-demonstrable. Hence there is brought about a second non-demonstrable in this form: "If apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition, and the signs are apparent, then the signs appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition; but the signs do not appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition; therefore the signs are not 238 apparent"; and a third in this form: "It is not $\langle \text{true} \rangle$ both that $\langle \text{true} \rangle$ apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition and that the signs are apparent; but in fact apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition; therefore the signs are not apparent."

The same method of deduction will be employed 239 in propounding such an argument as this: "If apparent things appear equally to all, and things apparent are signs of things non-evident then things non-evident appear equally to all; but things

^a Cf. §§ 225-227.

- φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης φαίνεται· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ φαινόμενα τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶ
 240 σημεῖα." τούτου δὴ τοῦ λόγου ἡ μὲν ἀνάλυσις ἐστὶν ὁμοία, [καθ' ἣν δεύτερος ἀναπόδεικτος ἐπιβάλλει τρίτῳ,]¹ ἡ δὲ παραμυθία τῶν λημμάτων προϋπτος. ὅτι γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐπ' ἴσης φαίνεται τοῖς ἀπαραποδίστους ἔχουσι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, συμφανές· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις ἄλλως τὸ λευκὸν φαίνεται, οὐδὲ ἄλλοις ἄλλως τὸ μέλαν, οὐδὲ διαφερόντως τὸ
 241 γλυκύ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως πάντας κινεῖ. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἐπ' ἴσης πᾶσι φαίνεται καὶ ἐνδεικτικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν τῶν ἀδήλων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ ἀδηλα ἐπ' ἴσης πᾶσι προσπίπτειν ὥς ἂν καὶ τῶν αἰτίων τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντων καὶ τῆς ὕλης ὁμοίας ὑποκειμένης. οὐχὶ δέ γε τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ πάντες ὡσαύτως τὰ ἀδηλα γινώσκουσι, καίπερ κατ' ἴσον τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐγκυροῦντες, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν οὐδ' εἰς ἔννοιαν αὐτῶν ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἔρχονται μὲν, εἰς ποικίλιαν δὲ καὶ πολυτρόπους καὶ μαχομένας ὑποσύρονται ἀποφάσεις. ἀκόλουθον ἄρα μὴ αἰσθητὰ λέγειν τὰ σημεῖα, ἵνα μὴ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν τὸ ἄτοπον ἔπηται.
 242 Ἐνέσται δὲ καὶ βραχέως τὰ προειρημένα περιλαμβάνοντας τοιουτοῦσι τινες προτείνειν λόγους. εἰ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι φαίνεται, τὰ δὲ σημεῖα οὐ πᾶσι φαίνεται, οὐκ ἔστι τὰ φαινόμενα σημεῖα.
 243 ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. καὶ πάλιν, εἰ τὰ φαινόμενα, καθόσον ἐστὶ φαινόμενα, διδασκαλίας οὐκ ἔχει χρεῖαν, τὰ δὲ σημεῖα, παρόσον ἐστὶ σημεῖα, διδασκαλίας ἔχει χρεῖαν, τὰ σημεῖα οὐκ ἔστι φαινόμενα. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον.

¹ [καθ' ἣν . . . τρίτῳ] secl. Heintz.

non-evident do not appear equally to all, though things apparent do appear equally to all ; therefore things apparent are not signs of things non-evident." Now the analysis of this argument is similar, [for in 240 it a second non-demonstrable is superimposed on a third,] and the logical force of the premisses is obvious. For it is plain at once that apparent things appear equally to all who have their senses unimpeded ; for white does not appear differently to different people, nor black differently to different people, nor sweet in distinct ways, but they affect all similarly. So if 241 these things appear equally to all and possess the power of indicating things non-evident, then the non-evident things also must necessarily be perceived equally by all, as the causes are the same and the material substrate is similar. But this is not so ; for all do not cognize non-evident things alike, although they experience sense-objects equally ; some, indeed, do not even arrive at a conception of them, while others do so arrive, but are swept off into a variety of complex and conflicting pronouncements. Therefore, in order that we may avoid this absurd consequence, it follows that the signs are not sensible.

It will also be possible by compressing the foregoing 242 to propound concise arguments such as these : " If apparent things appear to all, but the signs do not appear to all, the apparent things are not signs. But in fact the first <is true> ; therefore the second <is true>." And again : " If apparent things, in so 243 far as they are apparent, do not require explanation, but the signs, in so far as they are signs, require explanation, the signs are not apparent. But in fact the first <is true>, therefore the second <is true>."

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Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τὸ
 244 σημεῖον τοσαῦτα ἡπορήσθω· σκοπῶμεν δὲ καὶ
 τὴν ἀντικειμένην τούτοις στάσιν, φημὶ δὲ τῶν
 νοητὸν αὐτὸ προειληφότων καθεστάναι. βραχέα
 δὲ ἴσως δεήσει καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς
 προλαβεῖν, καθ' ὃ ἀξίωμα θέλουσιν εἶναι τὸ
 245 σημεῖον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο νοητόν. ὑπογράφοντες
 τοῖνυν φασὶ σημεῖον εἶναι ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συν-
 ημμένῳ καθηγούμενον, ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος.
 κρίσεις δὲ τοῦ ὑγιоῦς συνημμένου πολλὰς μὲν καὶ
 ἄλλας εἶναι φασιν, μίαν δ' ἐξ ἀπασῶν ὑπάρχειν,
 καὶ ταύτην οὐχ ὁμολογον, τὴν ἀποδοθησομένην.
 πᾶν γὰρ συνημμένον ἢ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον εἰς
 ἀληθὲς λήγει, ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδος
 λήγει, ἢ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἐπὶ ψεύδος, ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους
 246 ἐπ' ἀληθές. ἀπὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον ἐπ'
 ἀληθὲς λήγει τὸ "εἰ εἰσὶ θεοί, προνοία θεῶν
 διοικεῖται ὁ κόσμος," ἀπὸ ψεύδους δὲ ἐπὶ ψεύ-
 дос τὸ "εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, πτέρυγας ἔχει ἡ γῆ,"
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους δὲ ἐπ' ἀληθές τὸ "εἰ πέταται ἡ
 γῆ, ἔστιν ἡ γῆ," ἀπὸ δὲ ἀληθοῦς ἐπὶ ψεύδος τὸ
 "εἰ κινεῖται οὗτος, περιπατεῖ οὗτος," μὴ περι-
 247 πατοῦντος μὲν αὐτοῦ, κινουμένου δέ. τεσσάρων
 οὖν οὐσῶν τοῦ συνημμένου συζυγιῶν, ὅταν ἀπ'
 ἀληθοῦς τε ἄρχηται καὶ εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγῃ, ἢ ὅταν
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους, ἐπὶ ψεύδος, ἢ ὅταν ἀπὸ ψεύδους
 ἐπ' ἀληθὲς ἢ ἀναστροφῶς ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἐπὶ ψεύδος,
 κατὰ μὲν τοὺς πρῶτους τρεῖς τρόπους φασὶν ἀλη-
 θές τοῦτο γίνεσθαι (εἰάν τε γὰρ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρ-
 χόμενον ἐπ' ἀληθὲς λήγῃ, ἔστιν ἀληθές, εἰάν τε
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπὶ ψεύδος, πάλιν ἀληθές· ὡσαύτως
 δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθές), καθ' ἓνα δὲ
 366

In reply, then, to those who maintain that the sign is sensible let thus much be said by way of objection ; but let us also examine the view opposed to theirs— 244 I mean that of those who conceive it to be intelligible. But perhaps it will be proper for us first to deal shortly with the view they accept, according to which the sign is, they maintain, a proposition, and on this account an intelligible. Thus, in describing it, they 245 say that " The Sign is an antecedent proposition in a valid hypothetical major premiss, which serves to reveal the consequent." ^a And while there are, they say, many other tests of such a valid major, there is one above all—and even it not agreed upon—which shall be described. Every hypothetical major either begins with truth and ends in truth, or begins with falsehood and ends in falsehood, or <proceeds> from truth to falsehood or from falsehood to truth. The 246 premiss " If there are gods, the world is ordered by the gods' providence " begins with truth and ends in truth ; and " If the earth flies, the earth has wings " <proceeds> from falsehood to falsehood ; and " If the earth flies, the earth exists " from falsehood to truth ; and " If this man moves, this man walks " from truth to falsehood, when he is not walking but is moving. As, then, there are four combinations of the major 247 premiss—when it begins with truth and ends in truth, or when <it proceeds> from falsehood to falsehood, or when <it proceeds> from falsehood to truth, or conversely from truth to falsehood,—in the first three modes the premiss, they say, is true (for if it begins with truth and ends in truth it is true, and if it begins with falsehood and ends in falsehood it is again true, and so likewise when <it passes> from falsehood to

^a With §§ 245-253 *cf.* *P.H.* II. 104-106.

- μόνον γίνεσθαι ψεύδος, ὅταν ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον
 248 λήγῃ ἐπὶ ψεύδος. τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἀνα-
 ζητητέον, φασί, τὸ σημεῖον οὐκ ἐν τῷ μοχθηρῷ
 τούτῳ συνημμένῳ ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ὑγιεῖ· εἴρηται γὰρ
 ἀξίωμα τὸ ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ καθηγούμενον.
 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἐν ἡν ὑγιὲς συνημμένον, τρία δέ,
 καθάπερ τὸ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον καὶ ἐπ' ἀληθὲς
 λήγον καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπὶ ψεύδος καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ
 ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθές, σκεπτέον πότερον ποτε ἐν
 249 ἡ ἐν τισὶν ἢ ἐν τινί. οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀληθὲς
 εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἀληθοῦς παραστατικόν, οὔτε ἐν τῷ
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγοντι
 οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθὲς ὑποκείμεται.
 λείπεται οὖν ἐν ἐκείνῳ μόνον αὐτὸ τυγχάνειν τῷ
 ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τε ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπ' ἀληθὲς
 λήγοντι, ὡς ἂν καὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ τοῦ
 250 σημειωτοῦ συνυπάρχειν ὀφείλοντος αὐτῷ. τοίνυν
 ὅταν λέγεται τὸ σημεῖον ἀξίωμα εἶναι ἐν ὑγιεῖ
 συνημμένῳ καθηγούμενον, δεήσει ἐν μόνῳ ἀκούειν
 αὐτὸ καθηγούμενον συνημμένῳ τῷ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς τε
 ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπ' ἀληθὲς λήγοντι. καὶ μὴν οὐκ
 εἴ τι ἡγεῖται ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ ἀπ'
 ἀληθοῦς τε ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπ' ἀληθὲς λήγοντι,¹
 251 τοῦτό ἐστι σημεῖον. ἀντίκα γέ τοι τὸ τοιοῦτο
 συνημμένον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν" ἀπ'
 ἀληθοῦς μὲν ἄρχεται τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" καὶ ἐπ'
 ἀληθὲς λήγει τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν," οὐκ εἶχε δέ τι ἐν
 αὐτῷ ἡγούμενον ἀξίωμα σημείου τοῦ λήγοντος· οὐδὲ
 γὰρ ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστι τοῦ "φῶς ἔστιν" τὸ

¹ ἀρχομένῳ . . . λήγοντί Arnim: ἀρχόμενον . . . λήγον
 mss., Bekk.

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“ ἡμέρα ἔστιν,” ἀλλ’ ὡς αὐτὸ δι’ αὐτοῦ προσ-
 ἐπιπτεν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ “ φῶς ἔστιν ” ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας
 252 ἐλαμβάνετο περιφανείας. δεῖ ἄρα τὸ σημεῖον οὐ
 μόνον ἐν ὑγιεῖ εἶναι συνημμένῳ ἡγούμενον, τουτ-
 ἔστι τῷ ἀπ’ ἀληθοῦς ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπ’ ἀληθές
 λήγοντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικὴν ἔχει φύσιν τοῦ
 λήγοντος, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις συνημμέ-
 νοις “ εἰ γάλα ἔχει ἐν μαστοῖς ἦδε, κεκύηκεν ἦδε ”
 καὶ “ εἰ βρογχεῖον ἔπτυκεν οὗτος, ἔλκος ἔχει ἐν
 253 πνεύμονι οὗτος.” τουτὶ γὰρ τὸ συνημμένον ὑγιές
 ἐστίν, ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπ’ ἀληθοῦς τοῦ “ βρογχεῖον
 ἔπτυκεν οὗτος,” λήγον δὲ ἐπ’ ἀληθές τὸ “ ἔλκος
 ἔχει οὗτος ἐν πνεύμονι,” μετὰ τοῦ ἐκκαλυπτικόν
 εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ δευτέρου· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ προσ-
 βάλλοντες κατάληψιν τούτου ποιοῦμεθα.
 254 “ Ἐτι, φασί, τὸ σημεῖον παρὸν παρόντος εἶναι δεῖ
 σημεῖον. ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐξαπατῶμενοι καὶ παρὸν παρ-
 ωχημένου θέλουσιν εἶναι σημεῖον, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ “ εἰ
 οὐλὴν ἔχει οὗτος, ἔλκος ἔσχηκεν οὗτος ”· εἰ μὲν
 γὰρ οὐλὴν ἔχει, παρὸν ἐστίν, φαίνεται γάρ, τὸ δὲ
 ἔλκος ἐσχηκέναι παρωχημένον, οὐκέτι γὰρ ἔστιν
 ἔλκος· καὶ παρὸν μέλλοντος, ὡς τὸ περιεχόμενον
 τῷ τοιοῦτῳ συνημμένῳ “ εἰ καρδίαν τέτρωται
 οὗτος, ἀποθανεῖται οὗτος ”· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τραῦμα
 τῆς καρδίας εἶναι φασιν ἤδη, τὸν δὲ θάνατον μέλ-
 255 λειν. ἀγνοοῦσι δὴ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ὅτι
 ἄλλ’ ἐστὶ τὰ παρωχημένα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα, τὸ
 μέντοι σημεῖον [καὶ σημειωτὸν]¹ καὶ τούτοις παρὸν
 παρόντος ἐστίν. ἐν τε γὰρ τῷ προτέρῳ τῷ “ εἰ
 οὐλὴν ἔχει οὗτος, ἔλκος ἔσχηκεν οὗτος ” τὸ μὲν
 ἔλκος γέγονεν ἤδη καὶ παρώχηκεν, τὸ δὲ ἔλκος

¹ [καὶ σημειωτὸν] secl. Heintz (et add. σημεῖον post ἐστίν).

for just as the latter truth was perceived by means of itself, so also "it is light" was comprehended owing to its own obviousness. The sign, therefore, 252 must not only be the antecedent in a valid major premiss—that is, in one that begins with truth and ends in truth—but must also possess a character which serves to reveal the consequent; as, for example, the antecedent in premisses such as these—"If this woman has milk in her breasts, she has conceived"; and "If this man has had a viscid bronchial discharge, he has a wound in his lungs." For this premiss is 253 valid, as it begins with the truth "This man has had a viscid bronchial discharge," and ends in the truth "he has a wound in his lungs"; and, besides, the first serves to reveal the second; for by observing the former we come to an apprehension of the latter.

Further, they say, the sign must be a present sign 254 of a present thing. For some people erroneously claim that a present thing may also be a sign of a past thing, as in the case of "If this man has a scar, he has had a wound" (for if he has a scar it is present, for it is apparent, but his having had a wound is past, for there is no longer a wound), and that a present thing . (may be the sign) of a future thing, as for instance that included in such a premiss as this—"If this man is wounded in the heart, he will die," for they say that the wound in the heart exists already, but death is in the future. But those who make such state- 255 ments are ignorant of the fact that though things past and things future are different, yet even in these cases the sign is a present (sign) of a present thing. For in the former (premiss)—"If this man has a scar, he has had a wound"—the wound has existed already and is past, but the (statement) that this

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- ἐσχηκέναι τοῦτον ἀξίωμα καθεστηκός ἐνέστηκεν,
περὶ γεγονότος τινὸς λεγόμενον· ἐν τε τῷ “εἰ
καρδίαν τέτρωται οὗτος, ἀποθανεῖται οὗτος” ὁ
μὲν θάνατος μέλλει, τὸ δὲ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τοῦτον
ἀξίωμα ἐνέστηκεν, περὶ μέλλοντος λεγόμενον,
250 παρὸ καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ἀληθές. ὥστε καὶ ἀξίωμα
ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ καθ-
ηγείται τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγοντι
ἐπὶ ἀληθές, ἐκκαλυπτικόν τέ ἐστὶ τοῦ λήγοντος,
καὶ διὰ παντὸς παρὸν παρόντος ἐστὶ σημεῖον.
- 257 Τούτων δ’ ὑποδεδειγμένων κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν
ἐκείνων τεχνολογίας πρῶτον μὲν ἀξιόν ἐστὶ τὸ
τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν πρὸς αὐτούς. εἰ καθ’ οὓς μὲν
αἰσθητόν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον καθ’ οὓς δὲ νοητόν, καὶ
ἡ περὶ τούτου διαφωνία μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀνεπικρίτος
ἐστίν, ἀδηλον εἶναι ῥητέον ἀκμὴν τὸ σημεῖον,
ἀδηλον δὲ ὃν χρήζει τῶν ἐκκαλυφόντων, ἀλλ’ οὐκ
258 αὐτὸ ἐτέρων δεῖ ὑπάρχειν ἐκκαλυπτικόν. καὶ
μὴν εἰ τὸ σημεῖον κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἐν λεκτῷ τὴν ὑπό-
στασιν ἔχει, τὰ δὲ λεκτὰ εἰ ἔστι ζητεῖται, ἄτοπον,
πρὶν ὁμολογηθῆναι τὸ γένος, ὡς βέβαιον λαμ-
βάνειν τὸ εἶδος. ὁρῶμεν δὲ ὡς εἰσὶ τινες οἱ
ἀνηρηκότες τὴν ὑπαρξίν τῶν λεκτῶν, καὶ οὐχ οἱ
ἐτερόδοξοι μόνον, οἷον οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
οἱ στωικοί, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Βασιλείδην, οἷς ἔδοξε
μηδὲν εἶναι ἀσώματον. τοίνυν ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλα-
259 κτέον ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον. ἀλλ’ ἀποδείξαντες, φασί,
πρότερον τὴν τῶν λεκτῶν ὑπαρξίν ἔχομεν βεβαίαν

^a Cf. §§ 177 ff., 241.

^b Cf. §§ 12, 76, 77; P.H. II. 107, 108.

man has had a wound, which is a proposition, is present, being stated about a thing which has existed. And in the premiss "If this man is wounded in the heart, he will die," his death is in the future, but the proposition "he will die" is present, though a statement about the future, inasmuch as it is true even now. So that the sign is a proposition, and also it is the antecedent in a valid major premiss which begins with truth and ends in truth, and it serves to reveal the consequent, and always it is a present sign of a present thing.

Now that these things have been explained according to their own rules of logic, it is proper to reply to them, first, in this wise: If the sign is sensible according to some, but intelligible according to others,^a and the dispute on this point is undecided up till now, we must declare that the sign is as yet non-evident. And being non-evident, it needs things to reveal it and ought not to be capable itself of revealing other things.—Moreover, if the sign is, according to them, classed, as to its "substance," under the head of "expression," and if the existence of "expressions" is a matter of inquiry,^b it is absurd to take the particular as securely fixed before the genus is agreed upon. And we see that there are some who have denied the real existence of "expressions," and these not only men of other Schools, such as the Epicureans, but even Stoics like Basileides^c who held that nothing incorporeal exists. So, then, we must preserve suspension of judgement regarding Sign. But, say they, when we have first proved the real existence of "expressions" we shall have the reality

* A Stoic of this name is said to have given instruction to Marcus Antoninus.

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- καὶ τὴν τοῦ σημείου φύσιν. οὐκοῦν ὅταν ἀπο-
 δείξητε, ἔρει τις, τότε καὶ τὸ πιστὴν εἶναι τὴν
 τοῦ σημείου ὑπαρξιν λαμβάνετε· ἄχρι δὲ ἐπὶ ψιλῆς
 μένετε τῆς ὑποσχέσεως, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐν ἐποχῇ
 260 μένειν. εἴτα καὶ πῶς οἶόν τέ ἐστὶν ἀποδεικνύναι
 τὴν τῶν λεκτῶν ὑπαρξιν; ἢ γὰρ διὰ σημείου
 δεῖται τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ δι' ἀποδείξεως. ἀλλ' οὔτε
 διὰ σημείου τινὸς οὔτε δι' ἀποδείξεως δυνατόν
 τοῦτο ποιεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ αὐτὰ λεκτὰ ὄντα
 261 παραπλησίως τοῖς ἄλλοις λεκτοῖς ἐζήτῃται, καὶ
 τοσοῦτον ἀπέχει τοῦ δύνασθαι βεβαίως τι παριστᾶν
 ὥς καὶ ἀνάπαλιν αὐτὰ χρήζειν τοῦ παραστήσαντος.
 λεληθασί τε αὐτοὺς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς εἰς τὸν δι'
 ἀλλήλων ἐμπίπτοντες τρόπον. ἵνα γὰρ τὰ λεκτὰ
 ὁμολογηθῇ, ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ σημεῖον· ἵνα
 δὲ ἡ ἀπόδειξις καὶ τὸ σημεῖον προῦφεσθήκη, προ-
 πεπιστώσθαι ἀνάγκη τὴν τῶν λεκτῶν φύσιν. εἰς
 ἄλληλα οὖν συννεύοντα καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀλλήλων περι-
 μένοντα πίστιν ἐπ' ἴσης ἐστὶν ἄπιστα.
- 262 Ἄλλ' ἔστω γε καὶ ἐκ περιουσίας συγκεχωρήσθω,
 ἕνεκα τοῦ προβαίνειν τὴν ζήτησιν, ἐν ὑπάρξει τυγ-
 χάνειν τὰ λεκτὰ, καίπερ ἀνηνύτου καθεστώσεως τῆς
 περὶ αὐτῶν μάχης. οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα ἔστιν, ἦτοι
 σώματα ἢ ἀσώματα λέξουσιν εἶναι. καὶ σώματα
 μὲν οὐκ ἂν φαῖεν· εἰ δὲ ἀσώματα, ἦτοι ποιεῖ τι
 κατ' αὐτοὺς ἢ οὐδὲν ποιεῖ. καὶ ποιεῖν μὲν οὐκ
 263 ἂν ἀξιώσειαν· τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον κατ' αὐτοὺς οὔτε
 ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν. μηδὲν δὲ ποιοῦντα
 οὐδὲ οὐ ἐστὶ σημεῖα ἐνδείξεταί τε¹ καὶ δηλώσει·

¹ τε N: τι cet., Bekk. (†τι cj. Bekk.).

of the sign also securely established. "Yes," one will reply, "when you have proved it, then assume also that the existence of the sign is to be believed; but so long as you remain merely promising, we too must necessarily remain in an attitude of suspension." And 260 further, how is it possible to prove the existence of "expressions"? For one will have to do this either by means of a sign or by proof. But neither by means of a sign nor by proof is it possible to do this; for these, being themselves "expressions," are matters of inquiry like the other "expressions," and are so 261 far from being capable of establishing anything firmly that, on the contrary, they themselves require something to establish them. The Stoics, too, have unwittingly fallen into the fallacy of circular reasoning. For in order that "expressions" may be agreed to, proof and sign must exist; and in order that proof and sign may really pre-exist, the reality of "expressions" must be previously confirmed. As these lean, then, on one another and await confirmation from one another, they are equally untrustworthy.

But let it be supposed and gratuitously con- 262 ceded, for the sake of advancing our inquiry, that "expressions" are in existence, although the battle regarding them remains unending. If, then, they exist, the Stoics will declare that they are either corporeal or incorporeal. Now they will not say that they are corporeal; and if they are incorporeal, either—according to them—they effect something, or they effect nothing. Now they will not claim that they effect anything; for, according to them, the 263 incorporeal is not of a nature either to effect anything or to be affected. And since they effect nothing, they will not even indicate and make evident the thing of

τὸ γὰρ ἐνδείκνυσθαι τι καὶ δηλοῦν ἔστι ποιεῖν τι.
 264 ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ σημεῖον μήτε ἐνδείκνυσθαι τι
 μήτε δηλοῦν· οὐκ ἄρα νοητόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἀξίωμα,
 τὸ σημεῖον.

Ἄλλως τε, καθὼς ἐν πολλοῖς πολλάκις ὑπεδεί-
 ξαμεν, ἃ μὲν σημαίνει ἃ δὲ σημαίνεται. σημαίνουσι
 μὲν αἱ φωναί, σημαίνεται δὲ τὰ λεκτά, ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ
 καὶ τὰ ἀξιώματα. πάντων δὲ τῶν ἀξιωματῶν
 σημαυνομένων ἀλλὰ μὴ σημαυνόντων οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 τὸ σημεῖον ἀξίωμα.

265 Πάλιν παρακεχωρήσθω τὰ λεκτὰ φύσιν ἔχειν
 ἀσώματον. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἐν ὑγιεῖ συν-
 ημμένῳ καθηγεῖσθαι φασί, δεήσει προεπικεκρίσθαι
 τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον καὶ προεξητάσθαι, εἴτε τὸ
 κατὰ Φίλωνά ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἴτε κατὰ Διόδωρον
 ἢ τὴν συνάρτησιν ἢ ἄλλως πως κρινόμενον· πολλῶν
 γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτου διαστάσεων οὐσῶν οὐκ ἔνεστι
 λαβεῖν βεβαίως τὸ σημεῖον ἀνεπικρίτου τυγα-
 νούσης τῆς διαφωνίας.

266 Ἐτι πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοισι, κἂν δῶμεν σύμφωνον
 εἶναι τὸ ὑγιὲς κριτήριον, καὶ ὁποῖόν ποτ' ἂν
 ἐκεῖνοι θέλωσι, τοιοῦτο ἀμάχως ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν
 ἦττον τὸ περιεκτικὸν τοῦ σημείου ἀνεπικρίτον
 ὁμολογεῖν ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη. τὸ γὰρ σημειωτὸν ἦτοι
 267 πρόδηλον θέλουσιν εἶναι ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν
 πρόδηλον, οὐκ ἔσται σημειωτόν, οὐδὲ σημαυθήσε-
 ται ὑπὸ τινος, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δι' αὐτοῦ προσπεσεῖται·
 εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, πάντως ἄγνωστον ἔσται τοῦτο εἴτε
 ἀληθές ἐστιν εἴτε ψευδές, ἐπεὶ γνωσκόμενον ὃ τι
 268 ποτὲ τούτων ἐστί, γενήσεται πρόδηλον. τὸ οὖν

^a Cf. § 12.

^b With § 265 cf. §§ 70 ff. *supra*; P.H. ii. 110-112.

which they are signs ; for to indicate anything and make it evident is to effect something. But it is ²⁶⁴ absurd that the sign should neither indicate nor make evident anything ; therefore the sign is not an intelligible thing, nor yet a proposition.

Moreover, as we have frequently shown in many places,^a some things signify, others are signified. Vocal sounds signify, but " expressions " are signified, and they include also propositions. And as propositions are signified, but not signifying, the sign will not be a proposition.

Again, let it be conceded that " expressions " are ²⁶⁵ of an incorporeal nature.^b Yet, since they assert that the sign is the antecedent in a valid major premiss, the valid major will have to be tested and scrutinized beforehand, whether it be what is valid according to Philo, or according to Diodorus,^c or through congruence, or judged by some other criterion ; for since on this point also there are many rival views it is impossible to have a firm grasp of the sign so long as the dispute remains unsettled.

Further, in addition to the foregoing arguments, ²⁶⁶ even if we grant that the valid criterion is agreed upon and that it is incontestably of the kind the Stoics claim, none the less they must necessarily agree that the premiss containing the sign is uncertain. For they hold that the thing signified is either pre-evident or non-evident. And if it is pre-evident, it will not ²⁶⁷ admit of being signified, nor will it be signified by anything but will be perceived of itself ; while if it is non-evident, it certainly cannot be known whether it is true or false, since when it is known which of these it is it will become pre-evident. The premiss, then, which ²⁶⁸

^a Cf. § 115.

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περιεκτικὸν τοῦ τε σημείου καὶ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ
 συνημμένον, λήγον ἐπὶ ἄδηλον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶν
 ἀνεπὶκρίτον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχεται,
 γνώριμόν ἐστι, λήγει δὲ εἰς¹ ἄγνωστον. δεῖ δὲ
 πρὸ παντὸς ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐπὶκρίσιν αὐτοῦ γινώσκειν
 τὸ εἰς τί λήγει, ἵνα ἐὰν μὲν εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγῃ,
 θώμεθα τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς διὰ τὸ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς τε ἀρ-
 χεσθαι καὶ εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγειν, ἐὰν δὲ εἰς ψεῦδος,
 ἀνάπαλιν λέγωμεν ψεῦδος διὰ τὸ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρ-
 χεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ ψεῦδος λήγειν. οὐ τοίνυν ἀξίωμα
 ῥητέον εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον, οὐδὲ ἐν ὑγιεὶ συνημμένῳ
 καθηγούμενον.

- 269 Προσθετέον δὲ τούτοις ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἐναργείαις
 μάχονται οἱ ταύτης προεστῶτες τῆς δόξης. εἰ
 γὰρ ἀξίωμά ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον καὶ ἐν ὑγιεὶ συν-
 ημμένῳ καθηγείται, ἐχρῆν τοὺς μὴδ' ἀρχὴν ἔχοντας
 ἔννοιαν ἀξιώματος μὴδὲ τὰς διαλεκτικὰς τέχνας
 ἐπεληλυθότας ἐκτὸς εἶναι πάσης σημειώσεως.
- 270 οὐχὶ δέ γε τοῦτο· καὶ γὰρ ἀγράμματοι πολλάκις
 κυβερνῆται καὶ ἄπειροι [πολλάκις] τῶν διαλεκτικῶν
 θεωρημάτων γεωργοὶ ἄκρως σημειοῦνται, οἱ μὲν
 τὰ κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἀνέμους τε καὶ νηνεμίας χει-
 μῶνάς τε καὶ γαλήνας, οἱ δὲ κατὰ γεωργίαν,
 ὥσπερ εὐκαρπίαν καὶ ἀκαρπίαν αὐχμούς τε καὶ
 ἐπομβρίας. καίτοι τί περὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγομεν,
 ὅτε καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις τινὲς αὐτῶν μετα-
- 271 δεδώκασιν τῆς τοῦ σημείου νοήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ὁ
 κύων ὅτε ἐκ τοῦ ἵχνους στιβεύει τὸ θηρίον σημειοῦ-
 ται· ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ἀξιώματος ἔλκει φαντασίαν
 τοῦ "εἵπερ ἵχνος ἐστὶ τοῦτο, θηρίον ἔστιν ἐνθάδε."
 καὶ ὁ ἵππος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μύωπος προσβολὴν ἢ
 τὴν τῆς μαστιγὸς ἐπανάτασιν ἐξάλλεται μὲν καὶ

contains the sign and the thing signified, as it ends in what is non-evident, is of necessity uncertain. For that it begins with truth is known, but it ends in the unknown. But in order to pass judgement upon it we must first of all learn wherein it ends, so that if it ends in truth we may pronounce it true because it begins with truth and ends in truth, but if it ends in falsehood, we may, contrariwise, declare it to be false because it begins with truth and ends in falsehood. So then, the sign should not be said to be a proposition, or an antecedent in a sound premiss.

To these (objections) it should be added that those 269 who champion this opinion are in conflict with evident facts. For if the sign is a judgement and an antecedent in a valid major premiss, those who have no conception at all of a judgement, and have made no study of logical technicalities, ought to have been wholly incapable of interpreting by signs. But this is not the 270 case; for often illiterate pilots, and [often] farmers unskilled in logical theorems, interpret by signs excellently—the former on the sea (prognosticating) squalls and calms, stormy weather and fair, and the latter on the farm (foretelling) good crops and bad crops, droughts and rainfalls. Yet why do we talk of men, when some of the Stoics have endowed even irrational animals with understanding of the sign? For, in fact, the dog,^a when he tracks a beast by 271 its footprints, is interpreting by signs; but he does not therefore derive an impression of the judgement “if this is a footprint, a beast is here.” The horse, too, at the prod of a goad or the crack of a whip

^a Cf. *P. II.* l. 63 ff.

¹ *et* N: *þ* *et.*, Bekk.

ἀρούει πρὸς δρόμον, οὐκ ἐπικρίνει δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον συνημμένον διαλεκτικῶς "εἰ μᾶστιξ ἐπανατέταται, δραμητέον ἐστὶ μοι." οὐκ ἄρα ἀξιώμα ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ καθηγούμενον.

- 272 Ταῦτα μὲν ἰδιαίτερον πρὸς τοὺς νοητὸν ἀξιοῦντας εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον εἰρήσθω· κοινότερον δὲ ἐνέσται πρὸς αὐτοὺς λέγειν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς αἰσθητὸν αὐτὸ φάσκοντας εἶναι εἰρημένα. εἴπερ γὰρ ἀξιώμα ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ καθηγούμενον, καὶ ἐν παντὶ συνημμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ λήγον τῷ ἡγούμενῳ, αἷ τε ἀκολουθίαι παρόντων εἰσὶ πραγμάτων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ σημειωτὸν ὑφ' ἑνα καιρὸν παρόντα συνυπάρξει ἀλλήλοις, καὶ οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου γενήσεται μηνυτικόν, ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρα ἐξ αὐτῶν γνώριμα καταστήσεται.

- 273 "Ἐτι τὸ σημεῖον ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστὶ τοῦ [λήγοντος] σημειωτοῦ, τὸ δὲ σημειωτὸν ἐκκαλύπτεται πρὸς τοῦ σημείου. ταῦτα δὲ οὐ τῶν ἀπολύτων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι· πρὸς γὰρ τῷ ἐκκαλύπτοντι νοεῖται τὸ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἐκκαλυπτομένῳ νοεῖται τὸ ἐκκαλύπτον. εἰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρα πρὸς τι ὄντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν πάρεστι χρόνον, ἀμφοτέρα συνυφέστηκεν ἀλλήλοις· εἰ δὲ συνυφέστηκεν, ἐκάτερον ἐξ αὐτοῦ καταληπτὸν ἐστὶ

- 274 καὶ οὐδέτερον ἐκ θατέρου. λεκτέον δὲ κακεῖνο ὅτι ὁποῖόν ποτ' ἂν ᾖ τὸ σημεῖον, ἤτοι αὐτὸ φύσιν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι καὶ μηνύειν τὸ ἀδηλον, ἢ ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν μνημονικοὶ τῶν συναναγυμνωθέντων αὐτῷ. οὐχὶ δὲ ἐκεῖνο φύσιν ἔχει ἐνδεικτικὴν τῶν ἀδηλῶν, ἐπεὶ ὥφειλε πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης ἐνδείκνυσθαι τὰ ἀδηλα. ἡμεῖς ἄρα ὥς ἂν ἔχωμεν

leaps forward and starts to run, but he does not frame a judgement logically in a premiss such as this—"If a whip has cracked, I must run." Therefore the sign is not a judgement, which is the antecedent in a valid major premiss.

Let these special arguments be stated against those 272 who hold that the sign is intelligible ; but it will be possible also to use against them the general arguments we have brought against those who assert that it is sensible.^a For if the sign is an antecedent proposition in a valid major premiss, and in every major the consequent follows the antecedent, and these connexions are between things present, then the sign and the thing signified, both being present at one and the same time, will necessarily co-exist and neither of them will serve to disclose the other, but both will be known of themselves.

Further, the sign serves to reveal the thing 273 signified, and the thing signified is revealed by the sign. And these are not absolute things but relative ; for the thing revealed is conceived in relation to that which reveals, and that which reveals is conceived in relation to that which is revealed. But if both, being relative things, are present at the same time, both co-exist ; and if they co-exist, each of them is apprehensible of itself and neither of them through the other.—This, too, may be said : Whatever be 274 the character of the sign, either it is itself of such a nature as to indicate and disclose the non-evident, or we are capable of remembering the things laid bare together with it. But it does not possess a nature capable of indicating non-evident things, since, (if so), it ought to indicate non-evident things to all men equally. Therefore it depends upon the state

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μνήμης, οὕτω περὶ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ὑποστά-
σεως φερόμεθα.

- 275 'Αλλ' εἶπερ οὔτε αἰσθητόν ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον, ὡς
ἐδείξαμεν, οὔτε νοητόν, ὡς κατεστησάμεθα, παρὰ
δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι τρίτον, λεκτέον τι μὴ εἶναι
σημεῖον. οἱ δὲ δογματικοὶ πρὸς ἕκαστον μὲν τῶν
οὕτως ἐπικεχειρημένων πεφίμωνται, τοῦναντίον δὲ
κατασκευάζοντες φασὶν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος οὐχὶ τῷ
προφορικῷ λόγῳ διαφέρει τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων (καὶ
γὰρ κόρακες καὶ ψιττακοὶ καὶ κίτται ἐνάρθρους
276 προφέρονται φωνάς) ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ, οὐδὲ τῇ
ἀπλῇ μόνον φαντασίᾳ (ἐφαντασιούτο γὰρ κἀκεῖνα)
ἀλλὰ τῇ μεταβατικῇ καὶ συνθετικῇ. διόπερ ἀκο-
λουθίας ἔννοιαν ἔχων εὐθὺς καὶ σημείου νόησιν
λαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ
σημεῖόν ἐστι τοιοῦτον "εἰ τόδε, τόδε." ἔπεται ἄρα
τῇ φύσει καὶ κατασκευῇ τὰνθρώπου τὸ καὶ σημεῖον
277 ὑπάρχειν. ἀνωμολόγηται τε ἡ ἀποδείξις τῷ
γένει σημεῖον εἶναι. δηλωτικὴ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ συμ-
περάσματος, καὶ ἔσται ἡ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτῆς
συμπλοκὴ σημεῖον τοῦ ὑπάρχειν τὸ συμπέρασμα.
οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης "εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν·
ἔστι δὲ κίνησις· ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν" τὸ τοιοῦτον
συμπεπλεγμένον ("ἔστι κίνησις, καὶ" ¹ εἰ ἔστι κίνη-
σις, ἔστι κενόν," [διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπεπλεγ-
μένον,]² εὐθὺς καὶ σημεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ συμπεράσματος
278 τοῦ "ἔστι κενόν." ἥτοι οὖν ἀποδεικτικοὶ εἰσι
λόγοι, φασίν, οἱ κατὰ τοῦ σημείου κομισθέντες
ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπορητικῶν ἢ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί. καὶ εἰ
μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀποδεικτικοί, ἄπιστοι καθεστᾶσιν,

¹ συμπεπλεγμένον MSS.: συνημμένον Bekk.: <ἔστι . . . καὶ> add. Heintz.

² [διὰ . . . συμπ.] secl. Heintz.

of our memory what view we take about the real nature of things.

But if the sign is neither sensible, as we have shown, 275 nor intelligible, as we have established, and besides these there is no third (possibility), one must declare that no sign exists. But the Dogmatists remain muzzled as regards each of these objections, and by way of establishing the opposite they assert that Man does not differ in respect of uttered reason from the irrational animals (for crows and parrots and jays utter articulate sounds), but in respect of internal reason ; nor (does he differ) in respect of the merely 276 simple impression (for the animals, too, receive impressions), but in respect of the transitive and constructive impression.^a Hence, since he has a conception of logical sequence, he immediately grasps also the notion of sign because of the sequence ; for in fact the sign in itself is of this form—" If this, then this." Therefore the existence of sign follows from the nature and structure of Man.—Also, it is generally agreed 277 that proof is of the genus sign.^b For it serves to make evident the conclusion, and the combination formed by its premisses will be a sign of the existence of the conclusion. For example, in the case of this proof—" If motion exists, void exists ; but motion exists ; therefore void exists,"^c this combination " Motion exists, and if motion exists, void exists " is at once also a sign of the conclusion " void exists." The 278 arguments, then, brought against the sign by the Doubters are, they say, either probative or non-probative. And if they are non-probative they are

^a *i.e.*, a compound impression (or presentation) which involves mental "transition" from one "presented" idea to another (*cf.* "association of ideas").

^b *Cf.* *P.H.* II. 122.

^c *Cf.* I. 213.

- ὅπου γε καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ τυγχάνοντες μόλις ἂν ἐπιστεύθησαν· εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι τι σημεῖον· ἡ γὰρ ἀπόδειξις σημεῖον ἦν κατὰ τὸ
 279 γένος. εἴπερ δὲ οὐδὲν οὐδενός ἐστι σημεῖον, ἥτοι σημαίνουσί τι αἱ κατὰ τοῦ σημείου ἐκφερόμεναι φωναὶ ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐδέν, οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ σημείου ὕπαρξιν ἀνελοῦσιν· πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε τὰς μηδὲν σημαινούσας πιστεῦσθαι περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι σημεῖον; εἰ δὲ σημαίνουσι, μάταιοι καθεστᾶσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, λόγῳ μὲν ἐκβάλλοντες τὸ σημεῖον, ἔργῳ δὲ τοῦτο
 280 παραλαμβάνοντες. καὶ μὴν εἰ μηδὲν ἔστι θεώρημα τέχνης ἴδιον, οὐ διοίσει τῆς ἀτεχνίας ἢ τέχνη. εἰ δ' ἔστι θεώρημα τέχνης ἴδιον, ἥτοι φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδηλον. ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη· τὰ γὰρ φαινόμενα πᾶσιν ὁμοίως καὶ ἀδιδάκτως φαίνεται. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον τυγχάνει, διὰ σημείου θεωρηθήσεται. εἰ δὲ ἔστι τι διὰ σημείου θεωρούμενον, ἔσται τι καὶ σημεῖον.
- 281 Τινὲς δὲ καὶ οὕτω συνερωτῶσιν· “εἰ ἔστι τι σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον· εἰ μὴ ἔστι σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον. ἥτοι δ' οὐδὲν ἔστι σημεῖον ἢ ἔστιν· ἔστιν ἄρα.” ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον λῆμμα ὑγιὲς εἶναι φασίν· ἦν γὰρ διαφορούμενον, καὶ τῷ εἶναι σημεῖον ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ εἶναι σημεῖον, παρόσον εἰ ἔστι τὸ πρῶτον, ἔσται καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, μηδενὶ διαφέρον τοῦ πρῶτου τὸ δεύτερον. καὶ τὸ “εἰ μὴ ἔστι σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον” καὶ αὐτὸ ἦν ὑγιές. τῷ γὰρ λέγοντι μὴ εἶναι σημεῖον, ἀκολουθεῖ λέγειν εἶναι τι σημεῖον. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἔστι σημεῖον, αὐτοῦ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι

untrustworthy, seeing that they would hardly have been trusted, even had they been probative; while if they are probative it is plain that a sign exists, for proof is, as regards its genus, a form of sign.—And if 279 nothing is a sign of anything, the words uttered against the sign either signify something or signify nothing.^a And if nothing, neither will they destroy the existence of sign; for how can words that signify nothing possibly be trusted regarding the non-existence of a sign? And if they signify (something), the Sceptics are fools in that they verbally reject the sign while actually accepting it.—Moreover, if there 280 exists no special rule of art, art will not differ from lack of art. And if a special rule of art exists, it is either apparent or non-evident. But it will not be apparent, for things apparent appear to all similarly and without teaching. And if it is non-evident, it will be discerned by means of a sign. But if there exists anything discerned by means of a sign, there will also exist a sign.

Some also argue thus^b: "If a sign exists, a sign 281 exists; if a sign does not exist, a sign exists. But a sign either exists not or exists; therefore it exists." Such is the argument, and they declare that its first premiss is valid; for it is duplicated, and "a sign exists" follows from "a sign exists" inasmuch as the second also will be (true) if the first is (true), since it differs in no respect from the first. And the premiss "If a sign does not exist, a sign exists" is also valid in itself; for he who states that a sign does not exist is stating, consequently, that a sign does exist. For if no sign exists, there will be some sign that no sign

^a Cf. *P. II.* ii. 130.

^b With §§ 281-284 cf. §§ 466-469, and *P. H.* ii. 131, 188.

σημείον ἔσται τι σημεῖον. καὶ εἰκότως. ὁ γὰρ λέγων μὴ εἶναι τι σημεῖον ἤτοι φάσει μόνον τοῦτ' ἀξιοῖ ἢ ἀποδείξει. καὶ φάσει μὲν ἀξίων φάσιν
 282 ἔξει τὴν ἀντιτιθεμένην· ἀποδεικνύς δὲ ὡς ἀληθές τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον, διὰ τοῦ δεικνύντος λόγου τὸ μὴ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, σημειώσεται τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι σημεῖον, τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶν ὁμολογήσει τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον. ἀληθῆ οὖν τὰ πρῶτα δύο λήμματα, φασίν. ἀληθές δὲ καὶ τὸ τρίτον. διεzeug-
 μένον γάρ ἐστιν ἐξ ἀντικειμένων τοῦ τε εἶναι ση-
 μεῖον καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. ἐπεὶ οὖν¹ σύμπαν διεzeug-
 μένον τότε ἐστὶν ἀληθές ὅταν τὸ ἐν ἔχῃ ἀληθές, θεωρεῖται δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθές, ῥητέον τὸ τοιοῦτον συνεστῶς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἀληθές. ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ ὁμολογουμένοις τοῖς λήμμασι συνεισάγεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν τὴν
 "ἐστὶν ἄρα σημεῖον."

283 "Ἔσται δέ, φασί, καὶ οὕτως ἐφοδεύειν. δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ συνημμένα καὶ ἐν διεzeugμένον· τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν συνημμένα ὑπισχνεῖται τοῖς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡγουμένοις ἀκολουθεῖν τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς λήγοντα, τὸ δὲ διεzeugμένον ἐν ἔχει τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθές, ὡς εἰαν ἀμφοτέρω ἢ ἀληθῇ ἢ ἀμφοτέρω ψευδῇ,
 284 ψεῦδος ἔσται τὸ ὅλον. τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς λήμμασι δυνάμεως, ὑποθέμενοι τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐν τῷ διεzeugμένῳ ἀληθές ἴδωμεν πῶς συνάγεται τὰ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς. καὶ δὴ πρῶτον ὑποκείσθω ἀληθές τὸ "ἐστὶ τι σημεῖον." οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ τοῦτ' ἡγούμενόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ συνημμένῳ, ἔξει τὸ ἀκόλουθον αὐτῷ τὸ λήγον ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ. ἔληγε δὲ τὸ εἶναι σημεῖον, ὅπερ ταυτόν ἐστι τῇ ἐπιφορᾷ. συναχθήσεται ἄρα ἡ ἐπιφορά,

exists. And reasonably so ; for he who states that no sign exists affirms this either by mere assertion or by proof. And if he affirms it by assertion he will have (against him) the contrary assertion ; while if ²⁸² he tries to prove the truth of his statement, then by his argument proving the non-existence of a sign he will be signifying the non-existence of a sign, and in doing so he will be acknowledging the existence of a sign. So the first two premisses are, they say, true. And the third also is true ; for it is a disjunctive, composed of contradictories (the existence and non-existence of sign). Since, then, if every disjunctive is true when it has one clause true, and of contradictories one clause is regarded as true, one must declare that a premiss thus constructed is indisputably true. So that the conclusion, " sign therefore exists," is inferred along with the agreed premisses.

It will also be possible, they say, to argue thus : In ²⁸³ the argument there are two hypothetical premisses and one disjunctive ; and of these, the hypothetical promise that their consequents follow from their antecedents, while the disjunctive has one of its clauses true, since if both be true or both false the whole will be false. Such then being the quality of ²⁸⁴ the premisses, let us assume that one of the clauses of the disjunctive is true and see how the conclusion is deduced. And let it be assumed first that " a sign exists " is true : then, since this is the antecedent in the first hypothetical premiss, it will have as following from it the consequent in that premiss. And that consequent was " a sign exists," which is the same as the conclusion. The conclusion,

¹ οὐκ εἶ. Bekk. : εἰ MSS.

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ὑποτεθέντος ἀληθοῦς εἶναι ἐν τῷ διεξευγμένῳ τοῦ εἶναι τι σημεῖον. καὶ μὴν ἀνάπαλιν ὑποκείσθω τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθές τὸ μὴ εἶναι σημεῖον. τοίνυν ἐπεὶ τοῦτο ἡγούμενον ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ συνημμένῳ, ἔξει ἀκολουθοῦν αὐτῷ τὸ λῆγον ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ συνημμένῳ. ἡκολούθει δέ γε αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, ὃ καὶ ἐπιφορά ἐστίν. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἄρα συνάγεται ἡ ἐπιφορά.

- 285 Ταῦτα μὲν οἱ δογματικοί· τάξει δὲ ῥητέον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον εὐθύς, καθ' ὃ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς συνῆγον τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον ζητουμένου τὸ ἦττον ζητούμενον ἐθέλουσι διδάσκειν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι σημεῖον, καὶ εἰ πρὸς τινων ἀντείρηται, καθάπερ τῶν σκεπτικῶν, ἀλλὰ τοί γε παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς δογματικοῖς σύμ-
- 286 φωνόν ἐστίν· τὸ δὲ προνοητικῶς κατεσκευάσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον παρ' οὐκ ὀλίγοις αὐτῶν διαπεφώνηται. σφόδρα δ' ἦν βίαιον τὸ ἐκ τῶν μᾶλλον ἀσυγχωρήτων θέλειν τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα διδάσκειν. καὶ μὴν ῥητῶς ὁ Ἡράκλειτός φησι τὸ μὴ εἶναι λογικόν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μόνον δ' ὑπάρχειν φρενῆρες τὸ περιέχον. ὁ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἔτι παραδοξότερον πάντα ἡξίου λογικὰ τυγχάνειν, καὶ οὐ ζῶα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ φυτά, ῥητῶς γράφων

πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἴσαν.

- 287 μετὰ τοῦ καὶ πιθανόν εἶναι λόγον εἰς τὸ μὴ ἄφρονα τυγχάνειν τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων. εἰ γὰρ πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ προφορικὸς λόγος, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ἐνδιάθετοι αὐτοῖς παρεῖναι· δίχα γὰρ τούτου ἀνυπό-

therefore, will be deduced if it be assumed that the clause "a sign exists," in the disjunctive, is true. Again, let it be assumed, conversely, that the other clause, "a sign does not exist," is true. Then, since this is the antecedent in the second hypothetical premiss, it will have as following from it the consequent in the second hypothetical. And what followed from it was "a sign exists," which is also the conclusion. Therefore in this way also the conclusion is deduced.

Such are the contentions of the Dogmatists; and 285 to the first of them, (taking them) in order, in which they inferred the existence of a sign from the structure of Man, one must straightway reply that they try to explain the less questionable by the more questionable. For the existence of a sign, even if it is controverted by some, such as the Sceptics, is nevertheless generally accepted by all the Dogmatists; but that 286 Man is providentially constructed is disputed by not a few of them. And it is extremely violent to try to explain by what is more generally controverted what is less so. Moreover, Heraclitus ^a expressly affirms that "Man is not rational, and only the circumambient is intelligent." But Empedocles, still more paradoxically, held that all things are rational, and not animals only but plants as well, as he writes expressly—

Wisdom and power of thought, know thou, are shared in by all things.

Besides, there is a plausible argument to show that 287 the irrational animals are not unwise.^b For if they possess "uttered reason," they must necessarily possess also "internal reason"; for apart from this

^a Cf. i. 127, 349; "the circumambient" is the fiery world-substance ("Logos") of H., see Vol. I. *Intro.* p. viii.

^b Cf. *P.H.* i. 62 ff.

- 288 στατός ἐστὶν ὁ προφορικός. καὶν δῶμεν δὲ δια-
 φέρειν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τὸν ἄνθρωπον λόγῳ τε
 καὶ μεταβατικῇ φαντασίᾳ καὶ ἐννοίᾳ ἀκολουθίας,¹
 ἀλλ' οὐ τοί γε καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοις καὶ ἀνεπι-
 κρίτως διαπεφωνημένοις συγχωρήσομεν αὐτὸν
 εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φαινομένοις τηρητικὴν
 τίνα ἔχειν ἀκολουθίαν, καθ' ἣν μνημονεύων τίνα
 μετὰ τίνων τεθεώρηται καὶ τίνα πρὸ τίνων καὶ
 τίνα μετὰ τίνα, ἐκ τῆς τῶν προτέρων ὑποπτώσεως
- 289 ἀνανεοῦται τὰ λοιπά. ἀλλὰ συνομολογηθέν-
 τος, φασίν, ὅτι ἡ ἀπόδειξις κατὰ γένος ἐστὶ
 σημεῖον, εἰ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀποδείξεις οἱ κατὰ τοῦ
 σημείου κομισθέντες λόγοι, ἄπιστοι καθεστᾶσιν,
 εἰ δὲ ἀποδείξεις εἰσὶν, ἔστι τι σημεῖον. ἡμεῖς δὲ
 προειρηκότες ὅτι οὐ τῷ ὑπομνηστικῷ ἐνιστάμεθα
 σημείῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνδεικτικῷ, δυνάμεθα τοὺς κατὰ
 τοῦ σημείου κομισθέντας λόγους παραχωρεῖν τι
 σημαίνειν, ἥδη δὲ οὐκ ἐνδεικτικῶς ἀλλ' ὑπο-
 μνηστικῶς· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς κινούμεθα καὶ
 ἀναλαμβάνομεν τῇ μνήμῃ τὰ δυνάμενα λέγεσθαι
- 290 πρὸς τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ
 περὶ τῆς ἀκολουθίου ῥητέον ὑπομνήσεως, καθ' ἣν
 ἐπυνθάνοντο πότερον σημαίνουσί τι αἱ κατὰ τοῦ
 σημείου προφερόμεναι φωναὶ ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν.
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ πᾶν σημεῖον ἀνηροῦμεν, ἔδει κατ'
 ἀνάγκην ἢ μηδὲν σημαίνειν τὰς κατὰ τοῦ σημείου
 προφερομένας φωνὰς καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἢ σημαίνουσιν
 αὐτῶν δίδοσθαι τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον. νῦν δὲ τῇ
 διαιρέσει χρώμενοι τί μὲν ἀναιροῦμεν σημεῖον τί
 δὲ τίθεμεν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ σημαίνειν τι τὰς κατὰ τοῦ
 ἐνδεικτικοῦ σημείου προφερομένας φωνὰς παρακε-

¹ ἐννοία ἀκολουθίας Kayser: ἐν τῇ ἀκολουθίᾳ MSS., Bekk.

latter the uttered reason is non-existent. And 288 even if we grant that Man differs from the other animals in reason and transitive impression and conception of logical sequence, yet certainly we shall not agree that he is as described as regards things non-evident and matters of unsettled controversy, whereas in respect of things apparent he possesses a retentive sense of sequence, by which he remembers what things he has observed together with what, and what before what, and what after what, and from his experience of previous things revives the rest.—But, 289 they say, when it is agreed that proof is, in respect of its genus, a sign, if the arguments brought against the sign are not proofs they are untrustworthy, while if they are proofs a sign exists. But as we have previously stated that we do not object to the commemorative sign but to the indicative, we are able to admit that the arguments brought against the sign signify something, but not as yet in an indicative but in a commemorative way ; for we are affected by them and we recall in memory the things that can be said against the indicative sign.—And the 290 same may be said regarding their next contention, in which they inquired whether the words uttered against the sign signify something or signify nothing. For if we abolished every sign it would necessarily result either that the words uttered by us against the sign signify nothing, or, if they are significant, that the existence of a sign is conceded. But as it is, since we make use of the distinction, and abolish one kind of sign but affirm the other, by (our allowing that) the words spoken against the indicative sign

χώρηται τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἐνδεικτικόν τι σημεῖον.

- 291 ἔτι ἐλέγετο ὡς εἴπερ ἴδιον τέχνης ἐστὶ θεώρημα, δεήσει τοῦτο μὴ πρόδηλον ὑπάρχειν ἀλλ' ἄδηλον καὶ διὰ σημείου ληπτόν, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι τῆς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων θεωρητικῆς τέχνης οὐδέν ἐστι θεώρημα, καθάπερ ὕστερον διδάξομεν, τῆς δὲ ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις στρεφομένης ἔστιν ἴδιόν τι θεώρημα. διὰ γὰρ τῶν πολλάκις τετηρημένων ἢ ἱστορημένων ποιεῖται τὰς τῶν θεωρημάτων συστάσεις· τὰ δὲ πολλάκις τηρηθέντα καὶ ἱστορηθέντα ἴδια καθειστῆκει τῶν πλειστάκις τηρησάντων, ἀλλ' οὐ κοινὰ πάντων.

- 292 Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τέλει συνερωτηθεῖς αὐτοῖς λόγος ἐν τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ “ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ οὐ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ πρῶτον· ἦτοι τὸ πρῶτον ἢ οὐ τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ πρῶτον ἄρα ” τάχα μὲν καὶ κατὰ παρολκὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς λήμμασι μοχθηρὸς ἐστίν, ἀναμφιλέκτως δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς φαίνεται θλίβειν.

- 293 ῥητέον δὲ τάξει περὶ τοῦ πρώτου, τουτέστι τῆς παρολκῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ διεξευγμένον, ἐν ἔχειν ἀληθές ὀφείλει, καθὼς καὶ αὐτοὶ πρότερον ἔλεγον. ἐν δὲ ἔχον ἀληθές τὸ ἕτερον τῶν συνημμένων ὡς παρέλκον διελέγχει.

- 294 ἐάν τε γὰρ ἀληθές ὑποκέηται τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ “ ἔστι τι σημεῖον,” ἀναγκαῖον γίνεται πρὸς τὴν τούτου συναγωγὴν τὸ διαφορούμενον συνημμένον τὸ “ εἰ ἔστι τι σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον,” παρέλκον δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν τὸ “ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τι σημεῖον, ἔστι τι σημεῖον”· ἐάν τε τὸ μὴ εἶναί τι σημεῖον ὑποκέηται τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθές, τὸ μὲν διαφορούμενον παρ-

* Cf. § 281.

° Cf. P.H. II. 147.

are significant it is not admitted that an indicative sign exists.—Further, it was argued that if there is a special rule of art, this ought not to be pre-evident but non-evident and apprehensible by means of a sign. But this is to ignore the fact that (as we shall show later) while there is no rule of the art concerned with other cases, of the art which deals with things apparent there is a special rule ; for (this art) effects the framing of its rules by means of things frequently observed or investigated ; and the things frequently observed and investigated are peculiar to those who have made the most frequent observations, and are not the common property of all.

Then, as to the final argument propounded by them in this form ^a—“ If the first, the first ; if not the first, the first ; either the first or not the first ; therefore the first ”—it is, perhaps, unsound also because of the redundancy ^b in its premisses, and it indisputably appears to cause worry even to them. First one should speak of what comes first in order, that is to say, the redundancy. If the disjunctive premiss in the argument is true, it is bound to have one clause true, just as they themselves previously stated.^c And having one clause true it convicts one of the hypothetical premisses of redundancy. For, on the one hand, if one of its clauses, namely “ a sign exists,” be assumed as true, then for its deduction the duplicated ^d hypothetical premiss, “ if a sign exists, a sign exists,” becomes necessary, but the remaining premiss, “ if a sign does not exist, a sign exists,” becomes redundant. And, on the other hand, if its clause “ a sign does not exist ” is assumed to be true, the duplicated premiss is redundant for the purpose

^a Cf. § 282.

^d Cf. §§ 109, 181.

ἔλκει πρὸς τὴν τούτου κατασκευὴν, τὸ δὲ “ εἰ μὴ
 ἔστι τι σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον ” ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεται.
 296 μοχθηρὸς οὖν κατὰ παρολκὴν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλ’
 ἵνα μὴ νῦν εἰς τὰ κατὰ λεπτόν συμβαίνωμεν τοῖς
 ἐναντίοις, πάρεστιν ἕτερον συνερωτᾶν λόγον ἔχοντα
 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἴπερ περιτρέπεται ὁ λέγων
 μὴ εἶναι τι σημεῖον εἰς τὸ λέγειν εἶναι τι σημεῖον,
 περιτρέπεται καὶ ὁ λέγων εἶναι τι σημεῖον εἰς τὸ
 λέγειν μὴ εἶναι τι σημεῖον. ὁ δὲ λέγων μὴ εἶναι
 τι σημεῖον σκεπτικῶς περιετρέπετο κατ’ αὐτοὺς
 εἰς τὸ λέγειν εἶναι τι σημεῖον· καὶ ὁ λέγων ἄρα
 δογματικῶς εἶναι τι σημεῖον περιτραπήσεται εἰς
 τὸ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, ὥς παραστήσομεν.
 298 αὐτίκα γὰρ [εἰς] τὸν λέγοντα εἶναι τι σημεῖον
 σημεῖω δεῖ τὴν ἀπόφασιν πιστώσασθαι, ἀσυγ-
 χωρήτου δὲ ὄντος τοῦ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, πῶς ἂν
 οὗτος χρήσεται τῷ σημεῖω πρὸς πίστιν τοῦ εἶναι
 τι σημεῖον; μὴ δυνάμενος δὲ ἀποδείξαι σημεῖω
 τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, περιτραπήσεται εἰς τὸ ὁμο-
 λογεῖν μηδὲν εἶναι σημεῖον. ἔστω δὲ καὶ ἐκ περι-
 ουσίας¹ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ μόνον ὁμολογεῖσθω² σημεῖον, τὸ
 τοῦ [μὴ]³ εἶναι σημεῖον μηνυτικόν· τί τοῦτ’ ὄφελος
 αὐτοῖς μηδὲν ἔχουσι τῶν ιδίων εἰπεῖν δογμάτων
 297 σημεῖον; ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν ἀνόνητον αὐτοῖς, φημί
 δὲ τὸ κοινῶς ὁμολογεῖσθαι εἶναι τι σημεῖον· ἐκείνο
 δ’ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ ὑποτάξαι τῷ “ ἔστι τι
 σημεῖον ” ἀορίστω τὸ “ τοῦτο δ’ ἔστι σημεῖον ”
 ὠρισμένως ἐκφερόμενον. ὅπερ οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτοῖς
 ποιεῖν. πᾶν γὰρ σημεῖον ἐπ’ ἴσης τῷ σημειωτῷ
 δοξαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωνούμενον.
 ὥς οὖν τὸ “ τίς διὰ πέτρας πλεῖ ” ψευδὸς ἐστίν,

¹ περιουσίας Heintz: περιτροπῆς mss., Bekk.

of establishing this, whereas the premiss "if a sign does not exist, a sign exists" becomes necessary. The argument, therefore, is unsound because of redundancy.—But, not to follow our adversaries into 295 minute points, one may propound another argument of the following kind: If he who states that a sign does not exist is converted to stating that a sign exists, he also who states that a sign exists is converted to stating that a sign does not exist. But he who stated, sceptically, that a sign does not exist was converted, according to them, to stating that a sign exists; therefore he who states, dogmatically, that a sign exists will be converted to saying, as we shall show, that a sign does not exist. For instance, it is 296 necessary that he who states that a sign exists should confirm his assertion by a sign, but as it is not agreed that a sign exists, how can he use the sign for confirming the existence of a sign? And if he cannot prove by a sign that a sign exists he will be converted to agreeing that no sign exists.—But let it be granted and agreed, into the bargain, that only this particular sign exists which serves to inform us that a sign exists: of what advantage to them is this, when they are unable to mention any sign of their own special doctrines? So that this does not profit them at all— 297 the general agreement, I mean, that a sign exists; it is probably necessary for them to subjoin to the indefinite statement "a sign exists" the definitely expressed "this sign exists." And this it is not possible for them to do. For every sign, equally with the thing signified, is a matter of opinion and of unsettled controversy. Thus, just as the clause "Someone is sailing through

^a ὁμολογεῖσθω Heintz: ὁμολογεῖσθαι mss., Bekk.

^a [μὴ] secl. Kochalsky.

ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῷ ὠρισμένον ὑποτάττειν ἀληθές τὸ "οὗτος διὰ πέτρας πλεῖ," οὕτως ἐπεὶ τῷ "ἔστι τι σημεῖον" ἀορίστῳ οὐδὲν ἔχομεν ὠρισμένον ἀληθές ὑποτάττειν "τοῦτο δέ ἐστι σημεῖον," ψευδὸς ἄρα γίνεται τὸ "ἔστι τι σημεῖον," καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ ἀληθές, τὸ "οὐδέν ἐστι σημεῖον."

- 298 Πλὴν ἔστω γε καὶ τούτους τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτῶν κομισθέντας λόγους εἶναι σθεναροὺς, μεμενηκέναι δὲ καὶ τοὺς τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἀναντιρρήτους· τί ἀπολείπεται τῆς καθ' ἑκάτερον μέρος προσπιπτούσης ἰσοσθενείας εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐπέχειν καὶ ἀοριστεῖν περὶ τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος, οὔτε τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον λέγοντας οὔτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ οὐ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι μετὰ ἀσφαλείας προφερομένους;

- 299 Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις δοκεῖ κατὰ γένος εἶναι σημεῖον καὶ διὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων ἐκκαλύπτειν τὸ ἀδηλούμενον συμπέρασμα, μὴ τι οἰκείον ἐστὶ τῇ περὶ σημείου σκέψει καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς ζήτησιν συνάπτειν.

Δ — ΠΕΡΙ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΕΩΣ

- 300 Τίνος μὲν ἔνεκεν περὶ ἀποδείξεως ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ζητοῦμεν πρότερον ὑποδέδεικται, ὅτε περὶ τε τοῦ κριτηρίου καὶ τοῦ σημείου ἐσκεπτόμεθα· πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀμεθόδως γίνεσθαι τὴν ὑφήγησιν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς δογματικοὺς ἀντίρρῃσιν προβαίνειν, ὑποδεικτέον
- 301 τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῆς. ἡ τοίνυν ἀπόδειξις κατὰ μὲν τὸ γένος ἐστὶ λόγος· οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε αἰσθητὸν ἦν πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ διανοίας τις κίνησις καὶ συγκατά-

^a Cf. P.H. i. 8.^b Cf. P.H. i. 188.

a rock " is false, since it is impossible to subjoin to it as a definite truth " This man is sailing through a rock," so also, since we are unable to subjoin to the indefinite " a sign exists " a definite and true " this sign exists," the clause " a sign exists " becomes false and its contradictory, " no sign exists," true.

Let it be granted, however, both that the argu- 298
ments brought forward by the Stoics are strong and that those of the Sceptics remain uncontroverted : what remains for us, with this equipollence ^a of the two parties, except to suspend judgement and avoid definition regarding the matter in question, not affirming either that a sign exists or that it does not exist, but cautiously pronouncing that it is " no more " ^b existent than non-existent ?

But since proof seems to come under the genus 299
sign ^c and to reveal the non-evident conclusion by means of the agreed premisses, it is perhaps fitting to attach our inquiry about proof to our examination of sign.

IV.—CONCERNING PROOF

The reason why we are at present inquiring about 300
proof has been shown before, ^d when we were investigating the Sign and the Criterion ; but in order that our treatment may not be unmethodical and that our suspension ^e and our controversy with the Dogmatists may go forward, we must indicate the meaning of proof. Proof, then, in point of genus is an argument ; 301
for it is not, of course, a sensible thing, but a certain

^a With § 299 *cf.* *P.H.* i. 60, ii. 134, 135.

^b *Cf.* i. 27.

^c *i.e.* the Sceptics' doctrine of " suspension of judgement " ;
cf. *P.H.* i. 8 ff.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

θεσις, ἅπερ ἦν λογικά· λόγος δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ἀπλού-
 στερον εἰπεῖν, τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ
 302 ἐπιφοράς. λήμματα δὲ καλοῦμεν οὐ θέματά τινα,
 ἃ συναρπάζομεν, ἀλλ' ἅπερ ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος τῷ
 ἐμφανῇ εἶναι δίδωσι καὶ παραχωρεῖ. ἐπιφορὰ δὲ
 ἐτύγχανε τὸ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λημμάτων κατασκευα-
 ζόμενον. οἶον λόγος μὲν ἐστι τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο σύ-
 στημα " εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστι, φῶς ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα
 ἐστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἐστιν," λήμματα δὲ αὐτοῦ καθέστηκε
 τό τε " εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστι, φῶς ἐστιν " καὶ τὸ " ἀλλὰ
 μὴν ἡμέρα ἐστιν," ἐπιφορὰ δὲ τὸ " φῶς ἄρα ἐστιν."
 303 τῶν δὲ λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσι συνακτικοὶ οἱ δὲ οὐ,
 καὶ συνακτικοὶ μὲν ἐφ' ὧν συγχωρηθέντων ὑπάρχειν
 τῶν λημμάτων παρὰ τὴν τούτων συγχώρησιν
 ἀκολουθεῖν φαίνεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορὰ, ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ
 τοῦ μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἐκτεθέντος. ἐπεὶ γὰρ συν-
 ἐστήκεν ἐκ συνημμένου τοῦ " εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστι, φῶς
 ἐστιν," ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖτο ὄντος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ πρώτου
 ἀληθοῦς ἔσεσθαι καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ
 304 ἀληθές, καὶ ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ " ἡμέρα ἐστιν," ὅπερ ἦν
 ἡγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ, φημὶ ὅτι δοθέντος μὲν
 ἀληθοῦς εἶναι τοῦ συνημμένου, ὥστε ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ
 ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγούμενῳ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγον, δοθέντος δὲ
 ὑπάρχειν καὶ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ " ἡμέρα
 ἐστιν," κατ' ἀνάγκην συνεισαχθήσεται διὰ τὴν
 τούτων ὑπαρξιν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, τουτ-
 305 ἐστι τὸ " φῶς ἐστιν," ὅπερ ἦν ἐπιφορὰ. καὶ δὴ
 οἱ μὲν συνακτικοὶ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινές εἰσι κατὰ
 τὸν χαρακτήρα, ἀσύνακτοι δὲ ὑπάρχουσιν οἱ μὴ
 οὕτως ἔχουσιν. τῶν δὲ συνακτικῶν οἱ μὲν πρό-
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motion and assent of the mind, and these are rational.^a And an argument is, speaking in general terms, what is constructed of premisses and a conclusion. We give 302 the name of "premisses," not to certain assumptions which we take by force, but to those which, because they are obvious, the interlocutor grants and concedes. A conclusion is that which is established from the premisses. For example, this whole structure is an argument: "If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light"; and its premisses are "If it is day, it is light," and "but in fact it is day"; while its conclusion is "therefore it is light."—And of arguments some are conclusive, some not; 303 and conclusive are those in which, when it is agreed that the premisses are true, owing to this agreement the conclusion also appears to follow, as was the case with that set out a moment ago. For since it is composed of the hypothetical major premiss "If it is day, it is light," which promises that, if its first clause is true, the second also of its clauses will be true; and 304 also of the premiss "it is day," which is the antecedent in the major; I assert that if it is granted that the major premiss is true, so that its consequent follows from its antecedent, and granted also that the first of its clauses, "it is day," is a fact,—then, because of the actuality of these, the second also of its clauses, namely "it is light," will be deduced, and this is the conclusion. Such, then, in respect of their 305 type, are the conclusive arguments, and those which are not of this kind are inconclusive.^b—Of the conclusive arguments some deduce something pre-

^a With §§ 301-304 *cf.* *P.H.* ii. 135-138. "Argument" (*λόγος*) = Syllogism.

^b With §§ 305-310 *cf.* *P.H.* ii. 140-143.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

δηλόν τι συνάγουσιν οἱ δὲ ἄδηλον, καὶ πρόδηλον μὲν
 καθάπερ ὁ ἐκκείμενος καὶ οὕτως ἔχων " εἰ ἡμέρα
 ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα
 ἔστιν"· τὸ γὰρ " φῶς ἔστιν " ἐπ' ἴσης φαινόμενον
 τῷ " εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν." καὶ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος " εἰ
 περιπατεῖ Δίῳ, κινεῖται Δίῳ· περιπατεῖ δὲ Δίῳ·
 κινεῖται ἄρα Δίῳ"· τὸ γὰρ " κινεῖται Δίῳ," ὅπερ
 ἐστὶ συμπέρασμα, τῶν αὐτοφωράτων ὑπῆρχεν.
 308 ἄδηλον δὲ συνάγει οἶον ὁ τοιοῦτος " εἰ ἰδρῶτες
 ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ τῆς σαρκὸς
 πόροι· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον"· τὸ
 γὰρ νοητοὺς εἶναι τῆς σαρκὸς πόρους τῶν ἀδήλων
 ὑπῆρχεν. καὶ πάλιν " οὐ ἐκκριθέντος ἐκ τοῦ σώ-
 ματος τελευτῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ψυχὴ ἔστιν ἐκείνο·
 αἵματος δὲ ἐκκριθέντος ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τελευτῶσιν
 οἱ ἄνθρωποι· ψυχὴ ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ αἷμα"· τὸ γὰρ ἐν
 αἵματι κεῖσθαι τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἐν-
 307 ἀργές. τούτων δὲ τῶν ἀδηλόν τι συναγόντων οἱ μὲν
 ἐφοδευτικῶς μόνον ἐπάγουσιν ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν λημ-
 μάτων ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, οἱ δὲ ἐφοδευτικῶς
 380 ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς. ὧν ἐφοδευτικῶς μὲν μόνον
 ἐπάγουσιν οἱ ἐκ πίστεως καὶ μνήμης ἠρτῆσθαι
 δοκοῦντες, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος " εἰ τίς σοι θεῶν
 εἶπεν ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος, πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· οὗτοσὶ
 δὲ ὁ θεός " (δείκνυμι δέ γε τὸν Δία καθ' ὑπόθεσιν)
 " εἰπέ σοι ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· πλουτήσῃ ἄρα
 οὗτος." ἐνθάδε γὰρ παραδεχόμεθα τὸ συμπέρασμα,
 τὸ πλουτήσῃ τούτῳ, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ προταθέντος
 λόγου δυνάμεως κατασκευασθέν, ἀλλὰ τῷ πιστεύειν
 309 τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποφάνσει. ἐφοδευτικῶς δὲ ἅμα καὶ
 ἐκκαλυπτικῶς ἐπῆγεν ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν λημμάτων

evident, others something non-evident,—pre-evident, as in the case of the argument set forth in this form : “ If it is day, it is light ; but in fact it is day ; therefore it is light ” ; for “ it is light ” is just as apparent as “ it is day.” And again one like this : “ If Dion walks, Dion moves ; but Dion walks ; therefore Dion moves ” ; for “ Dion moves,” which is the conclusion, is a thing patent of itself. But an argument such as 306 this deduces what is non-evident : “ If sweat pours through the surface, intelligible pores^a of the flesh exist ; but in fact the first (is true) ; therefore the second (is true)” ; for the existence of intelligible pores of the flesh is a thing non-evident. And again : “ That by the separation of which from the body men die is the soul ; but it is by the separation of blood from the body that men die ; therefore the blood is soul.” For it is not manifest that the substance of the soul consists in blood. And of these arguments 307 which deduce something non-evident some lead us on from the premisses to the conclusion by way of progression only, others both by way of progression and by way of discovery as well. And of these such as 308 seem to depend on belief and memory lead us on by way of progression only, as, for example, “ If a god has said to you that this man will be rich, this man will be rich ; but this god (assume that I point to Zeus) has said to you that this man will be rich ; therefore he will be rich.” For here we accept the conclusion, that this man will be rich, not as established by the power of the argument set forth, but owing to our belief in the statement of the god. But 309 an argument such as that propounded regarding the intelligible pores leads us from the premisses to the

^a *i.e.* invisible excretory ducts ; *cf.* *P.H.* ii. 90.

ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα καθάπερ ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν πόρων συνερωτηθείς. τὸ γὰρ "εἰ ρέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἰδρῶτες, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ τῆς σαρκὸς πόροι" καὶ τὸ ρέειν διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἰδρῶτας, ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν φύσεως κατασκευάσαι ἐδίδασκεν ἡμᾶς τὸ ὅτι εἰσὶ νοητοὶ τῆς σαρκὸς πόροι, κατὰ τινα τοιαύτην ἔφοδον "διὰ ναστοῦ καὶ ἀποροποιήτου σώματος ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ὑγρὸν ρεῖν· ρεῖ δέ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἰδρώς· τοίνυν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ναστὸν τὸ σῶμα ἀλλὰ πεποροποιημένον."

- 310 Τούτων δὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἡ ἀπόδειξις πρὸ παντὸς ὀφείλει λόγος εἶναι, δεύτερον συνακτικός, τρίτον καὶ ἀληθής, τέταρτον καὶ ἄδηλον ἔχων συμπέρασμα, πέμπτον καὶ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον τοῦτο
- 311 ἐκ τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν λημμάτων. ὁ γοῦν τοιοῦτος λόγος ἡμέρας οὔσης "εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν" συνακτικός μὲν καθεισθῆκει, δοθέντων γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῶν λημμάτων ὑπάρχειν συνάγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά, οὐκ ἀληθής δέ γε ἦν, εἶχε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ λῆμμα ψεῦδος τὸ "νύξ ἔστιν". διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικός ἐστιν.
- 312 πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δ' ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν" πρὸς τῷ συνακτικός ἔτι καὶ ἀληθής ἐστιν, ἐπείπερ δοθέντων αὐτοῦ τῶν λημμάτων δίδεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά, καὶ δι' ἀληθῶν ἀληθές τι δείκνυσιν. τοιοῦτος δὲ ὢν πάλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις τῷ πρόδηλον ἔχειν τὸ συμπέρασμα
- 313 τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν," ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄδηλον. κατὰ ταῦτά δὲ καὶ ὁ οὕτως ἔχων "εἰ τίς σοι θεῶν εἶπεν ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος, πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· οὗτοσὶ δὲ ὁ θεὸς εἶπέ σοι ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· πλουτήσῃ ἄρα οὗτος" ἄδηλον μὲν ἔχει συμπέρασμα τὸ πλου-

conclusion both by way of progression and by way of discovery. For the premisses "If sweat flows through the surface, intelligible pores of the flesh exist," and "Sweat flows through the surface," teach us to conclude from their own nature that intelligible pores of the flesh exist, in virtue of a progression such as this—"Through a solid body of non-porous formation it is impossible for a liquid to flow; but sweat flows through the body; so the body will not be solid but of porous formation."

This being so, proof must first of all be an argument; 310 secondly, conclusive; thirdly, also true; fourthly, having also a non-evident conclusion; fifthly, having also this conclusion discovered through the power of the premisses. Thus an argument such as this,^a 311 when it is day,—*"If it is night, it is dark; but in fact it is night; therefore it is dark"*—is conclusive in form (for its premisses being granted its conclusion also is inferred to exist), but it certainly is not true (for it contains the false premiss "it is night"); and on this account it is not probative. Again, such an 312 argument as this—"If it is day it is light; but it is day; therefore it is light,"—besides being conclusive is also true, since, its premisses being granted, its conclusion also is granted, and by means of true premisses it proves something true. But though it does so, still it is not a proof owing to its having as its conclusion what is pre-evident and not non-evident. In the same way one like this ^b—"If a god said to 313 you that this man will be rich, this man will be rich; but this particular god said to you that this man will be rich; therefore he will be rich"—has a non-evident conclusion, that "this man will be rich," but is not

^a Cf. *P.H.* ii. 139.

^b Cf. *P.H.* ii. 141.

τήσιν τοῦτον, οὐκέτι δ' ἀποδεικτικὸν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐκ τῆς τῶν λημμάτων δυνάμεως ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ πίστεως παραδοχῆς τυγχάνειν.

- 314 συνδραμόντων οὖν πάντων τούτων, τοῦ τε συνακτικὸν εἶναι τὸν λόγον καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀδήλου παραστατικόν, ὑφίσταται ἡ ἀπόδειξις. ἔνθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν ὑπογράφουσιν "ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ λόγος δι' ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἀδήλον," οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ ἐστὶ κίνησις, ἐστὶ κενόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐστὶ κίνησις· ἐστὶν ἄρα κενόν." τὸ γὰρ εἶναι κενὸν ἀδήλον τ' ἐστί, καὶ δι' ἀληθῶν δοκεῖ, τοῦ τε "εἰ ἐστὶ κίνησις, ἐστὶ κενόν" καὶ τοῦ "ἐστὶ δὲ κίνησις," κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι.

- 315 Ἄ μὲν οὖν οἰκείον ἦν προλαβεῖν περὶ τῆς τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος ἐπινοίας, ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα· τάξει δὲ ὑποδεικτέον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τίνος ὕλης ἐστίν.

Ε'.—ΕΚ ΤΙΝΟΣ ΤΑΗΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ

- 316 Τῶν πραγμάτων, ὡς πολλάκις προείπομεν, τὰ μὲν πεπίστευται ἐναργῆ εἶναι τὰ δὲ ἀδηλα, καὶ ἐναργῆ μὲν τὰ ἐκ φαντασίας ἀβουλήτως καὶ ἐκ πάθους λαμβανόμενα, οἷον ἐστὶ νῦν τὸ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν," τό τε¹ "τοῦτ' ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν," ἕκαστον
317 τῶν τοιούτων, ἀδηλα δὲ τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα. καὶ τῶν ἀδήλων, ὥς τινες διαιρούμενοί φασιν, τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φύσει ἀδηλα, τὰ δ' ὁμωνύμως λεγόμενα τῷ γένει ἀδηλα. καὶ φύσει μὲν ἐστὶν ἀδηλα τὰ μήτε

¹ τό τε: διττ. mss., Bekk.: τὸ Mutsch.

probative because it is not discovered by the power of the premisses but meets with acceptance through trust in the god. When, then, all these things concur 314—that the argument is at once conclusive and true and making manifest a non-evident—then proof really exists. Hence also they describe it thus: "A proof is an argument which by means of agreed premisses reveals by way of deduction a non-evident conclusion";—for example, this: "If motion exists, void exists; but in fact motion exists; therefore void exists."^a For the existence of void is non-evident, and also it appears to be revealed by way of deduction by means of the true premisses "If motion exists, void exists" and "but motion exists."

Such, then, are the points regarding the notion 315 of the object of our inquiry which it was fitting to deal with first; and, next in order, we must explain its subject matter.

V.—THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PROOF

Some things—as we frequently said before ^b—are 316 believed to be manifest, others non-evident; and manifest are those which are perceived involuntarily through presentation and through affection, such as, at the present moment, "It is day," "This is a man," and everything of the kind; but non-evident are those which are not of this sort. And of things 317 non-evident—according to the distinction which some people make—some are naturally non-evident, but others are given the same name, "non-evident," as their genus. And naturally non-evident are the things

^a Cf. § 277; I. 213.

^b Cf. § 141. With §§ 316-320 cf. §§ 145-160; *P.H.* ii. 97-103.

- πρότερον καταληφθέντα μήτε νῦν καταλαμβανόμενα μήτε αὖθις καταληφθήσόμενα, αἰώνιον δὲ ἔχοντα τὴν ἀγνωσίαν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι
- 318 τοὺς ἀστέρας ἢ περισσοὺς. διὸ καὶ φύσει ἄδηλα λέγεται, οὐχ ὅτι αὐτὰ φύσιν ἔχει ἄδηλον ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτά, ἐπεὶ μαχόμενόν τι ἐροῦμεν, τουτέστιν ἅμα καὶ ἀγνοεῖν αὐτὰ φάσκοντες καὶ τίνα ἔχει φύσιν ὁμολογοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῇ ἡμῶν φύσει ἀδηλεῖται.
- 319 ὁμωνύμως δὲ τῷ γένει ἄδηλα προσαγορεύεται ἅπερ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ἀποκέκρυπται, διὰ δὲ σημείων ἢ ἀποδείξεων ἀξιούται γνωρίζεσθαι, οἷον τὸ ἄτομα εἶναι στοιχεῖα ἐν ἀπείρῳ φερόμενα κενῷ.
- 320 πλὴν τοιαύτης οὔσης ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι διαφορᾶς φαμέν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν οὔτε πρόδηλον εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ κατηναγκασμένου πάθους ἐγνωρίζετο) οὔτε φύσει ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ ἀπήλπισται ἢ κατάληψις αὐτῆς) ἀλλὰ τῆς λειπομένης τῶν ἀδήλων εἶναι διαφορᾶς, ἅπερ δεδυνκῖαν μὲν καὶ συνεσκιασμένην ἡμῖν ἔχει τὴν φύσιν, τῷ δ' ἐκ
- 321 φιλοσοφίας λόγῳ δοκεῖ καταλαμβάνεσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ βεβαίως λέγομεν, ἐπεὶ γελοῖον παραχωρήσαντας τὴν ὑπαρξιν ἔτι ἐπιζητεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ὅτι κατ' ἐπίνοιαν τοιαύτη τυγχάνει· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπινόας καὶ προλήψεως ἀνακύψει ὁ
- 322 περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως λόγος. ὅτι τοῖνυν τῶν ἀδήλων κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιάν ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις καὶ οὐ δύναται δι' αὐτῆς γνωρίζεσθαι, ἐπιλογιστέον οὕτως.

Τὸ μὲν πρόδηλον καὶ ἐναργές πάντῃ πρόδηλόν ἐστι καὶ ἐναργές, συμπεφώνηταί τε παρὰ πᾶσι, καὶ

οὐδεμίαν διολκὴν ἐπιδέχεται· τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον δια-
 323 πεφώνηται τε καὶ εἰς διολκὴν πίπτειν πέφυκεν. καὶ
 εἰκότως. πᾶς γὰρ λόγος κρίνεται ὅτι ἀληθὴς ἔστιν
 ἢ ψευδής, κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ οὗ κεκό-
 μισται ἀναφοράν· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ εὐρίσκηται σύμ-
 φωνος τῷ πράγματι τῷ περὶ οὗ κεκόμισται, ἀληθὴς
 εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐὰν δὲ διάφωνος, ψευδής. οἷον ἀπο-
 φαίνεται τις ὅτι ἡμέρα ἔστιν· οὐκοῦν ἀναπέμφαντες
 τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ γνόντες τὴν
 324 τούτου ὑπαρξίν συνεπιμαρτυροῦσαν τῷ λόγῳ,
 φαμέν ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον. διόπερ ὅταν
 μὲν ἐναργὲς ἢ καὶ πρόδηλον τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ
 οὗ ὁ λόγος κομίζεται, ῥάδιον ἀναπέμφαντας ἐπ’
 αὐτὸ τὸ λεγόμενον, τόθ’ οὕτως ἢ ἀληθῆ λέγειν
 εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον τῷ πράγματι ἢ
 ψευδῇ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον. ὅταν δὲ ἄδηλον καθ-
 εστήκη τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀποκεκρυμμένον ἡμῖν,
 τότε μηκέτι δυναμένης ἐπὶ τοῦτο βεβαίως γίνεσθαι
 τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἀναπομπῆς λείπεται τὸ καταπιθα-
 νεύεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἐπισπᾶσθαι τὴν διά-
 νοιαν εἰς συγκατάθεσιν. ἄλλου δὲ ἄλλως εἰκά-
 ζοντος καὶ διαπιθανενομένου φύεται ἡ διαφωνία,
 μήτε τοῦ ἀποτυχόντος εἰδότος ὅτι ἀπέτυχεν, μήτε
 325 τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος εἰδότος ὅτι ἐπέτυχεν. ταῦτά
 γέ τοι καὶ σφόδρα χαριέντως ἀπεικάζουσιν οἱ σκε-
 πτικοὶ τοὺς περὶ ἀδήλων ζητοῦντας τοῖς ἐν σκότῳ
 ἐπὶ τινα σκοπὸν τοξεύουσιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ τούτων
 εἰκὸς ἔστι τινὰ μὲν τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ τινὰ δ’
 ἀποτυχεῖν, τὸ δὲ τίς ἐπέτυχεν ἢ ἀπέτυχεν ἄγνω-
 στον, οὕτως ἐν βαθεῖ σχεδὸν σκότῳ τῆς ἀληθείας
 ἀποκεκρυμμένης ἀφίενται μὲν ἐπὶ ταύτην πολλοὶ
 λόγοι, τὸ δὲ τίς ἐξ αὐτῶν σύμφωνός ἐστιν αὐτῇ καὶ

admits of no dispute ; but the non-evident is disagreed about and naturally tends to fall into dispute. And reasonably so ; for every argument is judged to be either true or false according to its reference to the thing concerning which it is brought forward ; for if it is found to be in accord with the thing concerning which it is brought forward, it is held to be true, but if at variance, false. For example, someone declares that it is day. Then by referring the statement to the fact and learning that the fact's existence is confirmatory of the statement, we say that the statement is true. Consequently, when the fact concerning which the argument is brought forward is manifest and pre-evident, it is easy to refer the statement to it and then, in this way, to declare either that the argument is true as confirmatory of the fact, or false if contradictory. But when the fact is non-evident and hidden from us, then, as there can no longer be any secure reference of the argument to it, it only remains for the mind to be persuaded and drawn into assent by probabilities. But when one man guesses and tries to persuade in one way, another in another, disputation springs up, since neither he who has missed the mark knows that he has missed it, nor he who has hit it knows that he has hit it.—Accordingly, the Sceptics very neatly compare those who inquire about things non-evident to men shooting at a mark in the dark ; for just as it is probable that one of these hits the mark and another misses, but which has hit or missed is unknowable, so, with the truth hidden almost in the depths of darkness, many arguments are shot at it, but which of them is in accord with it, and which at variance, it is impossible

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τίς διάφωνος οὐχ οἶόν τε γινώσκειν, ἀρθέντος ἐκ
326 τῆς ἐναργείας τοῦ ζητουμένου. καὶ τοῦτο πρῶτον
εἶπε Ξενοφάνης,

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφές οὐ τις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις
ἔσται

εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,
αὐτὸς ὁμῶς οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

327 ὥστε εἰ μὲν τὸ πρόδηλον διὰ τὴν προειρημένην
αἰτίαν ἐστὶ σύμφωνον, τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον διαπεφώνηται,
δεήσει καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν διαφωνουμένην ἄδηλον
εἶναι. ὅτι δὲ τῷ ὄντι διαπεφώνηται, οὐ πολλῶν
ἡμῖν λόγων δεῖ, βραχείας δέ τινος καὶ προχείρου
ὑπομνήσεως, εἴ γε οἱ μὲν δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλο-
σόφων καὶ οἱ λογικοὶ τῶν ἱατρῶν τιθέασιν αὐτὴν,
οἱ δὲ ἐμπειρικοὶ ἀναιροῦσιν, τάχα δὲ καὶ Δημό-
κριτος (ἰσχυρῶς γὰρ αὐτῇ διὰ τῶν κανόνων ἀντ-
328 εἴρηκεν), οἱ δὲ σκεπτικοὶ ἐν ἐποχῇ ταύτῃ ἐφύ-
λαξαν, τῇ "μὴ μᾶλλον" ἀποφάνσει χρώμενοι. τῶν
τε τιθέντων αὐτὴν πάλιν ἱκανή τις ἐστὶ διαφωνία,
καθὼς προβαίνοντος τοῦ λόγου διδάξομεν. τοίνυν
ἄδηλόν τί ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις.

329 Καὶ μὴν εἰ πᾶσα ἀπόδειξις δόγμα ἐν τοῖς λήμ-
μασιν αὐτῆς περιέχουσα εὐθύς ἐστὶ δόγμα, πᾶν δὲ
δόγμα διαπεφώνηται, κατ' ἀνάγκην πᾶσα ἀπόδειξις
διαπεφώνηται καὶ τῶν ζητουμένων ἐστὶ πραγ-
μάτων. οἷον Ἐπίκουρος δοκεῖ ἰσχυροτάτην τεθει-
κέναι ἀπόδειξιν εἰς τὸ εἶναι κενὸν τοιαύτην "εἰ

^a Cf. i. 49, 110; P.H. ii. 18.

^b With §§ 327-331 cf. P.H. ii. 180, 181.

to learn, as the object of inquiry is removed from (the sphere of) the manifest. And this was first stated by 326 Xenophanes ^a :

Yet, with respect to the gods and what I declare about all things,
No man has seen and no man will know the truth in its clearness.
Nay, for e'en should he chance to affirm what is really existent,
He himself knoweth it not ; but opinion holds sway over all things.

So that if the pre-evident is, for the reason already 327 stated, agreed, whereas the non-evident is in dispute, it must be that proof also, being in dispute, is non-evident.^b And that it really is a matter of dispute it does not need many arguments to show us but only a short reminder, which lies ready to hand, seeing that the dogmatic philosophers and the logical doctors affirm it, but the Empirics ^c deny it, and perhaps Democritus also (for he has spoken against it strongly in his *Canons*), while the Sceptics have 328 cautiously suspended judgement about it, making use of the formula "not more." ^d And amongst those who affirm it, again, there is no little dissension, as we shall explain as our discourse proceeds. So, then, proof is a thing non-evident.

Furthermore, if every proof which contains an 329 opinion in the premisses is indisputably an opinion, and every opinion is disputed, necessarily every proof is disputed and is one of the objects of inquiry. Epicurus, for instance, opines that he has put forward a very strong argument for the existence of void,

^a Cf. § 191. For Democritus cf. i. 138.

^d Cf. P.II. i. 188, 213.

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- ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι κίνησις·
 330 ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν." ταύτης δὲ τῆς ἀποδείξεως τὰ
 λήμματα εἰ μὲν συνεχωρεῖτο πρὸς πάντων, ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης ἂν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν εἶχεν ἀκολουθοῦσαν
 331 αὐτοῖς καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων παραχωρουμένην. νῦν δ'
 ἐνέστησάν τινες τούτῳ, φημί δὲ τῷ [μὴ]¹ συν-
 ἄγεσθαι τοῖς λήμμασι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, οὐ διὰ τὸ μὴ
 ἀκολουθεῖν αὐτὴν ἐκείνοις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐκεῖνα
 332 εἶναι ψευδῆ καὶ ἀνομόλογα. ἵνα γὰρ μὴ πολλὰς
 ἐπιτρέχωμεν συνημμένους κρίσεις, λέγωμεν δ' αὐτό-
 θεν ὑγιὲς εἶναι συνημμένον τὸ μὴ ἀρχόμενον ἀπ'
 ἀληθοῦς καὶ λῆγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος, τὸ [δ'] "εἰ ἔστι
 κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν" κατὰ μὲν Ἐπίκουρον ἀρχό-
 μενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς τοῦ "[εἰ] ἔστι κίνησις" καὶ
 λῆγον ἐπ' ἀληθές ἔσται ἀληθές, κατὰ δὲ τοὺς
 περιπατητικοὺς ἀρχόμενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς τοῦ "[εἰ]
 ἔστι κίνησις" καὶ λῆγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος τὸ "ἔστι
 333 κενόν" ἔσται ψεύδος, κατὰ δὲ Διόδωρον ἀρχόμενον
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους τοῦ "ἔστι κίνησις" καὶ λῆγον ἐπὶ
 ψεύδος τὸ "ἔστι κενόν" αὐτὸ μὲν ἔσται ἀληθές,
 τὴν δὲ πρόσληψιν τὴν "ἔστι δέ γε κίνησις" ὥς
 334 ψευδῆ διελέγχει, κατὰ μέντοι τοὺς σκεπτικούς
 λῆγον ἐπ' ἀδηλον ἔσται ἀδηλον· τὸ γὰρ "ἔστι
 κενόν" κατ' αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀγνώστων ἐτύγχανεν. φα-
 νερόν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι διαπεφώνηται τὰ λήμματα
 τῆς ἀποδείξεως. διάφωνα δὲ ὄντα² ἀδηλά ἐστιν,
 ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀπόδειξις πάντως ἀδελος.
 335 Καὶ μὴν τῶν πρὸς τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις· οὐ γὰρ
 καθ' ἑαυτὴν φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἀποδεικνυμένῳ
 θεωρεῖται. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι εἰ ἔστιν ἐξήγηται, καὶ

¹ [μὴ] sccl. Kochalsky (τῶν Ν).

² ὄντα: καὶ τὰ 3193., Bekk. (ὄντα καὶ Kochalsky).

namely this—"If motion exists, void exists; but in fact motion exists; therefore void exists." But if the 330 premisses of this proof had been agreed to by all, it would necessarily have had a conclusion also following from them and admitted by all. But as it is, some 331 have objected to it—I mean, to the deduction of the conclusion from the premisses—not because it does not follow from them; but because they are false and not admitted. For—not to run over a great number 332 of judgements about it, but to state at once (the view) that a valid hypothetical premiss "is one that does not begin with truth and end in falsehood,—then, according to Epicurus, the premiss "If motion exists, void exists," as it begins with the truth "motion exists" and ends in truth, will be true; but according to the Peripatetics, as it begins with the truth "motion exists" and ends in the falsehood "void exists," it will be false; and according to Diodorus,^b 333 as it begins with the falsehood "motion exists" and ends in the falsehood "void exists," it will in itself be true, but the minor premiss, "But motion in fact exists," he criticizes as false; according to the 334 Sceptics, however, as it ends in a non-evident, it will be non-evident; for according to them "void exists" is one of the things unknowable. From this, then, it is plain that the premisses of the proof are matters of dispute. And matters of dispute are also non-evident, so that proof based on them is also wholly non-evident.

Moreover, proof is a relative thing, for it does not 335 appear by itself but is seen in relation to the thing proved. And the existence of relatives is a matter

^a For this Stoic definition *cf.* §§ 114, 268.

^b *Cf. P.H.* ii. 245.

πολὺς ἦν ὁ λέγων μὴ εἶναι αὐτά. τὸ δὲ διολκὴν
 ἔχον ἐστὶν ἄδηλον. καὶ ταύτῃ τοίνυν ἄδηλός ἐστιν
 336 ἡ ἀπόδειξις. πρὸς τούτοις ἦτοι ἐκ φωνῆς
 συνέστηκεν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὥς τοῖς Ἐπικουρείοις
 εἴρηται, ἡ ἐξ ἀσωμάτων λεκτῶν, ὥς τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς
 στοᾶς. ἐξ ὁποτέρων δ' ἂν συνεστήκη, πολλὴν
 ἐπιδέχεται ζήτησιν· τὰ τε γὰρ λεκτὰ εἰ ὑφέστηκε
 ζητεῖται, καὶ πολὺς ὁ περὶ τούτου λόγος, αἷ τε
 φωναὶ εἰ σημαίνουσιν τι διηπόρηται. εἰ δὲ ἐξ
 ὁποτέρας ἂν ὕλης ὑπάρχη ἡ ἀπόδειξις ζητεῖται, τὸ
 δὲ ζητούμενόν ἐστιν ἄδηλον, πάντως ἡ ἀπόδειξις
 ἐστὶν ἄδηλος.

Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ὥσπερ τι στοιχεῖον τῆς μελλούσης
 ἀντιρρήσεως ὑποκείσθω· μετελθόντες δὲ ἐξῆς
 σκοπῶμεν καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις.

5'.—ΒΙ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ

337 Παρεστακότες καὶ τὸ ἐκ τίνος ὕλης ἐστὶν ἡ
 ἀπόδειξις, ἀκολουθῶς πειρασόμεθα καὶ τοὺς σα-
 λεύοντας αὐτὴν λόγους προχειρίσασθαι, σκεπτόμενοι
 πότερον ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ καὶ προλήψει ταύτης
 ἡ ὑπαρξις ἡ οὐδαμῶς. καίτοι τινὲς εἰώθασιν ἡμῖν,
 καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐπικούρου αἰρέσεως,
 ἀγροικότερον ἐνίστασθαι, λέγοντες " ἦτοι νοεῖτε τί
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἡ οὐ νοεῖτε. καὶ εἰ μὲν νοεῖτε
 καὶ ἔχετε ἔννοιαν αὐτῆς, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ δὲ
 οὐ νοεῖτε, πῶς ζητεῖτε τὸ μὴδ' ἀρχὴν νοούμενον
 331 α ὑμῖν;" ταῦτα γὰρ λέγοντες ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν σχεδὸν περι-
 τρέπονται, ἐπεὶ περ τὸ μὲν παντὸς τοῦ ζητουμένου

^a Cf. §§ 453 ff.

^c Cf. P.H. ii. 107.

^b Cf. §§ 12, 13, 404.

^d Cf. P.H. ii. 214.

of inquiry,^a and there are many who say that they do not exist. And what is subject to dispute is non-evident. So in this way also proof is non-evident — Besides this, proof is composed either of sound, as is 336 said by the Epicureans, or of incorporeal expressions, as is said by the Stoics.^b But, whichever of these it is composed of, it is open to serious question. For it is a question whether "expressions" really exist,^c and there is much argument on the point; and whether sounds have any significance is also a matter of doubt.^d But if it is a question what subject matter is the basis of proof, and what is questioned is non-evident, certainly proof is non-evident.

Let this, then, be laid down as the basis of our counter-argument; and let us pass on to consider next the question of the existence of proof.

VI.—DOES PROOF EXIST?

Now that we have explained what is the matter of 337 which proof consists, we shall in the next place attempt to deal with the arguments which render it precarious, and consider whether its real existence follows from its notion and preconception or not.^e Some people, to be sure,—and especially those of the Epicurean School—are wont to withstand us rather rudely and say—"Either you understand what proof is, or you do not understand; and if you understand and have a notion of it, proof exists; but if you do not understand, how do you inquire into a thing of which you have no understanding at all?" For in saying this 331 a they are pretty well overthrown by their own selves, since it is agreed that a preconception and notion

* With §§ 337 ff. cf. *P.H.* II. 1 ff.

- πρόληψιν καὶ ἔννοιαν δεῖν προηγέισθαι ὁμόλογόν
 ἐστίν. πῶς γάρ τις καὶ ζητῆσαι δύναται μηδεμίαν
 ἔννοιαν ἔχων τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος; οὔτε
 γὰρ ἐπιτυχὼν εἴσεται ὅτι ἐπέτυχεν οὔτε ἀστοχήσας
 332^a ὅτι ἡστόχησεν. ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν δίδομεν, καὶ
 τοσοῦτόν γε ἀπέχομεν τοῦ λέγειν ἔννοιαν μὴ ἔχειν
 παντὸς τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος, ὥς καὶ ἀνά-
 παλιν πολλὰς γ' ἐννοίας αὐτοῦ καὶ προλήψεις ἔχειν
 ἀξιοῦν, καὶ χάριν τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ταύτας δια-
 κρίνειν καὶ τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν κυριωτάτην ἀνευρεῖν εἰς
 333^a ἐποχὴν καὶ ἀρρεψίαν περιστάσθαι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μίαν
 εἴχομεν τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος πρόληψιν, καὶ
 ταύτῃ συνεξακολουθήσαντες τοιοῦτ' ἐπιστεῦομεν
 ὑπάρχειν ὅποιον κατὰ μίαν προσέπιπτεν ἔννοιαν·
 νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ πολλὰς ἔχομεν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐννοίας καὶ
 πολυτρόπους μαχομένας καὶ ἐπ' ἴσης πιστὰς διὰ
 τε τὴν ἐν αὐταῖς πιθανότητα καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν
 προϋσταμένων ἀνδρῶν ἀξιοπιστίαν, μήτε πάσαις
 πιστεῦσαι δυνάμενοι διὰ τὴν μάχην, μήτε πάσαις
 ἀπιστῆσαι τῷ μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἔχειν αὐτῶν πιστο-
 τέραν, μήτε τινὶ μὲν πιστεῦσαι τινὶ δὲ ἀπιστεῖν διὰ
 τὴν ἰσότητα, κατ' ἀνάγκην ἤλθομεν εἰς τὸ ἐπέχειν.
 334^a ἀλλὰ γὰρ προλήψεις ἔχομεν τῶν πραγμάτων κατὰ
 τὸν ὑποδεδειγμένον τρόπον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, εἰ μὲν
 ἡ πρόληψις κατάληψις ὑπῆρχεν, ἴσως ἂν ἐν τῷ
 διδόναι τὸ πρόληψιν ἔχειν τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τὴν
 κατάληψιν τούτου συνωμολογοῦμεν· νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ ἡ
 πρόληψις καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ πράγματος οὐχ ὑπαρξίς
 ἐστίν, ἐπινοεῖν μὲν αὐτό φαμεν, καταλαμβάνεσθαι
 335^a δὲ μηδαμῶς διὰ τὰς προεκκειμένας αἰτίας, ἐπεὶ τοι
 εἰ αἱ προλήψεις εἰσὶ καταλήψεις, παρὰ μέρος καὶ

^a Cf. P.H. i. 190.

must precede every object of inquiry. For how can anyone even begin to inquire if he has no notion of the object of inquiry? For neither if he has hit the mark will he know that he has hit it, nor if he has missed it, that he has missed it. Consequently we grant 332 a this point, and in fact so far are we from saying that we have not a notion of the whole object of inquiry that, on the contrary, we claim to have many notions and preconceptions of it, and that it is because of our inability to decide between them and to discover the most cogent amongst them that we revert to suspension and indecision.^a For if we had possessed 333 a but one preconception of the object of inquiry, then, by following this closely, we would have believed that the object was such as we felt it to be owing to that one notion; but now, since we have many notions of the one object, and these manifold and conflicting and equally trustworthy both because of their inherent probability and because of the trustworthiness of the men who champion them,—as we are unable either to believe them all because of the conflict; or to disbelieve all, as we do not possess any other notion more trustworthy than they; or to believe one and disbelieve another, owing to their equality,—we are necessarily reduced to suspending judgement. But 334 a we do, in fact, possess preconceptions in the way that has been indicated. And because of this, if preconception was apprehension, in granting that we have a preconception of the thing we should probably have been admitting also apprehension of it; but as it is, since the preconception and notion of the thing is not its existence, we say that we have a notion of it but do not apprehend it for the reasons already set forth; for, to be sure, if preconceptions are appre- 335 a

- ἡμεῖς πευσόμεθα αὐτῶν πότερον ἔχει πρόληψιν καὶ
 ἐπίνοιαν Ἐπίκουρος τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων ἢ οὐκ
 ἔχει, καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει, πῶς ἀντιλήψεται τοῦ
 ζητουμένου πράγματος, καὶ τοῦτο ζητήσει οὐ μὴδὲ
 ἐπίνοιαν ἔχει; εἰ δὲ ἔχει, πῶς οὐ κατείληφε τὸ
 336^a τέσσαρα εἶναι στοιχεῖα; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ὅτι ἀπολογού-
 μενοι φήσουσιν ὥς ἐπινοεῖ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος τὰ
 τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, οὐ κατείληφε δὲ πάντως· ψιλὸν
 γὰρ κίνημά ἐστι τῆς διανοίας ἢ ἐπίνοια, ἧς ἐχό-
 μενος ἀντιλέγει τῷ εἶναι τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα. τοίνυν
 καὶ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν ἐπίνοιαν τῆς ἀποδείξεως, καὶ ἀπὸ
 ταύτης ἐξετάσομεν εἴτε ἔστιν εἴτε καὶ μὴ, ταύτην
 δὲ ἔχοντες οὐχὶ καὶ τὴν κατάληψιν ὁμολογήσομεν.
 337^a Ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τούτους καὶ αὐθὺς ποτε λεχθή-
 σεται· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐμμεθόδους προσήκει ποιεῖσθαι τὰς
 ἀντιρρήσεις, ζητητέον τίνι μάλιστα δεῖ ἀποδείξει
 ἐνίστασθαι. καὶ δὴ ἐὰν μὲν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ
 καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἀποδείξεσιν ἐνίστασθαι θέλω-
 μεν, ἀμέθοδον ποιησόμεθα τὴν ἔνστασιν, ἀπείρων
 338 οὐσῶν τῶν τοιούτων ἀποδείξεων· ἐὰν δὲ τὴν γενικὴν
 ἀπόδειξιν ἀνέλωμεν, ἥτις δοκεῖ πασῶν τῶν ἐπ'
 εἶδους εἶναι περιεκτική, δῆλον ὅτι ἐν ταύτῃ πάσας
 ἔχομεν ἀνηρημένας. ὥσπερ γὰρ ζώου μὴ ὄντος
 οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπου ἔστι καὶ ἀνθρώπου μὴ ὑπάρχοντος
 οὐδὲ Σωκράτους ὑφέστηκεν, συναναιρουμένων τοῖς
 γένεσι τῶν εἰδῶν, οὕτω μὴ οὕσης γενικῆς ἀπο-
 δείξεως οἴχεται καὶ ἅπαντα ἢ ἐπ' εἶδους ἀπόδειξις·
 339 τῷ μὲν γὰρ εἶδει οὐ πάντως συναναιρεῖται τὸ γένος,
 καθάπερ τῷ Σωκράτει ὁ ἀνθρώπος, τῷ γένει δ',
 ὥσπερ εἶπον, συμπεριγράφεται τὸ εἶδος. ἀναγ-
 καῖον οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ τοῖς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν σαλεύουσι μὴ

hensions, we too in our turn will ask them whether Epicurus has or has not a preconception and notion of the four elements ; and if he has not, how will he apprehend the object of inquiry and inquire into a thing of which he has not even a notion ? While if he has, how is it that he did not apprehend the fact that there are four elements ? But they will, I suppose, say in defence that Epicurus has a notion of the four elements, but has not, certainly, apprehended them ; for a notion is a bare movement of the mind, holding to which he denies that there are four elements. So then we, too, possess a notion of proof, and starting from it we shall inquire whether it exists or not ; but though we possess the notion we shall not also admit the apprehension. 336 a

To these people, however, a reply will be made at some later time ; but since it behoves us to produce our counter-arguments in a methodical way, we must inquire which proof one should object to most. Now if we propose to object to the special proofs and those belonging to each art, we shall be making our objection in an unmethodical way, as such proofs are endless ; whereas, if we abolish generic proof, which is held to be inclusive of all the particular proofs, it is evident that thereby we shall have all included therein abolished. For just as if Animal exists not, neither does Man exist, and if Man subsists not, neither does Socrates subsist,—the particulars being abolished along with the genera,—so if generic proof does not exist, particular proof wholly disappears as well. For although the genus is not wholly abolished along with the particular,—Man with Socrates, for example,—yet, as I said, the particular is cancelled along with the genus. It is necessary, then, for those who throw 338 339

ἄλλην τινὰ κινεῖν ὅτι μὴ τὴν γενικὴν, ἥ καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἀκολουθεῖν συμβέβηκεν.

- 340 Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἄδηλόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὡς ἐπελογισάμεθα, ὀφείλει ἀποδεδείχθαι· πᾶν γὰρ ἄδηλον ἀναποδείκτως λαμβανόμενόν ἐστιν ἄπιστον. ἦτοι οὖν ὑπὸ γενικῆς ἀποδείξεως καταστήσεται τὸ εἶναι
 341 τι ἀπόδειξιν ἢ ὑπὸ εἰδικῆς. ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μὲν εἰδικῆς οὐδαμῶς· οὐπω γὰρ οὐδεμία καθίσταται εἰδικὴ ἀπόδειξις διὰ τὸ μήπω ὡμολογηθῆαι τὴν γενικὴν. ὡς γὰρ μηδέπω σαφοῦς ὄντος τοῦ ὅτι ἔστι ζῶον, οὐδὲ ὅτι ἵππος ἔστι γνώριμον καθέστηκεν, οὕτω μηδέπω συνομολογηθέντος τοῦ ὅτι ἔστι γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀπο-
 342 δείξεων πιστή, μετὰ τοῦ καὶ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπον ἡμᾶς ἐμπίπτειν· ἵνα μὲν γὰρ ἡ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις βεβαιωθῇ, τὴν εἰδικὴν ἡμᾶς ἔχειν δεῖ πιστήν, ἵνα δὲ ἡ εἰδικὴ ὁμολογηθῇ, τὴν γενικὴν ἔχειν βέβαιον, ὥστε μήτε ἐκείνην πρὸ ταύτης ἔχειν δύνασθαι μήτε ταύτην πρὸ ἐκείνης. οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ μὲν εἰδικῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀμήχανον τὴν γενικὴν
 343 ἀποδειχθῆναι. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπὸ γενικῆς· αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ζητούμενη, ἄδηλος δὲ οὖσα καὶ ζητούμενη οὐκ ἂν εἴη κατασκευαστικὴ ἐαυτῆς, ἥ γε καὶ τῶν ἐκκαλυπτόντων αὐτὴν ἔχρηζεν. ἐκτός ἐι μὴ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθεῖσα λέγεται τινος εἶναι κατασκευαστικὴ. εἰ δὲ ἅπαξ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνεται τινα καὶ ἔστι πιστά, τίς ἔτι χρεῖα ἀποδεικνύει αὐτά, αὐτόθεν δυναμένων ἡμῶν λαμβάνειν ταῦτα καὶ ἀναποδείκτως διὰ γε τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔχειν πιστά;
 344 πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἡ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις παραστατικὴ ἐστὶ τῆς γενικῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἔσται ἡ αὕτη

* Cf. §§ 322 ff.

* Cf. P.H. i, 173.

doubt on proof to impugn no other proof save only the generic, since actually all the rest follow it.

Since, then, proof is, as we have argued,^a a thing 340 non-evident, it ought to have been proved ; for every non-evident thing, if it is received without proof, is untrustworthy. Therefore the fact that proof is something will be established either by a generic or by a particular proof. But certainly not by a par- 341 ticular proof ; for as yet particular proof does not even exist, because generic proof is not admitted as yet. For just as, if it is not yet clear that Animal exists, neither is it known that Horse exists, so when it is not yet agreed that generic proof exists, none of the particular proofs will be trustworthy ; and, in 342 addition, we shall be involved in circular reasoning ; for in order to establish the generic proof we must have the particular trustworthy, and in order that the particular may be admitted we must have the generic established, so that we can neither have the former before the latter, nor the latter before the former. So, then, it is not possible for the generic proof to be proved by the particular proof.—Nor yet by the 343 generic proof ; for this is the object of inquiry, and being non-evident and an object of inquiry it will not be capable of establishing itself, seeing that it itself needs things which reveal it. Unless, indeed, when accepted by assumption, it is said to be capable of establishing something. But if once things are accepted by assumption^b and are trustworthy, what further need is there to prove them, since we are able to accept them on the spot and consider them trustworthy without proof because of the assumption ?—Furthermore, if the generic proof is capable 344 of establishing the generic proof, the same proof will

περιφανῆς ἄμα καὶ ἄδηλος, καὶ ἥ μὲν ἀποδείκνυσι, περιφανῆς, ἥ δὲ ἀποδείκνυται, ἄδηλος. ἔσται θ' ὁμοίως πιστὴ τε καὶ ἄπιστος, πιστὴ μὲν ὅτι ἐκκαλυπτική τινός ἐστιν, ἄπιστος δὲ ὅτι ἐκκαλύπτεται. πάνυ δὲ ἄτοπον ταὐτὸ λέγειν πρόδηλον ἄμα καὶ ἄδηλον, πιστόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον. τοίνυν καὶ τὸ ἀξιούν τὴν γενικὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἑαυτῆς εἶναι παραστατικὴν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον.

- 345 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον οὐχ οἶον ἀπόδειξιν ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἑτερόν τι τῶν ὄντων διὰ γενικῆς ἀποδείξεως δυνατόν ἐστι παρασταθῆναι. ἦτοι γὰρ τάδε τινὰ ἔχει λήμματα καὶ τήνδε τινὰ ἐπιφορὰν ἡ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις (ἡ οὐκ ἔχει).¹ τάδε γὰρ τινὰ ἔχουσα λήμματα καὶ τήνδε τινὰ ἐπιφορὰν μία γέγονε τῶν ἐπ' εἰδους. εἰ δ' οὐκ ἔχει λήμματα καὶ ἐπιφορὰν, ἐπεὶ οὐ χωρὶς λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς συνάγει ἡ ἀπόδειξις, οὐδὲν συνάξει ἡ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις, μηδὲν δὲ συνάγουσα οὐδὲ τὸ ἑαυτὴν εἶναι
- 346 συνάξει. εἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ὅτι δεῖ ἀποδειχθῆναι τὴν πρώτην ἀπόδειξιν ὁμολόγηται, αὕτη δὲ οὔτε ἐκ γενικῆς οὔτε ἐξ εἰδικῆς ἀποδείξεως δύναται ἀποδειχθῆναι, δῆλον ὡς ἄλλου μηδενὸς εὕρισκομένου παρὰ ταύτας ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλάττειν ὀφείλομεν τὴν περὶ
- 347 τῆς ἀποδείξεως ζήτησιν. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ ἡ πρώτη ἀπόδειξις ἀποδείκνυται, ἦτοι ὑπὸ ζητουμένης ἀποδείξεως ἀποδείκνυται ἢ ὑπὸ ἀζητήτου. οὔτε δὲ ὑπὸ ἀζητήτου· πᾶσα γὰρ ἀπόδειξις τῆς πρώτης ὑπ' ἀμφισβήτησιν πεπτωκυίας ζητεῖται· οὔτε ὑπὸ ζητουμένης· πάλιν γὰρ ἐκεῖνη εἰ ζητεῖται, ὑπ' ἄλλης ἀποδείξεως ὀφείλει κατασταθῆναι, καὶ ἡ τρίτη ὑπὸ

¹ <ἡ οὐκ ἔχει> Mutsch.

* Cf. P.H. II. 172.

be at once quite apparent and non-evident—quite apparent in so far as it proves, but non-evident in so far as it is proved. And it will be equally trustworthy and untrustworthy—trustworthy because it serves to reveal something, but untrustworthy because it is revealed. But it is extremely absurd to term the same thing at once both pre-evident and non-evident, both trustworthy and untrustworthy. Therefore also the claim that the generic proof is capable of establishing itself is absurd.

Moreover, there is also another way of showing 345 that neither proof nor any other existing thing can be established by means of generic proof. For generic proof either possesses (or does not possess) these particular premisses and this particular conclusion.^a If, then, it possesses these particular premisses and this particular conclusion, it is a particular proof. But if it does not possess premisses and a conclusion, since proof does not deduce without premisses and a conclusion, generic proof will deduce nothing, and deducing nothing it will not even deduce its own existence. —If, then, it is agreed that the first proof ought to be 346 proved, and it cannot be proved either by generic or by particular proof, it is plain that, as nothing else beside these (proofs) is discovered, we ought to suspend judgement about the problem of proof. Moreover, if the 347 first proof is being proved, it is being proved either by a questioned proof or by an unquestioned proof. But not by an unquestioned, for when the first has come to be disputed, every proof is questioned; nor by a questioned proof, for, again, that proof, if questioned, must be established by another proof, and the third by a fourth, and

τετάρτης, καὶ ἡ τετάρτη ὑπὸ πέμπτης, καὶ τοῦτ' εἰς ἄπειρον. τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστι βεβαίως ἔχειν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

- 348 Δημήτριος δὲ ὁ Λάκων, τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἐπικούρειον αἵρεσιν ἐπιφανῶν, εὐαπόλυτον ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην ἔνστασιν. μίαν γάρ, φησί, τῶν ἐπ' εἶδους ἀποδείξεων (οἷον τὴν¹ συνάγουσαν ὅτι ἄτομα ἔστι στοιχεῖα ἢ ὅτι κενὸν ἔστι), καταστησάμενοι καὶ βεβαίαν δείξαντες αὐτόθεν ἔχομεν ἐν ταύτῃ καὶ τὴν γενικὴν ἀπόδειξιν πιστὴν· ὅπου γὰρ ἔστι τό τινος γένους εἶδος, ἐκεῖ πάντως εὐρίσκεται καὶ γένος οὐ ἔστι τὸ εἶδος, καθάπερ ἀνώτερον ὑπεμνήσαμεν.
- 349 τοῦτο δὲ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι πιθανόν, ἔστι δ' ἀδύνατον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἑάσει τὸν Λάκωνα τὴν εἰδικὴν ἀπόδειξιν καταστήσασθαι τῆς γενικῆς μὴ προϋφεστῶσης· καὶ ὡς αὐτὸς ἀξιοῖ ἔχων τὴν εἰδικὴν ἀπόδειξιν εὐθέως ἔχειν καὶ τὴν γενικὴν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ ἀξιόσουσι προαποδειχθῆναι τὸ γένος
- 350 αὐτῆς, ἵνα πιστευθῇ τὸ εἶδος. οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἐπιτρέψωσιν αὐτῷ τὸ τοιοῦτο, λέγω δὲ εἰδικὴν τινα καταστήσασθαι ἀπόδειξιν εἰς βεβαίωσιν τῆς γενικῆς, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμογενῶν αἱρέσεων οὐχ ἡσυχάσουσιν ἀλλ' ὅποιαν ἂν προχειρίσῃται ὡς πιστὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ταύτην ἀνατρέψουσι, πολὺ τε πλήθος ἔξει τῶν οὐκ ἐόντων ταύτην τεθῆναι. οἷον εἰ τὴν περὶ ἀτόμων λαμβάνοι, ἀμύθητοι ἀντιφθέγγονται αὐτῷ· εἰ τὴν περὶ κενοῦ, παμπληθεῖς ἐνστήσονται· εἰ τὴν
- 351 περὶ εἰδώλων, ὡσαύτως. καὶ τὰ μάλιστα οὖν συντρέχωσιν αὐτοῦ τῇ προαιρέσει οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, οὐ δυνήσεται μίαν τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποδείξεων πιστώσασθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν μάχην.

¹ οἷον τὴν cj. Bekk. : τινὰ MSS.

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 137,

^b Cf. § 338.

^c Cf. § 65.

the fourth by a fifth, and so on *ad infinitum*. So, then, it is not possible for proof to be firmly established.

But Demetrius the Laconian,^a one of the notables 348 of the Epicurean School, used to declare that this sort of objection is easy to dispose of, "for," says he, "when we have established one of the particular proofs (for example, that which deduces that indivisible elements exist, or that void exists) and shown that it is sure, we shall at once have secured, as included in this, the trustworthiness of generic proof; for where there exists the particular of a genus, there we certainly find also the genus of which it is the particular," as we mentioned above.^b But this, 349 though it seems to be plausible, is in fact impossible. For, in the first place, no one will allow the Laconian to establish his particular proof when his generic proof does not pre-exist: and just as he himself claims that, if he possesses the particular proof, he at once possesses also the generic, so too the Sceptics will claim that, to gain credence for the particular, its genus must first be proved. And, what is more, even 350 if they allow him to do this (I mean, to establish a certain particular proof in order to confirm the generic), some of the kindred Schools will not stay quiet, but will overturn whatever proof he produces as trustworthy, and he will have a large host of men who refuse to allow its acceptance. For instance, if he takes the proof concerning atoms, a countless number will contradict him; if that concerning void, a vast crowd will object; and so likewise with the proof concerning images.^c And even though the 351 Sceptics may concur ever so much with his choice, he will be unable to establish a single one of his proofs owing to the conflict of the Dogmatists.

Ἄλλως τε τίνα ποτὲ καὶ λέγει βεβαίαν ἔξειν
 εἰδικὴν ἀπόδειξιν; ἤτοι γὰρ τὴν αὐτόθεν ἐξ
 ἀπασῶν ἀρεσκομένην αὐτῷ ἢ τὴν ὁποιανδεπο-
 τοῦν ἢ τὴν ἀποδεικνυμένην. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τὴν
 ἐξ ἀπασῶν ἀρεσκομένην αὐτῷ λαμβάνειν αὐθαδές
 352 καὶ ἀποκληρώσει μᾶλλον ἐοικός ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ τὴν
 ὁποιοῦν, πάσας θήσει τὰς ἀποδείξεις, τοῦτο
 μὲν τὰς τῶν Ἐπικουρείων τοῦτο δὲ τὰς τῶν
 στωικῶν καὶ ἤδη περιπατητικῶν· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ
 δὲ τὴν ἀποδεικνυμένην, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ γὰρ
 ἀποδείκνυται ζητεῖται, καὶ ζητούμενη οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 πιστὴ ἀλλὰ τῶν βεβαιωσόντων δεομένη. οὐκ ἄρα
 δυνατόν ἐστι μίαν τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποδείξεων ἔχειν
 353 πιστήν. καὶ μὴν τὰ λήμματα ἧς λέγει ἀπο-
 δείξεως ὁ Λάκων ἤτοι ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἄπιστά
 ἐστιν ἢ ἀναμφισβήτητά ἐστι καὶ πιστά. ἀλλ' εἰ
 μὲν ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἄπιστά ἐστιν, πάντως καὶ
 ἢ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀπόδειξις ἄπιστος γενήσεται πρὸς τὴν
 τινος κατασκευήν. τὸ δὲ πιστὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ
 354 ἀναμφισβήτητα εὐχὴ μᾶλλον ἐστιν ἢ ἀλήθεια. εἰ
 γὰρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἤτοι αἰσθητά ἐστιν ἢ νοητά,
 ὀφείλει καὶ τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἤτοι
 αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ἢ νοητά. εἴαν τε δὲ αἰσθητὰ εἴαν τε
 νοητὰ ᾗ, ἐζήτῃται. τὰ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὰ ἢ ὑπό-
 κειται τοιαῦτα ὅποια φαίνεται, ἢ κενοπαθήματά
 ἐστι καὶ ἀναπλάσματα τῆς διανοίας, ἢ τινὰ μὲν
 αὐτῶν σὺν τῷ φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι, τινὰ δὲ φαίνεται
 μόνον, οὐκέτι δὲ γε καὶ ὑπόκειται. καὶ πάρεστιν
 ἐπισήμους ἰδεῖν ἄνδρας, τοὺς ἐκάστης στάσεως προ-
 355 εστῶτας, (διαφωνοῦντας)¹ εἶγε Δημόκριτος μὲν
 πᾶσαν αἰσθητὴν ὑπαρξιν κεκίνηκεν, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ

¹ <διαφωνοῦντας> cj. Kayser.

Besides, what sort of firm particular proof does he say that he will possess? It will be either that one of them all which pleases him of itself, or any one whatsoever, or the one which is being proved. But to take that one out of them all which pleases him is self-willed and choosing at random; and if he takes any one whatsoever, he will be adopting all the proofs, on the one hand those of the Epicureans, and on the other those of the Stoics, and of the Peripatetics as well; which is absurd. And if he takes the one which is being proved, it is not a proof; for if it is being proved, it is in question, and being in question it will not be trustworthy but needing things to confirm it. Therefore it is not possible to hold as trustworthy one of the particular proofs.—Moreover, the premisses of the proof which the Laconian mentions are either controverted and untrustworthy or are uncontroverted and trustworthy. But if they are controverted and untrustworthy, the proof also which they compose will certainly be untrustworthy for establishing anything. And that they are trustworthy and uncontroverted is a vain hope rather than the truth. For if all existing things are either sensible or intelligible, the premisses also of the proof must be either sensible or intelligible. And whether they be sensible or intelligible, they are subjects of inquiry. For sensible things either really exist such as they appear; or they are empty affections^a and concoctions of the mind; or some of them not only appear but also exist, while others only appear and do not really exist as well. And one may see notable men, the leaders of every School, (disagreeing,) since Democritus threw over all sensible reality, but

^a Cf. § 213.

- πᾶν αἰσθητὸν ἔλεξε βέβαιον εἶναι, ὃ δὲ στωικὸς
 Ζήνων διαιρέσει ἐχρήσατο, ὥστ' ἐὰν ἡ αἰσθητὰ τὰ
 λήμματα, διάφωνα ἔστιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ
 νοητὰ τυγχάνη· καὶ γὰρ περὶ τούτων, τοῦτο μὲν ἐν
 τῷ βίῳ τοῦτο δὲ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, πλείστην πάρεστιν
 356 ἰδεῖν μάχην, ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἀρεσκομένων. εἴτα πρὸς
 τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν, εἰ πᾶν νοητὸν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει καὶ
 πηγὴν τῆς βεβαιώσεως ἐξ αἰσθήσεως, τὰ δὲ δι'
 αἰσθήσεως γνωριζόμενα, ὥς ἐπελογισάμεθα, διά-
 φωνά ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοιαῦτα τυγχάνειν,
 ὥστε καὶ τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἐξ ὁποτέρας
 ἂν ἡ μοίρας, ἀπιστά ἐστι καὶ ἀβέβαια. διὰ δὲ
 τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις οὐ πιστή.
 357 Καὶ ἵνα καθολικώτερον εἴπωμεν, τὰ λήμματα
 φαινόμενά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ φαινόμενα ἐζητήται εἰ
 ὑπόκειται, τὰ δὲ ζητούμενα οὐκ αὐτόθεν ἐστὶ
 λήμματα, ἀλλὰ ὀφείλει διὰ τίνος βεβαιωθῆναι. τὸ
 οὖν φαινόμενον ὅτι ὁποῖον φαίνεται καὶ ὑπόκειται,
 358 διὰ τίνος ἔχομεν παραστήσαι; ἡ γὰρ δι' ἀδήλου
 πράγματος πάντως ἢ διὰ φαινομένου. ἀλλὰ τὸ
 μὲν δι' ἀδήλου ἄτοπον· τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἀπέχει τὸ
 ἄδηλον τοῦ δύνασθαι τι ἐκκαλύπτειν ὥς καὶ ἀνά-
 359 παλιν αὐτὸ δεῖσθαι τοῦ παραστήσοντος. διὰ φαινο-
 μένου δὲ πολλῷ ἄτοπώτερον· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι
 τὸ ζητούμενον, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ζητουμένων ἑαυτοῦ
 βεβαιωτικόν. ἀμήχανον ἄρα τὰ φαινόμενα κατα-
 στήσασθαι, ἵνα καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν οὕτως ἔχωμεν
 360 πιστήν. ἀλλὰ τὰ φαινόμενα, φασὶν οἱ δογ-
 ματικοί, πάντως δεῖ τιθέναι, πρῶτον ὅτι οὐδὲν

* i.e. he regarded some sensibles as real, but rejected others, cf. § 10 *supra*. For Democritus cf. § 6; for Epicurus, §§ 8 f. Cf. § 58.

Epicurus declared that every sensible thing has stable existence, while Zeno the Stoic employed a distinction^a; so that if the premisses are sensible, they are matters of dispute.—So likewise if they are intelligible; for concerning these also one may see a vast deal of conflict amongst ordinary folk on the one hand, and amongst philosophers on the other, as men's tastes differ. And further, in addition to what has been said, 356 if every intelligible thing derives its origin and source of confirmation from sensation,^b and the things made known through sense are, as we have argued, disputable, the intelligibles also will necessarily be of the same sort; so that the premisses, too, of the proof, to whichever class they belong, are untrustworthy and unsure. And because of this, proof also is not trustworthy.

To speak more generally, premisses are things 357 apparent, and it is a question whether things apparent really exist; and things questioned are not at once (accepted) premisses but must be confirmed by something. By what means, then, can we establish that the apparent thing is really such as it appears? Either, certainly, by means of a non-evident fact or by 358 means of an apparent one. But to do so by means of a non-evident fact is absurd; for the non-evident is so far from being able to reveal anything that, on the contrary, it is itself in need of something to establish it. And to do so by means of an apparent fact is 359 much more absurd; for it is itself the thing in question, and nothing that is in question is capable of confirming itself. It is not feasible, therefore, to establish things apparent, in order, by this means, to have proof made trustworthy.—“But,” say the Dogmatists, “one must 360 certainly posit things apparent, because, firstly, we

- ἔχομεν πιστότερον αὐτῶν, εἰθ' ὅτι ὁ κινῶν αὐτὰ λόγος αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ περιτρέπεται. ἤτοι γὰρ φάσει μόνον χρώμενος ταῦτα ἀναιρεῖ ἢ φαινομένοις ἢ μὴ φαινομένοις. ἀλλὰ φάσει μὲν χρώμενος ἄπιστός ἐστιν· ῥάδιον γὰρ τὴν ἀντικειμένην ἐκ-
 361 θέσθαι φάσιν. εἰ δὲ μὴ φαινομένοις, πάλιν ἄπιστος θέλων διὰ μὴ φαινομένων τὰ φαινόμενα περιτρέ-
 πειν. εἰ δὲ φαινομένοις κινεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα, πάντως πιστοῖς, καὶ οὕτως αὐτόθεν ἔσται τὰ φαινόμενα πιστά. ὥστε ὁ λόγος καὶ κατ' αὐτῶν χωρεῖ.¹
 362 ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅτι μὲν τὰ φαινόμενα, εἴτε αἰσθητὰ εἴη εἴτε νοητά, πλείστης γέμει μάχης τῆς τε παρὰ φιλοσόφοις καὶ τῆς παρὰ τῷ βίῳ, πρότερον ἐπε-
 λογισάμεθα· τὸ δὲ νῦν ἔχον πρὸς τὴν ἐκκειμένην διαστολὴν ἐκεῖνο ῥητέον ὅτι οὔτε φάσει χρώμενοι κινούμεν τὰ φαινόμενα οὔτε μὴ φαινομένοις, συγ-
 κρίνοντας δὲ αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ σύμφωνα εὐρίσκετο τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ ἐναλλάξ, ἴσως ἂν παρεχωροῦμεν
 363 αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα τυγχάνειν ὅποια φαίνεται· νῦν δὲ ἐν τῇ συγκρίσει ἀνεπίκριτον εὐρίσκοντες μάχην, καθ' ἣν τὰ ἕτερα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐκβάλλεται, τῷ μῆτε πάντα θεῖναι δύνασθαι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην μάχην μῆτε τινὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἰσοσθένειαν, μῆτε πάντ' ἐκβαλεῖν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν τοῦ φαίνεσθαι
 364 πιστότερον, ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπέχειν κατηντήσαμεν. ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων τὴν πίστιν λαμβάνων ἐν τῷ ταῦτα κινεῖν καὶ ἑαυτὸν συνεκβάλλει. ὅπερ

¹ χωρεῖ N: χρήται cet., Bekk.

^a i.e. against the Sceptics (the "ourselves" of the next sentence).

^b Cf. §§ 354 ff.

have nothing more trustworthy than they, and, next, because the argument which attacks them is overthrown by itself. For it destroys them by employing either assertion only, or things apparent, or things not apparent. But if it employs assertion, it is untrustworthy ; for it is easy to put forward the opposite assertion. And if it employs things not apparent, once again it is untrustworthy, since it attempts to overthrow apparent things by things not apparent. And if it attacks things apparent by things apparent, these must certainly be trustworthy, and in this way, too, the things apparent will at once be trustworthy. So that the argument goes against them.^a But as to ourselves—that the question whether things apparent are sensible or intelligible is one fraught with contention both amongst philosophers and amongst ordinary folk we have already argued.^b So, for the moment, in reply to the dilemma set forth, we must assert that we do not attack things apparent by employing either assertion or things not apparent, but by comparing them amongst themselves. For if sensibles had been found to be in accord with sensibles and intelligibles with intelligibles, and conversely, we might probably have conceded that they are such as they appear ; but now, because on comparing them we find insoluble contradictions, through which some are expelled by others ; and because we are unable either to posit all owing to this contradiction, or to posit some owing to the equipollence of the opposites, or to reject all owing to our having nothing more trustworthy than appearance ; we have fallen back on suspension of judgement.—But, (say they,) the argument which derives its credibility from things apparent, in the act of attacking these wrecks itself as well. But this is

τὴν συναρπαζόντων τὸ ζητούμενον ἀνδρῶν. οὐ γὰρ
 ὁ λόγος ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων βεβαιούται, ἀλλὰ τὰ
 365 φαινόμενα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου κρατύνεται. καὶ εἰκότως·
 εἰ γὰρ διαφωνία ἔστι τινῶν μὲν λεγόντων αὐτὰ
 ὑποκεῖσθαι τινῶν δὲ μηδαμῶς, ἐκ τοῦ λόγου ὀφείλει
 κατασταθῆναι. τούτου τε μάρτυρές εἰσιν οὐκ ἄλλοι
 τινὲς ἢ οἱ ἑτερόδοξοι, λόγῳ [δ']¹ ἀποδείξαι θέλοντες
 ὅτι ἀληθὴ ἔστι τὰ φαινόμενα. καὶ ἄλλως, πόθεν ὅτι
 366 τοῖς φαινομένοις δεῖ πιστεῦειν; οὐκ ἄρα² τὰ φαινόμενα
 τοῦ λόγου ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος τῶν φαινομένων βεβαιότερός
 ἐστίν, ὃ γε καὶ ἑαυτὸν κἀκεῖνα πιστοῦμενος.

Εἰ δὴ τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐστὶν ἄδηλα,
 ἄδηλος δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀδήλων συνεστὼς
 πάλιν ἄδηλον, ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶν ἄδηλος καὶ ἐπιζητεῖ
 τὸ παραστήσον αὐτῆς τὴν πίστιν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἐστὶν
 ἀποδείξεως.
 367 Ἄλλ' οὐ δεῖ, φασί, πάντων ἀπόδειξιν αἰτεῖν, τινὰ
 δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δυνήσεται
 προβαίνειν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, εἰ μὴ δοθῇ τι πιστὸν
 ἐξ αὐτοῦ τυγχάνειν. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἡμεῖς
 ἐροῦμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς ἐκείνων
 δογματολογίας προβαίνειν, πλάσματώδεις ὑπ-
 368 αρχούσας. εἴτα καὶ ποῖ προβήσονται; τῶν γὰρ
 φαινομένων αὐτὸ μόνον παριστάντων ὅτι φαίνεται,
 τὸ δ' ὅτι καὶ ὑπόκειται μηκέτι προσισχυόντων
 διδάσκειν, τιθέσθω καὶ τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως
 ὅτι φαίνεται, καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά ὁμοίως. ὧδε δὲ οὐ³
 συναχθήσεται τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ οὐ παραχθήσεται
 ἡ ἀλήθεια, μενόντων ἡμῶν ἐπὶ ψιλῆς φάσεως καὶ

¹ [δ] secl. cgo (ante λόγῳ lacunam notat Mutsch.).

² οὐκ ἄρα Heintz: οὐ γὰρ V, Bekk. (οὐ τὰ φ. γὰρ cet. mss.).

³ δὲ ὡ N: γὰρ cet., Bekk.

the plea of men who hastily assume the point at issue. For it is not the argument that is established by the things apparent, but the things apparent that are confirmed by the argument. And naturally so : for 365 if they are disputed (some saying that they really exist, some that they do not), they must be established by the argument. And those who bear witness to this are none other than those of the rival School who try to prove by argument that apparent things are true. And besides, on what grounds ought one to trust things apparent? Instead, therefore, of appar- 366 ent things being more certain than the argument, the argument is more certain than apparent things since it supports both itself and them.

Now if the premisses of the proof are non-evident and the conclusion also non-evident, and again if that which is composed of non-evident things is non-evident, then proof is non-evident and requires something else to support it, which is not the character of proof.

But, say they, one ought not to ask for proof of 367 everything, but accept some things by assumption, since the argument will not be able to go forward unless it be granted that there is something which is of itself trustworthy. But we shall reply, firstly, that there is no necessity for their dogmatic argumentations to go forward, fictitious as they are. And, 368 further, to what conclusion will they proceed? For as apparent things merely establish the fact that they appear, and are not capable also of showing that they subsist, let us assume also that the premisses of the proof appear, and the conclusion likewise. But even so the matter in question will not be deduced, nor will the truth be introduced, so long as we abide by our

τοῦ οἰκείου πάθους. τὸ δ' ὅτι οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπόκειται θέλειν παριστᾶν ἀνδρῶν ἐστὶ μὴ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἀρκουμένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δυνατόν συναρπάζειν ἐσπουδακότες.

369 Ἰαθόλου τε ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ ἀπόδειξις μόνον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως προκόπτειν ἀξιοῦται τοῖς δογματικοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλη σχεδὸν φιλοσοφία, πειρασόμεθα κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ὀλίγα διεξελεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως

370 τινα λαμβάνοντας. ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ φασιν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν, εἰ μὲν πιστά ἐστι διὰ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως εἰληφθαι, πιστὰ φανήσεται καὶ τὰναντία τούτοις ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθέντα, καὶ ταύτῃ θήσομεν τὰ μαχόμενα· εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτων, φημὶ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, πρὸς πίστιν ἢ ὑπόθεσιν ἀσθενῆς, ἀσθενῆς καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων γενήσεται, ὥστε οὐδέτερα πάλιν

371 ὑποθησόμεθα. τοῦτό τε ὁ ὑποτίθεται τις, ἥτοι ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ τοιοῦτον οἶον αὐτὸ ὑποτίθεται, ἢ ψεῦδος. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀληθές, ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος τοῦτο, εἵγε δυνάμενος αὐτὸ μὴ αἰτεῖσθαι ἀλλ' αὐτόθεν λαμβάνειν ὡς ἀληθές εἰς πρᾶγμα συμφεύγει ὑποψίας πλήρεις, εἰς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, αἰτούμενος τὸ αὐτόθεν ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ ψεῦδος ἐστίν, οὐκέτι αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀδικεῖ ὁ τῇ ὑπόθεσιν χρώμενος, τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀξιῶν αὐτῷ αὐτόθεν συγχωρηθῆναι ὡς ὄν, καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος

372 βιαζόμενος λαμβάνειν ὡς ἀληθές. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ πᾶν τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθεῖσιν ἀξιοῖ τις βέβαιον εἶναι, ὅλην συγχέει τὴν φιλόσοφον ζήτησιν. εὐθέως γὰρ ὑποθησόμεθα τὰ

bare assertion and our own affection. And the attempt to establish that apparent things not merely appear but also subsist is the act of men who are not satisfied with what is necessary for practical purposes but are eager also to assume hastily what is possible.

And in general—seeing that it is maintained by 369 the Dogmatists that not only proof but practically the whole of philosophy proceeds from assumption—we shall endeavour so far as possible to make answer briefly to those who accept a thing by assumption. If the things which they say they accept by assump- 370 tion are trustworthy because accepted by assumption, their opposites also will appear trustworthy when accepted by assumption, and thus we shall be positing things that conflict; but if in the case of the latter—the opposites, I mean—the assumption is too weak to support them, it will be too weak also in the case of the former; so that, once again, we shall assume neither.—Further, that which a man assumes is 371 either true and such as he assumes it to be, or it is false. And if it is true, he that assumes it is wronging himself, seeing that, when it was possible for him not to postulate it but to take it as true of itself, he has recourse to a thing that is gravely suspected—to assumption, that is—when he postulates what is true of itself. But if it is false, the man who employs assumption is no longer wronging himself, but the real nature of the things, when he claims that the non-existent should of itself be conceded to him as existent, and compels one to accept what is false as true.—Again, if a man maintains that everything 372 which follows from the things accepted by assumption is certain, he confounds the whole of philosophic inquiry. For we shall assume, for instance, that 3 is

- τρία τέσσαρα εἶναι, καὶ συνάξομεν ὥς ἀκολουθοῦν
 τὸ τὰ ἕξ ὅκτω ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο ἀληθὲς τὸ
 373 τὰ ἕξ ὅκτω ὑπάρχειν. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς
 ὅτι ἀτοπὸν ἐστὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο (δεῖ γὰρ βέβαιον εἶναι
 τὸ ὑποτεθεῖν, ἵνα συνομολογηθῇ καὶ τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν
 τούτῳ), καὶ τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀκούσονται, [τὸ] μηδὲν
 αὐτόθεν ἀξιούντων λαμβάνειν, πᾶν δὲ τὸ τιθέμενον
 374 μετ' ἀκριβείας τίθεσθαι. πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ τὸ
 ὑποτιθέμενον, ἢ ὑποτίθεται, βέβαιόν ἐστὶ καὶ
 ἀσφαλές, μὴ ταῦτα ὑποτιθέσθωσαν οἱ δογματικῶς
 φιλοσοφοῦντες τὰ ἕξ ὧν συνάγουσι τὸ ἄδηλον, ἀλλ'
 αὐτὸ τὸ ἄδηλον, τουτέστι μὴ τὰ λήμματα τῆς
 ἀποδείξεως ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιφοράν. ἀλλὰ καὶ μυριάκις
 τοῦθ' ὑποθῶνται, οὐκ ἔστι πιστὸν διὰ τὴν ἀδηλότητα
 καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ζήτησιν. φανερόν δὴπουθεν ὅτι,
 οὐδὲ ἐὰν τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως δίχα ἀπο-
 δείξεως αἰτήσωνται, ἀνύουσί τι πρὸς πίστιν διὰ τὸ
 καὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων ὑπάρχειν.
 375 Νῆ Δία, ἀλλ' εἰώθασιν ὑποτυγχάνοντες λέγειν
 ὅτι πίστις ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐρρῶσθαι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ
 ἀληθὲς εὐρίσκεισθαι ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῖς ἕξ ὑποθέσεως
 ληφθεῖσιν ἐπιφερόμενον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τούτοις ἀκολου-
 376 θοῦν ἐστὶν ὑγιές, κακεῖνα οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ ἀληθὴ καὶ
 ἀναμφίλεκτα καθέστηκεν. καὶ πόθεν ἔχομεν, ἐρεῖ
 τις, δεῖξαι ὅτι τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν τῷ ἕξ ὑποθέσεως
 ληφθέντι ἀληθές ἐστίν; ἰδρά γε ἕξ αὐτοῦ ἢ ἐκ τῶν
 λημμάτων οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ; ἀλλ' ἕξ αὐτοῦ μὲν οὐκ
 ἂν εἶη· ἄδηλον γάρ ἐστιν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν λημμάτων;
 οὐδ' οὕτως· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ μάχη, καὶ δεῖ
 377 αὐτὰ¹ πρότερον κατασταθῆναι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔστω

¹ τὰ . . . δατω MSS.; τῶ . . . οἷς τρία Fubg., Bekk.

² τούτων . . . αὐτὰ Heintz; τούτου . . . αὐτὸ MSS., Bekk.

4, and deduce as a consequence that 6 is 8 ; and this —that 6 is 8— will be true. And if they should say 373 to us that such a case is absurd (for the thing assumed must be certain, in order that its consequence also may be admitted), they shall hear us, in reply, maintaining that nothing should be accepted of itself and everything affirmed should be affirmed with precision. —Furthermore, if the thing assumed, in that it is 374 assumed, is certain and sure, let the *dogmatic* philosophers assume, not the things from which they deduce the non-evident, but the non-evident itself—that is to say, not the premisses of the proof but the conclusion. But even were they to assume this ten thousand times, it is not trustworthy, owing to its being non-evident and the subject of inquiry. Thus it is, to be sure, apparent that if they postulate the premisses of the proof without proof, they effect nothing in support of it since the premisses themselves are matters of dispute.

Yes, by Zeus ; but they are wont to interrupt with 375 the reply that a guarantee of the strength of the assumption is the fact that what is concluded by the premisses accepted by assumption is found to be true ; for if what follows from the premisses is sound, the premisses from which they follow are true and indisputable. But, someone will say, how can we show that 376 what follows from the premiss accepted by assumption is true ? By means of itself or by means of the premisses from which it follows ? But it will not be by means of itself, for it is non-evident. Is it, then, by means of the premisses ? Not in this way either ; for it is about these that the conflict exists, and it is they that must first be established. Notwithstanding, 377

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

- γε καὶ τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθεῖσιν ἀληθές· οὐ μὴν παρὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθέντα γενήσεται ἀληθῆ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μόνον κατ' αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀληθεῖ εἶπετο ἀληθές, προύβαινεν <ἀν>¹ ὁ λόγος, ὡς² τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος τῷ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθέντι ὄντος ἀληθοῦς γίνεσθαι τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
- 378 ληφθέν ἀληθές· νῦν δὲ ἐπεὶ καὶ ψεύδει ψεῦδος, φασίν, ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ψεύδει ἀληθές, οὐ κατ' ἀνάγκην, εἰ τὸ λήγόν ἐστιν ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον ἔσται ἀληθές, ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται τοῦ λήγοντος ἀληθοῦς ὄντος τὸ ἡγούμενον ὑπάρχειν ψεῦδος.
- Ὅδοῦ μὲν οὖν πάρεργον, ὡς φασί, καὶ παρενθήκη³ τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως κατάρχεσθαι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· ἀκολουθῶς δ' ὑποδεικτέον ὅτι καὶ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπον ἐμπέπτωκεν, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀπορώτερον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις προκατεστησάμεθα, πᾶν δὲ ἀδήλον ἐπικρίσεως δεῖται, τὸ δὲ ἐπικρίσεως δεόμενον κριτηρίου χρήζει τοῦ παραστήσοντος εἴτε ὑγιές ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ τοιοῦτον· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μετρηθῆναι ὀφείλον οὐ χωρὶς μέτρου μετρεῖσθαι πέφυκε καὶ πᾶν τὸ κανονιζόμενον οὐ χωρὶς κανόνος κανονίζεται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ κρινόμενον οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου
- 380 δοκιμάζεται. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τὸ εἰ ἔστι κριτήριον ἐξίτηται, τῶν μὲν μηδὲν εἶναι φασμένων τῶν δὲ εἶναι, τῶν δὲ ἐν ἐποχῇ τοῦτο φυλαξάντων, πάλιν δεήσει τὸ ὅτι ἔστι κριτήριον ἀποδειχθῆναι διὰ τινος ἀποδείξεως. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἴν' ἔχωμεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν

¹ <ἀν> Kayser.

² ὡς Kochalsky: καὶ mss., Bekk.

³ παρενθήκη Kochalsky: παρενθήκης mss., Bekk.

let it be granted that what follows from the assumed premisses is true ; all the same, the assumed premisses will not on this account become true. For if, according to them, the true had followed the true only, the argument would have gone forward, so that the assumed premiss would be true since the consequence of the premiss is true : but as it is, since they 378 assert that both falsehood follows from falsehood and truth from falsehood,^a it is not necessary that if the consequent is true the antecedent also should be true, but it is possible for the antecedent to be false though the consequent is true.

Let thus much be said, then,—as “ a bywork of our journey,” as they say,^b and an appendix—regarding the wrongfulness of founding proof on assumption. Next one must point out that it also 379 involves itself in circular reasoning,^c which is still more hopeless. For we have already established that proof is a non-evident thing, and every non-evident thing requires scrutiny, and what requires scrutiny needs a criterion to determine whether it is valid or not ; for just as a thing which needs to be measured cannot be measured without a measure, and nothing that is being ruled is ruled without a rule, so also what is being scrutinized is not tested without a criterion. Since, then, the existence of a criterion 380 also is questioned,^d some declaring that none exists, others that it does exist, and others again suspending judgement about it, the fact that a criterion exists will, in turn, have to be proved by means of some proof. But in order to have the proof confirmed, we

^a Cf. §§ 113, 114.

^b Cf. Eurip. *Electra*, 509 ἤλθον γὰρ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τάφον πάρεργ' ὁδοῦ.

^c Cf. *P.H.* ii. 183.

^d Cf. i. 47 ff.

πιστήν, ἀναστρέφειν ἐπὶ τὸ κριτήριον δεήσει, καὶ οὕτω μήτε ταύτην πρὸ ἐκείνου ἔχοντας πιστήν μήτε ἐκεῖνο πρὸ ταύτης βέβαιον ὁμολογεῖν τὴν περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἐποχήν.

- 381 Ἐνέσται οὖν σὺν τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ τῆς ἐπινοίας κινεῖν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. καίτοι εἰ ἐπενοείτο, οὐ πάντως ἂν ὑπῆρχεν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅπερ ἐπινοεῖται μὲν, ὡς ἔφην, οὐ μετέχει δέ τινος ὑπάρξεως. νῦν δὲ ὅταν καὶ ἡ ἐπίνοια εὐρίσκηται ἀδύνατος ἡ τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἀναμφιλέκτως καὶ ἡ τῆς ὑπάρξεως
382 ἐλπίς ἀποκόπτεται. δυοῖν οὖν οὐσῶν ἀποδείξεων, τῆς τε γενικῆς καὶ τῆς εἰδικῆς, τὴν μὲν γενικὴν αὐτόθεν εὐρήσομεν ἀνεπινόητον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οἶδε γενικὴν ἀπόδειξιν, οὐδὲ διὰ ταύτης πώποτε τι
383 δεδύνηται παραστήσαι. καὶ ἄλλως ἄξιον πυθέσθαι πότερον λήμματα ἔχει καὶ ἐπιφορὰν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει, πῶς ἔτι δύναται νοηθῆναι ἀπόδειξις, εἴγε ἡ πάσης ἀποδείξεως νόησις οὐ χωρὶς τῶν αὐτῆς λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς συνίσταται; εἰ δὲ ἔχει ἑκάτερα, τουτέστι τὰ λήμματα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, εἰδικὴ τίς ἐστίν
384 ἀπόδειξις· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀποδεικνύον τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν μίαν εἶναι τῶν εἰδικῶν. ἦν δέ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος οὐ περὶ τῆς εἰδικῆς ἀλλὰ τῆς γενικῆς·
385 οὐκ ἄρα ἐπινοεῖται ἡ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις. καὶ μὴν οὐδέ γε ἡ εἰδική. ἐλέγετο γὰρ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ἡ ἀπόδειξις λόγος εἶναι κατὰ συναγωγὴν διὰ τινων φαινομένων ἐκκαλύπτων τι ἄδηλον. ἦτοι οὖν τὸ πᾶν σύστημα, τουτέστι τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων

* Cf. § 334. ^b With §§ 383-384 cf. § 345; *P.H.* ii. 179.

^c With §§ 385-390 cf. *P.H.* ii. 173-176.

shall have to turn back to the criterion, and thus, as we neither have the latter trustworthy before the former nor the former certain before the latter, we must agree to suspension of judgement about both.

In addition to what has been said, it will be possible also to attack proof on the ground of its conception. Though even were it conceived, it would not necessarily be existent; for, as I said,^a there are many things which are conceived but have no share in real existence. But as it is, when even the conception of proof is found to be impossible, the hope also of its existence is cut off beyond dispute. As, then, there are two kinds of proof, the generic and the particular, we shall find the generic to be of itself inconceivable; for none of us knows generic proof nor has ever yet been able to establish anything by means of it. Besides, one may well ask whether this kind of proof has, or has not, premisses and a conclusion.^b And if it has not, how can it still be conceived as a proof, seeing that no conception of any proof is framed apart from its premisses and conclusion? And if it has both—that is to say, the premisses and the conclusion,—it is a particular proof; for if everything that is proved and everything that proves belongs to the class of particulars, it is necessary that proof also should be one of the particulars. But our argument was not concerned with the particular but with the generic; therefore generic proof is not conceived.—Nor, in fact, is particular proof.^c For proof was stated by the Dogmatists to be “an argument which reveals something non-evident through deduction by means of certain apparent things.”^d Either, then, the whole structure—that is, the thing conceived as a compound

^a Cf. §§ 301 ff.; *P.H.* ii. 135 ff.

- καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς νοοῦμενον, ἀπόδειξις ἦν, ἥ τὰ μὲν
 λήμματα μόνον ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις, ἥ δὲ ἐπιφορὰ τὸ
 ἀποδεικνύμενον. ὁπότερον δ' ἂν εἴπωσι τούτων,
 386 σαλευέται ἡ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐπίνοια. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
 τὸ σύνθετον ἐκ τε τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς
 ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις, ἀνάγκη ἄδηλόν τι περιέχουσιν τὴν
 ἀπόδειξιν εὐθὺς ἄδηλον εἶναι, τοιαύτην δὲ καθ-
 εστηκυῖαν δεῖσθαι τινος ἀποδείξεως, ὅπερ ἄτοπον.
 τοίνυν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς
 ἐπιφορᾶς συνεστὼς ἀπόδειξις, εἴγε οὔτε ἄδηλον
 οὔτε ἀποδείξεως δεομένην νοοῦμεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.
 387 ἔτι ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῶν πρὸς τι ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ εἰς
 ἑαυτὴν νεύει, οὐδὲ κατὰ περιγραφὴν νενοήται, ἀλλ'
 ἔχει τι οὗ ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις. εἰ οὖν ἡ ἐπιφορὰ ἐμ-
 περιεῖληπται αὐτῇ, πᾶν δὲ τὸ πρὸς τι ἐκτός ἐστιν
 ἐκείνου τοῦ πρὸς ᾧ λέγεται πρὸς τι, πρὸς οὐδέν
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις νοουμένη, ἐπεὶ περ ἡ ἐπιφορὰ
 388 ἐμπεριείχετο αὐτῇ. ἀλλὰ κἄν ἑτέραν ὑποστησώ-
 μεθα ἐπιφορὰν ἐκτός, πρὸς ἣν ἡ ἀπόδειξις νοηθή-
 σεται, δύο γενήσονται ἐπιφοραὶ κατὰ τὸν τόπον,
 μία μὲν ἡ ἐν τῇ ἀποδείξει περιεχομένη, δευτέρα δὲ
 ἡ ἐκτός, πρὸς ἣν νοεῖται ἡ ἀπόδειξις. ἄτοπον δέ
 γε μιᾶς ἀποδείξεως δύο λέγειν ἐπιφοράς· οὐκ ἄρα
 τὸ ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς συνεστὼς ἐστὶν
 389 ἀπόδειξις. λείπεται τοίνυν τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων
 λέγειν μόνον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι. ὅπερ ἦν εὐθες·
 τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ λόγος ἐστὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα
 ἐλλιπὲς καὶ ἀδιανόητον, εἴγε οὐθεὶς φῆσι τῶν νοῦν
 ἐχόντων τὸ τοιοῦτον κατ' ἰδίαν " εἰ ἔστι κίνησις,
 ἔστι κενόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι κίνησις " ἢ λόγον εἶναι
 390 ἢ διάνοιάν τινα σώζειν. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ ἐκ τῶν
 λημμάτων καὶ [τὸ ἐκ] τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς σύνθετον νοεῖ-

of the premisses and the conclusion—is proof, or the premisses only are proof, and the conclusion is what is proved. But whichever of these they declare for, the conception of proof is upset. For if, on the one 386 hand, the compound of premisses and conclusion is proof, proof must at once, of necessity, be non-evident as containing something non-evident; and being such, it must need a proof, which is absurd. So then the compound of premisses and conclusion will not be proof, since we conceive of proof as neither non-evident nor needing proof.—Again, proof is a 387 relative thing; for it does not refer to itself, nor is it conceived as isolated, but it has something whereof it is a proof. If, then, its conclusion is included within it, whereas every relative thing is outside of the thing whereto it is said to be in relation, then proof is conceived as relative to nothing, since its conclusion is contained within it. If, however, we assume 388 another conclusion outside, in relation to which the proof will be conceived, there will then be two conclusions in the argument—first, the conclusion included in the proof, and secondly the outside one, as relative to which proof is conceived. But it is absurd to state two conclusions of one proof. Proof, therefore, is not the compound of premisses and conclusion.—It only remains, then, to declare that proof 389 is composed of the premisses only, which is silly. For then it is not even an argument at all, but a defective thing and meaningless, since no sensible man asserts that a combination such as this—“If motion exists, void exists; but in fact motion exists”—when taken by itself either is an argument or contains any meaning. If, therefore, proof is conceived neither as the 390

ται ἀπόδειξις μήτε τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων μόνον, ἀνεπινόητός ἐστιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις.

- 391 "Ἐτι ἡ ἀποδεικνύουσα ἀπόδειξις ἦτοι πρόδηλος οὖσα προδήλου ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις ἢ ἄδηλος ἀδήλου ἢ ἄδηλος προδήλου ἢ πρόδηλος ἀδήλου· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ἀπό-
 392 δειξις. καὶ δὴ πρόδηλος μὲν προδήλου οὐ δύναται τυγχάνειν ἀπόδειξις, ἐπεὶ τὸ πρόδηλον οὐ χρήζει ἀποδείξεως ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ γνώριμον καθέστηκεν. ἄδηλος δὲ ἀδήλου πάλιν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀπόδειξις, παρόσον αὐτῇ χρεῖαν ἔξει τοῦ παριστάντος ἄδηλος οὖσα, καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρου τινὸς γενήσεται παραστατική.
 393 ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἄδηλος προδήλου. ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ συνδραμεῖται ἄπορα· τό τε γὰρ ἀποδεικνύμενον οὐ δεήσεται τινος ἀποδείξεως πρόδηλον ὄν, ἢ τε ἀπό-
 394 δειξις χρεῖαν ἔξει τοῦ καταστήσοντος αὐτὴν ἄδηλος οὖσα. ὥστε οὐδὲ ἄδηλος προδήλου γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε
 395 ἀπόδειξις. λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι πρόδηλος ἀδήλου, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀπόρων ἐτύγχανεν· εἰ γὰρ οὐ τῶν κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ ἀπολύτως νοουμένων ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι, ὡς ἐδείξαμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ σημείου ζητήσῃ, συγκατα-
 λαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ συγκαταλαμβανόμενα οὐκ ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἐκκαλύπτεται ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρόδηλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἢ ἀπόδειξις πρόδηλος ἀδήλου ἀπόδειξις διὰ τὸ κάκεινο συγκαταλαμβανόμενον
 395 αὐτῇ δι' αὐτοῦ προσπίπτειν. εἰ οὖν μήτε ὡς φαινόμενον φαινομένου ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις μήτε ὡς ἀδηλον ἀδήλου μήτε ὡς ἄδηλον φαινομένου μήτε

• With §§ 391-395 cf. P.H. II. 177-179.

• Cf. §§ 387, 373.

• Cf. §§ 174 ff.

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ὡς φαινόμενον ἀδήλου, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, λεκτέον μηδὲν εἶναι ἀποδείξιν.

- 396 Ἀκολουθῶς δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ στωικοὶ μάλιστα δοκοῦσιν ἐξηκριβωκέναι τοὺς ἀποδεικτικούς τρόπους, φέρε καὶ πρὸς τούτους ὀλίγα διεξέλθωμεν, παριστάντες ὅτι τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς ὑποθέσεσιν αὐτῶν τάχα μὲν πάντα ἐστὶν
397 ἀκατάληπτα, ἰδιαίτερον δὲ ἢ ἀποδείξεις. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ κατάληψις,¹ ὡς ἔστι παρ' αὐτῶν ἀκούειν, καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις, ἣτις διπλοῦν ἔοικεν εἶναι πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἔχει ἀκούσιον τὸ δὲ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ κρίσει κείμενον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαντασιωθῆναι ἀβούλητον ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ πάσχοντι ἔκειτο ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ φαντασιοῦντι τὸ οὕτωςι διατεθῆναι, οἷον λευκαντικῶς λευκοῦ ὑποπεσόντος χρώματος ἢ γλυκαντικῶς γλυκέος τῇ γεύσει προσαχθέντος· τὸ δὲ συγκαταθέσθαι τούτῳ τῷ κινήματι ἔκειτο ἐπὶ τῷ
398 παραδεχομένῳ τὴν φαντασίαν. ὥστε ἡ κατάληψις προηγουμένην ἔχει τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, ἥς ἐστὶ συγκατάθεσις. ἡ δὲ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία προάγουσαν εἶχε τὴν φαντασίαν, ἥς ἐστὶν εἶδος. φαντασίας γὰρ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲ καταληπτικῆς ἔστι φαντασία, παρόσον τοῦ γένους μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἔστιν· καὶ καταληπτικῆς μὴ οὔσης φαντασίας οὐδὲ συγκατάθεσις ἔστιν αὐτῆς. τῆς δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας τῆς συγκαταθέσεως αἰρο-
399 μένης αἵρεται καὶ ἡ κατάληψις. ἔνθεν, ἂν ἐπιδειχθῇ [διὰ] τῆς ἀποδείξεως ὅτι οὐ δύναται φαντασία γενέσθαι κατὰ τοὺς στωικούς, δῆλον ἔσται ὡς οὐδὲ

¹ κατάληψις Hirzel: ἀπόδειξις mss., Bekk.

^a Cf. i. 227.

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS, II. 395-399

apparent, nor an apparent of a non-evident, and besides these there is no other possibility, one must declare that proof is nothing.

As a sequel to what has been said, seeing that the 396
 Stoics seem to have elaborated most precisely the
 modes of proof, come and let us argue the matter
 briefly in reply to them, and show that, so far as
 depends on their assumptions, all things probably
 are non-apprehensible, and more particularly proof.
 Now apprehension, as one may learn from them, is 397
 "assent to the apprehensive presentation"^a; and this
 seems to be a twofold thing, and to be partly in-
 voluntary, and partly voluntary and dependent on
 our judgement. For the experience of a presentation
 is involuntary, and it does not depend on the person
 affected, but on the cause of the presentation, that
 he is affected in this particular way—as, for instance,
 with a sense of whiteness when a white colour presents
 itself, or with a sense of sweetness when something
 sweet is offered to his taste; but the act of assenting
 to this affection lies in the power of the person who
 receives the presentation. So that apprehension has 398
 as its antecedent the apprehensive presentation, to
 which it is the assent. And the apprehensive pre-
 sentation has as antecedent the presentation, of which
 it is a species. For if presentation does not exist,
 neither does apprehensive presentation exist, inas-
 much as when the genus does not exist, the species
 does not exist either; and if apprehensive presenta-
 tion does not exist, neither does assent thereto exist.
 And when assent to the apprehensive presentation is
 taken away, apprehension also is taken away. Hence, 399
 if it be shown that, according to the Stoics, a presenta-
 tion of proof cannot come into existence, it will be

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καταληπτική φαντασία τις ὑποστήσεται τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ταύτης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐδ' ἡ συγκατάθεσις αὐτῆς, ὅπερ ἦν ἡ κατάληψις.

- 400 "Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδείξεως φαντασία κατὰ τοὺς στωικούς, δείκνυται πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ κοινότερον παρ' αὐτοῖς διαπεφωνῆσθαι τὸ τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἡ φαντασία· μέχρι γὰρ τοῦ τύπωσιν αὐτὴν λέγειν ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ συμφωνήσαντες περὶ αὐτῆς διαφέρονται τῆς τυπώσεως, Κλεάνθους μὲν κυρίως ἀκούοντος τὴν μετὰ εἰσοχῆς καὶ ἐξοχῆς νοουμένην, Χρυσίππου δὲ καταχρηστικώτερον ἀντὶ τῆς ἀλ-
- 401 λοιώσεως. εἰ δὴ καὶ κατ' ἐκείνους αὐτοὺς ἡ τύπωσις μέχρι τοῦ νῦν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖται, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν φαντασίαν ἄχρι δεῦρο διαφωνουμένην ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλάσσεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐξηρτημένην αὐτῆς
- 402 ἀπόδειξιν. εἰτα δεδόσθω καὶ εἶναι τὴν φαντασίαν ὅποιαν ποτὲ θέλουσιν, εἴτε κυρίως τύπωσιν τὴν μετὰ εἰσοχῆς καὶ ἐξοχῆς εἴτε ἑτεροίωσιν· ἀλλὰ τὸ πῶς αὕτη γίνεται τῆς ἀποδείξεως τῶν ἀπορωτάτων. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μὲν φανταστὸν ὀφείλει ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ φαντασιούμενον ἡγεμονικὸν πάσχειν, ἐκείνο μὲν ἵνα τυπώσῃ, τοῦτο δ' ἵνα τυπωθῇ.
- 403 ἄλλως γὰρ οὐκ εἰκὸς συμβαίνειν φαντασίαν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἡγεμονικὸν τάχα συγχωρήσει τις δύνασθαι πάσχειν, καίπερ ἀσυγχώρητον ὄν· τὴν δὲ ἀπόδειξιν πῶς εἰκὸς ἔστι ποιεῖν; ἤτοι γὰρ σῶμα κατ'
- 404 αὐτοὺς ἔστιν ἡ ἀσώματον. σῶμα μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐξ ἀσωμάτων γὰρ λεκτῶν συνέστηκεν· εἰ δὲ ἀσώματον, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἀσώματα κατ' αὐτοὺς οὔτε ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν, καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις

^a Cf. I. 228, 372; P.H. II. 70.

^b Cf. §§ 262, 336.

evident that no apprehensive presentation of proof will subsist, and, this being non-existent, assent to it will not exist either, and this is apprehension.

That a presentation of proof, according to the 400 Stoics, does not exist is shown, firstly, by the general dissension amongst them as to what presentation is ; for when they have agreed so far as to say that it is " an impression on the regent part," they are at variance about " impression " itself, Cleanthes understanding it to mean literally " that conceived as involving depression and eminence," but Chrysippus more loosely as a synonym for " alteration." ^a If, 401 then, even amongst themselves there is no agreement up till now about " impression," presentation too, as being in dispute up till the present, must necessarily be treated with suspension, and also the proof which depends thereon. Next, let it be granted that 402 presentation exists, be it of whatsoever sort they wish, whether literal " impression " with depression and eminence or alteration ; yet how this (impression) comes about is a most doubtful question. For evidently the presented object ought to be the active agent, and the regent part, as receiving the presentation, the passive subject, so that the former may impress and the latter be impressed ; for it is not likely that presentation occurs in any other way. Now, that the regent part can be passive someone, 403 perhaps, will admit, although it is inadmissible ; but how is proof likely to be the agent ? For, according to them, it is either corporeal or incorporeal. Now, it is not corporeal, for it is composed 404 of incorporeal " expressions " ^b ; while if it is incorporeal, then, since incorporeals, according to them, can neither affect anything nor be affected,

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ἀσώματος οὐσα οὐδὲν δυνήσεται ποιεῖν, μηδὲν δὲ
 ποιοῦσα οὐδὲ τυπώσει τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, μὴ τυποῦσα
 δὲ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ φαντασίαν αὐτῆς ποιήσῃ περὶ αὐτῶ,
 405 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. μὴ
 οὔσης δὲ αὐτῆς περὶ τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ καταληπτικῆς
 406 φαντασίας, οὐδὲ κατάληψις αὐτῆς γενήσεται. κατὰ
 τὰς τῶν στωικῶν ἄρα τεχνολογίας ἀκατάληπτός
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.

Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνεστι λέγειν ὅτι τὰ ἀσώματα οὐ
 ποιεῖ τι οὐδὲ φαντασιοῖ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν οἱ
 ἐπ' ἐκείνοις φαντασιούμενοι. εἰ γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται
 ὅτι πᾶν ἀποτέλεσμα οὐ χωρὶς γε τοῦ δρῶντος καὶ
 τοῦ πάσχοντος συνίσταται, ὀφείλει καὶ ἡ φαντασία
 τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀποτέλεσμα καθεστηκυῖα μὴ χωρὶς
 407 τοῦ δρῶντός τε καὶ πάσχοντος νοεῖσθαι. τὸ μὲν
 οὖν πάσχον ὅτι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ἐστι, δεδώκασιν οἱ
 ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς φιλόσοφοι· τὸ δὲ τυποῦν καὶ ποιοῦν
 τί ἂν εἴη κατ' αὐτούς, ἄξιον μαθεῖν. ἥτοι γὰρ
 ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶν ἡ τυποῦσα τὸ ἡγεμονικόν καὶ κινου-
 σα τὴν ἑαυτῆς φαντασίαν, ἢ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν αὐτὸ
 τυποῖ καὶ φαντασιοῖ. ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις οὐκ ἂν
 εἴη τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τυπωτική· ἀσώματος γάρ ἐστι,
 τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον κατ' αὐτούς οὔτε ποιεῖ τι οὔτε
 408 πάσχει. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ἑαυτὸ τυποῖ, ἥτοι
 οἶός ἐστιν ὁ τύπος τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τυποῦν, ἢ ἄλλοιον
 μὲν τι ὁ τύπος ἀνόμοιον δέ τι τούτου τὸ τυποῦν.
 καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνόμοιον, ἄλλων ὑποκειμένων ἄλλων
 γενήσονται αἱ φαντασίαι· ὅπερ πάλιν εἰς τὴν περὶ
 ἀπάντων ἀκαταληψίαν συγκλείει τοὺς στωικούς.
 εἰ δὲ ὁμοίός ἐστιν ὁ τύπος τῷ τυποῦντι, ἐπεὶ τὸ
 450

proof also, being incorporeal, will not be able to affect anything; and, as affecting nothing, it will not impress the regent part; and, as not impressing this, neither will it produce therein a presentation of itself, nor, if this is so, an apprehensive presentation. But 405 if there exists no apprehensive presentation of it in the regent part, neither will there be an apprehension of it. Therefore, according to the technical rules of 406 the Stoics' logic, proof is non-apprehensible.

Moreover, it is not allowable to say that incorporeals do not affect anything nor produce in us presentations, but it is we who form presentations from them. For if it is agreed that no effect is brought about without an agent and a passive subject, then the presentation of proof also, being an effect, should not be conceived without both agent and patient. That the patient, 407 then, is the regent part has been granted by the Stoics; but what the agent is which, according to them, makes the impression is worth considering. For either it is proof which impresses the regent part and excites its own presentation, or it is the regent part which impresses itself and causes presentation. But proof will not be capable of impressing the regent part; for it is incorporeal, and the incorporeal, according to them, neither effects nor suffers anything. And if the regent part impresses itself, either what 408 impresses is the same sort of thing as the impression, or else the impression is one sort of thing and what impresses something dissimilar. And if it is dissimilar, as the underlying objects are different, the presentations will be of different things; and this again forces the Stoic to admit the non-apprehensibility of all things. But if the impression is similar to what impresses, since the regent part impresses itself,

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ἡγεμονικὸν ἑαυτὸ τυποῖ, λήψεται φαντασίαν οὐ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀλλὰ ἑαυτοῦ· ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον.

- 409 Οἱ δὲ καὶ δι' ὑποδειγμάτων πειρῶνται τὸ ἀξιού-
μενον παραμυθεῖσθαι. ὥσπερ γάρ, φασίν, ὁ παιδο-
τρίβης καὶ ὁ ὀπλομάχος ἔσθ' ὅτε μὲν λαβόμενος
τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ παιδὸς ῥυθμίζει καὶ διδάσκει τινὰς
κινεῖσθαι κινήσεις, ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ ἄπωθεν ἐστὼς καὶ
πῶς κινούμενος ἐν ῥυθμῷ παρέχει ἑαυτὸν ἐκείνῳ
πρὸς μίμησιν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φανταστῶν ἓνια μὲν
οἰοῦναι ψαύοντα καὶ θιγγάνοντα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ
ποιεῖται τὴν ἐν τούτῳ τύπωσιν, ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ
λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ κοινῶς τὸ σῶμα, ἓνια δὲ
(οὐ)¹ τοιαύτην ἔχει φύσιν, τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπ'
αὐτοῖς φαντασιουμένου καὶ οὐχ ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὁποῖά
410 ἐστὶ τὰ ἀσώματα λεκτά. οἱ δὲ τοῦτο λέγοντες
πιθανῶ μὲν χρῶνται παραδείγματι, οὐ συνάγουσι
δὲ τὸ προκείμενον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ παιδοτρίβης καὶ ὁ
ὀπλομάχος εἰσὶ σῶμα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐδύναντο
φαντασίαν ἐμποιεῖν τῷ παιδί· ἡ δὲ ἀπόδειξις ἀ-
σώματος καθειστήκει, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐζητεῖτο εἰ
δύναται φανταστικῶς τυποῦν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. ὥστε
μὴ ἀποδεδείχθαι αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀρχῆθεν ζητούμενον.
- 411 "Ὅθεν τούτων ὑποδεδειγμένων" σκοπῶμεν μετ-
ελθόντες εἰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν θεωρίαν
δύναται ἡ τῆς ἀποδείξεως αὐτοῖς ὑπόσχεσις σώζε-
σθαι. οἴονται τοίνυν τρεῖς τινὰς ἀλλήλοις συζυγεῖν
λόγους, τὸν τε συνακτικὸν καὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὸν
412 ἀποδεικτικόν, ὧν τὸν μὲν ἀποδεικτικὸν πάντως
ἀληθῆ τε καὶ συνακτικόν, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῆ πάντως
συνακτικὸν μὲν ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ καὶ

¹ <οὐ> ego (lacunam post φύσιν stat. Kochalsky).

² ὑποδεδειγμένων Fabr.: ἀποδεδειγμένων mss., Bekk.

it will receive a presentation not of the proof but of itself; which again is absurd.

But they endeavour also to render their view 409 plausible by means of illustrations. For, say they, just as the trainer or sergeant sometimes takes hold of the boy's hands when he is teaching him rhythm and how to make certain motions, and at other times stands at a distance and offers himself as a pattern for the boy's imitation by making certain rhythmical motions, so also some of the objects presented produce the impression in the regent part as it were by touching and contact with it—such as white and black and body generally,—whereas others are not of this nature, since the regent part receives the presentation as a result of them but not by their agency, as is the case with incorporeal expressions. But those who argue thus, though they use a plausible 410 illustration, do not prove the matter in question. For the trainer or sergeant is corporeal, and because of this he was able to produce a presentation in the boy; but proof is incorporeal, and because of this it was questioned whether it is able to impress, as a presentation, the regent part. So that the original point in question has not been proved by them.

These arguments, therefore, having been indicated, 411 let us pass on to consider whether the promise they ascribe to proof can be made good by their logical theory. Now they suppose that there are three forms of argument connected with one another^a—the conclusive and the true and the probative, and of these 412 the probative is always both true and conclusive, and the true is always conclusive but not necessarily

^a Cf. *P.H.* II. 137-143.

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- ἀποδεικτικόν, τὸν δὲ συνακτικὸν οὔτε πάντως
 413 ἀληθῆ οὔτε πάντως ἀποδεικτικόν. καὶ ὁ μὲν
 τοιοῦτος ἡμέρας οὔσης “ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν·
 ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν ” συνάγει
 μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐν ὑγιεῖ ἠρωτῆσθαι σχήματι, οὐκ ἔστι
 δὲ ἀληθές, τὸ δεύτερον λῆμμα ἔχων ψεύδος, τὴν
 414 πρόσληψιν, τὸ “ ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν.” ὁ δὲ οὕτως
 ἔχων ἡμέρας οὔσης “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν·
 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν ” συνακτικὸς
 ἅμα τῇ καὶ ἀληθῆς τῷ καὶ ἐν ὑγιεῖ ἠρωτῆσθαι
 415 σχήματι καὶ δι’ ἀληθῶν ἀληθές συνάγειν. κρίνε-
 σθαι δὲ φασὶ τὸν συνακτικὸν λόγον ὅτι συνακτικὸς
 ἔστιν, ὅταν τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ
 ἔπῃται τὸ συμπέρασμα, οἷον τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον
 ἡμέρας οὔσης “ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν
 νύξ ἔστιν· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν,” καίπερ μὴ ὄντα
 ἀληθῆ διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ ψεύδος ἄγειν, συνακτικὸν εἶναι
 416 φαμέν. συμπλέξαντες γὰρ οὕτω τὰ λήμματα,
 “ νύξ ἔστι, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστι,” ποιοῦμεν
 συνημμένον [συλλογισμόν],¹ ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς
 τοιαύτης συμπλοκῆς, λήγον² δὲ εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα
 τοιοῦτον, “[νύξ ἔστι, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἔστι,]” σκότος
 ἔστι.” τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ συνημμένον ἀληθές ἐστι διὰ
 τὸ μηδέποτε ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λήγειν ἐπὶ
 ψεύδος. ἡμέρας μὲν γὰρ οὔσης ἀρχεται ἀπὸ
 ψεύδους τοῦ “ νύξ ἔστι, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος
 ἔστι,” καὶ λήξει ἐπὶ ψεύδος, “ σκότος ἔστι,” καὶ
 οὕτως ἔσται ἀληθές· νυκτὸς δὲ ἀρξεται τε ἀπ’
 ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήξει ἐπ’ ἀληθές, καὶ ἔσται παρ’ αὐτὸ
 417 τοῦτο ἀληθές. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν συνακτικὸς τότε ἐστὶν
 ὑγιής, ὅταν συμπλεξάντων ἡμῶν τὰ λήμματα καὶ

¹ [συλλογισμόν] secl. Arnim.

probative as well, while the conclusive is not always true nor always probative. Thus an argument such 413 as this, when it is day—"If it is night, it is dark; but in fact it is night; therefore it is dark"—draws a conclusion because it is propounded in a valid form, but is not true as it has a false second premiss, the minor "but in fact it is night." But one of this kind, 414 when it is day—"If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light"—is at once both conclusive and true, as being not only propounded in a valid form but also drawing a true conclusion by means of true premisses. And they say that the 415 conclusive argument is judged to be conclusive when the conclusion follows from the combination of the premisses; for example, an argument such as this, when it is day—"If it is night, it is dark; but in fact it is night; therefore it is dark"—we declare to be conclusive, although it is not true because it leads us to a falsehood. For when we have combined the 416 premisses thus, "It is night, and if it is night it is dark," we frame a hypothetical syllogism which begins with this form of combination and ends in this form of conclusion "it is dark." For this hypothetical syllogism is true, as it never begins with truth and ends in falsehood.^a For when it is day, it will begin with the falsehood "It is night, and if it is night, it is dark," and will end in the falsehood "it is dark," and thus will be true; and in the night, it will both begin with truth and end in truth, and for this very reason it will be true. So, then, the conclusive argument is 417 sound when, after we have combined the premisses

^a Cf. §§ 114, 268, 331.

^a ἄλλων Ἀρμυ: ἄλλωτα mss., Bekk.

^b [ὅτι . . . ἐστὶ] secl. Kochalsky.

συνημμένον ποιησάντων τὸ ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς
 διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς λῆγον δ' εἰς τὸ
 συμπέρασμα, εὐρίσκηται τοῦτο αὐτὸ συνημμένον
 418 ἀληθές. ὁ δ' ἀληθῆς λόγος κρίνεται ὅτι ἔστιν
 ἀληθῆς οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ μόνον τὸ συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχό-
 μενον ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ
 λῆγον εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα εἶναι ἀληθές, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 ἐκ τοῦ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον ὑπ-
 ἀρχεῖν ὑγιές· ὥς ἂν τὸ ἕτερον τούτων εὐρίσκηται
 ψεύδος, καὶ τὸν λόγον ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι ψευδῆ,
 ὥς τὸν τοιοῦτον νυκτὸς οὔσης "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν,
 φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν"
 διὰ τὸ λῆμμα ἔχειν ψεύδος τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν,"
 419 ψεύδος ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν συμπεπλεγμένον διὰ
 τῶν λημμάτων, ἔν ἔχον τῶν λημμάτων ψεύδος τὸ
 "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ψεύδος ἐστίν· τὸ δὲ συνημμένον
 τὸ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμ-
 πλοκῆς καὶ λῆγον εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές ἐσται.
 οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς λήγει ἐπὶ
 ψεύδος, ἀλλὰ νυκτὸς μὲν ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχεται τῆς
 συμπλοκῆς, ἡμέρας δέ, ὥσπερ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχεται,
 420 οὕτω καὶ εἰς ἀληθές λήγει. καὶ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος
 "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· φῶς δέ γε ἔστιν· ἡμέρα
 ἄρα ἔστιν" ψευδῆς ἐστίν, δυνάμενος ἡμᾶς δι'
 421 ἀληθῶν λημμάτων ἄγειν ἐπὶ ψεύδος. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἂν
 ἐξετάζωμεν, δύναται τὸ μὲν διὰ τῶν λημμάτων
 συμπεπλεγμένον ἀληθές εἶναι ἡμέρας οὔσης, οἷον
 τὸ τοιοῦτο "φῶς ἔστιν, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς
 ἔστιν," τὸ δὲ συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς
 διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ λῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ
 συμπέρασμα ψεύδος, οἷον τὸ τοιοῦτον "εἰ φῶς ἔστι
 καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν(· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν)."¹

and framed a hypothetical syllogism which begins with the combination formed by the premisses and ends in the conclusion, this syllogism itself is found to be true. And the true argument is judged to be 418 true not solely from the fact that the hypothetical syllogism which begins with the combination formed by the premisses and ends with the conclusion is true, but also from the fact that the combination formed by the premisses is valid ; since, if either of these is found to be false, the argument also necessarily becomes false ; just as the following, when it is night, " If it is day, it is light ; but in fact it is day ; therefore it is light," is false because it contains the false premiss " it is day." And the combination 419 formed by the premisses is false, as it has one of its premisses—" it is day"—false ; but the hypothetical syllogism, which begins with the combination formed by the premisses and ends in the conclusion, will be true. For never when beginning with truth does it end in falsehood, but, in the night, it begins the combination with falsehood, and, in the day, as it begins with truth so also it ends in truth. And again, 420 an argument such as this is false—" If it is day, it is light ; but it is light ; therefore it is day," as it can lead us by means of true premisses to falsehood. But 421 in fact, if we examine it, the combination formed by the premisses can be true when it is day—as for instance " It is light, and if it is day, it is light,"—but the hypothetical syllogism, which begins with the combination formed by the premisses and ends in the conclusion, may be false, as for instance this—" If it is light and if it is day, it is light ; therefore it is day."

¹ <ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν> add. Kochalsky.

- δύναται γὰρ τὸ συνημμένον τοῦτο νυκτὸς οὕσης ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀρχεσθαι τῆς συμπλοκῆς, λήγειν ἐπὶ ψεύδος τὸ " ἡμέρα ἔστιν," καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι ψεύδος. ὥστε γίνεται ἀληθῆς ὁ λόγος οὔτε ὅταν τὸ συμπεπλεγ-
 422 μένον μόνον ᾗ ἀληθές οὔτε ὅταν τὸ συνημμένον, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀμφοτέρω ἀληθῇ. ὁ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς τοῦ ἀληθοῦς διαφέρει, ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἀληθῆς δύναται ἐναργῇ ἔχειν πάντα, φημὶ δὲ τὰ τε λήμματα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, ὁ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς πλέον τι ἔχειν βούλεται, λέγω δὲ τὸ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἀδηλον οὔσαν ἐκκαλύ-
 423 πτεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν λημμάτων. ὅθεν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος " εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν " ἐναργῇ ἔχων τὰ λήμματα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἀληθῆς ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικὸς, ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος " εἰ γάλα ἔχει ἐν μαστοῖς ἥδε, κεκύηκεν ἥδε· ἀλλὰ μὴν γάλα ἔχει ἐν μαστοῖς ἥδε· κεκύηκεν ἄρα ἥδε " σὺν τῷ ἀληθῆς εἶναι ἔτι καὶ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔστιν· ἀδηλον γὰρ ἔχων τὸ συμπέρασμα τὸ " κε-
 κύηκεν ἄρα ἥδε," τοῦτο διὰ τῶν λημμάτων ἐκ-
 424 καλύπτει. Τριῶν οὖν ὄντων λόγων, τοῦ τε συνακτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἀποδεικτικοῦ, εἰ μὲν τίς ἔστιν ἀποδεικτικὸς, οὗτος πολὺ πρότερόν ἐστιν ἀληθῆς καὶ συνακτικὸς· εἰ δὲ τις ἀληθῆς, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποδεικτικὸς, πάντως δὲ συνακτικὸς· εἰ δὲ τις συνακτικὸς, οὐ πάντως ἀληθῆς ὡς οὐδὲ πάντως
 425 ἀποδεικτικὸς. κοινῶς οὖν οφείλοντος πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς συμβεβηκέναι τοῦ συνακτικοῦ ιδιώματος, εἰναι παρα-
 στήσωμεν ὅτι ἀνεύρετός ἐστι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος, ἐσόμεθα παρεστακότες ὅτι οὐδὲ
 426 ἀληθῆς οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς δύναται εὑρεθῆναι. ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι συνακτικὸς λόγος τις, ῥᾶδιον γινῶναι.

For this syllogism can, when it is night, begin with its combination which is true and end in the falsehood "it is day," and on this account be false. So that the argument becomes true neither when the combination only, nor when the syllogism only, is true but when both are true.—But the probative argument ^a differs from 422 the true because, while the true can have all its parts manifest (both the premisses, I mean, and the conclusion), the probative purports to have something more—namely, the discovery of the conclusion, which is non-evident, by means of the premisses. Hence, an 423 argument like this—"If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light," which has both premisses and conclusion manifest, is true and not probative; but one such as this ^b—"If she has milk in her breasts, she has conceived; but in fact she has milk in her breasts; therefore she has conceived," besides being true is also probative, for it has a non-evident conclusion, "therefore she has conceived," and discovers this by means of its premisses.

As there are, then, three kinds of argument, the 424 conclusive and the true and the probative, if an argument is probative it must previously be true and conclusive; but one that is true is not necessarily probative, but it certainly is conclusive; and one that is conclusive is not always true, just as it is not always probative. Since, then, the conclusive character 425 must appertain to them all in common, if we shall establish that the conclusive argument is undiscoverable by the Stoics, we shall have established that the true and the probative cannot be discovered either. And that there does not exist any conclusive argument 426

^a Cf. §§ 312, 452; *P.H.* ii. 140 ff.

^b Cf. § 252.

εἰ γὰρ συνακτικὸν εἶναι λέγουσι λόγον, ὅταν ἀληθὲς ᾗ συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν λημάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῆς λήγον δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐπιφοράν, δεῖσει προεπικεκρίσθαι τὸ ἀληθὲς συνημμένον καὶ τότε βεβαίως λαμβάνεσθαι τὸν ἐκ τούτου ἡρτῆσθαι
 427 δοκοῦντα συνακτικὸν λόγον. ἀνεπίκριτον δὲ γέ ἐστι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον· τοίνυν οὐδὲ ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος δύναται γνώριμος ὑπάρχειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ μέτρου μὴ ἐστῶτος ἀλλ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως μεταβαλλομένου οὐδὲ τὸ μετρούμενον ἔστηκεν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ οἷονεὶ μέτρον ἐστὶ τοῦ συνάγειν τὸν λόγον τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον, ἀκολουθήσει τούτου ἀνεπικρίτου καθεστῶτος μηδὲ ἐκεῖνον εἶναι σαφῆ.
 428 ὅτι δ' ἀνεπίκριτόν ἐστι τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον, αἱ εἰσαγωγαὶ τῶν στωικῶν διδάσκουσιν, ἐν αἷς πολλὰς καὶ διαφώνους καὶ μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀνεπικρίτους ἐκτίθενται τούτου κρίσεις. ὅθεν τοῦ συνακτικοῦ τοιοῦτου τυγχάνοντος πάντως καὶ ὁ ἀληθής, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ ἀποδεικτικός, ὀφείλει ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλάττεσθαι.

Κἂν ἀποστάντες δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἐνστάσεως ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν περαινόντων καὶ ἀπεράντων χωρῶμεν τεχνολογίαν, ἀδύνατος εὐρεθήσεται ἢ τοῦ ἀπο-
 429 δεικτικοῦ λόγου σύστασις. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν περαινόντων πολλῆς καὶ ἀκριβοῦς οὔσης ζητήσεως οὐκ ἀνάγκη νῦν διεξελθεῖν, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπεράντων λόγων ἐπὶ ποσὸν ὑποδεικτέον. τοίνυν φασὶ τετραχῶς γίνεσθαι τὸν ἀπέραντον λόγον, ἥτοι κατὰ διάρτησιν ἢ κατὰ παρολκὴν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ

^a Cf. §§ 323, 413.

is easy to perceive. For if they assert that a conclusive argument exists whenever there exists a true hypothetical syllogism, beginning with the combination formed by its premisses and ending in its conclusion, the truth of the syllogism will have to be judged beforehand, and after that the conclusive argument which seems to depend on it must be accepted with certainty. But the valid syllogism has 427 not been determined up till now ; neither, then, can the conclusive argument be ascertained. For just as, when a standard measure does not remain constant but varies from time to time, the thing measured also is not constant, so likewise, since the valid syllogism is, as it were, the standard for deducing the argument, when the former is undetermined it will follow that the latter too is not clear. And that the 428 valid syllogism is undetermined is taught us by the " Introductions " of the Stoics,^a in which they propose many determinations of it, which are contradictory and up till now undetermined. Hence, as the conclusive argument is of this sort, certainly the true also, and therefore also the probative, ought to be regarded with suspension.

But even if we leave this objection and proceed to the logical rules about " definite " and " indefinite " arguments, the construction of the probative argument will be found impossible. Now concerning the 429 definite arguments there is much close investigation, and there is no necessity to discuss them now, but we must give some account of the indefinite.^b They say, then, that the indefinite argument comes about in four ways—either through inconsistency, or through redundancy, or through being propounded in a bad

^a With §§ 429-434 *cf.* *P.H.* ii. 146-150.

- 430 ἡρωτηῖσθαι σχήματι ἢ κατὰ ἔλλειψιν. ἀλλὰ κατὰ
 διάρτησιν μὲν ὅταν μηδεμίαν ἔχῃ κοινωνίαν καὶ
 συνάρτησιν τὰ λήμματα πρὸς ἀλληλά τε καὶ πρὸς
 τὴν ἐπιφοράν, ὅλον ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου "εἰ
 ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν πυροὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ
 πωλοῦνται· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ
 τούτου οὔτε τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἔχει τινὰ σύμ-
 πνοιαν καὶ συμπλοκὴν πρὸς τὸ "πυροὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ
 πωλοῦνται," οὔτε ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ "φῶς
 ἄρα ἔστιν," ἀλλ' ἕκαστον ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων διήρτη-
 431 ται. κατὰ δὲ παρολκὴν ἀπέραντος γίνεται ὁ λόγος
 ὅταν ἐξωθέν τι καὶ περισσῶς παραλαμβάνηται τοῖς
 λήμμασι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὕτως ἔχοντος "εἰ
 ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." τὸ γὰρ
 τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφελεῖν περισσῶς συμπαρείληπται τοῖς
 ἄλλοις λήμμασιν, εἶγε δυνατόν ἔστιν ἐξαιρεθέντος
 αὐτοῦ διὰ τῶν περιλειπομένων, τοῦ τε "εἰ ἡμέρα
 ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν" καὶ τοῦ "ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν,"
 συνάγεσθαι τὴν ἐπιφοράν τὸ "φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν."
 432 διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἡρωτηῖσθαι σχήματι ἀ-
 πέραντος γίνεται λόγος ὅταν ἐν τινι τῶν παρὰ τὰ
 ὑγιῆ σχήματα θεωρουμένων ἐρωτηθῇ σχήματι·
 ὅλον ὄντος ὑγιούς σχήματος τοῦ τοιούτου "εἰ τὸ
 πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ δέ γε πρῶτον, τὸ ἄρα
 433 δεύτερον," ὄντος δὲ καὶ τοῦ "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ
 δεύτερον, οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ δεύτερον, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶ-
 τον,"¹ φαμέν τὸν ἐν τοιούτῳ σχήματι ἐρωτηθέντα
 "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον, οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ πρῶτον,
 οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον" ἀπέραντον εἶναι, οὐχ ὅτι

¹ δεύτερον, οὐκ . . . πρῶτον Mutsch : πρῶτον, οὐκ . . . δεύτερον
 mss., Bekk.

form, or through deficiency. Thus it is through 430
 inconsistency when the premisses have no connexion
 and consistency with each other and with the con-
 clusion, as in an argument such as this—" If it is day,
 it is light ; but in fact wheat is being sold in the
 market ; therefore it is light." For we see that in
 this instance neither the clause " if it is day " has any
 relevance and connexion with the clause " wheat is
 being sold in the market," nor either of these with the
 clause " therefore it is light," but each of them is
 inconsistent with the others. And the argument is 431
 indefinite through redundancy when something is
 included, extrinsically and superfluously, along with
 the premisses, as is the case with one like this—" If it
 is day, it is light ; but in fact it is day, and also virtue
 benefits ; therefore it is light " ; for the fact that
 virtue benefits is superfluously introduced along with
 the other premisses, seeing that, when it is excluded,
 it is possible for the conclusion, " therefore it is light,"
 to be deduced by means of the remaining premisses,
 " if it is day, it is light " and " but in fact it is day."
 And the argument becomes indefinite owing to being 432
 propounded in a bad form whenever it is propounded
 in any form that differs from the valid forms ; for
 example, when a form such as this is valid—" If the
 first, the second ; but in fact the first ; therefore the
 second " ; and also this—" If the first, the second ; 433
 but not the second ; not, therefore, the first,"—we
 say that the argument propounded in this form—" If
 the first, the second ; but not the first ; not, therefore,
 the second," is indefinite, not because it is impossible

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

- ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σχήματι λόγον
 συνερωτᾶσθαι δι' ἀληθῶν ἀληθῆς συνάγοντα (δύ-
 νηται γάρ, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ τὰ τρία τέσσαρά
 ἐστιν, τὰ ἕξ ὀκτώ ἐστιν· οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ τρία τέσ-
 σαρὰ ἐστιν, οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ἕξ ὀκτώ ἐστιν"), τῷ δὲ
 δύνασθαι τινας λόγους ἐν αὐτῷ τάττεσθαι μοχ-
 θηρούς, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι,
 φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμέρα· οὐκ ἄρα
 434 ἔστι φῶς." κατ' ἔλλειψιν δὲ ἀπέραντος ἐγίνετο ὁ
 λόγος ὅταν ἐλλείπη τι τῶν συνακτικῶν λημμάτων.
 οἷον "ἤτοι κακόν ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν
 ὁ πλοῦτος· οὐχὶ δέ γε κακόν ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος·
 ἀγαθόν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ πλοῦτος." ἐλλείπει γὰρ ἐν
 τῷ διεzeugμένῳ τὸ ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸν πλοῦτον,
 ὥστε τὴν ὑγιῇ συνερῶτησιν τοιαύτην μᾶλλον
 ὑπάρχειν "ἤτοι ἀγαθόν ἐστὶν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ κακόν
 ἐστὶν ἢ ἀδιάφορον· οὔτε δέ γ' ἀγαθόν ἐστὶν ὁ
 πλοῦτος οὔτε κακόν· ἀδιάφορον ἄρα ἐστίν."
- 435 Τοιαύτης δὴ παρὰ τοῖς στωικοῖς κεμένης τεχνο-
 λογίας μήποτε τὸ ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτῇ οὐ δύναται ἀ-
 πέραντος ἐπικριθῆναι λόγος, καὶ γε εὐθέως ὁ κατὰ
 διάρτησιν καὶ οὕτως ἔχων "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς
 ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν ἀγορᾷ πυροὶ πωλοῦνται· φῶς
 ἄρα ἔστιν." τὸ γὰρ διηρτηθῆναι τὰ λήμματα, καὶ
 μήτε πρὸς ἀλληλα μήτε πρὸς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἔχειν
 τινὰ κοινωνίαν, ἥτοι ψιλῇ λέγουσι φάσει ἢ διὰ
 τινος τεχνικῆς καὶ διδασκαλικῆς ἐφόδου τὸ τοιοῦτο
 436 παριστάντες. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀναποδείκτω χρώμενοι
 φάσει, ῥάδιον φάσιν αὐτοῖς ἀντιθεῖναι, πάντα τὸν
 λεγόμενον κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀπέραντον λόγον φάσκον-

for an argument which deduces what is true by means of true premisses to be propounded in this form (for this is possible, as for instance "If 3 is 4, 6 is 8; but 3 is not 4; therefore 6 is not 8"), but because it is possible for some bad arguments to be arranged in this form, such as this, for example—"If it is day it is light; but in fact it is not day; therefore it is not light." And the argument becomes indefinite 434 through deficiency when one of its deductive premisses is deficient. For example, "Either wealth is an evil or wealth is a good; but wealth is not an evil; therefore wealth is a good"; for in the disjunctive premiss there is an omission of "wealth is indifferent," so that the valid statement ought rather to run thus—"Wealth is either a good or an evil or indifferent; but wealth is neither a good nor an evil; therefore it is indifferent."

Such, then, being the logical theory laid down by 435 the Stoics, one suspects that, if we go by it, an argument cannot be judged to be indefinite,^a—for example, that through inconsistency which takes the form—"If it is day it is light; but in fact wheat is being sold in the market; therefore it is light." For the fact that the premisses are inconsistent and possess no connexion either with each other or with the conclusion is stated by them either by bare assertion or by establishing the fact by means of some technical and doctrinal method. But if they are 436 employing bare assertion, it is easy to reply with an opposite assertion, which asserts that every argument termed indefinite through inconsistency is definite;

* With §§ 435-437 cf. *P.H.* ii. 146 ff., 152-153, where, for indefinite (ἀπέμικτος), the term "inconclusive" (ἀσύντακτος) is used.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

- τας περαίνειν· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ ψιλῆς φάσεως ἐκεῖνοι
 δύνανται πιστεῦσθαι, δυνήσονται καὶ οἱ τοῦναν-
 τίων λέγοντες εἶναι πιστοί· τὴν ἰσοσθενῆ γὰρ προ-
 φέρονται φάσιν. εἰ δὲ μεθόδῳ τοῦτο διδάσκοντες,
 ἐπιζητήσομεν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη μέθοδος.
- 437 καὶ λέγωσιν ὅτι τοῦ κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀπεράντου
 λόγου τεκμήριόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ πάντως ἀκολουθεῖν
 αὐτοῦ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῇ τὸ συμ-
 πέρασμα, μηδὲ ὑγιὲς εἶναι συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχό-
 μενον ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ
 λῆγον εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα, πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἀρχῇθεν
 φήσομεν αὐτοὺς ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτειν· εἰ γὰρ ἵνα
 τὸν κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀπεράντον λόγον μάθωμεν, δεῖ
 ἔχειν ἐπικεκριμένον τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον, τοῦτο
 δ' οὐκ ἔχομεν μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἐπικεκριμένον, πάντως
 οὐδὲ τὸν κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀπεράντον λόγον δυνά-
- 438 μεθα γινγνώσκειν. ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερος τῇ
 τρόπος ἀπεράντων ὁ κατὰ παρολκὴν, ὅταν ἔξω-
 θεν παραλαμβάνηται τι τοῖς λήμμασι παρέλκον ὡς
 πρὸς τὴν τοῦ συμπεράσματος κατασκευὴν. ὅσον
 δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ δεήσει τὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ [καὶ τῷ
 δευτέρῳ]¹ τρόπῳ συνερωτώμενον λόγον κατὰ παρ-
 ολκὴν εἶναι ἀπεράντον, ἐπεὶ παρέλκει ἐν αὐτῷ
 τροπικόν. καὶ τοῦτ' εἰσόμεθα παρατεθέντων ἡμῖν
- 439 τῶν λόγων. τὸν² γὰρ δὴ τοιοῦτόν φασιν ἀπεράν-
 τον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα
 ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν."
 παρέλκει γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ "ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ"
 πρὸς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ συμπεράσματος, διὰ

¹ [καὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ] secl. Mutsch.

² τὸν Kochalsky: τὸ mss., Bekk.

for if these men can be trusted on a bare assertion, those too who say the opposite will be able to be trusted; for they utter an equipollent assertion. And if they are expounding this by method, we shall inquire further what this method can possibly be. And if they allege that the sign of the argument 437 indefinite through inconsistency is the fact that the conclusion does not always follow from the combination of its premisses, and that the syllogism which begins with the combination formed by the premisses and ending in the conclusion is not valid, we shall assert that they are falling again into the original difficulty; for if, in order to discern the argument which is indefinite through inconsistency, we must have the valid syllogism determined, and up till now we have not got this determined, we certainly cannot ascertain the argument which is indefinite through inconsistency.—But there exists also a second 438 type of indefinite arguments—that through redundancy,—in which something from without is introduced into the premisses which is redundant for establishing the conclusion.^a But, to judge by this, an argument propounded according to the first type will have to be indefinite through redundancy, since in it the hypothetical premiss is redundant. This we shall learn when we have compared the arguments. For they assert that an argument such as this is 439 indefinite—"If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day, and also virtue benefits; therefore it is light." For in this case "virtue benefits" is redundant for the deduction of the conclusion, because when this

^a With §§ 438-443 *cf.* *P. II.* ii. 156; and for the (five) Stoic "modes" or "types" of non-demonstrable arguments *cf.* §§ 224 ff. *supra*.

- τὸ ἀρθέντος αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐκ τῶν περι-
 λειπομένων δυοῖν λημμάτων ἀνελλιπῶς συνάγεσθαι
 440 τὴν ἐπιφοράν. τοῖνυν ὑποτιυχάνοντες οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς
 σκέψεως ἐροῦσιν ὡς εἴπερ ἀπέραντός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος
 κατὰ παρολκὴν ἐφ' οὗ ἀρθέντος τινὸς λήμματος ἐκ
 τῶν περιλειπομένων συνάγεται ἡ ἐπιφορά, ῥητέον
 ἀπέραντον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τρόπῳ
 ἐρωτώμενον, ἔχοντα δὲ οὕτως "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι,
 φῶς ἔστι· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν."
 παρέλκει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ συμπερά-
 σματος κατασκευὴν τὸ τροπικόν τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι,
 (φῶς ἔστι)" καὶ δύναται ἐκ τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστι"
 441 μόνου συνάγεσθαι τὸ "φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." τοῦτο δὲ
 πρόδηλον μὲν ἦν καὶ αὐτόθεν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐκ
 τῆς ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο² ἀκολουθίας παραμυθεῖσθαι.
 ἥτοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν φήσουσι τῷ ἡμέραν εἶναι τὸ
 φῶς εἶναι, ἢ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀκολουθεῖ,
 αὐτόθεν ὁμολογηθέντος ἀληθοῦς εἶναι τοῦ "ἡμέρα
 ἔστι" συνάγεται καὶ τὸ "φῶς ἔστι," κατ' ἀνάγ-
 442 κην ἐπόμενον αὐτῷ· ὅπερ ἦν συμπέρασμα. εἰ δὲ
 οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ συνημμένου ἀκολου-
 θήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔσται ψεῦδος τὸ συνημμένον,
 μὴ ἀκολουθοῦντος ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ λήγοντος τῷ ἡγου-
 μένῳ. ὥστε δυοῖν θάτερον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ προ-
 ειρημένῃ τεχνολογίᾳ, ἢ ἀπέραντον εὐρίσκεσθαι τὸν
 ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τρόπῳ ἡρωτημένον παρέλκοντος ἐν
 αὐτῷ τοῦ τροπικοῦ, ἢ ψευδῇ πάντως διὰ τὸ ψεῦδος
 443 ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι τὸ τροπικόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν
 μὴ ἀρέσκειν τῷ Χρυσίππῳ μονολημμάτων εἶναι
 λόγους, ὃ τάχα τινὲς ἐροῦσι πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην

¹ <φῶς ἔστι> Kuchalsky.² ἐκεῖνο Heintz: ἐκείνους 1188., Bekk.

clause is removed the conclusion can be deduced, with no deficiency from the two remaining premisses. The Sceptics, then, will say in reply that if that 440 argument is indefinite through redundancy in which, when one premiss is removed, the conclusion is deduced from the remaining premisses, then we must declare that the argument propounded in the first mode is also indefinite,^a namely this—"If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light." For in this the hypothetical premiss "If it is day, (it is light)" is redundant for the establishing of the conclusion, and "therefore it is light" can be deduced from the clause "it is day" by itself. And this 441 is pre-evident even of itself, but it is also possible to argue it from its logical relation to the latter clause. For they will say that "it is light" either follows or does not follow from "it is day." And if it follows, when the clause "it is day" is allowed of itself to be true, the clause "it is light" is also deduced, as necessarily following it; and this is the conclusion. But if it does not follow, neither will it follow in the 442 case of the hypothetical premiss, and because of this the hypothetical premiss will be false, as the consequent in it does not follow the antecedent. So that, to judge by the logical theory stated above, one of two things must result—either that the argument propounded in the first mode is found to be indefinite, as its hypothetical premiss is redundant, or that it is wholly false because its hypothetical premiss is false. For to say that Chrysippus does not approve of argu- 443 ments having but one premiss—which some, perhaps, will say in reply to this objection—is utterly non-

^a Cf. *P.H.* ii. 159.

ἔνστασιν, τελέως ληρῶδες. οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς Χρυσίπου φωναῖς ὡς πυθοχρήστοις παραγγέλμασιν ἀνάγκη πείθεσθαι, οὔτε μαρτυρίᾳ προσέχειν ἀνδρῶν ἐστὶν [†]τεῖς οἰκείαν ἀπόρρησιν[†] ἐκ μάρτυρος τοῦ τὸ ἐναντίον λέγοντος· Ἀντίπατρος γάρ, τῶν ἐν τῇ στωικῇ αἰρέσει ἐπιφανεστάτων ἀνδρῶν, ἔφη δύνασθαι καὶ μονολημμάτους λόγους συνίστασθαι.

- 444 Ἔτι κατὰ τρίτον τρόπον ἀπέραντος ἐλέγετο λόγος παρὰ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρωτηῆσθαι σχήματι. πάλιν οὖν ἢ φάσει μόνον ἀρκοῦμενοι λέξουσιν ἐν μοχθηρῷ τινὶ σχήματι λόγον συνηρωτηῆσθαι, ἢ ὑπόμνησιν εἰς τοῦτο παραλήφονται. καὶ εἰ μὲν φάσει ἀρκοῦνται, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀντιθήσομεν φάσιν τὴν λέγουσαν ὅτι οὐκ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρώτηται σχή-
 445 ματι. εἰ δὲ λόγον παραλαμβάνουσι, πάντως ἀληθῆ. τὸ δ' ὅτι ἔστιν ἀληθὴς οὗτος ὁ λόγος, φημὶ δὲ ὁ δεικνὺς τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ σχήματι ἠρωτηῆσθαι τινα λόγον, πόθεν δείκνυται; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ὑγιεῖ ἠρωτηῆσθαι σχήματι; οὐκοῦν ἵνα μὲν ὁ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἐρωτηθεῖς σχήματι λόγος γνωσθῇ ὅτι ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρώτηται σχήματι, δεῖ λόγον ὑγιῇ παραληφθῆναι· ἵνα δὲ οὗτος ὑγιῆς ᾖ, ἔδει αὐτὸν ἐν ὑγιεῖ ἠρωτηῆσθαι σχήματι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τοῦ ὑγιοῦς λόγου πρὶν τοῦ σχήματος πιστωθῆναι δυναμένου ὅτι ἔστιν ὑγιῆς, μήτε τοῦ σχήματος, ὅτι ἔστιν ὑγιὲς σχῆμα, πρὶν τοῦ ἐπικρίναντος αὐτὸ λόγου, συνίσταται ὁ δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπος, ὅς ἐστιν ἀπορώτατος.

[†] *†*τεῖς οἰκ. ἀπόρρησιν[†] *dubia videntur*: ἀπόρρησιν LE: ἀπορύρησιν N: ? οἰς οἰκεία (vel οἰκοί) ἦν ἀπόρρησις.

sensical.^a For it is neither necessary to believe in the utterances of Chrysippus as though they were pronouncements of the Delphic oracle, nor to pay attention to the witness of men (who are contradicted)^b by a witness (of their own) who says the opposite; for Antipater, one of the most eminent men in the Stoic school, asserted that arguments with a single premiss can be constructed.

Again, in the third mode an argument is said to 444 be indefinite owing to its being propounded in a bad form.^c So, once again, they will either state that an argument is propounded in a bad form by contenting themselves with assertion only or they will bring in also an argument to support it. But if they content themselves with assertion, we too will make the opposite assertion which declares that it has not been put in a bad form. And if they bring in an argument, 445 it must certainly be a true one. But how is it proved that this argument is true (I mean, that which proves that an argument has been propounded in a bad form)?^b Evidently by the fact that it is propounded in a valid form. So, then, in order that it may be known that the argument propounded in a bad form has been propounded in a bad form, a valid argument must be brought in; and in order that this may be valid, it must be propounded in a valid form. And for this reason, since neither the valid argument can be confirmed as being valid before the form, nor the form, as being a valid form, before the argument which determines it, the mode of circular reasoning, which allows no escape, is brought about.

^a Cf. *P.H.* ii. 167.

^b I give the apparent sense, as the Greek of mss. and Bekk. is (as Mutsch. says) hardly intelligible.

^c Cf. *P.H.* ii. 154.

- 446 Καὶ πρὸς τὴν λειπομένην δὲ διαφορὰν τῶν ἀπεράντων λόγων, τουτέστι τὴν παρ' ἑλλειψιν, ἥδη [μὲν] σχεδὸν ἀντειρήκαμεν. εἰ γὰρ ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν ὁ ἀπηρτισμένος λόγος, ὡς ἀνώτερον ὑπεδείξαμεν, ἄγνωστος ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν καὶ ὁ ἐλλιπής· ἀνεύρετος δὲ γέ ἐστιν ὁ ἀπηρτισμένος, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν· τοίνυν καὶ ὁ ἐλλιπής ἄγνωστος γενήσεται.
- 447 Εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς στωικοὺς τεσσάρων ὄντων τρόπων καθ' οὓς ἀπέραντος γίννεται λόγος, ἐδείξαμεν καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μὴ γινωσκομένους τοὺς ἀπεράντους λόγους, ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὸν περαίνοντα ἄγνωστον εἶναι. τούτου δὲ μὴ γινωσκομένου καὶ ὁ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται λόγος τῶν ἀνευρέτων.
- 448 Πρὸς τούτοις ἐπὶ παντός ἀληθοῦς λόγου δεῖ ἐπικεκρίσθαι τὰ λήμματα (τούτων γὰρ συγχωρουμένων δίδονται ἢ ἐπιφορὰ ἀκολουθῶς αὐτοῖς), ἐπὶ δὲ γε τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀνεπίκριτά ἐστι τὰ λήμματα, καθὼς παρεστήσαμεν· οὐκ ἄρα δυνήσεται ἀληθὺς
- 449 λόγος εἶναι ἢ ἀπόδειξις. τὸ γὰρ συνημμένον, ὡς ἔμπροσθεν ἐδείκνυμεν, ὑγιὲς ἀξιοῦσι τυγχάνειν ὅταν ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον (ἐπ' ἀληθὲς ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους)¹ ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγῃ ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθές, καὶ καθ' ἓνα τρόπον ψεύδος, ὅταν ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγῃ. τούτων δ' οὕτως ἐχόντων εὑρεθήσεται ἐπὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀν-
- 450 ἐπίκριτον. ὡς ἐπίπαν γὰρ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς προσλήψεως λήγει εἰς τὴν ἐπιφοράν, ὡς ἔχει ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων "εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι κίνησις· ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν." ἐνταῦθα γὰρ

¹ <ἐπ' . . . ψεύδους> add. Fabr., Bekk. : om. mss.

^a Cf. §§ 435 ff., 411 ff.

^b Cf. § 429.

The species of indefinite arguments which still 446
remains—namely, that through deficiency—we have
pretty well criticized already. For if the fully com-
pleted argument is undiscoverable, as we have shown
above,^a the deficient also must be unknowable; but
the fully completed is undiscoverable, as we have
established; so then the deficient also will be un-
knowable.

But if there are, according to the Stoics, four 447
modes ^b in which an argument is indefinite, and we
have proved that in each of them the indefinite
arguments are not known, it will follow that the
definite argument also is unknowable. And if this is
not known, the probative argument also will be un-
discoverable.

Furthermore, in the case of every true argument 448
the premisses must be approved (for when these are
agreed, the conclusion is granted as following from
them), but in the case of proof the premisses are not
approved, as we have established ^c; therefore proof
will not be able to be a true argument. For, as we 449
showed above,^d they maintain that the hypothetical
premiss is valid whenever it begins with truth (and
ends in truth, or begins with falsehood) and ends in
falsehood, or begins with falsehood and ends in
truth; and is false in one mode—namely, when it
begins with truth and ends in falsehood ^e; and this
being so, it will be found to be undetermined in the
case of proof. For in all cases it begins with the 450
minor premiss and ends in the conclusion, as is the
case with arguments such as this—"If motion exists,
void exists; but in fact motion exists; therefore void

^a Cf. §§ 267 ff., 331 ff. ^d Cf. §§ 112 ff., 247.

^e Cf. §§ 114, 268, 331, 416.

- τὸ συνημμένον ἄρχεται τε ἀπὸ τῆς προσλήψεως
 τῆς "ἔστι κίνησις," καὶ λήγει εἰς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν
 451 τὴν "ἔστι κενόν." ἤτοι οὖν πρόδηλόν ἐστι πρᾶγμα
 ἢ ἐπιφορὰ καὶ γνωσκόμενον ἡμῖν ἢ ἄδηλον καὶ
 ἄγνωστον. καὶ εἰ μὲν πρόδηλον καὶ γνωστόν,
 οὐκέτι ἀποδεικτικὸς γίνεται ὁ λόγος, ἐκ πάντων
 προδηλῶν συνεστώς, τοῦτο μὲν τῶν λημμάτων
 τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 452 ἀνεπικρίτον γίνεται τὸ συνημμένον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 ἀπὸ τίνος ἄρχεται γνώριμόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν (πρόδηλον
 γάρ), τὸ δὲ εἰς τί λήγει ἀγνοεῖται διὰ τὴν ἀδηλό-
 τητα. μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ πότερον ἀληθὲς ἢ
 ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐδ' ἐπικρίνειν δυνη-
 σόμεθα τὸ συνημμένον. ἀνεπικρίτου δὲ ὄντος
 αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ λόγος γίνεται μοχθηρός.
- 453 "Ἐτι τῶν πρὸς τί ἐστιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις, τὰ δὲ πρὸς
 τι ἐπινοεῖται μόνον, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ ὑπάρχει· τοῖνυν
 καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἐν ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐν
 ὑπάρξει. καὶ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἐπινοία μόνον σώζεται
 τὰ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα, ὑπαρξεις δὲ οὐκ ἐστιν
 αὐτοῖς, πάρεστι διδάσκειν ἐκ τῆς τῶν δογματικῶν
 454 ἀνθομολογήσεως. ὑπογράφοντες γὰρ τὸ πρὸς τι
 συμφώνως φασὶ "πρὸς τί ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑτέρῳ
 νοούμενον." εἰ δέ γε ὑπάρξεως μετείχεν, οὐκ ἂν
 οὕτως αὐτὸ ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνως μᾶλλον
 "πρὸς τί ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑτέρῳ ὑπάρχον." οὐκ
 455 ἄρα ὑπόκειται τι ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ πρὸς τι. καὶ
 ἄλλως, πᾶν τὸ ὑπάρχον οὐ δύναται ἀλλαγὴν τινα
 καὶ ἑτεροίωσιν ἀναδέξασθαι χωρὶς πάθους, οἷον
 τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμα οὐ δύναται μέλαν γενέσθαι μὴ
 τραπὲν καὶ μεταβαλόν, καὶ τὸ μέλαν οὐ δύναται

^a With §§ 451-453 cf. *P.H.* II. 167-168.

exists." For there the hypothetical major both begins with the minor premiss "motion exists," and ends in the conclusion "void exists." Either, then, 451 the conclusion is a fact that is pre-evident and known by us, or it is non-evident and unknowable.* And if it is pre-evident and knowable, the argument is no longer probative, being composed of parts that are all pre-evident, the premisses on the one side, and the conclusion on the other. But if it is non-evident, the major premiss is necessarily undetermined. For 452 what it begins with is known to us (for it is pre-evident), but what it ends in is not known owing to its being non-evident. But when we do not understand whether this is true or false, we shall also be unable to pass judgement on the major premiss. And when it is undetermined the argument, too, is bad.

Again, proof is a relative thing, and relatives are 453 conceived only and do not really exist as well; so, then, proof too exists only in conception and not in reality. And that relative things are, in truth, only preserved by conception, and that they have no real existence, one may show by the admission of the Dogmatists. For in describing the relative they say 454 with one accord: "Relative is that which is conceived in relation to another;" whereas if it had participated in real existence they would not have given that account of it but rather this: "Relative is that which exists in relation to another." Therefore the relative is not among the things that are really existent.—Moreover, nothing which really exists can 455 admit of any modification and alteration without being affected—just as white colour cannot become black unless it has been converted and changed, and black cannot change to another colour while it re-

εἰς ἕτερον μεταβαλεῖν χρώμα μένον μέλαν, καὶ
 ὡσαύτως τὸ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πικρὸν ἀπαθές
 456 καὶ ἀνετεροίωτον ὑποκείμενον. ὥστε πᾶν τὸ ὑπ-
 ἄρχον οὐ χωρὶς πάθους τινὸς τὴν εἰς ἕτερον ἀνα-
 δέχεται μεταβολήν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς τι ἀλλάσσεται
 χωρὶς πάθους καὶ μηδεμιᾶς περὶ αὐτὸ γινομένης
 ἑτεροιώσεως. οἷον τὸ πηχυαῖον ξύλον πηχυαίου
 μὲν αὐτῷ ἀντιπαρεθέντος λέγεται ἴσον ἐκείνῳ
 τυγχάνειν, διπλήχους δὲ οὐκέτι ἴσον ἀλλ' ἄνισον,
 μηδεμιᾶς περὶ αὐτὸ γενομένης τροπῆς καὶ ἀλ-
 λοιώσεως. καὶ εἰ νοήσαιμὲν τινα ἐξ ἄγγους ὕδωρ
 προχέοντα, ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑποτεθέντος μὲν τινος ἑτέρου
 ἄγγους λεχθήσεται ἐγγέειν, μὴ ὑποτεθέντος δὲ
 ἐκχέειν, καίπερ μηδεμίαν αὐτὸς τροπὴν καὶ
 457 ἀλλοίωσιν ἀναδεξάμενος. ὥστε εἰ τῷ μὲν ὑπ-
 ἄρχοντι συμβέβηκε τὸ μὴ χωρὶς πάθους ἀλλαγὴν
 ὑπομένειν, τῷ δὲ πρὸς τι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν συμ-
 458 βέβηκεν, ῥητέον μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρὸς τι. σὺν
 τούτοις τοῦ χωρὶς ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς τι· τοῦ γὰρ ἄνω
 459 τὸ κάτω χωρὶς ἐστίν. εἴπερ δ' ὑπάρχει τὸ πρὸς
 τι καὶ μὴ ψιλὴν ἔχει ἐπίνοιαν, ἔσται τὸ ἐν τᾶναντία.
 ἄτοπον δὲ γέ ἐστι λέγειν τὸ ἐν τᾶναντία· οὐκ ἄρα
 ὑπάρχει τὸ πρὸς τι, ἀλλ' ἐπινοεῖται μόνον. πάλιν
 γὰρ τὸ πηχυαῖον σῶμα κατὰ μὲν τὴν τοῦ ἡμι-
 πηχυαίου παράθεσιν λέγεται μείζον κατὰ δὲ τὴν δι-
 πηχυαίου μικρότερον. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
 χρόνον καὶ μείζον καὶ μικρότερον ὑπάρχειν, τουτ-
 ἐστὶ τᾶναντία, τῶν ἀδυνάτων· ἐπινοεῖσθαι μὲν
 γὰρ τάχ' ἴσως δυνήσεται κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς ἄλλο
 {καὶ ἄλλο}¹ σύμβλησιν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ὑπάρχειν
 οὐχ οἷόν τε. οὐκ ἄρα ὑπάρχει τὰ πρὸς τι.

¹ {καὶ ἄλλο} Heintz.

mains black, and in the same way what is sweet will not become bitter while it subsists unaffected and unaltered. So that no real existent admits of change 456 into something else without some affection. But the relative is modified without affection and when no alteration takes place in it. For example, when the stick of a cubit's length is compared with one of a cubit's length, it is said to be equal to it, but as compared with one of two cubits it is no longer equal but unequal, although no conversion or alteration has happened to it. And were we to conceive of a man pouring forth water out of a jug, if another jug is placed underneath this man will be said to pour in, but if there is no jug underneath, to pour out, although the man himself has undergone no conversion or alteration. So that, if it is an attribute of the really 457 existent not to submit to modification without being affected, and the relative has no such attribute, one must declare that the relative does not really exist.— Besides this, the relative is relative to what is apart 458 from it; for "above" is apart from "below." But if 459 the relative has real existence and not mere conception, the one thing will be both opposites. But it is absurd to call the one the opposites; therefore the relative does not really exist but is only conceived. For, once again, the body of a cubit's length is called greater in comparison with one of half a cubit, but smaller as compared to one of two cubits. But that the same thing at the same time should really be both greater and smaller—that is, two opposites—is a thing impossible. For it may possibly, perhaps, be conceived as such on account of the reference being to different objects, but it cannot be such in reality. Therefore relatives do not really exist.

- 460 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἔστι τὰ πρὸς τι, ἔστι τι ταῦτὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ· οὐχὶ δέ γε τοῦτο· τοίνυν οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ῥητέον ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρὸς τι. ἔτι εἰ ὑπάρχει τὸ πρὸς τι, ἔσται τι ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον· οὐκ εὐλογον δέ γε ἔστιν εἶναι τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον· τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸς τι ὑπάρχειν εὐλογόν ἐστιν.
- 461 τὸ γὰρ ἄνω τῷ κάτω ἐστὶν ἐναντίον, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ὥς μὲν πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄνω ἐστίν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὑπερκείμενον κάτω. εἰ δ' ἔσται τρία, ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ μέσον τοῦ ἄνω καὶ τοῦ κάτω, τὸ μέσον ἔσται πρὸς μὲν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄνω πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὑπερκείμενον κάτω, καὶ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. οὐκ ἄρα ὑπάρχει τὸ πρὸς τι. εἰ δ' ἄρα τὸ πρὸς τι ὑπάρχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται ἄνω καὶ κάτω. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ εἰ ἔστι, λέγεται τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν ὥς πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο σχέσιν ἄνω καὶ κάτω. τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα χωρὶς ἑαυτοῦ γενήσεται, ὃ πάντων ἀτοπώτατον.
- 462 Ἄλλ' εἴπερ τὰ πρὸς τι ἀνύπαρκτά ἐστι, πάντως καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῶν πρὸς τι οὔσα ἀνύπαρκτος γενήσεται· τὰ δέ γε πρὸς τι δέδεικται ἀνύπαρκτα· καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἄρα τῶν ἀνυπάρκτων γενήσεται.
- 463 Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν τοιαυτὰ τινα καθέστηκεν· σκοπῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀντικείμενον λόγον. οἶονται γὰρ οἱ δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων λόγον τὸν ἀξιούντα μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν αὐτὸν ὑφ' αὐτοῦ περιτρέπεσθαι, καὶ δι' ὧν ἀναιρεῖ ταύτην, διὰ τούτων αὐτὴν ὀρίζειν. ὅθεν

^a i.e. "above" and "below" are things "apart from" each other; but they are also identical ("the same thing") since both are "relatives."

Nevertheless, if the relative does exist, there exists 460
 an identical thing which is opposite to itself; but
 there is not such a thing; so neither in this way can
 we say that the relative really exists.—Again, if the
 relative really exists, there will be something opposite
 to itself; but it is not reasonable that there should
 be anything opposite to itself; neither, then, is it
 reasonable that the relative should really exist. For 461
 "above" is opposite to "below," and the same thing
 is "above" relatively to what lies beneath it, and
 "below" relatively to what lies above it. And if
 there are to be three things, "above" and "below"
 and "midway" between "above" and "below,"
 "midway" will be "above" relatively to what lies
 beneath it, and "below" relatively to what lies above
 it, and the same thing will be above and below;
 which is impossible. Therefore the relative does not
 really exist.—But if, after all, the relative does exist,
 the same thing will be above and below. And for
 this reason, even if it exists, the same thing is called
 "above" and "below" in respect of its relation to
 different things. The same thing, therefore, will
 come to be apart from itself,^a which is the greatest
 absurdity of all.

But if relatives are, in fact, non-existent, proof also, 462
 being a relative thing, will certainly be non-existent;
 but relatives have been proved to be non-existent;
 proof, therefore, will also be a non-existent thing.

Such, then, are the arguments for the non-existence 463
 of proof. Let us also examine the argument brought
 against them. The Dogmatic philosophers imagine
 that the argument which maintains the non-existence
 of proof is overthrown by itself, and that it affirms
 proof by the very means by which it abolishes it.

καὶ ἀντικαθιστάμενοι τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς φασίν, ὁ
λέγων μηδὲν εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἤτοι ψιλῇ καὶ ἀναπο-
δείκτω χρώμενος φάσει λέγει μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀπό-
484 δειξιν, ἢ λόγῳ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀποδεικνύς. καὶ εἰ
μὲν ψιλῇ φάσει προσχρώμενος, οὐθεὶς αὐτῷ πι-
στεύσει τῶν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν παραδεχομένων, ψιλῇ
φάσει χρωμένῳ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀντικειμένης ἐπι-
σχεθήσεται φάσεως, εἰπόντος τινὸς εἶναι ἀπό-
δειξιν. εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικνύς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν
(τοῦτο γὰρ φασιν), αὐτόθεν ὡμολόγησε τὸ εἶναι
ἀπόδειξιν· ὁ γὰρ δεικνύς λόγος τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπό-
485 δειξιν ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις τοῦ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. καὶ
καθόλου ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγος ἤτοι ἀπό-
δείξις ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ
ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀπιστός ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀπό-
486 δειξις, ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ οὕτω
συνερωτῶσιν. εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν·
εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν. ἤτοι δὲ
ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἀπόδειξις ἄρα ἔστιν.
καὶ δὴ ἡ μὲν τῶν λημμάτων τοῦ λόγου τούτου
παραμυθία προὔπτος ἐστίν. τό τε γὰρ πρῶτον
συνημμένον τὸ “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπό-
δειξις” διαφορούμενον καθεστῶς ἀληθές ἐστιν·
ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ πρώτῳ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ
δεύτερον, μὴ ἕτερον ὃν ἐκείνου. τό τε δεύτερον
συνημμένον τὸ “εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπό-
δειξις” πάλιν ὑγιές ἐστιν· τῷ γὰρ μὴ εἶναι ἀπό-
δειξιν, ἡγουμένῳ ὄντι, ἔπεται τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν·
487 αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ δεικνύς λόγος τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν
ἀποδεικτικὸς ὢν βεβαιοῖ τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. τό
τε διεξευγμένον τὸ “ἤτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις,” ἐξ ἀντικειμένων διεξευγ-
480

Hence in withstanding the Sceptics they say: "He who states that proof is nothing states that proof is nothing either by using a bare and unproved assertion or by proving his statement by argument.^a And 464 if it is by using bare assertion, none of those who are receiving the proof will trust him when using bare assertion, but he will be checked by the opposite assertion, when someone declares that proof exists. But if it is by proving the non-existence of proof (for this is what they say), he has thereby confessed that proof exists; for the argument which proves the non-existence of proof is a proof of the existence of proof. And, in general, the argument against proof either 465 is proof or is not proof; and if it is not proof, it is untrustworthy, but if it is proof, proof exists."—And some, too, argue thus ^b: "If proof exists, proof 466 exists; if proof exists not, proof exists; but proof either exists or exists not; therefore proof exists." And indeed the convincing character of the premisses of this argument is manifest. For the first hypothetical premiss, "If proof exists, proof exists," being duplicated, is true; for its second clause follows from its first as it does not differ from it. And the second hypothetical premiss—"if proof exists not, proof exists"—is also valid; for the existence of proof follows from the non-existence of proof, which is its antecedent; for the very argument which proves the 467 non-existence of proof, being probative, certifies the existence of proof. And the disjunctive, "either proof exists or proof exists not," being a disjunctive

^a Cf. §§ 282 ff.

^b Cf. *P.H.* ii. 3, 186; also § 281 *supra*. The second premiss ("if proof exists not, proof exists") sounds absurd, but it really stands for "If proof is proved not to exist, proof exists," as is implied in § 467.

- μένον τοῦ τε εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι, ἔν
 ὀφείλει ἔχειν ἀληθές καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι ἀληθές.
 ὥστε ἀληθῶν ὄντων τῶν λημμάτων συνεισάγεται
 468 καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά. πάρεστι δὲ καὶ ἐτέρως διδά-
 σκειν ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτοῖς. εἰ γὰρ τὸ διεξευγ-
 μένον ἀληθές ἐστιν ἐν ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθές,
 ὁπότερον ἂν ἐκ τούτων [ἂν] ὑποθώμεθα ἀληθές,
 συνεισαχθήσεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά. ὑποκείσθω δὲ
 πρῶτον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθές τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν.
 οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ τοῦτο ἡγούμενόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ
 συνημμένῳ, ἀκολουθήσει αὐτῷ τὸ λῆγον ἐν τῷ
 πρώτῳ συνημμένῳ· ἔληγε δὲ τὸ “ἐστὶν ἀπό-
 469 δειξίς,” ὅπερ ἦν καὶ ἐπιφορά. δοθέντος ἄρα τοῦ
 εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθοῦς ἐν τῷ διεξευγμένῳ, ἀκο-
 λουθήσει ἡ τοῦ λόγου ἐπιφορά. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς τῆς
 παραμυθίας τρόπος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λειπομένου ἀξιώ-
 ματος τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· ἡγεῖτο γὰρ καὶ
 τοῦτο¹ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ συνημμένῳ (καὶ)² εἶχεν ἀκο-
 λουθοῦσαν τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐπιφορὰν.
 470 Τοιαύτης δὲ οὔσης τῆς τῶν δογματικῶν ἐν-
 στάσεως σύντομός ἐστι καὶ ἡ πρὸς ταύτην τῶν
 σκεπτικῶν ἀπάντησις. λέξουσι γάρ, εἰ μὲν οὐκ
 ἐνδέχεται ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τὴν πεῦσιν καθ’
 ἣν ἐπεζήτουν πότερον ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τῆς
 ἀποδείξεως λόγος ἢ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὀφείλουσι συγ-
 γνωμονεῖν εἰ μὴ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄπορον οὕτω πεῦσιν
 471 ἀποκρίνασθαι. εἰ δὲ εὐχερές ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ὁ προσ-
 τὰττουσι τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς, ὥς εὐχερές ὃν ποιεί-
 τωσαν, ἀποκρινόμενοι πότερον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι
 λέγουσι τὸν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγον ἢ οὐκ

¹ τοῦτο Kochalsky : τούτου δ mss., Bekk.

² <καὶ> Kochalsky.

ἀπόδειξιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, οὐκ ἐνέσται ἐξ αὐτοῦ διδάσκειν ὅτι [οὐκ]¹ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, οὐδὲ λέγειν ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ἀπόδειξις ὅτι [οὐκ]¹ ἔσται ἢ ἀπόδειξις· ὡμολογήκασιν γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὸ
 472 μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. εἰ δὲ ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ, πάντως ἀληθῆ ἔχει τὰ λήμματα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφοράν· σὺν γὰρ τῇ τούτων ἀληθότητι νοεῖται ἢ ἀπόδειξις. ἦν δέ γε ἐπιφορὰ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· ἀληθὲς ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τούτῳ ψεῦδος, τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. οὕτω γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὸν θέλοντες ἀποδείξαι τὸν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγον, οὐ μᾶλλον αὐτὴν τιθέασιν
 473 ἢ ἀναιροῦσιν. ὅμως δὲ καὶ τοὺς σκεπτικούς ἂν δέη ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀσφαλῶς ἀποκρινόμενοι. φήσουσι γὰρ τὸν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγον πιθανὸν εἶναι μόνον καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν πείθειν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐπάγεσθαι συγκατάθεσιν, ἀγνοεῖν δὲ εἰ καὶ αὐθις ἔσται τοιοῦτος διὰ τὸ πολύτροπον τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης διανοίας. οὕτω γὰρ γενομένης τῆς ἀποκρίσεως οὐδὲν ἔτι δυνήσεται λέγειν ὁ δογματικός. ἡ γὰρ τοῦτο διδάξει ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως κομισθεὶς λόγος, ἡ τοῦτο παραστήσει ὅτι οὐ πείθει
 474 τὸν σκεπτικόν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον δεικνὺς οὐ τῷ σκεπτικῷ μάχεται διὰ τὸ μηδὲ ἐκείνον διαβεβαιοῦσθαι περὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου ὡς ἀληθοῦς,
 475 μόνον δὲ λέγειν ὅτι πιθανός ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ποιῶν προπετὴς γενήσεται, ἀλλότριον πάθος θέλων λόγῳ καταπαλαῖσαι· καθὰ γὰρ τὸν χαίροντα οὐθεὶς δύναται λόγῳ πείσαι ὅτι οὐ χαίρει καὶ τὸν λυπούμενον ὅτι οὐ λυπεῖται, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸν πειθόμενον

¹ [οὐκ] secl. Heintz.

proof, it will not be possible to show by it that proof exists, nor to affirm that, because this argument is proof, proof must exist ; for they have agreed that it is not proof. But if it is proof, it certainly has its pre- 472
 misses and its conclusion true ; for proof is conceived as involving the truth of these. But its conclusion was " proof exists not " ; therefore it is true that proof exists not, and the contradictory of this, that proof exists, is false. For by trying in this way to prove that the argument against proof is probative they no more affirm than deny proof. Yet if the 473
 Sceptics are obliged to answer on their own behalf, they will give a safe answer. For they will say that the argument against proof is merely probable ^a and that at the moment it convinces them and draws them on to assent, but that they do not know whether it will still do so later on owing to the variableness of the human mind. For when our answer is framed thus, the Dogmatist will no longer be able to say anything. For either he will make it clear that the argument brought against proof is not true, or else he will establish the fact that he does not convince the Sceptic. But if he proves the first, he is not in 474
 conflict with the Sceptic, since neither does the latter positively assert the truth of this argument, but merely says that it is probable. And if he does the 475
 second he will show himself rash, by trying to upset another man's mental impression by argument ; for just as nobody can by argument convince the joyful man that he is not joyful, or the man in pain that he is not in pain, so nobody can convince the man who

^a With §§ 473-476 *cf.* *P.H.* ii. 187.

- 476 ὅτι οὐ πείθεται. πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ μὲν δισχυρίζοντο οἱ σκεπτικοὶ μετὰ συγκαταθέσεως περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, τάχα ἂν διετρέποντο ὑπὸ τοῦ διδάσκοντος ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· νῦν δὲ ἐπεὶ ψιλὴν θέσιν λόγων ποιοῦνται τῶν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως χωρὶς τοῦ συγκατατίθεσθαι τούτοις, τοσοῦτον ἀπέχουσι τοῦ βλάπτεσθαι πρὸς τῶν τούναντίον
- 477 κατασκευαζόντων ὥς ὠφελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον. εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως κομισθέντες λόγοι μεμενήκασιν ἀναντίρρητοι, οἱ δὲ εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν παραληφθέντες λόγοι πάλιν εἰσὶν ἰσχυροί, μήτε ἐκείνοις μήτε τούτοις προσθέμενοι τὴν ἐποχὴν
- 478 ὁμολογῶμεν. κἂν συγχωρηθῇ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς εἶναι ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγος, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ὠφελουνταί τι εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν οἱ δογματικοί, καθὼς ἤδη ὑπεμνήσαμεν· συνάγει γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ τούτου ἀληθοῦς ὄντος ψεύδους γίνεται
- 479 τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. ναί φασιν, ἀλλ' ὁ συνάγων τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἀποδεικτικὸς ὢν ἑαυτὸν ἐκβάλλει. πρὸς ὃ ρητέον ὅτι οὐ πάντως ἑαυτὸν ἐκβάλλει. πολλὰ γὰρ καθ' ὑπεξαίρεσιν λέγεται, καὶ ὡς τὸν Δία φάμεν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι πατέρα καθ' ὑπεξαίρεσιν αὐτοῦ τούτου (οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἦν πατήρ), οὕτω καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν μηδεμίαν εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, καθ' ὑπεξαίρεσιν λέγομεν τοῦ δεικνύντος λόγου ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· μόνος γὰρ οὗτός ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις.
- 480 κἂν αὐτὸν δὲ ἐκβάλλῃ, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο κυροῦται τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅπερ ὁ ἄλλα ποιεῖ, τοῦτο καὶ ἑαυτὰ διατίθησιν. οἶον ὡς τὸ πῦρ δαπανῇσαν τὴν ὕλην καὶ ἑαυτὸ συμφθείρει,

is convinced that he is not convinced.—Furthermore, 476 if the Sceptics had asseverated, together with assent, that proof is nothing, they might, perhaps, have been confuted by him who shows that proof exists ; but as it is, seeing that they only make a bare statement of the arguments against proof without assenting to them, so far from being injured by those who establish the opposite, they are benefited rather. For if the 477 arguments brought against proof have remained uncontradicted, and the arguments adopted in favour of proof's existence are likewise strong, let us adhere neither to the former nor to the latter but agree to suspend judgement. And if it be conceded that the 478 argument against proof is probative, the Dogmatists will not gain any help thereby towards the existence of proof, as we have already shown ; for it deduces the non-existence of proof, and if this is true the existence of truth becomes false.—Yes, say they, but 479 the argument which deduces that proof does not exist, being probative itself, banishes itself. To which it must be replied that it does not entirely banish itself. For many things are said which imply an exception ; and just as we declare that Zeus is " the Father of both gods and men," implying the exception of this god himself (for, to be sure, he is not his own father), so also when we say that no proof exists we imply in our statement the exception of the argument which proves that proof does not exist ; for this alone is proof. And even if it does banish itself, 480 the existence of proof is not thereby confirmed.^a For there are many things which produce the same effect on themselves as they produce on other things. Just as, for example, fire after consuming the fuel destroys

^a Cf. *P.H.* ii. 188.

καὶ ὃν τρόπον τὰ καθαρτικά, ἐξελάσαντα τῶν
 σωμάτων τὰ ὑγρά, καὶ αὐτὰ συνεκτίθῃσιν, οὕτω
 δύναται καὶ ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγος μετὰ
 τὸ πᾶσαν ἀπόδειξιν ἀνελεῖν καὶ ἑαυτὸν συμπερι-
 481 γράφειν. καὶ πάλιν ὥς οὐκ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸν διὰ
 τινος κλίμακος ἐφ' ὕψηλὸν ἀναβάντα τόπον μετὰ
 τὴν ἀνάβασιν ἀνατρέψαι τῷ ποδὶ τὴν κλίμακα,
 οὕτως οὐκ ἀπέοικε τὸν σκεπτικόν, ὥς διὰ τινος
 ἐπιβάθρας τοῦ δεικνύντος λόγου τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπό-
 δεῖξιν χωρήσαντα ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ προκειμένου κατα-
 σκευήν, τότε καὶ αὐτὸν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀνελεῖν.
 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν
 λογικὸν τόπον ἐφόδων ἀπορήσαντες τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο
 καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς ζήτησιν χωρή-
 σομεν.

also itself, and like as purgatives ^a after driving the fluids out of the bodies expel themselves as well, so too the argument against proof, after abolishing every proof, can cancel itself also. And again, just 481 as it is not impossible for the man who has ascended to a high place by a ladder to overturn the ladder with his foot after his ascent, so also it is not unlikely that the Sceptic after he has arrived at the demonstration of his thesis by means of the argument proving the non-existence of proof, as it were by a step-ladder, should then abolish this very argument.

Well, then, now that we have raised all these difficulties regarding the doctrines which belong to the division of Logic, we will proceed next to our criticism of the Physicists.

^a Cf. *P.H.* I. 206, ii. 188.

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